

Baseline survey on Development of Democracy

DATA COMPILATION

Assessment on problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia involving 592 expert-informants in 28 cities/regencies and two special regions.



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A. The Informants

Table A.1. Distribution of Informants

| NO | CITY/REGENCY | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|--------------|------------------|------------|--------------|
| 1 | Banda Aceh | 20 | 3.4 |
| 2 | Medan | 23 | 3.9 |
| 3 | Batam | 20 | 3.4 |
| 4 | Bekasi | 17 | 2.9 |
| 5 | Bandung | 19 | 3.2 |
| 6 | Pekalongan | 25 | 4.2 |
| 7 | Surakarta | 20 | 3.4 |
| 8 | Surabaya | 24 | 4.1 |
| 9 | Banjarmasin | 24 | 4.1 |
| 10 | Balikpapan | 17 | 2.9 |
| 11 | Makassar | 22 | 3.7 |
| 12 | Manado | 25 | 4.2 |
| 13 | Ternate | 18 | 3.0 |
| 14 | Pontianak | 17 | 2.9 |
| 15 | Kupang | 24 | 4.1 |
| 16 | Ambon | 16 | 2.7 |
| 17 | Jayapura | 13 | 2.2 |
| 18 | Aceh Selatan | 18 | 3.0 |
| 19 | Kerinci | 20 | 3.4 |
| 20 | Bengkulu | 12 | 2.0 |
| 21 | Lampung Selatan | 20 | 3.4 |
| 22 | Tangerang | 20 | 3.4 |
| 23 | Batang | 20 | 3.4 |
| 24 | Sidoarjo | 20 | 3.4 |
| 25 | Badung | 15 | 2.5 |
| 26 | KutaiKartanegara | 20 | 3.4 |
| 27 | Poso | 21 | 3.5 |
| 28 | Belu | 23 | 3.9 |
| 29 | DI Yogyakarta | 16 | 2.7 |
| 30 | DKI Jakarta | 23 | 3.9 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

Table A.2. Gender composition of informants

| NO | GENDER | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|
| 1 | Female | 130 | 22.0 |
| 2 | Male | 462 | 78.0 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

Table A.3. Age composition of informants

| NO | AGE GROUPS | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|
| 1 | 25 and younger | 10 | 1.7 |
| 2 | 26-30 | 33 | 5.6 |
| 3 | 31-35 | 103 | 17.4 |
| 4 | 36-40 | 125 | 21.1 |
| 5 | 41-45 | 105 | 17.7 |
| 6 | 46-50 | 67 | 11.3 |
| 7 | Older than 50 | 120 | 20.3 |
| 8 | Unknown | 29 | 4.9 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

Table A.4. Gender composition in each city/regency

| NO | CITY/REGENCY | | GENDER | | TOTAL |
|-------|-------------------|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | FEMALE | MALE | |
| 1 | Banda Aceh | f | 8 | 12 | 20 |
| | | % | 40.0% | 60.0% | 100.0% |
| 2 | Medan | f | 4 | 19 | 23 |
| | | % | 17.4% | 82.6% | 100.0% |
| 3 | Batam | f | 5 | 15 | 20 |
| | | % | 25.0% | 75.0% | 100.0% |
| 4 | Bekasi | f | 3 | 14 | 17 |
| | | % | 17.6% | 82.4% | 100.0% |
| 5 | Bandung | f | 5 | 14 | 19 |
| | | % | 26.3% | 73.7% | 100.0% |
| 6 | Pekalongan | f | 11 | 14 | 25 |
| | | % | 44.0% | 56.0% | 100.0% |
| 7 | Surakarta | f | 6 | 14 | 20 |
| | | % | 30.0% | 70.0% | 100.0% |
| 8 | Surabaya | f | 8 | 16 | 24 |
| | | % | 33.3% | 66.7% | 100.0% |
| 9 | Banjarmasin | f | 7 | 17 | 24 |
| | | % | 29.2% | 70.8% | 100.0% |
| 10 | Balikpapan | f | 4 | 13 | 17 |
| | | % | 23.5% | 76.5% | 100.0% |
| 11 | Makassar | f | 1 | 21 | 22 |
| | | % | 4.5% | 95.5% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Manado | f | 4 | 21 | 25 |
| | | % | 16.0% | 84.0% | 100.0% |
| 13 | Ternate | f | 3 | 15 | 18 |
| | | % | 16.7% | 83.3% | 100.0% |
| 14 | Pontianak | f | 0 | 17 | 17 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 15 | Kupang | f | 6 | 18 | 24 |
| | | % | 25.0% | 75.0% | 100.0% |
| 16 | Ambon | f | 2 | 14 | 16 |
| | | % | 12.5% | 87.5% | 100.0% |
| 17 | Jayapura | f | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| | | % | 38.5% | 61.5% | 100.0% |
| 18 | Aceh Selatan | f | 2 | 16 | 18 |
| | | % | 11.1% | 88.9% | 100.0% |
| 19 | Kerinci | f | 1 | 19 | 20 |
| | | % | 5.0% | 95.0% | 100.0% |
| 20 | Bengkulu | f | 2 | 10 | 12 |
| | | % | 16.7% | 83.3% | 100.0% |
| 21 | Lampung Selatan | f | 6 | 14 | 20 |
| | | % | 30.0% | 70.0% | 100.0% |
| 22 | Tangerang | f | 1 | 19 | 20 |
| | | % | 5.0% | 95.0% | 100.0% |
| 23 | Batang | f | 3 | 17 | 20 |
| | | % | 15.0% | 85.0% | 100.0% |
| 24 | Sidoarjo | f | 4 | 16 | 20 |
| | | % | 20.0% | 80.0% | 100.0% |
| 25 | Badung | f | 3 | 12 | 15 |
| | | % | 20.0% | 80.0% | 100.0% |
| 26 | Kutai Kartanegara | f | 8 | 12 | 20 |
| | | % | 40.0% | 60.0% | 100.0% |
| 27 | Poso | f | 3 | 18 | 21 |
| | | % | 14.3% | 85.7% | 100.0% |
| 28 | Belu | f | 3 | 20 | 23 |
| | | % | 13.0% | 87.0% | 100.0% |
| 29 | DI Yogyakarta | f | 3 | 13 | 16 |
| | | % | 18.8% | 81.3% | 100.0% |
| 30 | DKI Jakarta | f | 9 | 14 | 23 |
| | | % | 39.1% | 60.9% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | F | 130 | 462 | 592 |
| | | % | 22.0% | 78.0% | 100.0% |

Table A.5. Age composition in each city/regency

| NO | CITY/REGENCY | | AGE GROUPS | | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|-------|------------------|---|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|---------|--------|
| | | | 25 AND YOUNGER | 26-30 | 31-35 | 36-40 | 41-45 | 46-50 | OLDER THAN 50 | UNKNOWN | |
| 1 | Banda Aceh | f | 0 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 35.0% | 15.0% | 10.0% | 5.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 2 | Medan | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 23 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 13.0% | 8.7% | 26.1% | 34.8% | 17.4% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 3 | Batam | f | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 5.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | 10.0% | 35.0% | 20.0% | 10.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 4 | Bekasi | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | 23.5% | 35.3% | .0% | 11.8% | 11.8% | 100.0% |
| 5 | Bandung | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 19 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 10.5% | 15.8% | 10.5% | 5.3% | 36.8% | 21.1% | 100.0% |
| 6 | Pekalongan | f | 3 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 25 |
| | | % | 12.0% | .0% | 28.0% | 16.0% | 4.0% | 20.0% | 16.0% | 4.0% | 100.0% |
| 7 | Surakarta | f | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | 20.0% | 30.0% | 10.0% | 15.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 8 | Surabaya | f | 0 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 24 |
| | | % | .0% | 8.3% | 12.5% | 33.3% | 12.5% | 8.3% | 16.7% | 8.3% | 100.0% |
| 9 | Banjarmasin | f | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 0 | 24 |
| | | % | .0% | 4.2% | 8.3% | 8.3% | .0% | 25.0% | 54.2% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 10 | Balikpapan | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 17 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | 17.6% | 11.8% | .0% | 47.1% | 5.9% | 100.0% |
| 11 | Makassar | f | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 22 |
| | | % | 9.1% | 18.2% | 13.6% | 22.7% | 4.5% | 18.2% | 9.1% | 4.5% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Manado | f | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 25 |
| | | % | .0% | 4.0% | 8.0% | 20.0% | 28.0% | .0% | 36.0% | 4.0% | 100.0% |
| 13 | Ternate | f | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 33.3% | 22.2% | 38.9% | 5.6% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 14 | Pontianak | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 17 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | 11.8% | 23.5% | 17.6% | 29.4% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 15 | Kupang | f | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 24 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 29.2% | 29.2% | 29.2% | .0% | 12.5% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 16 | Ambon | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 16 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 18.8% | 25.0% | 31.3% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 17 | Jayapura | f | 0 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 13 |
| | | % | .0% | 7.7% | 30.8% | 30.8% | 15.4% | .0% | 15.4% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 18 | Aceh Selatan | f | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| | | % | 11.1% | 16.7% | 33.3% | 11.1% | 22.2% | 5.6% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 19 | Kerinci | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 25.0% | 10.0% | 30.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 20 | Bengkulu | f | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 12 |
| | | % | .0% | 16.7% | 16.7% | 8.3% | 25.0% | 8.3% | 8.3% | 16.7% | 100.0% |
| 21 | Lampung Selatan | f | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 5.0% | 20.0% | 35.0% | 15.0% | 20.0% | 5.0% | 100.0% |
| 22 | Tangerang | f | 0 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 30.0% | 40.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 100.0% |
| 23 | Batang | f | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | 5.0% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 15.0% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 10.0% | 100.0% |
| 24 | Sidoarjo | f | 0 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | 5.0% | 30.0% | 45.0% | 10.0% | 5.0% | .0% | 5.0% | 100.0% |
| 25 | Badung | f | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 15 |
| | | % | .0% | 6.7% | 6.7% | 20.0% | 13.3% | 20.0% | 33.3% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 26 | KutaiKartanegara | f | 0 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | 10.0% | 30.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 35.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 27 | Poso | f | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 21 |
| | | % | .0% | 4.8% | 14.3% | 19.0% | 14.3% | 19.0% | 23.8% | 4.8% | 100.0% |
| 28 | Belu | f | 2 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 23 |
| | | % | 8.7% | 21.7% | .0% | 21.7% | 13.0% | 8.7% | 26.1% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 29 | DI Yogyakarta | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 16 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 12.5% | 18.8% | 6.3% | 18.8% | 18.8% | 25.0% | 100.0% |
| 30 | DKI Jakarta | f | 0 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 |
| | | % | .0% | 13.0% | 21.7% | 21.7% | 4.3% | 4.3% | 13.0% | 21.7% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | f | 10 | 33 | 103 | 125 | 105 | 67 | 120 | 29 | 592 |
| | | % | 1.7% | 5.6% | 17.4% | 21.1% | 17.7% | 11.3% | 20.3% | 4.9% | 100.0% |

Table A.6. Frontline composition

| NO | FRONTLINE* | NUMBER OF INFORMANTS | PERCENT |
|--------------|--|----------------------|--------------|
| 1 | Education | 64 | 10.8 |
| 2 | Health | 26 | 4.4 |
| 3 | Ecology and environment | 69 | 11.7 |
| 4 | Labor movement | 30 | 5.1 |
| 5 | Informal sectors | 33 | 5.6 |
| 6 | Agrarian and Land reform | 19 | 3.2 |
| 7 | Women and children rights | 62 | 10.5 |
| 8 | Clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation | 66 | 11.1 |
| 9 | Media and Social Media | 26 | 4.4 |
| 10 | Security sector reform | 11 | 1.9 |
| 11 | Anticorruption | 58 | 9.8 |
| 12 | Human rights | 48 | 8.1 |
| 13 | Party and election reform | 58 | 9.8 |
| 14 | Business sector | 22 | 3.7 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

* Frontline is movement/arena where the informants (i.e. pro-democratic actors) are active and involve intensively promoting basic principles/values of democracy.

Table A.7. Gender composition in each frontline

| NO | FRONTLINES | | GENDER | | TOTAL |
|-------|--|---|--------|-------|--------|
| | | | FEMALE | MALE | |
| 1 | Education | f | 10 | 54 | 64 |
| | | % | 15.6% | 84.4% | 100.0% |
| 2 | Health | f | 6 | 20 | 26 |
| | | % | 23.1% | 76.9% | 100.0% |
| 3 | Ecology and environment | f | 8 | 61 | 69 |
| | | % | 11.6% | 88.4% | 100.0% |
| 4 | Labor movement | f | 7 | 23 | 30 |
| | | % | 23.3% | 76.7% | 100.0% |
| 5 | Informal sectors | f | 6 | 27 | 33 |
| | | % | 18.2% | 81.8% | 100.0% |
| 6 | Agrarian and Land reform | f | 4 | 15 | 19 |
| | | % | 21.1% | 78.9% | 100.0% |
| 7 | Women and children rights | f | 51 | 11 | 62 |
| | | % | 82.3% | 17.7% | 100.0% |
| 8 | Clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation | f | 7 | 59 | 66 |
| | | % | 10.6% | 89.4% | 100.0% |
| 9 | Media and Social Media | f | 3 | 23 | 26 |
| | | % | 11.5% | 88.5% | 100.0% |
| 10 | Security sector reform | f | 1 | 10 | 11 |
| | | % | 9.1% | 90.9% | 100.0% |
| 11 | Anticorruption | f | 4 | 54 | 58 |
| | | % | 6.9% | 93.1% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Human rights | f | 9 | 39 | 48 |
| | | % | 18.8% | 81.3% | 100.0% |
| 13 | Party and election reform | f | 10 | 48 | 58 |
| | | % | 17.2% | 82.8% | 100.0% |
| 14 | Business sector | F | 4 | 18 | 22 |
| | | % | 18.2% | 81.8% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | F | 130 | 462 | 592 |
| | | % | 22.0% | 78.0% | 100.0% |

Table A.8. Age composition in each frontline

| NO | FRONTLINES | | AGE GROUPS | | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|-------|--|---|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|---------|--------|
| | | | 25 AND YOUNGER | 26-30 | 31-35 | 36-40 | 41-45 | 46-50 | OLDER THAN 50 | UNKNOWN | |
| 1 | Education | f | 1 | 2 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 3 | 13 | 5 | 64 |
| | | % | 1.6% | 3.1% | 18.8% | 20.3% | 23.4% | 4.7% | 20.3% | 7.8% | 100.0% |
| 2 | Health | f | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 26 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 7.7% | 19.2% | 19.2% | 26.9% | 7.7% | 11.5% | 7.7% | 100.0% |
| 3 | Ecology and environment | f | 1 | 9 | 5 | 17 | 13 | 7 | 13 | 4 | 69 |
| | | % | 1.4% | 13.0% | 7.2% | 24.6% | 18.8% | 10.1% | 18.8% | 5.8% | 100.0% |
| 4 | Labor movement | f | 0 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 30 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 0.0% | 33.3% | 13.3% | 16.7% | 20.0% | 16.7% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| 5 | Informal sectors | f | 0 | 2 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 33 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 6.1% | 30.3% | 30.3% | 9.1% | 3.0% | 15.2% | 6.1% | 100.0% |
| 6 | Agrarian and Land reform | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 19 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 0.0% | 15.8% | 36.8% | 26.3% | 5.3% | 5.3% | 10.5% | 100.0% |
| 7 | Women and children rights | f | 0 | 3 | 7 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 16 | 1 | 62 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 4.8% | 11.3% | 21.0% | 17.7% | 17.7% | 25.8% | 1.6% | 100.0% |
| 8 | Clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation | f | 1 | 1 | 6 | 12 | 14 | 8 | 23 | 1 | 66 |
| | | % | 1.5% | 1.5% | 9.1% | 18.2% | 21.2% | 12.1% | 34.8% | 1.5% | 100.0% |
| 9 | Media and Social Media | f | 2 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 26 |
| | | % | 7.7% | 3.8% | 26.9% | 11.5% | 7.7% | 15.4% | 23.1% | 3.8% | 100.0% |
| 10 | Security sector reform | f | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 27.3% | 9.1% | 18.2% | 18.2% | 9.1% | 9.1% | 9.1% | 100.0% |
| 11 | Anticorruption | f | 2 | 4 | 14 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 4 | 58 |
| | | % | 3.4% | 6.9% | 24.1% | 19.0% | 13.8% | 6.9% | 19.0% | 6.9% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Human rights | f | 0 | 3 | 10 | 14 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 48 |
| | | % | 0.0% | 6.3% | 20.8% | 29.2% | 18.8% | 8.3% | 12.5% | 4.2% | 100.0% |
| 13 | Party and election reform | f | 1 | 3 | 12 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 1 | 58 |
| | | % | 1.7% | 5.2% | 20.7% | 19.0% | 13.8% | 17.2% | 20.7% | 1.7% | 100.0% |
| 14 | Business sector | f | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 22 |
| | | % | 9.1% | 0.0% | 4.5% | 13.6% | 13.6% | 22.7% | 22.7% | 13.6% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | f | 10 | 33 | 103 | 125 | 105 | 67 | 120 | 29 | 592 |
| | | % | 1.7% | 5.6% | 17.4% | 21.1% | 17.7% | 11.3% | 20.3% | 4.9% | 100.0% |

Table A.9. Frontlines composition in each city/regency

| NO | CITY/REGENCY | | FRONTLINES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|----|--------------|---|------------|--------|-------------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Education | Health | Ecology and environment | Labor movement | Informal sectors | Agrarian and Land reform | Women and children rights | Clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation | Media and Social Media | Security sector reform | Anti-corruption | Human rights | Party and election reform | Business sector | |
| | KOTA/CITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Banda Aceh | f | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | 5.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | 25.0% | .0% | 15.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | 10.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 2 | Medan | f | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 23 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | .0% | 13.0% | .0% | 8.7% | 17.4% | 4.3% | 17.4% | .0% | .0% | 13.0% | 26.1% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 3 | Batam | f | 10 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 50.0% | 20.0% | .0% | 20.0% | .0% | .0% | 10.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 4 | Bekasi | f | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 17 |
| | | % | 23.5% | .0% | .0% | 11.8% | 5.9% | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | 5.9% | 17.6% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 5 | Bandung | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 19 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 10.5% | 10.5% | 10.5% | .0% | 15.8% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 36.8% | .0% | .0% | 15.8% | 100.0% |
| 6 | Pekalongan | f | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 25 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | .0% | 16.0% | 4.0% | .0% | .0% | 20.0% | 16.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 24.0% | 20.0% | 100.0% |
| 7 | Surakarta | f | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 20 |
| | | % | 20.0% | 20.0% | .0% | .0% | 20.0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | 5.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 10.0% | 100.0% |
| 8 | Surabaya | f | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| | | % | 16.7% | .0% | 16.7% | .0% | 8.3% | 4.2% | 16.7% | 4.2% | 12.5% | .0% | .0% | 20.8% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 9 | Banjarmasin | f | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 24 |
| | | % | 4.2% | .0% | 12.5% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 16.7% | 29.2% | 20.8% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 16.7% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 10 | Balikpapan | f | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 17 |
| | | % | 11.8% | .0% | 29.4% | .0% | .0% | 5.9% | .0% | 5.9% | 5.9% | .0% | 11.8% | 11.8% | 5.9% | 11.8% | 100.0% |
| 11 | Makassar | f | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 22 |
| | | % | 9.1% | .0% | 9.1% | .0% | 22.7% | .0% | .0% | 13.6% | 4.5% | .0% | 18.2% | 4.5% | 13.6% | 4.5% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Manado | f | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 25 |
| | | % | 16.0% | 4.0% | 12.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 4.0% | 20.0% | 8.0% | .0% | 4.0% | 12.0% | 12.0% | 8.0% | 100.0% |
| 13 | Ternate | f | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 18 |
| | | % | 11.1% | .0% | 11.1% | .0% | .0% | 27.8% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 16.7% | 27.8% | 5.6% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 14 | Pontianak | f | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| | | % | 29.4% | 5.9% | 5.9% | .0% | 17.6% | .0% | 5.9% | 11.8% | 5.9% | .0% | .0% | 17.6% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 15 | Kupang | f | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 24 |
| | | % | .0% | 16.7% | .0% | .0% | 20.8% | .0% | .0% | 20.8% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 20.8% | 20.8% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 16 | Ambon | f | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 16 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | 6.3% | 18.8% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 17 | Jayapura | f | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| | | % | 7.7% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 30.8% | .0% | 23.1% | .0% | .0% | 38.5% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |

| | KABUPATEN/REGENCY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| 18 | Aceh Selatan | f | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 18 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 11.1% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 16.7% | .0% | .0% | 22.2% | 11.1% | 33.3% | 5.6% | 100.0% |
| 19 | Kerinci | f | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 20.0% | .0% | 10.0% | .0% | .0% | 10.0% | 5.0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | 10.0% | 10.0% | 10.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 20 | Bengkulu | f | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 12 |
| | | % | .0% | 8.3% | 16.7% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 8.3% | 8.3% | .0% | .0% | 16.7% | 16.7% | 25.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 21 | Lampung Selatan | f | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 25.0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 22 | Tangerang | f | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 30.0% | 5.0% | .0% | 5.0% | 10.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 15.0% | 10.0% | 25.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 23 | Batang | f | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | 20.0% | 25.0% | 25.0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 5.0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 24 | Sidoarjo | f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 15.0% | 25.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | 15.0% | 5.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 20.0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 25 | Badung | f | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 15 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 33.3% | 26.7% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 26.7% | .0% | .0% | 13.3% | 100.0% |
| 26 | KutaiKartanegara | f | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | .0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 25.0% | .0% | 10.0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 27 | Poso | f | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 21 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 19.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 23.8% | 9.5% | .0% | 19.0% | 23.8% | 4.8% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| 28 | Belu | f | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| | | % | .0% | .0% | 21.7% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 17.4% | 21.7% | .0% | 17.4% | 21.7% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% |
| | SPECIAL REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29 | DI Yogyakarta | f | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 16 |
| | | % | 12.5% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 6.3% | 12.5% | 18.8% | 12.5% | 6.3% | .0% | 12.5% | .0% | 12.5% | 6.3% | 100.0% |
| 30 | DKI Jakarta | f | 4 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 23 |
| | | % | 17.4% | 17.4% | 21.7% | .0% | 17.4% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 13.0% | .0% | .0% | 13.0% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | f | 64 | 26 | 69 | 30 | 33 | 19 | 62 | 66 | 26 | 11 | 58 | 48 | 58 | 22 | 592 |
| | | % | 10.8% | 4.4% | 11.7% | 5.1% | 5.6% | 3.2% | 10.5% | 11.1% | 4.4% | 1.9% | 9.8% | 8.1% | 9.8% | 3.7% | 100.0% |

B. Assessment on Public Issues

Q1.1. In your assessment which of the problems that are listed in the table below do people in your town/district think are accepted as major public issues and tasks of the government in the town/district? (*Multiple responses allowed*)

Table Q1.1. Problems that are accepted as major public issues

| NO | PROBLEM | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENTAGE (based on number of responses) |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 1 | Public services | 2750 | 55.0% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within public services</i> |
| 1.1. | Education | 526 | 19.1% |
| 1.2. | Health services | 519 | 18.9% |
| 1.3. | Physical security | 253 | 9.2% |
| 1.4. | Welfare and social security | 430 | 15.6% |
| 1.5. | Public transportations | 363 | 13.2% |
| 1.6. | Traffic | 335 | 12.2% |
| 1.7. | Public housing | 247 | 9.0% |
| 1.8. | Other issues related to public services | 77 | 2.8% |
| 2 | Mode of economic governance | 1405 | 28.1% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within modes of economic governance</i> |
| 2.1. | Fishery | 188 | 13.4% |
| 2.2. | Agriculture | 226 | 16.1% |
| 2.3. | Informal sector | 369 | 26.3% |
| 2.4. | Industry | 261 | 18.6% |
| 2.5. | Wages and labour regulations | 319 | 22.7% |
| 2.6. | Other issues related to modes of economic governance | 42 | 3.0% |
| 3 | Citizens' rights | 689 | 13.8% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within citizens' rights</i> |
| 3.1. | Discrimination against minority | 251 | 36.4% |
| 3.2. | Regulations of the rights of children | 217 | 31.5% |
| 3.3. | Religion-based regulations | 200 | 29.0% |
| 3.4. | Other issues related to citizens' rights | 21 | 3.0% |
| 4 | Others | 156 | 3.1% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within others</i> |
| 4.1. | Local (and national) politics, incl. local election issues, regional division | 29 | 18.6% |
| 4.2. | Environmental issues | 78 | 50.0% |
| 4.3. | Performance of government and good governance issues | 31 | 19.9% |
| 4.4. | Problems in society, e.g. drugs, moral issues | 16 | 10.3% |
| 4.5. | Demographic issues, e.g. population growth, jobless | 1 | 0.6% |
| 4.6. | Leadership | 1 | 0.6% |
| TOTAL OF RESPONSES | | 5000 | 100.0% |

Q1.2. In your assessment, which problem in the table do local people in your town/district think is the most important issue in the town/district? (Pick one from the list)

Table Q1.2. Most important public issues

| NO | PUBLIC ISSUES | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENTAGE (based on number of responses) |
|--------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 1 | Public services | 420 | 70.95% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within public services</i> |
| 1.1. | Education | 161 | 38.33% |
| 1.2. | Health services | 100 | 23.81% |
| 1.3. | Physical security | 17 | 4.05% |
| 1.4. | Welfare and social security | 62 | 14.76% |
| 1.5. | Public transportation | 35 | 8.33% |
| 1.6. | Traffic | 18 | 4.29% |
| 1.7. | Public housing | 4 | 0.95% |
| 1.8. | Other issues related to public services | 23 | 5.48% |
| 2 | Modes of economic governance | 87 | 14.70% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within modes of economic governance</i> |
| 2.1. | Fishery | 7 | 8.05% |
| 2.2. | Agriculture | 17 | 19.54% |
| 2.3. | Informal sector | 19 | 21.84% |
| 2.4. | Industry | 8 | 9.20% |
| 2.5. | Wages and labor regulations | 25 | 28.74% |
| 2.6. | Other issues related to modes of economic governance | 11 | 12.64% |
| 3 | Citizens' rights | 27 | 4.56% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within citizens' rights</i> |
| 3.1. | Discrimination against minority | 9 | 33.33% |
| 3.2. | Regulations of the rights of children | 6 | 22.22% |
| 3.3. | Religion-based regulations | 5 | 18.52% |
| 3.4. | Others | 7 | 25.93% |
| 4 | Others | 51 | 8.61% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within others</i> |
| 4.1. | Local (and national) politics, incl. local election issues, regional division | 7 | 13.73% |
| 4.2. | Environmental issues | 28 | 54.90% |
| 4.3. | Performance of government and good governance issues | 14 | 27.45% |
| 4.4. | Problems in society, e.g. drugs, moral issues | 2 | 3.92% |
| 4.5. | Demographic issues, e.g. population growth, jobless | 0 | 0.00% |
| 4.6. | Leadership | 0 | 0.00% |
| 5 | No answer | 7 | 1.18% |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.00% |

Q.1.3. In your assessment, what major issues within the policy areas listed below do people in your town/district think that are left outside public politics and public life in the town/district and left to the market, self-help among communities or private solutions? (Multiple responses allowed)

Table Q1.3. Solutions for major issues

| NO | MAJOR ISSUES | ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS | | | | | |
|----------|---|-----------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | | MARKET | | SELF-HELP | | FAMILY-INDIVIDUAL | |
| 1 | Public services | Average | 47.8% | Average | 26.8% | Average | 25.0% |
| 1.1. | Education | 388 | 65.5% | 245 | 41.4% | 201 | 34.0% |
| 1.2. | Health services | 393 | 66.4% | 201 | 34.0% | 177 | 29.9% |
| 1.3. | Physical security | 118 | 19.9% | 181 | 30.6% | 164 | 27.7% |
| 1.4. | Welfare and social security | 246 | 41.6% | 164 | 27.7% | 144 | 24.3% |
| 1.5. | Public transportations | 357 | 60.3% | 132 | 22.3% | 148 | 25.0% |
| 1.6. | Traffic | 140 | 23.6% | 86 | 14.5% | 80 | 13.5% |
| 1.7. | Public housing | 376 | 63.5% | 84 | 14.2% | 118 | 19.9% |
| 1.8. | Other issues related to public services (N=77) | 32 | 41.6% | 23 | 29.9% | 20 | 26.0% |
| 2 | Modes of economic governance | Average | 47.9% | Average | 29.3% | Average | 27.5% |
| 2.1. | Fishery | 259 | 43.8% | 176 | 29.7% | 183 | 30.9% |
| 2.2. | Agriculture | 224 | 37.8% | 177 | 29.9% | 198 | 33.4% |
| 2.3. | Informal sector | 249 | 42.1% | 248 | 41.9% | 180 | 30.4% |
| 2.4. | Industry | 398 | 67.2% | 107 | 18.1% | 126 | 21.3% |
| 2.5. | Wages and labor regulations | 304 | 51.4% | 151 | 25.5% | 64 | 10.8% |
| 2.6. | Other issues related to modes of economic governance (N=42) | 19 | 45.2% | 13 | 31.0% | 16 | 38.1% |
| 3 | Citizens' rights | Average | 10.7% | Average | 50.8% | Average | 27.8% |
| 3.1. | Discrimination against minority | 76 | 12.8% | 338 | 57.1% | 128 | 21.6% |
| 3.2. | Regulations of the rights of children | 69 | 11.7% | 263 | 44.4% | 208 | 35.1% |
| 3.3. | Religion-based regulations | 51 | 8.6% | 319 | 53.9% | 126 | 21.3% |
| 3.4. | Other issues related to citizens' rights (N=21) | 2 | 9.5% | 10 | 47.6% | 7 | 33.3% |
| 4 | Others | | | | | | |
| 4.1. | Local (and national) politics, incl. local election issues (N=29) | 3 | 10.3% | 7 | 24.1% | 5 | 17.2% |
| 4.2. | Environmental issues (N=78) | 25 | 32.1% | 33 | 42.3% | 27 | 34.6% |
| 4.3. | Performance of government, incl. good governance issues (N=31) | 5 | 16.1% | 15 | 48.4% | 4 | 12.9% |
| 4.4. | Problems in society, e.g. drugs, moral issues (N=16) | 2 | 12.5% | 9 | 56.3% | 5 | 31.3% |
| 4.5. | Demographic issues, e.g. population growth, jobless (N=1) | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 4.6. | Leadership (N=1) | 1 | 100.0% | 1 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |

Q1.4. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below that people say have been left out of public governance do they think should instead be subject to public governance?

Table Q1.4. Major issues should be subject to public governance

| NO | MAJOR ISSUES | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENTAGE (based on number of responses) |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 1 | Public services | 2538 | 50.5% |
| | | <i>f</i> | <i>% within public services</i> |
| 1.1. | Education | 401 | 15.8% |
| 1.2. | Health services | 392 | 15.5% |
| 1.3. | Physical security | 334 | 13.2% |
| 1.4. | Welfare and social security | 353 | 13.9% |
| 1.5. | Public transportations | 361 | 14.2% |
| 1.6. | Traffic | 342 | 13.5% |
| 1.7. | Public housing | 310 | 12.2% |
| 1.8. | Others | 45 | 1.8% |
| 2 | Modes of economic governance | 1482 | 29.5% |
| | | <i>F</i> | <i>% within modes of economic governance</i> |
| 2.1. | Fishery | 267 | 18.0% |
| 2.2. | Agriculture | 277 | 18.7% |
| 2.3. | Informal sector | 313 | 21.1% |
| 2.4. | Industry | 261 | 17.6% |
| 2.5. | Wages and labor regulations | 336 | 22.7% |
| 2.6. | Others | 28 | 1.9% |
| 3 | Citizens' rights | 912 | 18.2% |
| | | <i>F</i> | <i>% within citizens' rights</i> |
| 3.1. | Discrimination against minority | 323 | 35.4% |
| 3.2. | Regulations of the rights of children | 320 | 35.1% |
| 3.3. | Religion-based regulations | 258 | 28.3% |
| 3.4. | Others | 11 | 1.2% |
| 4 | Others | 90 | 1.8% |
| | | <i>F</i> | <i>% within others</i> |
| 4.1. | Local (and national) politics, incl. local election issues, regional division | 12 | 13.3% |
| 4.2. | Environmental issues | 51 | 56.7% |
| 4.3. | Performance of government and good governance issues | 16 | 17.8% |
| 4.4. | Problems in society, e.g. drugs, moral issues | 10 | 11.1% |
| 4.5. | Demographic issues, e.g. population growth, jobless | 0 | 0.00% |
| 4.6. | Leadership | 1 | 1.1% |
| TOTAL OF RESPONSES | | 5022 | 100.00% |

Q1.5. In your assessment, do people in your town/district know who and what institutions are supposed to control and manage the problem that they deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Table Q1.5. People knowledge on public institutions

| NO | KNOW INSTITUTIONS OR NOT? | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|--------------|--|------------------|----------------|
| 1 | Yes, they know very well | 212 | 35.9 |
| 2 | Yes, but they know only partially | 311 | 52.5 |
| 3 | No, they don't really know much about this | 59 | 10.0 |
| 4 | No answer | 10 | 1.7 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

Q1.6. In your assessment, who and what institutions do people in your town/district think should handle the problem you just said that they deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Q1.7. And how should this be done?

Table Q1.6-Q1.7. Institutions should handle the problem

| NO | INSTITUTIONS | F | % WITHIN EACH GROUP | % OF INFORMANTS |
|--------------|---|------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | By the individual | 19 | 3.2% | 3.2% |
| 2 | By the family | 3 | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| 3 | On the market | 35 | 5.9% | 5.9% |
| 3.1 | By paying for help/services | 13 | 37.1% | 2.2% |
| 3.2 | Cooperation state-market, state-community, community-market | 8 | 22.9% | 1.4% |
| 3.3 | Support system development, e.g. human resources | 3 | 8.6% | 0.5% |
| 3.4 | Building foundation (e.g. education foundation) | 1 | 2.9% | 0.2% |
| 3.5 | No answer | 10 | 28.6% | 1.7% |
| 4 | By citizens' and people's own organizations | 48 | 8.1% | 8.1% |
| 4.1 | Getting it done through community organizations | 23 | 47.9% | 3.9% |
| 4.2 | Getting it done by joint interest/issue organizations | 9 | 18.8% | 1.5% |
| 4.3 | Getting it done through religious-based organizations | 3 | 6.3% | 0.5% |
| 4.4 | No answer | 13 | 27.1% | 2.2% |
| 5 | By state and/or local government | 390 | 65.9% | 65.9% |
| 5.1 | Getting it done by town/district government | 251 | 64.4% | 42.4% |
| 5.2 | Getting it done by provincial/ national government | 43 | 11.0% | 7.3% |
| 5.3 | People power | 6 | 1.5% | 1.0% |
| 5.4 | Synergy between the government and society | 22 | 5.6% | 3.7% |
| 5.5 | Through policies | 25 | 6.4% | 4.2% |
| 5.6 | Government control economic society/business sector | 5 | 1.3% | 0.8% |
| 5.7 | No answer | 38 | 9.7% | 6.4% |
| 6 | By state and stakeholder organizations | 38 | 6.4% | 6.4% |
| 6.1 | By the town/district government and local stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discretion of the politicians and bureaucrats | 10 | 26.3% | 1.7% |
| 6.2 | By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (6.1) | 4 | 10.5% | 0.7% |
| 6.3 | By town/district government and local stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint their representatives | 14 | 36.8% | 2.4% |
| 6.4 | By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (6.3) | 3 | 7.9% | 0.5% |
| 6.5 | No answer | 7 | 18.4% | 1.2% |
| 7 | No answer | 59 | 10.0% | 10.0% |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Q1.8. In your own assessment, who in this town/district discuss actively debate the issue that you just said people deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Table Q1.8. People involved in public debate

| NO | PEOPLE INVOLVED IN PUBLIC DEBATE | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|--------------|--|------------|------------|
| 1 | State actors | 22 | 3.7 |
| 2 | Civil society actors | 299 | 50.5 |
| 3 | Political society actors | 5 | .8 |
| 4 | Economic/Business actors | 2 | .3 |
| 5 | State & Civil society actors | 128 | 21.6 |
| 6 | State & Political society actors | 3 | .5 |
| 7 | State & Economic/Business actors | 3 | .5 |
| 8 | Civil society & Political society actors | 19 | 3.2 |
| 9 | Civil society & Economic/Business actors | 2 | .3 |
| 10 | Political society & Economic/Business actors | 2 | .3 |
| 11 | All actors | 69 | 11.7 |
| 12 | No answer | 38 | 6.4 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100 |

Q1.9. What additional issues do you yourself think are also necessary for people at the local level to engage in, in order to control their 'local' problems?

Table Q1.9. Additional issues needed to invite people to engage in controlling their 'local' problems

| NO | ISSUES | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|--------------|--|------------|------------|
| 1 | Public services | 167 | 28.2 |
| 2 | Modes of economic governance | 68 | 11.5 |
| 3 | Citizen's rights | 23 | 3.9 |
| 4 | Local and national politics (incl. regional division) | 30 | 5.1 |
| 5 | Environmental issues | 63 | 10.6 |
| 6 | Issues related to good/bad governance | 83 | 14.0 |
| 7 | Issues related to societal problems | 64 | 10.8 |
| 8 | Leadership | 2 | 0.3 |
| 9 | Issues related to civil society's roles and support system | 4 | 0.7 |
| 10 | No answer | 89 | 15.1 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100 |

Q1.10. In your assessment, are there any problems in your town/district with regard to who have the right to decide and control public affairs (and to thus be part of the political demos)?

Table Q1.10.

| NO | PROBLEMS | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|--------------|--|------------------|----------------|
| 1 | Public services | 117 | 19.8 |
| 2 | Modes of economic governance | 30 | 5.1 |
| 3 | Citizen's rights | 20 | 3.4 |
| 4 | Local and national politics | 33 | 5.6 |
| 5 | Environmental issues | 11 | 1.9 |
| 6 | Issues related to good/bad governance | 156 | 26.4 |
| 7 | Issues related to societal problems | 22 | 3.7 |
| 8 | Leadership | 6 | 1.0 |
| 9 | Issues related to civil society's roles and support system | 111 | 18.8 |
| 10 | Problems related to cultural identity | 9 | 1.5 |
| 11 | Economic society | 4 | .7 |
| 12 | No answer | 73 | 12.3 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100 |

C. THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

Q2.1.What is your general assessment about the situation in your town/district with regard to the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad?

Table Q2.1. General assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
|----------------|---|-------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| | | (% of informants) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 29.0 | 42.0 | 25.8 | 3.2 |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 34.3 | 45.3 | 17.9 | 2.5 |
| 2 | Rule of law | 27.7 | 42.9 | 25.2 | 4.2 |
| 3 | Equal justice | 22.3 | 36.0 | 38.5 | 3.2 |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 31.8 | 43.8 | 21.6 | 2.9 |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 25.5 | 41.7 | 28.8 | 4.0 |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 27.4 | 35.5 | 33.3 | 3.9 |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 20.8 | 43.8 | 32.3 | 3.2 |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 24.0 | 47.0 | 24.8 | 4.2 |
| 8 | Local democracy | 28.9 | 43.2 | 23.8 | 4.1 |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 26.7 | 39.0 | 29.9 | 4.4 |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 19.4 | 41.7 | 35.1 | 3.7 |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 19.8 | 39.9 | 37.5 | 2.9 |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 19.1 | 43.6 | 32.8 | 4.6 |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 52.0 | 33.4 | 10.6 | 3.9 |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 49.0 | 34.5 | 12.2 | 4.4 |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 55.1 | 32.4 | 9.1 | 3.4 |
| AVERAGE | | 29.7 | 40.5 | 26.1 | 3.7 |

Table Q2.1a. Comparison of General assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations - 2003, 2007, 2013

| NO | CLUSTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS | Years | | | | | |
|----------------|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | 2003 | | 2007 | | 2013 | |
| | | Good | Bad | Good | Bad | Good | Bad |
| 1 | Citizenship, law and rights | 36 | 63 | 55 | 44 | 71 | 26 |
| 2 | Representation | 36 | 62 | 57 | 42 | 67 | 29 |
| 3 | Governance | 23 | 76 | 53 | 45 | 61 | 35 |
| 4 | Democratically oriented civil society and direct participation | 45 | 55 | 62 | 38 | 85 | 11 |
| AVERAGE | | 35 | 64 | 57 | 42 | 70 | 26 |

Table Q2.1b. Frontliners' assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations (1#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | | |
|----------------|---|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=64) | | | | (% of informants, N=26) | | | | (% of informants, N=69) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 38.3% | 36.3% | 21.1% | 4.3% | 31.7% | 47.1% | 19.2% | 1.9% | 25.0% | 40.6% | 28.6% | 5.8% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 50.0% | 34.4% | 12.5% | 3.1% | 34.6% | 53.8% | 11.5% | 0.0% | 26.1% | 44.9% | 23.2% | 5.8% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 34.4% | 37.5% | 21.9% | 6.3% | 42.3% | 34.6% | 19.2% | 3.8% | 20.3% | 43.5% | 30.4% | 5.8% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 28.1% | 34.4% | 31.3% | 6.3% | 23.1% | 42.3% | 34.6% | 0.0% | 29.0% | 24.6% | 40.6% | 5.8% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 40.6% | 39.1% | 18.8% | 1.6% | 26.9% | 57.7% | 11.5% | 3.8% | 24.6% | 49.3% | 20.3% | 5.8% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 26.9% | 44.7% | 22.8% | 5.6% | 29.2% | 50.0% | 18.5% | 2.3% | 24.1% | 38.0% | 31.6% | 6.4% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 21.9% | 40.6% | 31.3% | 6.3% | 26.9% | 38.5% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 23.2% | 34.8% | 34.8% | 7.2% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 28.1% | 43.8% | 21.9% | 6.3% | 30.8% | 53.8% | 15.4% | 0.0% | 17.4% | 42.0% | 36.2% | 4.3% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 25.0% | 46.9% | 21.9% | 6.3% | 26.9% | 69.2% | 3.8% | 0.0% | 27.5% | 36.2% | 30.4% | 5.8% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 29.7% | 43.8% | 21.9% | 4.7% | 26.9% | 53.8% | 15.4% | 3.8% | 29.0% | 44.9% | 18.8% | 7.2% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 29.7% | 48.4% | 17.2% | 4.7% | 34.6% | 34.6% | 26.9% | 3.8% | 23.2% | 31.9% | 37.7% | 7.2% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 21.9% | 39.8% | 32.0% | 6.3% | 19.2% | 59.6% | 17.3% | 3.8% | 19.6% | 41.3% | 34.8% | 4.3% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 23.4% | 40.6% | 31.3% | 4.7% | 19.2% | 61.5% | 15.4% | 3.8% | 20.3% | 39.1% | 37.7% | 2.9% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 20.3% | 39.1% | 32.8% | 7.8% | 19.2% | 57.7% | 19.2% | 3.8% | 18.8% | 43.5% | 31.9% | 5.8% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 52.3% | 27.3% | 16.4% | 3.9% | 61.5% | 32.7% | 1.9% | 3.8% | 51.4% | 32.6% | 10.9% | 5.1% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 45.3% | 31.3% | 20.3% | 3.1% | 61.5% | 34.6% | 0.0% | 3.8% | 46.4% | 34.8% | 13.0% | 5.8% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 59.4% | 23.4% | 12.5% | 4.7% | 61.5% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 3.8% | 56.5% | 30.4% | 8.7% | 4.3% |
| AVERAGE | | 33.5% | 38.7% | 22.7% | 5.0% | 33.4% | 47.9% | 16.0% | 2.7% | 27.9% | 38.5% | 28.0% | 5.7% |

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Table Q2.1b. Frontliners' assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations (2#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | | |
|----------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
| | | <i>(% of informants, N=30)</i> | | | | <i>(% of informants, N=33)</i> | | | | <i>(% of informants, N=19)</i> | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 22.5% | 39.2% | 36.7% | 1.7% | 13.6% | 49.2% | 34.1% | 3.0% | 30.3% | 44.7% | 22.4% | 2.6% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 26.7% | 46.7% | 23.3% | 3.3% | 15.2% | 60.6% | 24.2% | 0.0% | 36.8% | 47.4% | 15.8% | 0.0% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 16.7% | 50.0% | 30.0% | 3.3% | 12.1% | 42.4% | 39.4% | 6.1% | 36.8% | 42.1% | 21.1% | 0.0% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 16.7% | 20.0% | 63.3% | 0.0% | 9.1% | 42.4% | 45.5% | 3.0% | 26.3% | 36.8% | 31.6% | 5.3% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 30.0% | 40.0% | 30.0% | 0.0% | 18.2% | 51.5% | 27.3% | 3.0% | 21.1% | 52.6% | 21.1% | 5.3% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 23.3% | 42.7% | 29.3% | 4.7% | 15.2% | 45.5% | 35.8% | 3.6% | 20.0% | 51.6% | 26.3% | 2.1% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 16.7% | 40.0% | 43.3% | 0.0% | 21.2% | 39.4% | 33.3% | 6.1% | 31.6% | 47.4% | 21.1% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 20.0% | 40.0% | 36.7% | 3.3% | 3.0% | 45.5% | 48.5% | 3.0% | 5.3% | 57.9% | 36.8% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 20.0% | 50.0% | 23.3% | 6.7% | 9.1% | 42.4% | 45.5% | 3.0% | 10.5% | 73.7% | 15.8% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 26.7% | 46.7% | 20.0% | 6.7% | 15.2% | 60.6% | 21.2% | 3.0% | 26.3% | 31.6% | 36.8% | 5.3% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 33.3% | 36.7% | 23.3% | 6.7% | 27.3% | 39.4% | 30.3% | 3.0% | 26.3% | 47.4% | 21.1% | 5.3% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 18.3% | 26.7% | 53.3% | 1.7% | 16.7% | 47.0% | 33.3% | 3.0% | 10.5% | 44.7% | 42.1% | 2.6% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 20.0% | 26.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 21.2% | 39.4% | 36.4% | 3.0% | 10.5% | 42.1% | 42.1% | 5.3% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 16.7% | 26.7% | 53.3% | 3.3% | 12.1% | 54.5% | 30.3% | 3.0% | 10.5% | 47.4% | 42.1% | 0.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 51.7% | 30.0% | 16.7% | 1.7% | 48.5% | 42.4% | 6.1% | 3.0% | 36.8% | 39.5% | 21.1% | 2.6% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 46.7% | 33.3% | 20.0% | 0.0% | 45.5% | 48.5% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 31.6% | 47.4% | 15.8% | 5.3% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 56.7% | 26.7% | 13.3% | 3.3% | 51.5% | 36.4% | 9.1% | 3.0% | 42.1% | 31.6% | 26.3% | 0.0% |
| AVERAGE | | 26.7% | 37.2% | 33.3% | 2.8% | 20.0% | 46.4% | 30.3% | 3.3% | 24.3% | 46.6% | 26.7% | 2.4% |

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Table Q2.1b. Frontliners' assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations (3#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | | | | FRONTLINE CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|--------------|-------------|---|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
| | | <i>(% of informants, N=62)</i> | | | | <i>(% of informants, N=66)</i> | | | | <i>(% of informants, N=26)</i> | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 31.5% | 42.3% | 25.4% | 0.8% | 34.5% | 43.9% | 18.9% | 2.7% | 30.8% | 40.4% | 26.0% | 2.9% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 32.3% | 51.6% | 16.1% | 0.0% | 40.9% | 42.4% | 13.6% | 3.0% | 42.3% | 30.8% | 23.1% | 3.8% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 30.6% | 45.2% | 22.6% | 1.6% | 33.3% | 42.4% | 21.2% | 3.0% | 34.6% | 46.2% | 19.2% | 0.0% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 27.4% | 27.4% | 43.5% | 1.6% | 27.3% | 47.0% | 24.2% | 1.5% | 19.2% | 34.6% | 42.3% | 3.8% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 35.5% | 45.2% | 19.4% | 0.0% | 36.4% | 43.9% | 16.7% | 3.0% | 26.9% | 50.0% | 19.2% | 3.8% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 30.3% | 37.7% | 29.7% | 2.3% | 30.3% | 34.8% | 30.0% | 4.8% | 19.2% | 46.2% | 33.1% | 1.5% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 33.9% | 27.4% | 37.1% | 1.6% | 39.4% | 33.3% | 24.2% | 3.0% | 15.4% | 34.6% | 46.2% | 3.8% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 32.3% | 41.9% | 24.2% | 1.6% | 25.8% | 25.8% | 43.9% | 4.5% | 15.4% | 42.3% | 38.5% | 3.8% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 27.4% | 45.2% | 22.6% | 4.8% | 27.3% | 40.9% | 25.8% | 6.1% | 23.1% | 50.0% | 26.9% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 29.0% | 38.7% | 29.0% | 3.2% | 33.3% | 36.4% | 25.8% | 4.5% | 23.1% | 53.8% | 23.1% | 0.0% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 29.0% | 35.5% | 35.5% | 0.0% | 25.8% | 37.9% | 30.3% | 6.1% | 19.2% | 50.0% | 30.8% | 0.0% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 27.4% | 41.1% | 27.4% | 4.0% | 24.2% | 42.4% | 29.5% | 3.8% | 23.1% | 36.5% | 38.5% | 1.9% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 21.0% | 51.6% | 27.4% | 0.0% | 27.3% | 36.4% | 33.3% | 3.0% | 30.8% | 30.8% | 34.6% | 3.8% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 33.9% | 30.6% | 27.4% | 8.1% | 21.2% | 48.5% | 25.8% | 4.5% | 15.4% | 42.3% | 42.3% | 0.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 62.9% | 25.0% | 7.3% | 4.8% | 52.3% | 34.1% | 7.6% | 6.1% | 67.3% | 19.2% | 13.5% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 62.9% | 24.2% | 6.5% | 6.5% | 51.5% | 31.8% | 9.1% | 7.6% | 53.8% | 23.1% | 23.1% | 0.0% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 62.9% | 25.8% | 8.1% | 3.2% | 53.0% | 36.4% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 80.8% | 15.4% | 3.8% | 0.0% |
| AVERAGE | | 35.2% | 37.7% | 24.6% | 2.5% | 34.0% | 38.7% | 23.1% | 4.2% | 30.8% | 38.8% | 28.7% | 1.8% |

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Table Q2.1b. Frontliners' assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations (4#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | | | FRONTLINE ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | | |
|----------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=11) | | | | (% of informants, N=58) | | | | (% of informants, N=26) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 25.0% | 34.1% | 40.9% | 0.0% | 27.2% | 43.1% | 26.7% | 3.0% | 21.4% | 35.9% | 41.7% | 1.0% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 45.5% | 27.3% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 32.8% | 46.6% | 19.0% | 1.7% | 27.1% | 41.7% | 31.3% | 0.0% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 18.2% | 36.4% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 24.1% | 43.1% | 29.3% | 3.4% | 25.0% | 39.6% | 33.3% | 2.1% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 9.1% | 27.3% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 19.0% | 39.7% | 39.7% | 1.7% | 12.5% | 33.3% | 52.1% | 2.1% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 27.3% | 45.5% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 32.8% | 43.1% | 19.0% | 5.2% | 20.8% | 29.2% | 50.0% | 0.0% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 25.5% | 36.4% | 36.4% | 1.8% | 27.2% | 36.6% | 31.0% | 5.2% | 15.8% | 45.8% | 36.3% | 2.1% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 27.3% | 18.2% | 45.5% | 9.1% | 29.3% | 29.3% | 36.2% | 5.2% | 16.7% | 37.5% | 43.8% | 2.1% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 9.1% | 63.6% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 22.4% | 39.7% | 32.8% | 5.2% | 8.3% | 56.3% | 35.4% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 9.1% | 54.5% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 24.1% | 43.1% | 27.6% | 5.2% | 22.9% | 50.0% | 25.0% | 2.1% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 36.4% | 36.4% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 36.2% | 34.5% | 25.9% | 3.4% | 14.6% | 47.9% | 35.4% | 2.1% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 45.5% | 9.1% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 24.1% | 36.2% | 32.8% | 6.9% | 16.7% | 37.5% | 41.7% | 4.2% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 22.7% | 22.7% | 54.5% | 0.0% | 15.5% | 36.2% | 45.7% | 2.6% | 13.5% | 37.5% | 47.9% | 1.0% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 27.3% | 18.2% | 54.5% | 0.0% | 12.1% | 34.5% | 51.7% | 1.7% | 14.6% | 29.2% | 54.2% | 2.1% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 18.2% | 27.3% | 54.5% | 0.0% | 19.0% | 37.9% | 39.7% | 3.4% | 12.5% | 45.8% | 41.7% | 0.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 36.4% | 54.5% | 9.1% | 0.0% | 44.8% | 37.9% | 14.7% | 2.6% | 50.0% | 35.4% | 13.5% | 1.0% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 27.3% | 63.6% | 9.1% | 0.0% | 43.1% | 36.2% | 19.0% | 1.7% | 45.8% | 33.3% | 18.8% | 2.1% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 45.5% | 45.5% | 9.1% | 0.0% | 46.6% | 39.7% | 10.3% | 3.4% | 54.2% | 37.5% | 8.3% | 0.0% |
| AVERAGE | | 26.6% | 36.4% | 36.4% | 0.7% | 28.1% | 38.7% | 29.4% | 3.7% | 22.4% | 39.9% | 36.2% | 1.4% |

(continue to next page)

Table Q2.1b. Frontliners' assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations (5#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | | | FRONTLINE BUSINESS SECTOR | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER | GOOD | FAIR | BAD | NO ANSWER |
| | | <i>(% of informants, N=58)</i> | | | | <i>(% of informants, N=22)</i> | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 28.0% | 46.6% | 19.4% | 6.0% | 43.2% | 44.3% | 8.0% | 4.5% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 29.3% | 53.4% | 12.1% | 5.2% | 54.5% | 40.9% | 0.0% | 4.5% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 24.1% | 48.3% | 19.0% | 8.6% | 40.9% | 45.5% | 4.5% | 9.1% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 22.4% | 41.4% | 31.0% | 5.2% | 18.2% | 59.1% | 18.2% | 4.5% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 36.2% | 43.1% | 15.5% | 5.2% | 59.1% | 31.8% | 9.1% | 0.0% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 29.3% | 43.8% | 23.1% | 3.8% | 31.8% | 47.3% | 19.1% | 1.8% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 31.0% | 39.7% | 27.6% | 1.7% | 45.5% | 36.4% | 13.6% | 4.5% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 20.7% | 50.0% | 25.9% | 3.4% | 27.3% | 45.5% | 27.3% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 27.6% | 48.3% | 19.0% | 5.2% | 27.3% | 50.0% | 22.7% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 37.9% | 39.7% | 19.0% | 3.4% | 31.8% | 50.0% | 13.6% | 4.5% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 29.3% | 41.4% | 24.1% | 5.2% | 27.3% | 54.5% | 18.2% | 0.0% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 10.3% | 52.6% | 31.0% | 6.0% | 29.5% | 47.7% | 18.2% | 4.5% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 10.3% | 46.6% | 37.9% | 5.2% | 27.3% | 50.0% | 18.2% | 4.5% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 10.3% | 58.6% | 24.1% | 6.9% | 31.8% | 45.5% | 18.2% | 4.5% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 45.7% | 42.2% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 59.1% | 29.5% | 4.5% | 6.8% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 48.3% | 41.4% | 3.4% | 6.9% | 59.1% | 27.3% | 4.5% | 9.1% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 43.1% | 43.1% | 8.6% | 5.2% | 59.1% | 31.8% | 4.5% | 4.5% |
| AVERAGE | | 28.5% | 45.8% | 20.6% | 5.2% | 39.2% | 43.7% | 13.3% | 3.8% |

Q2.2. In your assessment, has the quality of the means of democracy (rules and regulations) improved or worsened or remained the same since the first *Pemilukada* (direct elections of local executives) during 2008/2009 in your town/district?

Table Q2.2. Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | IMPROVED | WORSENER | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
|----------------|---|-------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| | | (% of informants) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 33.4 | 14.6 | 48.0 | 4.0 |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 38.5 | 12.7 | 44.9 | 3.9 |
| 2 | Rule of law | 33.4 | 14.2 | 47.1 | 5.2 |
| 3 | Equal justice | 27.2 | 16.7 | 52.4 | 3.7 |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 34.6 | 14.7 | 47.5 | 3.2 |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 32.5 | 15.1 | 47.5 | 4.9 |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 28.9 | 21.3 | 45.3 | 4.6 |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 31.8 | 14.4 | 50.2 | 3.7 |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 35.8 | 11.5 | 47.3 | 5.4 |
| 8 | Local democracy | 34.0 | 14.0 | 46.8 | 5.2 |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 32.3 | 14.2 | 48.0 | 5.6 |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 27.8 | 17.1 | 50.4 | 4.6 |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 29.7 | 16.9 | 49.7 | 3.7 |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 25.8 | 17.4 | 51.2 | 5.6 |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 54.1 | 7.5 | 34.3 | 4.1 |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 51.9 | 6.6 | 37.2 | 4.4 |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 56.3 | 8.4 | 31.4 | 3.9 |
| AVERAGE | | 35.4 | 14.1 | 46.1 | 4.5 |

Table Q2.2a. Comparison of Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) – 2003 and 2013

| NO | CLUSTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS | Years | | | | | |
|----------------|--|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| | | 2003 | | | 2013 | | |
| | | Improved | Worsened | Not changed | Improved | Worsened | Not changed |
| 1 | Citizenship, law and rights | 34 | 17 | 48 | 33 | 15 | 48 |
| 2 | Representation | 33 | 22 | 49 | 33 | 15 | 48 |
| 3 | Governance | 23 | 76 | 0 | 28 | 17 | 50 |
| 4 | Democratically oriented civil society and direct participation | 45 | 55 | 0 | 54 | 8 | 34 |
| AVERAGE | | 34 | 42 | 24 | 35 | 14 | 46 |

Table Q2.2b. Frontliners' assessment on Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) (1#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | | |
|----------------|---|-------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=64) | | | | (% of informants, N=26) | | | | (% of informants, N=69) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 41.4% | 10.5% | 43.4% | 4.7% | 51.0% | 10.6% | 35.6% | 2.9% | 23.9% | 14.9% | 53.3% | 8.0% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 48.4% | 6.3% | 40.6% | 4.7% | 57.7% | 7.7% | 34.6% | 0.0% | 27.5% | 11.6% | 53.6% | 7.2% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 39.1% | 6.3% | 48.4% | 6.3% | 57.7% | 7.7% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 20.3% | 17.4% | 53.6% | 8.7% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 34.4% | 17.2% | 42.2% | 6.3% | 38.5% | 19.2% | 42.3% | 0.0% | 24.6% | 14.5% | 52.2% | 8.7% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 43.8% | 12.5% | 42.2% | 1.6% | 50.0% | 7.7% | 34.6% | 7.7% | 23.2% | 15.9% | 53.6% | 7.2% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 35.9% | 13.8% | 42.5% | 7.8% | 47.7% | 13.1% | 34.6% | 4.6% | 25.5% | 18.8% | 48.4% | 7.2% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 31.3% | 20.3% | 42.2% | 6.3% | 26.9% | 26.9% | 42.3% | 3.8% | 20.3% | 26.1% | 44.9% | 8.7% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 35.9% | 9.4% | 48.4% | 6.3% | 57.7% | 7.7% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 24.6% | 18.8% | 50.7% | 5.8% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 37.5% | 17.2% | 35.9% | 9.4% | 61.5% | 7.7% | 26.9% | 3.8% | 33.3% | 15.9% | 44.9% | 5.8% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 39.1% | 14.1% | 40.6% | 6.3% | 50.0% | 15.4% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 30.4% | 14.5% | 46.4% | 8.7% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 35.9% | 7.8% | 45.3% | 10.9% | 42.3% | 7.7% | 42.3% | 7.7% | 18.8% | 18.8% | 55.1% | 7.2% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 31.3% | 19.5% | 42.2% | 7.0% | 51.9% | 0.0% | 42.3% | 5.8% | 25.4% | 20.3% | 50.0% | 4.3% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 34.4% | 20.3% | 40.6% | 4.7% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 42.3% | 7.7% | 27.5% | 18.8% | 50.7% | 2.9% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 28.1% | 18.8% | 43.8% | 9.4% | 53.8% | 0.0% | 42.3% | 3.8% | 23.2% | 21.7% | 49.3% | 5.8% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 50.0% | 10.9% | 35.2% | 3.9% | 73.1% | 1.9% | 19.2% | 5.8% | 54.3% | 8.7% | 31.9% | 5.1% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 45.3% | 9.4% | 42.2% | 3.1% | 69.2% | 0.0% | 26.9% | 3.8% | 49.3% | 8.7% | 36.2% | 5.8% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 54.7% | 12.5% | 28.1% | 4.7% | 76.9% | 3.8% | 11.5% | 7.7% | 59.4% | 8.7% | 27.5% | 4.3% |
| AVERAGE | | 39.1% | 13.2% | 41.6% | 6.1% | 53.3% | 8.6% | 33.7% | 4.4% | 29.4% | 16.3% | 47.6% | 6.7% |

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Table Q2.2b. Frontliners' assessment on Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) (2#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | | |
|----------------|---|------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | IMPROVED | WORSENER | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENER | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENER | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=30) | | | | (% of informants, N=33) | | | | (% of informants, N=19) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 30.0% | 14.2% | 55.8% | 0.0% | 31.1% | 18.2% | 48.5% | 2.3% | 34.2% | 18.4% | 46.1% | 1.3% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 33.3% | 3.3% | 63.3% | 0.0% | 42.4% | 12.1% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 47.4% | 21.1% | 31.6% | 0.0% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 30.0% | 16.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 21.2% | 24.2% | 48.5% | 6.1% | 47.4% | 10.5% | 42.1% | 0.0% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 16.7% | 23.3% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 24.2% | 21.2% | 51.5% | 3.0% | 15.8% | 26.3% | 57.9% | 0.0% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 40.0% | 13.3% | 46.7% | 0.0% | 36.4% | 15.2% | 48.5% | 0.0% | 26.3% | 15.8% | 52.6% | 5.3% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 28.7% | 16.0% | 51.3% | 4.0% | 32.1% | 17.6% | 49.1% | 1.2% | 33.7% | 12.6% | 51.6% | 2.1% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 6.7% | 36.7% | 56.7% | 0.0% | 27.3% | 21.2% | 48.5% | 3.0% | 42.1% | 21.1% | 36.8% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 30.0% | 13.3% | 56.7% | 0.0% | 18.2% | 18.2% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 36.8% | 15.8% | 47.4% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 40.0% | 6.7% | 43.3% | 10.0% | 33.3% | 15.2% | 48.5% | 3.0% | 31.6% | 5.3% | 63.2% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 33.3% | 10.0% | 50.0% | 6.7% | 30.3% | 12.1% | 57.6% | 0.0% | 26.3% | 5.3% | 63.2% | 5.3% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 33.3% | 13.3% | 50.0% | 3.3% | 51.5% | 21.2% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 31.6% | 15.8% | 47.4% | 5.3% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 23.3% | 18.3% | 56.7% | 1.7% | 33.3% | 18.2% | 48.5% | 0.0% | 34.2% | 18.4% | 42.1% | 5.3% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 30.0% | 16.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 39.4% | 12.1% | 48.5% | 0.0% | 31.6% | 10.5% | 52.6% | 5.3% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 16.7% | 20.0% | 60.0% | 3.3% | 27.3% | 24.2% | 48.5% | 0.0% | 36.8% | 26.3% | 31.6% | 5.3% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 58.3% | 5.0% | 35.0% | 1.7% | 60.6% | 10.6% | 27.3% | 1.5% | 47.4% | 7.9% | 39.5% | 5.3% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 50.0% | 10.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 3.0% | 27.3% | 3.0% | 42.1% | 10.5% | 42.1% | 5.3% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 66.7% | 0.0% | 30.0% | 3.3% | 54.5% | 18.2% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 52.6% | 5.3% | 36.8% | 5.3% |
| AVERAGE | | 32.8% | 14.1% | 51.0% | 2.1% | 36.4% | 16.8% | 45.5% | 1.4% | 36.0% | 14.6% | 46.6% | 2.8% |

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Table Q2.2b. Frontliners' assessment on Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) (3#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | | | | FRONTLINE CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|----------------|--------------|---|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=62) | | | | (% of informants, N=66) | | | | (% of informants, N=26) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 44.0% | 13.7% | 41.5% | 0.8% | 29.5% | 15.2% | 51.1% | 4.2% | 35.6% | 10.6% | 52.9% | 1.0% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 48.4% | 9.7% | 41.9% | 0.0% | 30.3% | 22.7% | 42.4% | 4.5% | 46.2% | 11.5% | 38.5% | 3.8% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 48.4% | 14.5% | 35.5% | 1.6% | 33.3% | 13.6% | 48.5% | 4.5% | 42.3% | 11.5% | 46.2% | 0.0% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 37.1% | 16.1% | 45.2% | 1.6% | 22.7% | 10.6% | 63.6% | 3.0% | 19.2% | 7.7% | 73.1% | 0.0% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 41.9% | 14.5% | 43.5% | 0.0% | 31.8% | 13.6% | 50.0% | 4.5% | 34.6% | 11.5% | 53.8% | 0.0% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 41.9% | 14.5% | 40.3% | 3.2% | 27.6% | 12.1% | 53.6% | 6.7% | 22.3% | 17.7% | 58.5% | 1.5% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 40.3% | 17.7% | 40.3% | 1.6% | 25.8% | 13.6% | 56.1% | 4.5% | 15.4% | 30.8% | 50.0% | 3.8% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 50.0% | 12.9% | 33.9% | 3.2% | 22.7% | 12.1% | 59.1% | 6.1% | 23.1% | 7.7% | 65.4% | 3.8% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 45.2% | 6.5% | 41.9% | 6.5% | 31.8% | 9.1% | 50.0% | 9.1% | 23.1% | 15.4% | 61.5% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 38.7% | 16.1% | 41.9% | 3.2% | 28.8% | 12.1% | 53.0% | 6.1% | 19.2% | 23.1% | 57.7% | 0.0% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 35.5% | 19.4% | 43.5% | 1.6% | 28.8% | 13.6% | 50.0% | 7.6% | 30.8% | 11.5% | 57.7% | 0.0% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 36.3% | 16.9% | 41.9% | 4.8% | 22.0% | 12.9% | 59.1% | 6.1% | 28.8% | 11.5% | 55.8% | 3.8% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 40.3% | 14.5% | 43.5% | 1.6% | 27.3% | 12.1% | 56.1% | 4.5% | 26.9% | 11.5% | 53.8% | 7.7% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 32.3% | 19.4% | 40.3% | 8.1% | 16.7% | 13.6% | 62.1% | 7.6% | 30.8% | 11.5% | 57.7% | 0.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 61.3% | 4.0% | 29.8% | 4.8% | 48.5% | 6.1% | 38.6% | 6.8% | 51.9% | 9.6% | 38.5% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 62.9% | 1.6% | 29.0% | 6.5% | 51.5% | 3.0% | 36.4% | 9.1% | 42.3% | 19.2% | 38.5% | 0.0% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 59.7% | 6.5% | 30.6% | 3.2% | 45.5% | 9.1% | 40.9% | 4.5% | 61.5% | 0.0% | 38.5% | 0.0% |
| AVERAGE | | 44.7% | 13.0% | 39.3% | 3.0% | 30.5% | 12.2% | 51.4% | 5.8% | 32.0% | 13.3% | 53.3% | 1.5% |

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Table Q2.2b. Frontliners' assessment on Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) (4#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | | | FRONTLINE ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | | |
|----------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=11) | | | | (% of informants, N=58) | | | | (% of informants, N=26) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 29.5% | 34.1% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 28.9% | 20.3% | 44.4% | 6.5% | 20.3% | 17.7% | 60.9% | 1.0% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 36.4% | 27.3% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 32.8% | 17.2% | 44.8% | 5.2% | 22.9% | 20.8% | 56.3% | 0.0% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 27.3% | 36.4% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 27.6% | 22.4% | 41.4% | 8.6% | 25.0% | 14.6% | 58.3% | 2.1% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 18.2% | 36.4% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 29.3% | 22.4% | 41.4% | 6.9% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 72.9% | 2.1% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 36.4% | 36.4% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 25.9% | 19.0% | 50.0% | 5.2% | 20.8% | 22.9% | 56.3% | 0.0% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 34.5% | 23.6% | 40.0% | 1.8% | 29.7% | 20.3% | 43.1% | 6.9% | 22.1% | 12.5% | 62.9% | 2.5% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 27.3% | 27.3% | 36.4% | 9.1% | 31.0% | 27.6% | 32.8% | 8.6% | 22.9% | 12.5% | 62.5% | 2.1% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 27.3% | 18.2% | 54.5% | 0.0% | 25.9% | 22.4% | 46.6% | 5.2% | 22.9% | 16.7% | 60.4% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 18.2% | 18.2% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 27.6% | 15.5% | 50.0% | 6.9% | 29.2% | 6.3% | 62.5% | 2.1% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 36.4% | 27.3% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 39.7% | 17.2% | 37.9% | 5.2% | 16.7% | 12.5% | 64.6% | 6.3% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 63.6% | 27.3% | 9.1% | 0.0% | 24.1% | 19.0% | 48.3% | 8.6% | 18.8% | 14.6% | 64.6% | 2.1% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 27.3% | 36.4% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 19.0% | 23.3% | 50.9% | 6.9% | 14.6% | 16.7% | 67.7% | 1.0% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 27.3% | 45.5% | 27.3% | 0.0% | 20.7% | 27.6% | 46.6% | 5.2% | 16.7% | 18.8% | 62.5% | 2.1% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 27.3% | 27.3% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 17.2% | 19.0% | 55.2% | 8.6% | 12.5% | 14.6% | 72.9% | 0.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 31.8% | 4.5% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 44.8% | 9.5% | 40.5% | 5.2% | 45.8% | 10.4% | 42.7% | 1.0% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 36.4% | 0.0% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 41.4% | 12.1% | 43.1% | 3.4% | 37.5% | 8.3% | 52.1% | 2.1% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 27.3% | 9.1% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 48.3% | 6.9% | 37.9% | 6.9% | 54.2% | 12.5% | 33.3% | 0.0% |
| AVERAGE | | 31.5% | 25.9% | 42.0% | 0.7% | 30.1% | 19.1% | 44.3% | 6.5% | 24.0% | 14.4% | 59.9% | 1.6% |

(continue to next page)

Table Q2.2b. Frontliners' assessment on Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations) (5#5)

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | | | FRONTLINE BUSINESS SECTOR | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER | IMPROVED | WORSENE | NOT CHANGED | NO ANSWER |
| | | (% of informants, N=58) | | | | (% of informants, N=22) | | | |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 35.3% | 10.8% | 46.6% | 7.3% | 44.3% | 5.7% | 43.2% | 6.8% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 41.4% | 8.6% | 41.4% | 8.6% | 45.5% | 0.0% | 40.9% | 13.6% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 29.3% | 8.6% | 50.0% | 12.1% | 36.4% | 4.5% | 54.5% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 34.5% | 17.2% | 44.8% | 3.4% | 36.4% | 9.1% | 50.0% | 4.5% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 36.2% | 8.6% | 50.0% | 5.2% | 59.1% | 9.1% | 27.3% | 4.5% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 42.8% | 11.0% | 41.0% | 5.2% | 34.5% | 11.8% | 50.9% | 2.7% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 39.7% | 17.2% | 39.7% | 3.4% | 45.5% | 13.6% | 36.4% | 4.5% |
| 6 | Citizen participation | 37.9% | 12.1% | 44.8% | 5.2% | 36.4% | 13.6% | 50.0% | 0.0% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation | 46.6% | 6.9% | 43.1% | 3.4% | 27.3% | 18.2% | 54.5% | 0.0% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 46.6% | 12.1% | 34.5% | 6.9% | 31.8% | 9.1% | 54.5% | 4.5% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 43.1% | 6.9% | 43.1% | 6.9% | 31.8% | 4.5% | 59.1% | 4.5% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 29.3% | 14.7% | 50.9% | 5.2% | 29.5% | 18.2% | 45.5% | 6.8% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 27.6% | 17.2% | 50.0% | 5.2% | 22.7% | 13.6% | 59.1% | 4.5% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 31.0% | 12.1% | 51.7% | 5.2% | 36.4% | 22.7% | 31.8% | 9.1% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 63.8% | 6.9% | 24.1% | 5.2% | 59.1% | 2.3% | 34.1% | 4.5% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 67.2% | 1.7% | 25.9% | 5.2% | 54.5% | 4.5% | 36.4% | 4.5% |
| 13 | Democratic citizen's self-organizing | 60.3% | 12.1% | 22.4% | 5.2% | 63.6% | 0.0% | 31.8% | 4.5% |
| AVERAGE | | 41.6% | 10.9% | 41.6% | 5.8% | 40.6% | 9.4% | 45.1% | 4.9% |

Q2.3. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy?

Table Q2.3. How informal rules and regulations support the formalized means of democracy

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | INFORMALITY SUPPORTS FORMALIZED MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | | | |
|----------|---|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | Values | Organization | Mechanism | Uncategorized |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 29.4% | 12.4% | 39.9% | 18.4% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 33.9% | 11.2% | 36.2% | 18.8% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 24.9% | 11.0% | 39.1% | 24.9% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 25.0% | 16.0% | 43.5% | 15.4% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 33.7% | 11.2% | 40.6% | 14.4% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 12.9% | 20.2% | 44.4% | 22.5% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 12.2% | 10.0% | 32.8% | 45.0% |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | 10.9% | 18.3% | 51.3% | 19.5% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest and issue-based representation in public governance | 7.6% | 40.2% | 33.5% | 18.7% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 14.3% | 11.9% | 55.2% | 18.6% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 19.3% | 20.5% | 49.2% | 11.0% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 18.6% | 18.6% | 50.4% | 12.4% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 14.6% | 18.0% | 55.7% | 11.8% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 22.7% | 19.3% | 45.0% | 13.0% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 16.9% | 22.5% | 51.8% | 8.9% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 20.2% | 11.3% | 60.2% | 8.3% |
| 13 | Democratic citizens' self-organizing | 13.5% | 33.7% | 43.4% | 9.4% |

Q2.4. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy?

Table Q2.4. How informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formalized means of democracy

| NO | RULES AND REGULATIONS | INFORMALITY CONTRADICTS FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY | | | |
|----------|---|---|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | Values | Organization | Mechanism | Uncategorized |
| A | CITIZENSHIP | 32.2% | 9.8% | 46.7% | 11.4% |
| 1 | Equal citizenship | 41.0% | 9.2% | 40.7% | 9.2% |
| 2 | Rule of law | 28.8% | 9.0% | 50.5% | 11.8% |
| 3 | Equal justice | 25.6% | 13.2% | 48.3% | 12.8% |
| 4 | Universal human rights | 33.3% | 7.7% | 47.3% | 11.7% |
| B | REPRESENTATION | 29.4% | 12.7% | 42.9% | 16.1% |
| 5 | Democratic political representation | 38.2% | 4.1% | 30.7% | 27.0% |
| 6 | Rights based citizen participation in public governance | 32.7% | 10.2% | 36.2% | 20.9% |
| 7 | Institutionalized channels for interest and issue-based representation in public governance | 28.0% | 18.0% | 42.9% | 11.2% |
| 8 | Local democracy | 29.7% | 10.4% | 50.5% | 9.4% |
| 9 | Democratic control of instruments of coercion | 18.4% | 20.9% | 54.4% | 11.9% |
| C | GOVERNANCE | 21.8% | 14.6% | 53.1% | 10.4% |
| 10 | Transparent, impartial and accountable governance | 20.4% | 11.4% | 59.2% | 9.0% |
| 11 | Government's independence to make decisions and implement them | 23.2% | 17.8% | 47.0% | 11.9% |
| D | CIVIL SOCIETY | 31.3% | 15.2% | 44.1% | 9.4% |
| 12 | Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses | 28.8% | 12.4% | 48.0% | 10.7% |
| 13 | Democratic citizens' self-organizing | 33.7% | 18.0% | 40.1% | 8.1% |

D. MAIN ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors – individual or collective – in the discussion about public issues in your town/district? (Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table F)

Table Q3.1a. Current position of influential actors

| NO | CURRENT POSITION | STATE AND GOVERNMENT | | POLITICAL SOCIETY | | BUSINESS LIFE | | CIVIL SOCIETY | | ALL INFLUENTIAL ACTORS | |
|-------|---|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|------------------------|--------|
| | | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 254 | 16.0% | 376 | 27.4% | 38 | 3.2% | 19 | 1.2% | 687 | 11.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 66 | 4.1% | 452 | 32.9% | 63 | 5.3% | 33 | 2.0% | 614 | 10.6% |
| 3 | Public official | 718 | 45.1% | 79 | 5.7% | 23 | 1.9% | 10 | 0.6% | 830 | 14.3% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 292 | 18.4% | 11 | 0.8% | 7 | 0.6% | 14 | 0.8% | 324 | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 18 | 1.1% | 6 | 0.4% | 1 | 0.1% | 31 | 1.9% | 56 | 1.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 2 | 0.1% | 20 | 1.5% | 802 | 67.6% | 21 | 1.3% | 845 | 14.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 21 | 1.3% | 42 | 3.1% | 21 | 1.8% | 870 | 52.8% | 954 | 16.4% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 34 | 2.1% | 172 | 12.5% | 142 | 12.0% | 264 | 16.0% | 611 | 10.5% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 8 | 0.5% | 50 | 3.6% | 6 | 0.5% | 130 | 7.9% | 194 | 3.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 65 | 4.1% | 2 | 0.1% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 67 | 1.2% |
| 11 | Militia | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.1% | 0 | 0.0% | 6 | 0.4% | 7 | 0.1% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 34 | 2.1% | 70 | 5.1% | 36 | 3.0% | 169 | 10.3% | 309 | 5.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 79 | 5.0% | 93 | 6.8% | 49 | 4.1% | 81 | 4.9% | 303 | 5.2% |
| TOTAL | | 1591 | 100.0% | 1374 | 100.0% | 1188 | 100.0% | 1648 | 100.0% | 5801 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.1b. Influential actors' relation to New Order regime

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER | STATE AND GOVERNMENT | | POLITICAL SOCIETY | | BUSINESS LIFE | | CIVIL SOCIETY | | ALL INFLUENTIAL ACTORS | |
|-------|--|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|------------------------|--------|
| | | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Old elite / Have relation to New Order regime | 325 | 20.4% | 191 | 13.9% | 196 | 16.5% | 29 | 1.8% | 741 | 12.8% |
| 2 | New elite / Do not have relation to the New Order regime | 595 | 37.4% | 559 | 40.7% | 358 | 30.1% | 647 | 39.3% | 2160 | 37.2% |
| 3 | Unknown | 671 | 42.2% | 624 | 45.4% | 634 | 53.4% | 972 | 59.0% | 2900 | 50.0% |
| TOTAL | | 1591 | 100.0% | 1374 | 100.0% | 1188 | 100.0% | 1648 | 100.0% | 5801 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.1c. Influential actors' scale of business

| NO | SCALE OF BUSINESS | STATE AND GOVERNMENT | | POLITICAL SOCIETY | | BUSINESS LIFE | | CIVIL SOCIETY | | ALL INFLUENTIAL ACTORS | |
|-------|---|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|------------------------|--------|
| | | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Large scale (Big/Medium-National/Big-Local enterprises) | 415 | 26.1% | 241 | 17.5% | 753 | 63.4% | 83 | 5.0% | 1492 | 25.7% |
| 2 | Medium/Small scale (Medium/Small-Local business) | 81 | 5.1% | 64 | 4.7% | 40 | 3.4% | 37 | 2.2% | 222 | 3.8% |
| 3 | Do not have own business | 542 | 34.1% | 524 | 38.1% | 28 | 2.4% | 651 | 39.5% | 1745 | 30.1% |
| 4 | Unknown | 553 | 34.8% | 545 | 39.7% | 367 | 30.9% | 877 | 53.2% | 2342 | 40.4% |
| TOTAL | | 1591 | 100.0% | 1374 | 100.0% | 1188 | 100.0% | 1648 | 100.0% | 5801 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.1d. Influential actors' in various position and their relation to the New Order

| NO | ACTOR'S CURRENT POSITION | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | | |
|--------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | OLD ELITE | NEW ELITE | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 12.4% | 46.1% | 41.5% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 22.0% | 42.2% | 35.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 31.6% | 51.1% | 17.3% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 7.1% | 33.6% | 59.3% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 1.8% | 67.9% | 30.4% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 20.0% | 20.5% | 59.5% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 1.3% | 41.1% | 57.7% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 6.7% | 34.6% | 58.7% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 0.5% | 43.8% | 55.7% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 2.4% | 30.1% | 67.5% |
| 11 | Militia | 20.0% | 0.0% | 80.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 1.7% | 40.4% | 57.9% |
| 13 | Unknown | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| TOTAL | | 13.2% | 37.3% | 49.5% |

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your town/district? (Please mention two actors)

Table Q3.2a. The Dominant Actors

| NO | CURRENT POSITION OF DOMINANT ACTORS | F | % |
|--------------|---|-------------|---------------|
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 160 | 14.0% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 84 | 7.3% |
| 3 | Public official | 562 | 49.2% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 60 | 5.2% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 5 | 0.4% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 73 | 6.4% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 41 | 3.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 48 | 4.2% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 21 | 1.8% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 15 | 1.3% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 1 | 0.1% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 28 | 2.4% |
| 13 | Unknown | 45 | 3.9% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.2b. Dominant actors' relation to the New Order Regime

| NO | DOMINANT ACTOR'S CURRENT POSITION | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | | |
|--------------|---|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | OLD ELITE | NEW ELITE | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 6.9% | 63.1% | 30.0% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 36.9% | 46.4% | 16.7% |
| 3 | Public official | 33.3% | 49.6% | 17.1% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 15.0% | 40.0% | 45.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 26.0% | 11.0% | 63.0% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 0.0% | 65.9% | 34.1% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 18.8% | 37.5% | 43.8% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 4.8% | 28.6% | 66.7% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 38.5% | 30.8% | 30.8% |
| 11 | Militia | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 3.6% | 60.7% | 35.7% |
| 13 | Unknown | 6.7% | 15.6% | 77.8% |
| TOTAL | | 24.4% | 46.8% | 28.8% |

Table Q3.2c. Dominant actors' business ownership

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS' CURRENT POSITION | SCALE OF BUSINESS | | | |
|-------|---|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| | | LARGE SCALE | MEDIUM-SMALL BUSINESS | HAVE NOT OWN BUSINESS | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 23.1% | 1.9% | 51.3% | 23.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 38.1% | 3.6% | 38.1% | 20.2% |
| 3 | Public official | 48.6% | 7.8% | 29.4% | 14.2% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 20.0% | 1.7% | 40.0% | 38.3% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 0.0% | 80.0% | 20.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 83.6% | 0.0% | 4.1% | 12.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 0.0% | 0.0% | 63.4% | 36.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 27.1% | 6.3% | 25.0% | 41.7% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 14.3% | 14.3% | 19.0% | 52.4% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 7.7% | 0.0% | 61.5% | 30.8% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 33.3% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 17.9% | 3.6% | 53.6% | 25.0% |
| 13 | Unknown | 8.9% | 0.0% | 11.1% | 80.0% |
| TOTAL | | 38.6% | 5.1% | 33.4% | 22.9% |

Table Q3.2d. Current positions of the dominant actors in each frontline (1#2)

| NO | CURRENT POSITION | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|---|-------------------------|--------|----------------------|--------|--|--------|---------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|---|--------|--|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 16 | 12.9% | 7 | 13.7% | 16 | 12.1% | 8 | 13.3% | 6 | 9.7% | 4 | 10.8% | 15 | 12.7% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 8 | 6.5% | 3 | 5.9% | 11 | 3.2% | 6 | 10.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 3 | 8.1% | 11 | 9.3% |
| 3 | Public official | 63 | 50.8% | 27 | 52.9% | 63 | 51.6% | 30 | 50.0% | 32 | 51.6% | 15 | 40.5% | 59 | 50.0% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 4 | 3.2% | 6 | 11.8% | 7 | 9.7% | 3 | 5.0% | 6 | 9.7% | 2 | 5.4% | 11 | 9.3% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 6 | 4.8% | 2 | 3.9% | 9 | 9.7% | 6 | 10.0% | 6 | 9.7% | 5 | 13.5% | 4 | 3.4% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 3 | 2.4% | 1 | 2.0% | 9 | 1.6% | 2 | 3.3% | 1 | 1.6% | 1 | 2.7% | 3 | 2.5% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 7 | 5.6% | 4 | 7.8% | 1 | 4.8% | 1 | 1.7% | 3 | 4.8% | 3 | 8.1% | 5 | 4.2% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 4 | 3.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 1.7% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 2 | 1.7% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 2.7% | 1 | 0.8% |
| 11 | Militia | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 7 | 5.6% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 3.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 1 | 0.8% |
| 13 | Unknown | 6 | 4.8% | 1 | 2.0% | 6 | 3.2% | 3 | 5.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 6 | 5.1% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 100.0% | 51 | 100.0% | 132 | 100.0% | 60 | 100.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 37 | 100.0% | 118 | 100.0% |

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Table Q3.2d. Current positions of the dominant actors in each frontline (2#2)

| NO | CURRENT POSITION | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI- CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|---|--|--------|---|--------|---|--------|---|--------|--|--------|---|--------|-------------------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 22 | 16.9% | 8 | 15.4% | 3 | 15.8% | 17 | 16.2% | 10 | 10.8% | 20 | 17.2% | 8 | 18.2% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 12 | 9.2% | 3 | 5.8% | 1 | 5.3% | 9 | 8.6% | 5 | 5.4% | 8 | 6.9% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 63 | 48.5% | 23 | 44.2% | 11 | 57.9% | 48 | 45.7% | 49 | 52.7% | 54 | 46.6% | 25 | 56.8% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 7 | 5.4% | 2 | 3.8% | 2 | 10.5% | 3 | 2.9% | 4 | 4.3% | 3 | 2.6% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 3.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.1% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 5 | 3.8% | 6 | 11.5% | 0 | 0.0% | 7 | 6.7% | 9 | 9.7% | 7 | 6.0% | 1 | 2.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 2 | 1.5% | 2 | 3.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 6 | 5.7% | 3 | 3.2% | 6 | 5.2% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 6 | 4.6% | 1 | 1.9% | 1 | 5.3% | 5 | 4.8% | 2 | 2.2% | 8 | 6.9% | 1 | 2.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 1 | 0.8% | 1 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.0% | 3 | 3.2% | 1 | 0.9% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 3 | 2.3% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 1.9% | 3 | 3.2% | 3 | 2.6% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 2 | 1.5% | 2 | 3.8% | 1 | 5.3% | 3 | 2.9% | 2 | 2.2% | 3 | 2.6% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 13 | Unknown | 7 | 5.4% | 1 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 3.8% | 2 | 2.2% | 3 | 2.6% | 3 | 6.8% |
| TOTAL | | 130 | 100.0% | 52 | 100.0% | 19 | 100.0% | 105 | 100.0% | 93 | 100.0% | 116 | 100.0% | 44 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.2e. Dominant actors' in each frontline and their relation to the New Order Regime (1#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 28 | 22.6% | 7 | 13.7% | 25 | 22.6% | 13 | 21.7% | 14 | 22.6% | 5 | 13.5% | 31 | 26.3% |
| 2 | New elites | 56 | 45.2% | 31 | 60.8% | 70 | 61.3% | 24 | 40.0% | 38 | 61.3% | 10 | 27.0% | 51 | 43.2% |
| 3 | Unknown | 40 | 32.3% | 13 | 25.5% | 37 | 16.1% | 23 | 38.3% | 10 | 16.1% | 22 | 59.5% | 36 | 30.5% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 100.0% | 51 | 100.0% | 132 | 100.0% | 60 | 100.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 37 | 100.0% | 118 | 100.0% |

(continue to below)

Table Q3.2e. Dominant actors' in each frontline and their relation to the New Order Regime (2#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|----------------------------------|---|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 44 | 33.8% | 17 | 32.7% | 6 | 31.6% | 24 | 22.9% | 16 | 17.2% | 37 | 31.9% | 12 | 27.3% |
| 2 | New elites | 58 | 44.6% | 19 | 36.5% | 7 | 36.8% | 46 | 43.8% | 48 | 51.6% | 55 | 47.4% | 22 | 50.0% |
| 3 | Unknown | 28 | 21.5% | 16 | 30.8% | 6 | 31.6% | 35 | 33.3% | 29 | 31.2% | 24 | 20.7% | 10 | 22.7% |
| TOTAL | | 130 | 100.0% | 52 | 100.0% | 19 | 100.0% | 105 | 100.0% | 93 | 100.0% | 116 | 100.0% | 44 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.2f. Dominant actors' in each frontline and their business ownership (1#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Large scale | 59 | 47.6% | 19 | 37.3% | 46 | 46.8% | 35 | 58.3% | 29 | 46.8% | 10 | 27.0% | 35 | 29.7% |
| 2 | Medium/Small scale | 3 | 2.4% | 4 | 7.8% | 8 | 3.2% | 2 | 3.3% | 2 | 3.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 10 | 8.5% |
| 3 | Have not own business | 32 | 25.8% | 23 | 45.1% | 41 | 37.1% | 13 | 21.7% | 23 | 37.1% | 9 | 24.3% | 36 | 30.5% |
| 4 | Unknown | 30 | 24.2% | 5 | 9.8% | 37 | 12.9% | 10 | 16.7% | 8 | 12.9% | 18 | 48.6% | 37 | 31.4% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 100.0% | 51 | 100.0% | 132 | 100.0% | 60 | 100.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 37 | 100.0% | 118 | 100.0% |

(continue to below)

Table Q3.2f. Dominant actors' in each frontline and their business ownership (2#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|----------------------------------|---|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 43 | 33.1% | 20 | 38.5% | 10 | 52.6% | 42 | 40.0% | 28 | 30.1% | 49 | 42.2% | 16 | 36.4% |
| 2 | New elites | 8 | 6.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 6 | 31.6% | 5 | 4.8% | 6 | 6.5% | 3 | 2.6% | 1 | 2.3% |
| 3 | Have not own business | 54 | 41.5% | 25 | 48.1% | 3 | 15.8% | 33 | 31.4% | 28 | 30.1% | 46 | 39.7% | 16 | 36.4% |
| 4 | Unknown | 25 | 19.2% | 7 | 13.5% | 0 | 0.0% | 25 | 23.8% | 31 | 33.3% | 18 | 15.5% | 11 | 25.0% |
| TOTAL | | 130 | 100.0% | 52 | 100.0% | 19 | 100.0% | 105 | 100.0% | 93 | 100.0% | 116 | 100.0% | 44 | 100.0% |

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important sub-ordinated (alternative actors) in favor of change and more popular control of public affairs in your town/district? (Please mention two actors)

Table Q3.3a. Alternative actors

| NO | CURRENT POSITION OF ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | F | % |
|--------------|---|-------------|---------------|
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 79 | 7.3% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 66 | 6.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 21 | 1.9% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 18 | 1.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 35 | 3.2% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 43 | 4.0% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 394 | 36.5% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 92 | 8.5% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 78 | 7.2% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 2 | 0.2% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 1 | 0.1% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 126 | 11.7% |
| 13 | Unknown | 124 | 11.5% |
| TOTAL | | 1079 | 100.0% |

Table Q3.3b. Dominant actors' relation to the New Order Regime

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTOR'S CURRENT POSITION | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | | |
|--------------|---|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | OLD ELITE | NEW ELITE | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 12.7% | 59.5% | 27.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 10.6% | 57.6% | 31.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 14.3% | 76.2% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 5.6% | 72.2% | 22.2% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 91.4% | 8.6% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 14.0% | 18.6% | 67.4% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 0.8% | 68.3% | 31.0% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 4.3% | 48.9% | 46.7% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 0.0% | 62.8% | 37.2% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 1.6% | 57.1% | 41.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 0.8% | 5.6% | 93.5% |
| TOTAL | | 3.6% | 55.2% | 41.1% |

Table Q3.3c. Alternative actors' business ownership

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' CURRENT POSITION | SCALE OF BUSINESS | | | |
|-------|---|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| | | LARGE SCALE | MEDIUM-SMALL BUSINESS | HAVE NOT OWN BUSINESS | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 32.9% | 8.9% | 39.2% | 19.0% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 28.8% | 7.6% | 37.9% | 25.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 19.0% | 14.3% | 57.1% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 0.0% | 22.2% | 61.1% | 16.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 2.9% | 0.0% | 88.6% | 8.6% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 79.1% | 0.0% | 2.3% | 18.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 1.8% | 1.5% | 61.7% | 35.0% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 20.7% | 3.3% | 39.1% | 37.0% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 10.3% | 1.3% | 76.9% | 11.5% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 50.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 13.1% | 1.6% | 39.3% | 45.9% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 10.9% | 5.5% | 21.1% | 62.5% |
| 13 | Unknown | 11.1% | 2.6% | 44.3% | 42.0% |
| TOTAL | | 13.6% | 4.0% | 44.8% | 37.5% |

Table Q3.3d. Current positions of the alternative actors in each frontline (1#2)

| NO | CURRENT POSITION | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|---|-------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|--|--------|---------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|--------|---|-------|--|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 16 | 12.9% | 5 | 9.8% | 12 | 9.1% | 3 | 5.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 11 | 9.3% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 6 | 4.8% | 3 | 5.9% | 4 | 8.1% | 5 | 8.3% | 5 | 8.1% | 4 | 10.8% | 10 | 8.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 3 | 2.4% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 1.6% | 1 | 1.7% | 1 | 1.6% | 0 | 0.0% | 5 | 4.2% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 2 | 1.6% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.7% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.8% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 4 | 3.2% | 3 | 5.9% | 1 | 1.6% | 2 | 3.3% | 1 | 1.6% | 2 | 5.4% | 3 | 2.5% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 10 | 8.1% | 1 | 2.0% | 4 | 3.2% | 5 | 8.3% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 2 | 1.7% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 35 | 28.2% | 24 | 47.1% | 48 | 58.1% | 19 | 31.7% | 36 | 58.1% | 7 | 18.9% | 41 | 34.7% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 8 | 6.5% | 3 | 5.9% | 11 | 6.5% | 9 | 15.0% | 4 | 6.5% | 0 | 0.0% | 5 | 4.2% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 4 | 3.2% | 2 | 3.9% | 5 | 0.0% | 2 | 3.3% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 2.7% | 7 | 5.9% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.8% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 13 | 10.5% | 4 | 7.8% | 16 | 8.1% | 2 | 3.3% | 5 | 8.1% | 9 | 24.3% | 12 | 10.2% |
| 13 | Unknown | 17 | 13.7% | 3 | 5.9% | 17 | 9.7% | 8 | 13.3% | 6 | 9.7% | 3 | 8.1% | 13 | 11.0% |
| TOTAL | | 118 | 95.2% | 48 | 94.1% | 122 | 100.0% | 57 | 95.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 28 | 75.7% | 111 | 94.1% |

(continue to next page)

Table Q3.3d. Current positions of the alternative actors in each frontline (2#2)

| NO | CURRENT POSITION | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI- CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|---|--|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|--|-------|---|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 6 | 4.6% | 4 | 7.7% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 2.9% | 6 | 6.5% | 9 | 7.8% | 1 | 2.3% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 5 | 3.8% | 4 | 7.7% | 1 | 5.3% | 4 | 3.8% | 4 | 4.3% | 9 | 7.8% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 1 | 0.8% | 1 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 1.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 1.7% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 5 | 3.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 2.9% | 3 | 3.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 5 | 3.8% | 4 | 7.7% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 1.9% | 2 | 2.2% | 6 | 5.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 9 | 6.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 3.8% | 2 | 2.2% | 1 | 0.9% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 30 | 23.1% | 16 | 30.8% | 9 | 47.4% | 42 | 40.0% | 41 | 44.1% | 37 | 31.9% | 9 | 20.5% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 12 | 9.2% | 4 | 7.7% | 0 | 0.0% | 14 | 13.3% | 7 | 7.5% | 12 | 10.3% | 3 | 6.8% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 19 | 14.6% | 7 | 13.5% | 2 | 10.5% | 8 | 7.6% | 5 | 5.4% | 5 | 4.3% | 11 | 25.0% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 2 | 1.5% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 18 | 13.8% | 5 | 9.6% | 1 | 5.3% | 10 | 9.5% | 11 | 11.8% | 16 | 13.8% | 4 | 9.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 12 | 9.2% | 5 | 9.6% | 3 | 15.8% | 10 | 9.5% | 10 | 10.8% | 14 | 12.1% | 3 | 6.8% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 95.4% | 50 | 96.2% | 16 | 84.2% | 102 | 97.1% | 91 | 97.8% | 111 | 95.7% | 39 | 88.6% |

Table Q3.3e. Alternative actors' in each frontline and their relation to the New Order Regime (1#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 6 | 4.8% | 1 | 2.0% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 1.7% | 2 | 3.2% | 1 | 2.7% | 6 | 5.1% |
| 2 | New elites | 55 | 44.4% | 31 | 60.8% | 65 | 67.7% | 26 | 43.3% | 42 | 67.7% | 11 | 29.7% | 62 | 52.5% |
| 3 | Unknown | 57 | 46.0% | 16 | 31.4% | 55 | 29.0% | 30 | 50.0% | 18 | 29.0% | 16 | 43.2% | 43 | 36.4% |
| TOTAL | | 118 | 95.2% | 48 | 94.1% | 122 | 100.0% | 57 | 95.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 28 | 75.7% | 111 | 94.1% |

(continue to below)

Table Q3.3e. Alternative actors' in each frontline and their relation to the New Order Regime (2#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|----------------------------------|---|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 8 | 6.2% | 2 | 3.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 2.9% | 4 | 4.3% | 3 | 2.6% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 2 | New elites | 76 | 58.5% | 24 | 46.2% | 13 | 68.4% | 51 | 48.6% | 57 | 61.3% | 64 | 55.2% | 19 | 43.2% |
| 3 | Unknown | 40 | 30.8% | 24 | 46.2% | 3 | 15.8% | 48 | 45.7% | 30 | 32.3% | 44 | 37.9% | 20 | 45.5% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 95.4% | 50 | 96.2% | 16 | 84.2% | 102 | 97.1% | 91 | 97.8% | 111 | 95.7% | 39 | 88.6% |

Table Q3.3f. Alternative actors' in each frontline and their business ownership (1#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: EDUCATION | | FRONTLINE: HEALTH | | FRONTLINE: ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT | | FRONTLINE: LABOR MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: INFORMAL SECTORS | | FRONTLINE: AGRARIAN AND LAND REFORM | | FRONTLINE: WOMEN AND CHILDREN RIGHTS | |
|-------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Large scale | 27 | 21.8% | 10 | 19.6% | 12 | 8.1% | 10 | 16.7% | 5 | 8.1% | 4 | 10.8% | 10 | 8.5% |
| 2 | Medium/Small scale | 5 | 4.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 3.2% | 4 | 6.7% | 2 | 3.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 2.5% |
| 3 | Have not own business | 37 | 29.8% | 20 | 39.2% | 51 | 46.8% | 20 | 33.3% | 29 | 46.8% | 5 | 13.5% | 58 | 49.2% |
| 4 | Unknown | 49 | 39.5% | 18 | 35.3% | 55 | 41.9% | 23 | 38.3% | 26 | 41.9% | 19 | 51.4% | 40 | 33.9% |
| TOTAL | | 118 | 95.2% | 48 | 94.1% | 122 | 100.0% | 57 | 95.0% | 62 | 100.0% | 28 | 75.7% | 111 | 94.1% |

(continue to below)

Table Q3.3f. Alternative actors' in each frontline and their business ownership (2#2)

| NO | RELATION TO THE NEW ORDER REGIME | FRONTLINE: CLAN, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS INTER-RELATION | | FRONTLINE: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA | | FRONTLINE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM | | FRONTLINE: ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT | | FRONTLINE: PARTY AND ELECTION REFORM | | FRONTLINE: BUSINESS SECTOR | |
|-------|----------------------------------|---|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|
| | | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Old elites | 14 | 10.8% | 10 | 19.2% | 1 | 5.3% | 13 | 12.4% | 7 | 7.5% | 14 | 12.1% | 3 | 6.8% |
| 2 | New elites | 6 | 4.6% | 2 | 3.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 1.9% | 5 | 5.4% | 2 | 1.7% | 2 | 4.5% |
| 3 | Have not own business | 71 | 54.6% | 24 | 46.2% | 13 | 68.4% | 49 | 46.7% | 42 | 45.2% | 62 | 53.4% | 24 | 54.5% |
| 4 | Unknown | 33 | 25.4% | 14 | 26.9% | 2 | 10.5% | 38 | 36.2% | 37 | 39.8% | 33 | 28.4% | 10 | 22.7% |
| TOTAL | | 124 | 95.4% | 50 | 96.2% | 16 | 84.2% | 102 | 97.1% | 91 | 97.8% | 111 | 95.7% | 39 | 88.6% |

E. MAIN ACTORS' RELATION TO THE MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

Q4.1. In your assessment, how do the dominant actors (Q3.2) promote the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to thus foster the issues that they give priority to (Q3.4)?

Table Q4.1a. How dominant actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to the Citizens' Rights

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | EQUAL CITIZENSHIP | | | RULE OF LAW | | | EQUAL TO JUSTICE | | | UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS | | |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 66.9% | 29.4% | 3.8% | 50.0% | 45.0% | 5.0% | 56.9% | 39.4% | 3.8% | 48.8% | 46.3% | 5.0% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 50.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 29.8% | 67.9% | 2.4% | 31.0% | 65.5% | 3.6% | 35.7% | 59.5% | 4.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 62.6% | 35.8% | 1.6% | 49.1% | 47.5% | 3.4% | 50.4% | 45.7% | 3.9% | 49.5% | 47.0% | 3.6% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 61.7% | 36.7% | 1.7% | 45.0% | 51.7% | 3.3% | 41.7% | 55.0% | 3.3% | 40.0% | 55.0% | 5.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 60.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 60.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 60.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 28.8% | 68.5% | 2.7% | 26.0% | 72.6% | 1.4% | 19.2% | 75.3% | 5.5% | 21.9% | 68.5% | 9.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 65.9% | 26.8% | 7.3% | 70.7% | 24.4% | 4.9% | 53.7% | 26.8% | 19.5% | 56.1% | 29.3% | 14.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 60.4% | 37.5% | 2.1% | 35.4% | 60.4% | 4.2% | 45.8% | 45.8% | 8.3% | 45.8% | 47.9% | 6.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 76.2% | 19.0% | 4.8% | 33.3% | 52.4% | 14.3% | 33.3% | 42.9% | 23.8% | 33.3% | 42.9% | 23.8% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 53.3% | 46.7% | 0.0% | 53.3% | 46.7% | 0.0% | 73.3% | 26.7% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 78.6% | 17.9% | 3.6% | 64.3% | 25.0% | 10.7% | 64.3% | 28.6% | 7.1% | 46.4% | 46.4% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 68.9% | 24.4% | 6.7% | 57.8% | 35.6% | 6.7% | 57.8% | 28.9% | 13.3% | 55.6% | 31.1% | 13.3% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 60.8% | 36.8% | 2.4% | 46.8% | 49.3% | 3.9% | 47.9% | 46.6% | 5.4% | 45.8% | 48.6% | 5.6% |

Table Q4.1b. How dominant actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to the Representation

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION | | | CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | INSTITUTIONALIZED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE-BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | LOCAL DEMOCRACY | | | DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION | | |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|--|----------------|-----------|--|----------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|-----------|---|----------------|-----------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 65.6% | 31.3% | 3.1% | 60.0% | 36.9% | 3.1% | 58.8% | 39.4% | 1.9% | 57.5% | 38.1% | 4.4% | 51.3% | 46.3% | 2.5% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 46.4% | 50.0% | 3.6% | 39.3% | 56.0% | 4.8% | 35.7% | 57.1% | 7.1% | 44.0% | 50.0% | 6.0% | 29.8% | 65.5% | 4.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 54.8% | 40.9% | 4.3% | 54.3% | 42.0% | 3.7% | 48.6% | 47.5% | 3.9% | 48.2% | 47.5% | 4.3% | 48.2% | 47.5% | 4.3% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 36.7% | 56.7% | 6.7% | 51.7% | 41.7% | 6.7% | 43.3% | 50.0% | 6.7% | 33.3% | 60.0% | 6.7% | 30.0% | 63.3% | 6.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 21.9% | 69.9% | 8.2% | 26.0% | 69.9% | 4.1% | 28.8% | 64.4% | 6.8% | 21.9% | 64.4% | 13.7% | 16.4% | 71.2% | 12.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 51.2% | 34.1% | 14.6% | 61.0% | 26.8% | 12.2% | 53.7% | 29.3% | 17.1% | 51.2% | 34.1% | 14.6% | 41.5% | 43.9% | 14.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 39.6% | 52.1% | 8.3% | 47.9% | 45.8% | 6.3% | 35.4% | 56.3% | 8.3% | 33.3% | 60.4% | 6.3% | 37.5% | 54.2% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 38.1% | 38.1% | 23.8% | 38.1% | 38.1% | 23.8% | 33.3% | 42.9% | 23.8% | 47.6% | 23.8% | 28.6% | 42.9% | 33.3% | 23.8% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% | 46.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 53.3% | 46.7% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 60.7% | 28.6% | 10.7% | 64.3% | 28.6% | 7.1% | 50.0% | 39.3% | 10.7% | 53.6% | 39.3% | 7.1% | 57.1% | 35.7% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 53.3% | 35.6% | 11.1% | 51.1% | 40.0% | 8.9% | 46.7% | 44.4% | 8.9% | 60.0% | 28.9% | 11.1% | 53.3% | 35.6% | 11.1% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 51.1% | 43.2% | 5.7% | 51.6% | 43.5% | 4.9% | 46.4% | 48.1% | 5.5% | 46.6% | 47.1% | 6.3% | 43.9% | 50.2% | 5.9% |

Table Q4.1c. How dominant actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to Governance

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE | | | GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|----------------|-------------|--|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 50.6% | 46.3% | 3.1% | 44.4% | 52.5% | 3.1% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 38.1% | 57.1% | 4.8% | 25.0% | 70.2% | 4.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 53.2% | 43.8% | 3.0% | 42.7% | 54.1% | 3.2% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 41.7% | 50.0% | 8.3% | 36.7% | 58.3% | 5.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 17.8% | 75.3% | 6.8% | 23.3% | 71.2% | 5.5% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 58.5% | 24.4% | 17.1% | 51.2% | 34.1% | 14.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 45.8% | 45.8% | 8.3% | 43.8% | 47.9% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 33.3% | 42.9% | 23.8% | 19.0% | 57.1% | 23.8% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% | 33.3% | 66.7% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 53.6% | 35.7% | 10.7% | 50.0% | 42.9% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 60.0% | 31.1% | 8.9% | 40.0% | 51.1% | 8.9% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 48.1% | 46.7% | 5.2% | 39.8% | 55.4% | 4.8% |

Table Q4.1d. How dominant actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to Civil Society

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSES | | | DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS' SELF-ORGANIZING | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|----------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 44.4% | 52.5% | 3.1% | 53.8% | 42.5% | 3.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 25.0% | 70.2% | 4.8% | 44.0% | 50.0% | 6.0% |
| 3 | Public official | 42.7% | 54.1% | 3.2% | 56.8% | 39.9% | 3.4% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 36.7% | 58.3% | 5.0% | 41.7% | 53.3% | 5.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 23.3% | 71.2% | 5.5% | 21.9% | 69.9% | 8.2% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 51.2% | 34.1% | 14.6% | 58.5% | 24.4% | 17.1% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 43.8% | 47.9% | 8.3% | 56.3% | 37.5% | 6.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 19.0% | 57.1% | 23.8% | 38.1% | 38.1% | 23.8% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 33.3% | 66.7% | 0.0% | 33.3% | 66.7% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 50.0% | 42.9% | 7.1% | 60.7% | 28.6% | 10.7% |
| 13 | Unknown | 40.0% | 51.1% | 8.9% | 55.6% | 33.3% | 11.1% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 39.8% | 55.4% | 4.8% | 51.7% | 42.9% | 5.4% |

Q4.2. In your assessment, how do the alternative actors (Q3.3) promote the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to thus foster the issues that they give priority to (Q3.5)?

Table Q4.2a. How the alternative actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to the Citizens' Rights

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | EQUAL CITIZENSHIP | | | RULE OF LAW | | | EQUAL TO JUSTICE | | | UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS | | |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 70.9% | 26.6% | 2.5% | 50.6% | 41.8% | 7.6% | 55.7% | 35.4% | 8.9% | 51.9% | 39.2% | 8.9% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 65.2% | 31.8% | 3.0% | 65.2% | 30.3% | 4.5% | 63.6% | 31.8% | 4.5% | 57.6% | 37.9% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 47.6% | 47.6% | 4.8% | 23.8% | 61.9% | 14.3% | 47.6% | 38.1% | 14.3% | 42.9% | 47.6% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 61.1% | 38.9% | 0.0% | 55.6% | 44.4% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 33.3% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 85.7% | 14.3% | 0.0% | 85.7% | 14.3% | 0.0% | 74.3% | 25.7% | 0.0% | 74.3% | 25.7% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 41.9% | 48.8% | 9.3% | 37.2% | 51.2% | 11.6% | 46.5% | 44.2% | 9.3% | 34.9% | 55.8% | 9.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 81.5% | 15.7% | 2.8% | 73.6% | 22.8% | 3.6% | 76.9% | 19.8% | 3.3% | 75.1% | 21.6% | 3.3% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 66.3% | 30.4% | 3.3% | 57.6% | 38.0% | 4.3% | 68.5% | 26.1% | 5.4% | 64.1% | 31.5% | 4.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 59.0% | 37.2% | 3.8% | 42.3% | 53.8% | 3.8% | 55.1% | 42.3% | 2.6% | 48.7% | 48.7% | 2.6% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 80.2% | 11.9% | 7.9% | 71.4% | 22.2% | 6.3% | 78.6% | 13.5% | 7.9% | 76.2% | 15.9% | 7.9% |
| 13 | Unknown | 66.1% | 25.0% | 8.9% | 56.5% | 33.9% | 9.7% | 65.3% | 25.0% | 9.7% | 62.9% | 27.4% | 9.7% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 72.2% | 23.4% | 4.4% | 63.0% | 31.6% | 5.4% | 68.9% | 25.7% | 5.5% | 65.3% | 29.4% | 5.3% |

Table Q4.2b. How the alternative actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to the Representation

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION | | | CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | INSTITUTIONALIZED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE-BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | LOCAL DEMOCRACY | | | DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION | | |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|--|----------------|-----------|--|----------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|-----------|---|----------------|-----------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 60.8% | 30.4% | 8.9% | 57.0% | 34.2% | 8.9% | 41.8% | 46.8% | 11.4% | 49.4% | 41.8% | 8.9% | 40.5% | 51.9% | 7.6% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 63.6% | 30.3% | 6.1% | 59.1% | 34.8% | 6.1% | 50.0% | 42.4% | 7.6% | 65.2% | 30.3% | 4.5% | 53.0% | 40.9% | 6.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 38.1% | 47.6% | 14.3% | 33.3% | 57.1% | 9.5% | 42.9% | 42.9% | 14.3% | 38.1% | 47.6% | 14.3% | 28.6% | 61.9% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 50.0% | 44.4% | 5.6% | 61.1% | 33.3% | 5.6% | 72.2% | 22.2% | 5.6% | 50.0% | 44.4% | 5.6% | 55.6% | 38.9% | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 74.3% | 25.7% | 0.0% | 74.3% | 25.7% | 0.0% | 77.1% | 22.9% | 0.0% | 60.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% | 62.9% | 37.1% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 34.9% | 53.5% | 11.6% | 37.2% | 46.5% | 16.3% | 41.9% | 41.9% | 16.3% | 27.9% | 55.8% | 16.3% | 34.9% | 53.5% | 11.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 58.9% | 36.5% | 4.6% | 76.4% | 20.1% | 3.6% | 69.3% | 26.4% | 4.3% | 64.2% | 31.5% | 4.3% | 62.7% | 32.7% | 4.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 53.3% | 38.0% | 8.7% | 64.1% | 28.3% | 7.6% | 54.3% | 37.0% | 8.7% | 45.7% | 44.6% | 9.8% | 43.5% | 46.7% | 9.8% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 34.6% | 59.0% | 6.4% | 43.6% | 50.0% | 6.4% | 37.2% | 57.7% | 5.1% | 39.7% | 55.1% | 5.1% | 48.7% | 46.2% | 5.1% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 69.0% | 22.2% | 8.7% | 73.8% | 20.6% | 5.6% | 63.5% | 29.4% | 7.1% | 62.7% | 27.8% | 9.5% | 64.3% | 26.2% | 9.5% |
| 13 | Unknown | 56.5% | 32.3% | 11.3% | 55.6% | 33.1% | 11.3% | 49.2% | 38.7% | 12.1% | 45.2% | 42.7% | 12.1% | 47.6% | 38.7% | 13.7% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 56.8% | 36.1% | 7.0% | 64.9% | 28.8% | 6.3% | 58.0% | 34.8% | 7.2% | 55.0% | 37.8% | 7.2% | 54.2% | 38.6% | 7.2% |

Table Q4.2c. How the alternative actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to Governance

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE | | | GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|----------------|-------------|--|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 53.2% | 38.0% | 8.9% | 32.9% | 57.0% | 10.1% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 65.2% | 30.3% | 4.5% | 43.9% | 50.0% | 6.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 47.6% | 38.1% | 14.3% | 28.6% | 61.9% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 55.6% | 38.9% | 5.6% | 50.0% | 44.4% | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 80.0% | 20.0% | 0.0% | 65.7% | 34.3% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 25.6% | 60.5% | 14.0% | 30.2% | 53.5% | 16.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 72.8% | 23.6% | 3.6% | 58.4% | 36.8% | 4.8% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 59.8% | 30.4% | 9.8% | 45.7% | 45.7% | 8.7% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 37.2% | 57.7% | 5.1% | 35.9% | 59.0% | 5.1% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 73.0% | 17.5% | 9.5% | 60.3% | 29.4% | 10.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 50.8% | 35.5% | 13.7% | 41.9% | 41.9% | 16.1% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 62.1% | 30.9% | 7.0% | 49.5% | 42.5% | 8.0% |

Table Q4.2d. How the alternative actors promote the rules and regulations with regard to Civil Society

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSES | | | DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS' SELF-ORGANIZING | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|----------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer | Frequently promote | Rarely promote | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 46.8% | 46.8% | 6.3% | 57.0% | 35.4% | 7.6% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 54.5% | 40.9% | 4.5% | 56.1% | 39.4% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 52.4% | 33.3% | 14.3% | 57.1% | 28.6% | 14.3% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 66.7% | 22.2% | 11.1% | 50.0% | 38.9% | 11.1% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 80.0% | 20.0% | 0.0% | 71.4% | 28.6% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 32.6% | 53.5% | 14.0% | 25.6% | 58.1% | 16.3% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 68.8% | 26.4% | 4.8% | 70.1% | 26.4% | 3.6% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 53.3% | 37.0% | 9.8% | 60.9% | 29.3% | 9.8% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 43.6% | 51.3% | 5.1% | 46.2% | 48.7% | 5.1% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 66.7% | 23.0% | 10.3% | 67.5% | 23.0% | 9.5% |
| 13 | Unknown | 50.0% | 36.3% | 13.7% | 61.3% | 27.4% | 11.3% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 59.1% | 33.4% | 7.5% | 61.9% | 31.2% | 6.9% |

Q4.3. In your assessment, how do the dominant actors (Q3.2) abuse or avoid the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to thus foster the issues that they give priority to (Q3.4)?

Table Q4.3a. How the dominant actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to the Citizens' Rights

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | EQUAL CITIZENSHIP | | | RULE OF LAW | | | EQUAL TO JUSTICE | | | UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS | | |
|----------------------------|---|-------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 30.0% | 66.3% | 3.8% | 26.9% | 67.5% | 5.6% | 25.6% | 68.8% | 5.6% | 23.1% | 71.9% | 5.0% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 47.6% | 48.8% | 3.6% | 39.3% | 52.4% | 8.3% | 45.2% | 46.4% | 8.3% | 41.7% | 51.2% | 7.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 38.3% | 57.7% | 4.1% | 29.9% | 64.8% | 5.3% | 35.2% | 58.9% | 5.9% | 29.9% | 64.6% | 5.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 33.3% | 55.0% | 11.7% | 25.0% | 63.3% | 11.7% | 25.0% | 65.0% | 10.0% | 16.7% | 71.7% | 11.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 47.9% | 46.6% | 5.5% | 41.1% | 50.7% | 8.2% | 43.8% | 45.2% | 11.0% | 41.1% | 47.9% | 11.0% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 9.8% | 78.0% | 12.2% | 0.0% | 85.4% | 14.6% | 9.8% | 82.9% | 7.3% | 12.2% | 80.5% | 7.3% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 31.3% | 58.3% | 10.4% | 20.8% | 70.8% | 8.3% | 29.2% | 64.6% | 6.3% | 16.7% | 75.0% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 23.8% | 57.1% | 19.0% | 19.0% | 61.9% | 19.0% | 19.0% | 61.9% | 19.0% | 9.5% | 71.4% | 19.0% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 33.3% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 39.3% | 57.1% | 3.6% | 28.6% | 60.7% | 10.7% | 28.6% | 60.7% | 10.7% | 21.4% | 64.3% | 14.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 37.8% | 53.3% | 8.9% | 26.7% | 62.2% | 11.1% | 42.2% | 51.1% | 6.7% | 31.1% | 57.8% | 11.1% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 36.5% | 58.1% | 5.4% | 28.9% | 64.0% | 7.1% | 33.2% | 59.8% | 6.9% | 28.5% | 64.5% | 7.0% |

Table Q4.3b. How the dominant actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to the Representation

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION | | | CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | INSTITUTIONALIZED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE-BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | LOCAL DEMOCRACY | | | DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION | | |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|------------------|--------------|-----------|---|--------------|-----------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 34.4% | 61.9% | 3.8% | 30.6% | 65.6% | 3.8% | 25.6% | 70.0% | 4.4% | 21.9% | 72.5% | 5.6% | 30.0% | 65.6% | 4.4% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 45.2% | 46.4% | 8.3% | 44.0% | 47.6% | 8.3% | 31.0% | 60.7% | 8.3% | 31.0% | 61.9% | 7.1% | 40.5% | 52.4% | 7.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 35.6% | 58.5% | 5.9% | 34.3% | 60.0% | 5.7% | 28.5% | 65.7% | 5.9% | 24.9% | 67.8% | 7.3% | 30.6% | 64.1% | 5.3% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 13.3% | 75.0% | 11.7% | 26.7% | 61.7% | 11.7% | 18.3% | 71.7% | 10.0% | 16.7% | 70.0% | 13.3% | 16.7% | 71.7% | 11.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 41.1% | 46.6% | 12.3% | 35.6% | 54.8% | 9.6% | 31.5% | 57.5% | 11.0% | 26.0% | 60.3% | 13.7% | 37.0% | 53.4% | 9.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 4.9% | 85.4% | 9.8% | 4.9% | 85.4% | 9.8% | 0.0% | 90.2% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 80.5% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 78.0% | 12.2% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 31.3% | 58.3% | 10.4% | 25.0% | 64.6% | 10.4% | 27.1% | 62.5% | 10.4% | 22.9% | 66.7% | 10.4% | 25.0% | 66.7% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 19.0% | 66.7% | 14.3% | 19.0% | 66.7% | 14.3% | 9.5% | 76.2% | 14.3% | 4.8% | 81.0% | 14.3% | 14.3% | 71.4% | 14.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 46.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 20.0% | 80.0% | 0.0% | 46.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 46.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 60.0% | 40.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 25.0% | 64.3% | 10.7% | 17.9% | 75.0% | 7.1% | 21.4% | 67.9% | 10.7% | 21.4% | 64.3% | 14.3% | 28.6% | 64.3% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 31.1% | 57.8% | 11.1% | 31.1% | 57.8% | 11.1% | 37.8% | 51.1% | 11.1% | 31.1% | 57.8% | 11.1% | 28.9% | 57.8% | 13.3% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 33.3% | 59.5% | 7.2% | 31.7% | 61.5% | 6.8% | 26.9% | 66.1% | 7.1% | 24.0% | 67.7% | 8.3% | 29.8% | 63.4% | 6.7% |

Table Q4.3c. How the dominant actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to Governance

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE | | | GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|--------------|-------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 30.0% | 65.0% | 5.0% | 29.4% | 66.9% | 3.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 48.8% | 45.2% | 6.0% | 41.7% | 51.2% | 7.1% |
| 3 | Public official | 40.0% | 54.6% | 5.3% | 37.7% | 57.3% | 5.0% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 35.0% | 55.0% | 10.0% | 23.3% | 65.0% | 11.7% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 35.6% | 56.2% | 8.2% | 39.7% | 52.1% | 8.2% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 7.3% | 82.9% | 9.8% | 0.0% | 87.8% | 12.2% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 29.2% | 62.5% | 8.3% | 29.2% | 62.5% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 19.0% | 66.7% | 14.3% | 23.8% | 61.9% | 14.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 66.7% | 33.3% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 25.0% | 67.9% | 7.1% | 21.4% | 71.4% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 26.7% | 64.4% | 8.9% | 31.1% | 60.0% | 8.9% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 36.0% | 57.7% | 6.3% | 33.5% | 60.3% | 6.2% |

Table Q4.3d. How dominant actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to Civil Society

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSES | | | DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS' SELF-ORGANIZING | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|--------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 20.6% | 76.3% | 3.1% | 18.8% | 77.5% | 3.8% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 28.6% | 64.3% | 7.1% | 28.6% | 65.5% | 6.0% |
| 3 | Public official | 19.6% | 74.7% | 5.7% | 19.8% | 74.6% | 5.7% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 18.3% | 68.3% | 13.3% | 16.7% | 70.0% | 13.3% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/ Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 32.9% | 58.9% | 8.2% | 31.5% | 63.0% | 5.5% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 0.0% | 90.2% | 9.8% | 2.4% | 87.8% | 9.8% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 16.7% | 75.0% | 8.3% | 16.7% | 75.0% | 8.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 19.0% | 61.9% | 19.0% | 9.5% | 76.2% | 14.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 46.7% | 53.3% | 0.0% | 40.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 17.9% | 71.4% | 10.7% | 14.3% | 71.4% | 14.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 24.4% | 66.7% | 8.9% | 20.0% | 71.1% | 8.9% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 20.8% | 72.5% | 6.6% | 20.0% | 73.5% | 6.5% |

Q4.4. In your assessment, how do the alternative actors (Q3.3) abuse or avoid the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to thus foster the issues that they give priority to (Q3.5)?

Table Q4.4a. How the alternative actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to the Citizens' Rights

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | EQUAL CITIZENSHIP | | | RULE OF LAW | | | EQUAL TO JUSTICE | | | UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS | | |
|-------------------------------|---|-------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 7.6% | 88.6% | 3.8% | 2.5% | 91.1% | 6.3% | 3.8% | 88.6% | 7.6% | 3.8% | 88.6% | 7.6% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 15.2% | 78.8% | 6.1% | 9.1% | 86.4% | 4.5% | 12.1% | 81.8% | 6.1% | 9.1% | 86.4% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 14.3% | 76.2% | 9.5% | 14.3% | 76.2% | 9.5% | 4.8% | 85.7% | 9.5% | 14.3% | 76.2% | 9.5% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 16.7% | 83.3% | 0.0% | 11.1% | 83.3% | 5.6% | 11.1% | 83.3% | 5.6% | 11.1% | 83.3% | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 5.7% | 94.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 11.6% | 74.4% | 14.0% | 4.7% | 83.7% | 11.6% | 9.3% | 79.1% | 11.6% | 2.3% | 86.0% | 11.6% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 10.9% | 87.1% | 2.0% | 6.1% | 90.4% | 3.6% | 6.3% | 90.4% | 3.3% | 4.8% | 92.1% | 3.0% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 12.0% | 79.3% | 8.7% | 6.5% | 83.7% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 79.3% | 10.9% | 7.6% | 82.6% | 9.8% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 5.1% | 92.3% | 2.6% | 5.1% | 93.6% | 1.3% | 5.1% | 92.3% | 2.6% | 3.8% | 94.9% | 1.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 5.6% | 85.7% | 8.7% | 6.3% | 84.1% | 9.5% | 4.8% | 86.5% | 8.7% | 5.6% | 86.5% | 7.9% |
| 13 | Unknown | 8.9% | 85.5% | 5.6% | 7.3% | 86.3% | 6.5% | 11.3% | 83.1% | 5.6% | 5.6% | 87.9% | 6.5% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 9.7% | 85.5% | 4.7% | 6.1% | 88.3% | 5.6% | 7.0% | 87.3% | 5.7% | 5.4% | 89.3% | 5.3% |

Table Q4.4b. How the alternative actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to the Representation

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION | | | CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | INSTITUTIONALIZED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE-BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE | | | LOCAL DEMOCRACY | | | DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION | | |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|------------------|--------------|-----------|---|--------------|-----------|
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 11.4% | 81.0% | 7.6% | 5.1% | 87.3% | 7.6% | 2.5% | 89.9% | 7.6% | 3.8% | 88.6% | 7.6% | 2.5% | 89.9% | 7.6% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 19.7% | 75.8% | 4.5% | 18.2% | 77.3% | 4.5% | 12.1% | 83.3% | 4.5% | 10.6% | 84.8% | 4.5% | 13.6% | 81.8% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 19.0% | 76.2% | 4.8% | 14.3% | 76.2% | 9.5% | 23.8% | 66.7% | 9.5% | 9.5% | 85.7% | 4.8% | 9.5% | 85.7% | 4.8% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 5.6% | 88.9% | 5.6% | 11.1% | 83.3% | 5.6% | 5.6% | 88.9% | 5.6% | 5.6% | 88.9% | 5.6% | 16.7% | 77.8% | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 2.9% | 97.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 14.0% | 74.4% | 11.6% | 14.0% | 76.7% | 9.3% | 16.3% | 74.4% | 9.3% | 9.3% | 79.1% | 11.6% | 16.3% | 76.7% | 7.0% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 9.4% | 87.3% | 3.3% | 5.8% | 91.1% | 3.0% | 6.6% | 90.1% | 3.3% | 5.1% | 91.6% | 3.3% | 5.1% | 91.9% | 3.0% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 5.4% | 83.7% | 10.9% | 8.7% | 80.4% | 10.9% | 10.9% | 79.3% | 9.8% | 5.4% | 83.7% | 10.9% | 5.4% | 87.0% | 7.6% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 10.3% | 88.5% | 1.3% | 2.6% | 96.2% | 1.3% | 3.8% | 94.9% | 1.3% | 5.1% | 93.6% | 1.3% | 2.6% | 96.2% | 1.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 7.1% | 84.1% | 8.7% | 5.6% | 86.5% | 7.9% | 5.6% | 85.7% | 8.7% | 6.3% | 84.1% | 9.5% | 4.0% | 87.3% | 8.7% |
| 13 | Unknown | 12.9% | 79.8% | 7.3% | 8.1% | 84.7% | 7.3% | 8.1% | 85.5% | 6.5% | 4.8% | 87.1% | 8.1% | 7.3% | 86.3% | 6.5% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 10.0% | 84.4% | 5.6% | 7.1% | 87.5% | 5.4% | 7.4% | 87.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 88.7% | 5.7% | 5.9% | 89.2% | 4.9% |

Table Q4.4c. How the alternative actors abuse or avoid the rules and regulations with regard to the Governance and Civil Society

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE GOVERNANCE | | | | | | CIVIL SOCIETY | | |
|------------------------|---|---|--------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|---|--------------|-----------|
| | | TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE | | | GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM | | | FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSES | | |
| | | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer | Frequently abuse | Rarely abuse | No answer |
| 1 | Member of national/local parliament | 10.1% | 81.0% | 8.9% | 11.4% | 81.0% | 7.6% | 3.8% | 88.6% | 7.6% |
| 2 | Party leader/prominent figure | 16.7% | 78.8% | 4.5% | 19.7% | 75.8% | 4.5% | 9.1% | 86.4% | 4.5% |
| 3 | Public official | 23.8% | 71.4% | 4.8% | 23.8% | 71.4% | 4.8% | 14.3% | 81.0% | 4.8% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 11.1% | 83.3% | 5.6% | 22.2% | 72.2% | 5.6% | 16.7% | 77.8% | 5.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 5.7% | 94.3% | 0.0% | 2.9% | 97.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 6 | Businessman/Entrepreneur | 9.3% | 83.7% | 7.0% | 16.3% | 76.7% | 7.0% | 4.7% | 88.4% | 7.0% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 6.6% | 90.4% | 3.0% | 5.8% | 90.9% | 3.3% | 3.8% | 92.1% | 4.1% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 4.3% | 87.0% | 8.7% | 9.8% | 81.5% | 8.7% | 6.5% | 84.8% | 8.7% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 5.1% | 93.6% | 1.3% | 3.8% | 94.9% | 1.3% | 2.6% | 96.2% | 1.3% |
| 10 | Military/Police officer | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 7.1% | 84.1% | 8.7% | 3.2% | 88.1% | 8.7% | 4.0% | 88.9% | 7.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 6.5% | 87.1% | 6.5% | 8.1% | 85.5% | 6.5% | 6.5% | 87.1% | 6.5% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 7.7% | 87.2% | 5.1% | 8.2% | 86.7% | 5.1% | 4.9% | 89.9% | 5.2% |

F. ACTORS' CAPACITY

Q5.1. In your assessment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your town/district?

Table Q5.1. Methods to involve people

| NO | METHODS TO INVOLVE PEOPLE | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------|
| 1 | Politics | 498 | 39.4% |
| 2 | Economy | 361 | 28.6% |
| 3 | Social and culture | 405 | 32.0% |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 1264 | 100.0% |

Q5.2. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 include other main actors or other people?

Table Q5.2. How inclusive the actors are

| NO | ACTORS | INCLUSIVE TO OTHERS | |
|----|--------------------|---------------------|-------|
| | | <i>f</i> | %* |
| 1 | Dominant actors | 884 | 77.3% |
| 2 | Alternative actors | 868 | 80.4% |

* Percentage based on number of actors. (Dominant actors = 1143; Alternative actors=1079)

Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?**Box Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?**

Dominant and alternative actors tend to inclusive to various actors. However, there are different patterns of inclusion between dominant and alternative actors. For the dominant actors there are four patterns: first, the dominant actors most widely predominant inclusion community. That is, the dominant actors open channels so that peoples have access to it. Second, the others actors like (1) businessmen or capital owners, (2) the people who became into his circle (include succes team, advisory, internal bases, and his family), (3) bureaucracy (include SKPD-SKPD dan government), (4) the military actors, (5) legislators, (6) professional (like academisc, rector) which is often called by dominant actors, include the parties (Demokrat, PDIP, and Golkar). Third, in the civil society domain the names who called of dominant actors is; (1) traditional leaders, rate, clan, and religious like Kesultanan Ternate, Owners of the Pondok Pesantren, Tionghoa Community, Majelis Adat Aceh, (2) NGO and popular movement organisations like LSM, NGO activist, or Buruh Tani. But the number of mentoins from NGO domain is not significant. Mention more for (3) youth organisations usually called OKP. Although very minor, in this domain designation satgas and militia organisations like Pemuda Pancasila also mentions. Fourth, inclusion against associations who concern in the specific issues like Lapindo's victim, and supporting privilege. Although rarely mentions, this actors called as victim incluion from dominant actors.

Different with dominant actors, the alternative actors are more inclusive to community. Second, frequently mentioned is media, NGO, CSO, dan popular movement dan businessmen (including foreign donors). Third, peoples who became in alternative circles, and then pilgrims, member of CSO, networking, and followers. Fourth, the next variation is called bureucrate, government, public official, legislators, party politic, military, and academics. Fifth, altirnative actors also inclusion actors who have focus to spesific issues like pro- contra- regional division (pemekaran) and Lapindo's victim.

Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

Box Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people?

Dominant actors and alternative actors have similar patterns to inclusion another sector. In generally, some informants called like economic, social, culture, and politic sectors. But there are some informant explain specific sectors. First, things relating too governance like transparency, against corruption movement, budgeting, capacity building, bureaucracy, participation (involvement in the political process), regulation, programming related vision and mission of regent or mayor. Second, basic service related with citizenship right like education, licensing, property and flats, quarante of equality (including gender and child), and quarante of security, religious sector, clan, and ethnic. Fourth, things about economic development like agrarian, labor, agriculture, informal sectors. Fifth, governance areas like development study, enviromental, physical development, infrastructure, facilities and infrastructure. Sixth, specific things about interest sector from the actors (especially inclusion of the dominant actors) like imaging, project transactions, politic recruitment, relationship between party politic. Little that distinguishes between dominant patterns and alternative patterns is emergence "advocay" and "coersive actions" in the alternative actors list.

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

Table Q5.5. How exclusive the actors are

| NO | ACTORS | EXCLUSIVE TO OTHERS | |
|----|--------------------|---------------------|-------|
| | | f | %* |
| 1 | Dominant actors | 495 | 43.3% |
| 2 | Alternative actors | 242 | 22.4% |

* Percentage based on number of actors. (Dominant actors = 1143; Alternative actors=1079)

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Box Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

The process of exclusion of dominant and alternative actors is not too many, generally inclusion do to community. The pattern of dominant actors is; first, exclusion to his political opponents both individually, party politic (opposition or another party- Golkar, Demokrat), and people who have different political orientation. Second, exclusion doing to civil society like CSO, NGO and media, or spesificly called Fitra, labor community, CSO, "Pasir Besi" support for Kulonprogo case, democracy activist, agrarian activist, youth organisations. Third, government actors like bureucratic opposition, legislator, and stakeholder. Fourth, exclusion for business sectors like forestry business, and his business rivals, also traditional business sector. Fifth, individual or minority groups who have base clan, rate, religion, custom, and gender like LGBT, Tionghoa, ordinary women, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and church. Although just minority, group movement security vandals also discuss between the actors. In the alternative actors, the pattern of exclusion almost same with dominant actors. Added exclusion to budgetting mafia, radical military, another groups who have diffrent advocacy models, and exclusion to spesific policy. Nevertheless in alternative sectors there are some informant join exclusion community with any variants.

Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

Box Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people?

Nor dominant and alternative actors have same Exclusion sectors. Although from variations in terms of diversity of the sectors exclusion more done dominanttt actors. In generally dominant actors and alternative actors called public sectors, economis, social, and culture as exclusion sectors. But specifically dominant and alternative actors explpain became; first, the issue of participation- the extent to which the public is involved in decision making. Participation including words like hearing, information access, and the openness public information. Second, internal problem of government like human resources capasity, governance, mutation positions. Third, things about governance including bugdeting, transparancy, regulations and policy, also cooperation. Fourth, things related basic needs dan citizenship, also about public service like security, militarism/thuggery/violence, agrarian, wage, unemployment, trafficking, gender, relation inter clan, religion, and human rights. Fifth, things about areas and economis development like infrastructure, enviromental, regional assets, tourism, and investment. Sixth, related with actor interest, for example exclusion another actors who have different program, excluion active NGO (alternative actors answer). Seventh, specific things like Lapindo, feature, and iron sands problem in Kulonprogo.

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

Table Q5.8. Actors' attempt to overcome exclusion

| NO | ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | | f | % | F | % |
| 1 | Using patronage | 61 | 5.34% | 24 | 2.22% |
| 2 | Using money | 26 | 2.27% | 11 | 1.02% |
| 3 | Using media/information/discourses | 87 | 7.61% | 193 | 17.89% |
| 4 | Using democratic organization and institutions | 55 | 4.81% | 49 | 4.54% |
| 5 | Using coercion/intimidation | 17 | 1.49% | 5 | 0.46% |
| 6 | Using propaganda/campaign | 68 | 5.95% | 45 | 4.17% |
| 7 | Persuasive action | 278 | 24.32% | 167 | 15.48% |
| 8 | Using authority | 75 | 6.56% | 9 | 0.83% |
| 9 | To open access for public/To involve people | 76 | 6.65% | 52 | 4.82% |
| 10 | Building political image | 22 | 1.92% | 5 | 0.46% |
| 11 | Mass action/Network | 32 | 2.80% | 169 | 15.66% |
| 12 | Doing advocacy, real program | 18 | 1.57% | 45 | 4.17% |
| 13 | Others | 29 | 2.54% | 18 | 1.67% |
| 14 | Doing nothing | 74 | 6.47% | 20 | 1.85% |
| 15 | Unknown | 225 | 19.69% | 267 | 24.75% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.00% | 1079 | 100.00% |

Q5.9. In your assessment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalizing people in your town/district? (You may indicate more than one option)

Box Q5.9. Who (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalizing people in your town/district?

Other actors who did exclusion outside dominant and alternative actors are divided into three domains. First, the political arena which includes legislators like a parliament, the executive actors like a public officials such as the governor and mayor, commissioners such as the KPU and Bawaslu, members of political parties such as PDI-P, Golkar, PKS, Democrats, and the Aceh Party, a group of NGOs and organizations such as trade unions, HTI, FPI, ethnic and religious-based organizations, including NGOs also considered as opposition.

Second, the business sphere mention a name of local actors. Some of them are a big / well known companies names in the national level as Danar Hadi, Tommy Winata Group, Jusuf Kalla Group, Great Sedayu Group, Sahid Group, Clairvoyant Kingdom, Alfamart, Indomaret group, and Pertamina. On the other, also mention such as APINDO business associations, Chamber of Commerce, and Gapensi. In addition to professional associations based job-profession, ethnic-based groups such as migrant associations, unions ethnicity, and Chinese groups.

Thirdly, the people does exclusion in socio-cultural sector is who have influence, and if classified as derived from religious organizations like a Kyai, Muhammadiyah, Sinode groups, Department of Islamic Law, FBR, HTI and FPI. On the other that such as academics groups, campus movement BEM Bandung Raya, and ethnic-based groups such as the Kraton (Palace)

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do they (Q5.9) exclude people? (Please provide examples!)

Box Q5.10.

In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do they (Q5.9) exclude people?

Exclusion in politics sector is related with the first , governance such as public services performance, money-politics, policy-regulation, transparency, independency and bureaucracy. Secondly, related to practical politics such as political dynasties, parties, competition-groups opposition. Third, related to citizenship right such as religion ideology, disabilities, gender, land acquisition, ethnic minorities.

Exclusion in economic business sector is related with the first, labor right such as wages, social security, outsourcing, unilateral dismissal, leave entitlements. Secondly, related to conflict with society because of land acquisition, custom/cultural problems, community involvement in business decisions that their affect and ribbish management. Third, related to competition of bussines such as internal project local goverment (indpendence), nepotisme-project doing by their family network (child) / family member of public official, exclusion business who didn't participate in this organization that controlled by certain groups.

Exclusion in socio-cultural sector mostly struggling in religion affairs, caused by ideology (khilfiyah, syiah), differences of organization (HTI, FPI) and differences respected public figure. On the other hand, exclusion also related in discrimination ethnic and custom.

Q5.11. What kind of favors, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalized in your town/district need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

Table Q5.11. Type of rights and policies that needed to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life

| NO | RIGHTS AND POLICIES | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
|-------|--|-----------|---------|
| 1 | Special favors and preferential treatments | 201 | 34.0 |
| 2 | Rights for all | 355 | 60.0 |
| 3 | No answer | 36 | 6.0 |
| TOTAL | | 592 | 100.0 |

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them)

Table Q5.12. Prime bases of the main actors

| NO | PRIME BASES OF MAIN ACTORS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------|---------|-------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------------|
| | | Rank 1* | Rank 2* | Total responses** | Rank 1* | Rank 2* | Total responses** |
| 1 | Economic resources | 520 | 143 | 663 | 164 | 52 | 216 |
| | | 45.5% | 12.5% | 31.7% | 15.2% | 4.8% | 10.8% |
| 2 | Good contact | 363 | 398 | 761 | 567 | 316 | 883 |
| | | 31.8% | 34.8% | 36.4% | 52.5% | 29.3% | 44.3% |
| 3 | Knowledge | 95 | 263 | 358 | 270 | 501 | 771 |
| | | 8.3% | 23.0% | 17.1% | 25.0% | 46.4% | 38.7% |
| 4 | Coercive | 102 | 208 | 310 | 30 | 93 | 123 |
| | | 8.9% | 18.2% | 14.8% | 2.8% | 8.6% | 6.2% |

* Percentage based on number of actors. (Dominant actors = 1143; Alternative actors=1079)

* Rank 1 column reflects the most important resources; Percentages in rank columns based on number of actors (dominant actors = 1143, alternative actors= 1079).

** Total responses column reflects the most popular resources among others; Percentages based on number of responses.

Table Q5.12a. Prime bases of the Dominant actors

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS | ECONOMIC RESOURCES | | | GOOD CONTACT | | | KNOWLEDGE | | | COERCIVE POWER | | |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum |
| 1 | Member of national/ local parliament | 36.9% | 13.8% | 28.3% | 40.0% | 29.4% | 38.8% | 6.3% | 23.8% | 16.8% | 10.6% | 18.1% | 16.1% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 44.0% | 7.1% | 30.1% | 28.6% | 35.7% | 37.8% | 7.1% | 19.0% | 15.4% | 6.0% | 22.6% | 16.8% |
| 3 | Public official | 51.1% | 15.5% | 36.0% | 32.0% | 37.5% | 37.6% | 4.8% | 19.2% | 13.0% | 6.9% | 17.8% | 13.4% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 36.7% | 8.3% | 25.2% | 25.0% | 26.7% | 29.0% | 20.0% | 25.0% | 25.2% | 11.7% | 25.0% | 20.6% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 0.0% | 20.0% | 16.7% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 33.3% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 33.3% | 20.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 84.9% | 6.8% | 46.9% | 1.4% | 39.7% | 21.0% | 4.1% | 15.1% | 9.8% | 8.2% | 35.6% | 22.4% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 17.1% | 2.4% | 10.5% | 53.7% | 26.8% | 43.4% | 22.0% | 43.9% | 35.5% | 4.9% | 14.6% | 10.5% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 29.2% | 6.3% | 18.7% | 43.8% | 31.3% | 39.6% | 12.5% | 39.6% | 27.5% | 14.6% | 12.5% | 14.3% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 33.3% | 0.0% | 18.4% | 47.6% | 38.1% | 47.4% | 14.3% | 42.9% | 31.6% | 4.8% | 0.0% | 2.6% |
| 10 | Military/ Police officer | 20.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 6.7% | 26.7% | 16.7% | 20.0% | 33.3% | 26.7% | 53.3% | 20.0% | 36.7% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 100.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 28.6% | 7.1% | 20.4% | 28.6% | 42.9% | 40.8% | 28.6% | 32.1% | 34.7% | 3.6% | 3.6% | 4.1% |
| 13 | Unknown | 31.1% | 15.6% | 25.6% | 35.6% | 31.1% | 36.6% | 15.6% | 31.1% | 25.6% | 15.6% | 6.7% | 12.2% |
| ALL DOMINANT ACTORS | | 45.5% | 12.5% | 31.7% | 31.8% | 34.8% | 36.4% | 8.3% | 23.0% | 17.1% | 8.9% | 18.2% | 14.8% |

Table Q5.12b. Prime bases of the Alternative actors

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | ECONOMIC RESOURCES | | | GOOD CONTACT | | | KNOWLEDGE | | | COERCIVE POWER | | |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Cum |
| 1 | Member of national/ local parliament | 27.8% | 7.6% | 18.4% | 53.2% | 30.4% | 43.4% | 16.5% | 39.2% | 28.9% | 1.3% | 16.5% | 9.2% |
| 2 | Party leader/ prominent figure | 31.8% | 6.1% | 20.3% | 47.0% | 33.3% | 43.1% | 18.2% | 36.4% | 29.3% | 1.5% | 12.1% | 7.3% |
| 3 | Public official | 28.6% | 9.5% | 22.9% | 47.6% | 28.6% | 45.7% | 9.5% | 33.3% | 25.7% | 4.8% | 4.8% | 5.7% |
| 4 | Bureaucrat | 11.1% | 16.7% | 14.3% | 55.6% | 22.2% | 40.0% | 16.7% | 50.0% | 34.3% | 16.7% | 5.6% | 11.4% |
| 5 | State's auxiliary body/Commissioner | 2.9% | 5.7% | 4.3% | 68.6% | 22.9% | 46.4% | 22.9% | 68.6% | 46.4% | 2.9% | 2.9% | 2.9% |
| 6 | Businessman/ Entrepreneur | 53.5% | 11.6% | 37.8% | 20.9% | 34.9% | 32.4% | 9.3% | 25.6% | 20.3% | 7.0% | 9.3% | 9.5% |
| 7 | CSO activist | 6.6% | 3.6% | 5.5% | 57.9% | 27.2% | 46.3% | 28.9% | 48.7% | 42.3% | 2.5% | 8.1% | 5.8% |
| 8 | Public figure/Adat leader/Ethnic group leader | 16.3% | 4.3% | 12.0% | 47.8% | 21.7% | 40.5% | 20.7% | 45.7% | 38.6% | 4.3% | 10.9% | 8.9% |
| 9 | Religious leader | 14.1% | 3.8% | 9.2% | 73.1% | 16.7% | 46.1% | 10.3% | 70.5% | 41.4% | 1.3% | 5.1% | 3.3% |
| 10 | Military/ Police officer | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Militia, Preman | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | Professional, Academician | 6.3% | 3.2% | 5.1% | 34.1% | 50.0% | 45.1% | 53.2% | 31.7% | 45.5% | 1.6% | 6.3% | 4.3% |
| 13 | Unknown | 23.4% | 4.0% | 14.7% | 53.2% | 27.4% | 43.3% | 16.1% | 50.8% | 35.9% | 2.4% | 8.9% | 6.1% |
| ALL ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | | 15.2% | 4.8% | 10.8% | 52.5% | 29.3% | 44.3% | 25.0% | 46.4% | 38.7% | 2.8% | 8.6% | 6.2% |

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a legitimate and authoritative political leader?**Table Q5.13. Attempt to become legitimate and authoritative political leader**

| NO | ATTEMPT TO BECOME LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE LEADER | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | | FREQUENCY | PERCENT | FREQUENCY | PERCENT |
| 1 | Easy <i>(details in Table Q5.13a)</i> | 831 | 72.7% | 401 | 37.0% |
| 2 | Difficult <i>(details in Table Q5.13b)</i> | 294 | 25.7% | 656 | 60.9% |
| 3 | Unknown | 18 | 1.6% | 22 | 2.1% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Table Q5.13a. Factors that facilitate the actors to become legitimate and authoritative political leader

| NO | FACTORS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|---|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Active and participate in democratic organizations | 60 | 7.2% | 26 | 6.5% |
| 2 | Professional background, works, job | 30 | 3.6% | 9 | 2.2% |
| 3 | Have good capacity, knowledge, expertise | 48 | 5.8% | 40 | 10.0% |
| 4 | Have good understanding on social and political context | 33 | 4.0% | 36 | 9.0% |
| 5 | Good personality | 13 | 1.6% | 6 | 1.5% |
| 6 | Have similar ideology with constituent | 2 | 0.2% | 6 | 1.5% |
| 7 | Getting support from mass bases | 56 | 6.7% | 58 | 14.5% |
| 8 | Have authority | 120 | 14.4% | 27 | 6.7% |
| 9 | Good network and contacts | 42 | 5.1% | 29 | 7.2% |
| 10 | In-group of patronage, oligarchy, political dynasty | 29 | 3.5% | 2 | 0.5% |
| 11 | Winning political competition | 32 | 3.9% | 4 | 1.0% |
| 12 | Good image, track record, popularity | 36 | 4.3% | 41 | 10.2% |
| 13 | Long experiences | 44 | 5.3% | 19 | 4.7% |
| 14 | Big capital, economic resources, rich | 166 | 20.0% | 16 | 4.0% |
| 15 | Getting trust from society | 31 | 3.7% | 18 | 4.5% |
| 16 | Factors related to clan, ethnic, religion | 13 | 1.6% | 4 | 1.0% |
| 17 | Have coercive power | 7 | 0.8% | 3 | 0.7% |
| 18 | Media exposed | 7 | 0.8% | 13 | 3.2% |
| 19 | Leadership capacity | 20 | 2.4% | 7 | 1.7% |
| 20 | Others | 15 | 1.8% | 5 | 1.2% |
| 21 | Unknown | 27 | 3.2% | 32 | 8.0% |
| TOTAL | | 831 | 100.0% | 401 | 100.0% |

Table Q5.13b. Factors that prevent the actors to become legitimate and authoritative political leader

| NO | FACTORS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|---|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Lack of support from organization/party/institution | 14 | 4.8% | 45 | 6.9% |
| 2 | Professional background not supportive | 22 | 7.5% | 31 | 4.7% |
| 3 | Lack of capacity/expertise, limited knowledge | 15 | 5.1% | 62 | 9.5% |
| 4 | Do not have strong mass bases | 24 | 8.2% | 73 | 11.1% |
| 5 | Limited/Lack of authority | 6 | 2.0% | 51 | 7.8% |
| 6 | Do not have network and contacts | 4 | 1.4% | 41 | 6.3% |
| 7 | Lack of economic resources | 9 | 3.1% | 84 | 12.8% |
| 8 | Not getting support from society; People apathy | 29 | 9.9% | 14 | 2.1% |
| 9 | Minority group (ethnic, religion, clan) | 14 | 4.8% | 15 | 2.3% |
| 10 | Political competition too hard | 27 | 9.2% | 19 | 2.9% |
| 11 | Fragmented, segmented society | 15 | 5.1% | 6 | 0.9% |
| 12 | Do not interest to politics | 10 | 3.4% | 44 | 6.7% |
| 13 | Negative image, bad track record | 35 | 11.9% | 29 | 4.4% |
| 14 | Blocked by patronage, oligarchy, and political dynasty | 15 | 5.1% | 4 | 0.6% |
| 15 | Suffer from political pressures | 5 | 1.7% | 15 | 2.3% |
| 16 | Do not have enough experiences | 2 | 0.7% | 8 | 1.2% |
| 17 | Do not have charisma | 2 | 0.7% | 12 | 1.8% |
| 18 | Tend to use coercive power | 5 | 1.7% | 8 | 1.2% |
| 19 | Lack of media coverage, not able to influence public debate | 1 | 0.3% | 11 | 1.7% |
| 20 | Others | 19 | 6.5% | 32 | 4.9% |
| 21 | Unknown | 21 | 7.1% | 52 | 7.9% |
| TOTAL | | 294 | 100.0% | 656 | 100.0% |

Q5.14. How successful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

Table Q5.14. Indicators of successful in using their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority

| NO | INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|--|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Honest, clean and trustworthy | 17 | 1.5% | 29 | 2.7% |
| 2 | Policies are implemented | 138 | 12.1% | 49 | 4.5% |
| 3 | Democratic, aspiring, fair, enlightened | 19 | 1.7% | 39 | 3.6% |
| 4 | Efficient | 24 | 2.1% | 12 | 1.1% |
| 5 | Pro people, populist | 29 | 2.5% | 42 | 3.9% |
| 6 | Accumulating wealth/money/resources | 113 | 9.9% | 39 | 3.6% |
| 7 | Become popular (in media) | 40 | 3.5% | 54 | 5.0% |
| 8 | Strong and powerful | 303 | 26.5% | 132 | 12.2% |
| 9 | Skillful, have knowledge/expertise | 26 | 2.3% | 84 | 7.8% |
| 10 | Building patronage and oligarchy | 29 | 2.5% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 11 | Re-elected in political competition | 56 | 4.9% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 12 | Gain strong support from the people | 109 | 9.5% | 89 | 8.2% |
| 13 | Have strong network | 31 | 2.7% | 100 | 9.3% |
| 14 | Create political stability | 20 | 1.7% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 15 | Coercive | 20 | 1.7% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 16 | Become national figure | 8 | 0.7% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 17 | Have close relation to the government | 29 | 2.5% | 40 | 3.7% |
| 18 | Able to do advocacy, organizing and mobilization | 23 | 2.0% | 83 | 7.7% |
| 19 | Develop leadership, charismatic | 16 | 1.4% | 66 | 6.1% |
| 20 | Others | 27 | 2.4% | 52 | 4.8% |
| 21 | Unknown | 66 | 5.8% | 115 | 10.7% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

Table Q5.15. Causes of failure in gaining political legitimacy and authority

| NO | CAUSES OF FAILURE IN GAINING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|---|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Democratic institutions, regulations and channels are weak | 69 | 6.0% | 41 | 3.8% |
| 2 | Lack of support from bureaucracy | 38 | 3.3% | 38 | 3.5% |
| 3 | Lack of capacity, actors are not capable, no vision | 125 | 10.9% | 95 | 8.8% |
| 4 | Character of society (communalism, intolerant, etc.) | 67 | 5.9% | 96 | 8.9% |
| 5 | Lack of support from local elites | 13 | 1.1% | 44 | 4.1% |
| 6 | Not legitimized | 98 | 8.6% | 48 | 4.4% |
| 7 | Using coercion | 36 | 3.1% | 96 | 8.9% |
| 8 | Lack of money/budget and support system | 66 | 5.8% | 97 | 9.0% |
| 9 | Corruption | 21 | 1.8% | 13 | 1.2% |
| 10 | Ineffective policies | 27 | 2.4% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 11 | Lack of knowledge, expertise, information | 39 | 3.4% | 21 | 1.9% |
| 12 | Un-authoritative to make decision | 10 | 0.9% | 47 | 4.4% |
| 13 | Alternative movements are still limited | 9 | 0.8% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 14 | Law enforcement still poor | 6 | 0.5% | 23 | 2.1% |
| 15 | Not able to compete | 68 | 5.9% | 34 | 3.2% |
| 16 | Limited network | 27 | 2.4% | 94 | 8.7% |
| 17 | Too tight political competition, also within parties | 103 | 9.0% | 6 | 0.6% |
| 18 | Dynamic of local politics | 41 | 3.6% | 25 | 2.3% |
| 19 | Uncategorized | 39 | 3.4% | 46 | 4.3% |
| 20 | Others | 18 | 1.6% | 81 | 7.5% |
| 21 | There is no challenges | 119 | 10.4% | 94 | 8.7% |
| 22 | Unknown | 104 | 9.1% | 41 | 3.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alternative actors give priority to?

Table Q5.16. Actors' main issue

| NO | DESCRIPTION | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|------------------------|--|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | RESPONSE | PERCENT | RESPONSE | PERCENT |
| 1 | Issues related to moral and ethics | 37 | 3.2% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 2 | Issues related to welfare | 450 | 39.4% | 346 | 32.1% |
| 3 | Issues related to governance | 123 | 10.8% | 151 | 14.0% |
| 4 | Issues related democracy, human rights and pluralism | 114 | 10.0% | 230 | 21.3% |
| 5 | Issue related to development, infrastructure | 71 | 6.2% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 6 | Various issues (combined) | 148 | 12.9% | 131 | 12.1% |
| 7 | Others | 106 | 9.3% | 72 | 6.7% |
| 8 | Unknown | 94 | 8.2% | 87 | 8.1% |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 1143 | 100,0% | 1079 | 100,0% |

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)

Table Q5.17a. Dominant actors' methods to put issues on political agenda

| NO | METHODS TO PUT ISSUES ON POLITICAL AGENDA | RANK 1* | | RANK 2 | | RANK 3 | | CUMULATIVE RESPONSES** | |
|-----------------|--|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|------------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %**** |
| 1 | Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda | 647 | 56.9% | 80 | 7.0% | 44 | 3.9% | 771 | 24.8% |
| 2 | Be active in an interest organization and bring the issue to | 211 | 18.6% | 458 | 40.3% | 150 | 13.2% | 819 | 26.3% |
| 3 | Build TV/radio stations | 20 | 1.8% | 48 | 4.2% | 71 | 6.2% | 139 | 4.5% |
| 4 | Writing articles in media, press briefing | 57 | 5.0% | 119 | 10.5% | 110 | 9.7% | 286 | 9.2% |
| 5 | Offering support | 117 | 10.3% | 273 | 24.0% | 362 | 31.8% | 752 | 24.1% |
| 6 | Petition | 11 | 1.0% | 32 | 2.8% | 44 | 3.9% | 87 | 2.8% |
| 7 | Demonstration, Mass action | 7 | 0.6% | 16 | 1.4% | 54 | 4.7% | 77 | 2.5% |
| 8 | Working with academicians, university, research institutions | 3 | 0.3% | 1 | 0.1% | 12 | 1.1% | 16 | 0.5% |
| 9 | Direct contact to community to get support, "sosialisasi" | 17 | 1.5% | 12 | 1.1% | 34 | 3.0% | 63 | 2.0% |
| 10 | Using bureaucracy, regulations | 14 | 1.2% | 10 | 0.9% | 24 | 2.1% | 48 | 1.5% |
| 11 | Using business network, economic resources to influence | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.1% | 18 | 1.6% | 19 | 0.6% |
| 12 | Others | 4 | 0.4% | 11 | 1.0% | 22 | 1.9% | 37 | 1.2% |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | | | | | | | 3114 | 100.0% |

* Rank 1 column reflects the most important method among others

** Cumulative responses column reflects the most popular method among others

*** Percentages based on number of dominant actors (N=1143)

**** Percentages based on number of responses

Table Q5.17b. Alternative actors' methods to put issues on political agenda

| NO | METHODS TO PUT ISSUES ON POLITICAL AGENDA | RANK 1* | | RANK 2 | | RANK 3 | | CUMULATIVE RESPONSES** | |
|-----------------|--|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|------------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %*** | <i>f</i> | %*** |
| 1 | Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda | 214 | 19.8% | 22 | 2.0% | 25 | 2.3% | 261 | 8.7% |
| 2 | Be active in an interest organization and bring the issue to | 417 | 38.6% | 247 | 22.9% | 102 | 9.5% | 766 | 25.5% |
| 3 | Build TV/radio stations | 12 | 1.1% | 25 | 2.3% | 19 | 1.8% | 56 | 1.9% |
| 4 | Writing articles in media, press briefing | 173 | 16.0% | 266 | 24.7% | 115 | 10.7% | 554 | 18.4% |
| 5 | Offering support | 59 | 5.5% | 154 | 14.3% | 171 | 15.8% | 384 | 12.8% |
| 6 | Petition | 58 | 5.4% | 157 | 14.6% | 177 | 16.4% | 392 | 13.1% |
| 7 | Demonstration, Mass action | 79 | 7.3% | 116 | 10.8% | 202 | 18.7% | 397 | 13.2% |
| 8 | Working with academician, university, research institutions | 4 | 0.4% | 7 | 0.6% | 21 | 1.9% | 32 | 1.1% |
| 9 | Direct contact to community to get support, "sosialisasi" | 37 | 3.4% | 13 | 1.2% | 32 | 3.0% | 82 | 2.7% |
| 10 | Using bureaucracy, regulations | 2 | 0.2% | 3 | 0.3% | 8 | 0.7% | 13 | 0.4% |
| 11 | Using business network, economic resources to influence | 1 | 0.1% | 1 | 0.1% | 6 | 0.6% | 8 | 0.3% |
| 12 | Others | 4 | 0.4% | 15 | 1.4% | 39 | 3.6% | 58 | 1.9% |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | | | | | | | 3003 | 100.0% |

* Rank 1 column reflects the most important method among others

** Cumulative responses column reflects the most popular method among others

*** Percentages based on number of alternative actors (N=1079)

**** Percentages based on number of responses

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? (Pick only one option per actor)

Table Q5.18. How the actors framing the issues

| NO | ISSUE FRAMING | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|-------------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>F</i> | % | <i>F</i> | % |
| 1 | Single issue | 239 | 20.9% | 315 | 29.2% |
| 2 | Part of strategic issue | 874 | 76.5% | 738 | 68.4% |
| 3 | Unknown | 30 | 2.6% | 26 | 2.4% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.19. How successful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

Table Q5.19. Indicators of successful in turning their issues into public matters

| NO | INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|--|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Presence in media | 42 | 3.7% | 44 | 4.1% |
| 2 | Presence in public discourse | 83 | 7.3% | 111 | 10.3% |
| 3 | Presence in agendas of government, parliaments, parties and and/or social movements | 21 | 1.8% | 24 | 2.2% |
| 4 | Resulting in physical infrastructures | 14 | 1.2% | 5 | 0.5% |
| 5 | Resulting becoming a state official, a member of parliament | 148 | 12.9% | 131 | 12.1% |
| 6 | Resulting in welfare policies and/or the implementation of welfare policies (education, health, physical security, income rate, working condition, etc.) | 71 | 6.2% | 44 | 4.1% |
| 7 | Resulting in political in political supports from society, other groups/parties, etc. and formation of coalition as well as ending of tensions | 178 | 15.6% | 153 | 14.2% |
| 8 | Resulting in a good governance | 41 | 3.6% | 31 | 2.9% |
| 9 | Resulting in a specific material/financial benefits and/or socio-political status advantages | 44 | 3.8% | 12 | 1.1% |
| 10 | Resulting in social activities and events involving people | 16 | 1.4% | 11 | 1.0% |
| 11 | Resulting in development program in general and economic development in particular | 38 | 3.3% | 10 | 0.9% |
| 12 | Resulting in policy change | 16 | 1.4% | 16 | 1.5% |
| 13 | Resulting in new regulations | 63 | 5.5% | 27 | 2.5% |
| 14 | Resulting in peaceful condition, (political) fairness, implementation of human rights, improved political awareness, ethical improvement of social life and/or democracy | 18 | 1.6% | 64 | 5.9% |
| 15 | Resulting in a successful program, strategy or policy | 54 | 4.7% | 24 | 2.2% |
| 16 | Resulting in fulfilled demands and in influencing political process | 32 | 2.8% | 92 | 8.5% |
| 17 | Others | 99 | 8.7% | 88 | 8.2% |
| 18 | Combined | 48 | 4.2% | 50 | 4.6% |
| 19 | Unknown | 117 | 10.2% | 142 | 13.2% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

Table Q5.20. Cause of failure in turning issues into public matters

| NO | CAUSES OF FAILURE IN TURNING ISSUES INTO PUBLIC MATTERS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|--|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Commercialization of media control, fragmentation | 2 | 0.2% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 2 | The powerful are dominating everything | 13 | 1.1% | 100 | 9.3% |
| 3 | Education is poor so no demands for important issues | 38 | 3.3% | 36 | 3.3% |
| 4 | People are afraid of some issues so these are avoided | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 0.3% |
| 5 | Lack of support and trust from society, other parties, other (key) figures and/or other institutions | 245 | 21.4% | 166 | 15.4% |
| 6 | Unreliable and unperformed institutions and institutional framework (e.g. being inefficient, ineffective, malfunction, etc.) | 67 | 5.9% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 7 | Political apathy | 8 | 0.7% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 8 | Lack of “sosialisasi”, good and proper communications, and reliable social and political networks | 31 | 2.7% | 39 | 3.6% |
| 9 | Cultural difference (e.g. ethnic and religious differences) | 16 | 1.4% | 11 | 1.0% |
| 10 | Conflicting interests | 26 | 2.3% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 11 | Lack of economic, social and political resources | 34 | 3.0% | 114 | 10.6% |
| 12 | Geographical barriers | 5 | 0.4% | 2 | 0.2% |
| 13 | Democracy, political inclusions, increasing political awareness | 41 | 3.6% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 14 | Political conflict | 81 | 7.1% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 15 | Actor’s lack of capacity | 41 | 3.6% | 38 | 3.5% |
| 16 | Actors are involved in and/or implied by political scandals (e.g. corruption, power abuse etc.) | 28 | 2.4% | 15 | 1.4% |
| 17 | The problem is on the strategy, on the selected issues and on how the society is approached | 16 | 1.4% | 37 | 3.4% |
| 18 | Others | 109 | 9.5% | 73 | 6.8% |
| 19 | Combined | 88 | 7.7% | 92 | 8.5% |
| 20 | Unknown | 254 | 22.2% | 192 | 17.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilize and organize support for their demands and policies? (Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)

Table Q5.21a. Dominant actors' capacity to mobilize and organize support

| NO | METHODS OF MOBILIZATION | RANK 1 | | RANK 2 | | RANK 3 | | TOTAL RESPONSES | |
|-------|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|--------|
| | | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Develop populism | 519 | 45.4% | 60 | 5.2% | 54 | 4.7% | 633 | 18.5% |
| 2 | Charismatic leadership | 135 | 11.8% | 211 | 18.5% | 37 | 3.2% | 383 | 11.2% |
| 3 | Offer patronage to clients | 137 | 12.0% | 115 | 10.1% | 84 | 7.3% | 336 | 9.8% |
| 4 | Offer alternative protection and support | 57 | 5.0% | 82 | 7.2% | 58 | 5.1% | 197 | 5.7% |
| 5 | Provide contacts with influential people | 48 | 4.2% | 178 | 15.6% | 103 | 9.0% | 329 | 9.6% |
| 6 | Utilize family or clan connections | 65 | 5.7% | 133 | 11.6% | 154 | 13.5% | 352 | 10.3% |
| 7 | Build networks between equal actors | 70 | 6.1% | 132 | 11.5% | 223 | 19.5% | 425 | 12.4% |
| 8 | Coordinate groups and movements | 39 | 3.4% | 107 | 9.4% | 149 | 13.0% | 295 | 8.6% |
| 9 | Facilitate the building of organizations from below | 32 | 2.8% | 59 | 5.2% | 154 | 13.5% | 245 | 7.1% |
| 10 | Unknown | 41 | 3.6% | 66 | 5.8% | 127 | 11.1% | 234 | 6.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1143 | 100.0% | 1143 | 100.0% | 3429 | 100.0% |

Table Q5.21b. Alternative actors' capacity to mobilize and organize support

| NO | METHODS OF MOBILIZATION | RANK 1 | | RANK 2 | | RANK 3 | | TOTAL RESPONSES | |
|-------|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|--------|
| | | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 1 | Develop populism | 326 | 30.2% | 53 | 4.9% | 37 | 3.4% | 416 | 12.9% |
| 2 | Charismatic leadership | 108 | 10.0% | 80 | 7.4% | 20 | 1.9% | 208 | 6.4% |
| 3 | Offer patronage to clients | 39 | 3.6% | 26 | 2.4% | 35 | 3.2% | 100 | 3.1% |
| 4 | Offer alternative protection and support | 212 | 19.6% | 138 | 12.8% | 89 | 8.2% | 439 | 13.6% |
| 5 | Provide contacts with influential people | 61 | 5.7% | 115 | 10.7% | 62 | 5.7% | 238 | 7.4% |
| 6 | Utilize family or clan connections | 20 | 1.9% | 53 | 4.9% | 34 | 3.2% | 107 | 3.3% |
| 7 | Build networks between equal actors | 103 | 9.5% | 216 | 20.0% | 139 | 12.9% | 458 | 14.1% |
| 8 | Coordinate groups and movements | 99 | 9.2% | 241 | 22.3% | 250 | 23.2% | 590 | 18.2% |
| 9 | Facilitate the building of organizations from below | 82 | 7.6% | 110 | 10.2% | 307 | 28.5% | 499 | 15.4% |
| 10 | Unknown | 29 | 2.7% | 47 | 4.4% | 106 | 9.8% | 182 | 5.6% |
| TOTAL | | 1079 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% | 3237 | 100.0% |

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilize people (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

Table Q5.22. Methods to mobilize people

| NO | METHODS TO MOBILIZE PEOPLE | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|---|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Using trust in e.g. religious, ethnic, clan based organizations | 45 | 3.9% | 42 | 3.9% |
| 2 | Using social media | 46 | 4.0% | 74 | 6.9% |
| 3 | Via organizations | 142 | 12.4% | 54 | 5.0% |
| 4 | Addressing hot issue | 42 | 3.7% | 54 | 5.0% |
| 5 | By way of spreading and linking people through common ideology | 12 | 1.0% | 5 | 0.5% |
| 6 | By way of and developing (political) coalition | 5 | 0.4% | 1 | 0.1% |
| 7 | By providing money or other resources | 58 | 5.1% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 8 | By cultivating and mobilizing elite supports | 31 | 2.7% | 15 | 1.4% |
| 9 | Using charisma and/or political image | 55 | 4.8% | 31 | 2.9% |
| 10 | Using populism and egalitarianism | 111 | 9.7% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 11 | By way of networking | 168 | 14.7% | 245 | 22.7% |
| 12 | Using coercive means and violence | 15 | 1.3% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 13 | Using patronage | 15 | 1.3% | 2 | 0.2% |
| 14 | By advocacy and political education | 3 | 0.3% | 107 | 9.9% |
| 15 | The answer is not clear | 124 | 10.8% | 143 | 13.3% |
| 16 | The answer consist of more than one category | 188 | 16.4% | 165 | 15.3% |
| 17 | Unknown | 83 | 7.3% | 84 | 7.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilizing and organizing support for demands and policies?

Table Q5.23. Indicators of successful in mobilizing and organizing support

| NO | INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-----------------|--|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Enable to conducting more frequent demonstration, rally | 5 | 0.4% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 2 | Have good connection, link to parties | 33 | 2.9% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 3 | Have many friends, connection, alliances | 37 | 3.2% | 77 | 7.1% |
| 4 | Engage in policy making processes collectively | 36 | 3.1% | 16 | 1.5% |
| 5 | The issue become public interest, get media coverage | 163 | 14.3% | 256 | 23.7% |
| 6 | Enable to get into power, formal public/political position | 293 | 25.6% | 134 | 12.4% |
| 7 | Enable to form mass organization | 27 | 2.4% | 24 | 2.2% |
| 8 | Have supporter, mass base | 332 | 29.0% | 329 | 30.5% |
| 9 | Others | 134 | 11.7% | 106 | 9.8% |
| 10 | Unknown | 83 | 7.3% | 98 | 9.1% |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 1143 | 100,0% | 1079 | 100,0% |

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilize and organize support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

Table Q5.24. Causes of failure in mobilizing and organizing support

| NO | CAUSES OF FAILURE IN MOBILIZING AND ORGANIZING SUPPORT | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|--|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>F</i> | % |
| 1 | Fragmentation | 51 | 4.5% | 40 | 3.7% |
| 2 | Lack of ideology | 27 | 2.4% | 26 | 2.4% |
| 3 | Loose network, not well organized | 141 | 12.3% | 207 | 19.2% |
| 4 | Active only in social media (facebook, twitter, etc) | 1 | 0.1% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 5 | Unclear concepts/substances/issues | 30 | 2.6% | 14 | 1.3% |
| 6 | Fail to identify basic problems and mapping the actors | 126 | 11.0% | 117 | 10.8% |
| 7 | The opponent is stronger and well organized | 168 | 14.7% | 102 | 9.5% |
| 8 | Lack of public support/ Public resistance/cynical | 173 | 15.1% | 122 | 11.3% |
| 9 | Lack of political awareness | 46 | 4.0% | 32 | 3.0% |
| 10 | Lack of institutions/personal capacity | 89 | 7.8% | 189 | 17.5% |
| 11 | Others | 31 | 2.7% | 37 | 3.4% |
| 12 | Unknown | 260 | 22.7% | 193 | 17.9% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Where do the dominant actors go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

Table Q5.25.

| NO | CHANNELS | RESPONSE | PERCENT OF RESPONSES |
|-----------------|--|----------|----------------------|
| 1 | Institutions for private governance | 223 | 10.3 |
| 2 | Institutions for community and civil self-governance | 407 | 18.8 |
| 3 | Joint state- and stakeholders agencies | 639 | 29.5 |
| 4 | Civil and military administration | 333 | 15.4 |
| 5 | Judiciary and police | 190 | 8.8 |
| 6 | Political executive | 373 | 17.2 |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 2165 | 100.0 |

Table Q5.26.

| NO | MEDIATOR | RESPONSE | PERCENT OF RESPONSE |
|-----------------|---|----------|---------------------|
| 1 | Civil society organizations | 438 | 13.8 |
| 2 | Media | 682 | 21.5 |
| 3 | Issue and interest organizations | 397 | 12.5 |
| 4 | Individual direct participation | 296 | 9.3 |
| 5 | Political society | 609 | 19.2 |
| 6 | Informal leaders | 535 | 16.9 |
| 7 | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 214 | 6.8 |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 3171 | 100.0% |

Where do the sub-ordinated/alternative actors go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?

Q5.28. Via what mediators?

Q5.27. To what institutions of governance?

| NO | CHANNELS | RESPONSE | PERCENT OF RESPONSE |
|-----------------|--|----------|---------------------|
| 1 | Institutions for private governance | 238 | 11.5 |
| 2 | Institutions for community and civil self-governance | 800 | 38.7 |
| 3 | Joint state- and stakeholders agencies | 500 | 24.2 |
| 4 | Civil and military administration | 112 | 5.4 |
| 5 | Judiciary and police | 203 | 9.8 |
| 6 | Political executive | 215 | 10.4 |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 2068 | 100.0 |

Q5.28. To what institutions of governance?

| NO | MEDIATOR | RESPONSE | PERCENT OF RESPONSE |
|-----------------|---|----------|---------------------|
| 1 | Civil society organizations | 703 | 23.0 |
| 2 | Media | 791 | 25.8 |
| 3 | Issue and interest organizations | 387 | 12.6 |
| 4 | Individual direct participation | 304 | 9.9 |
| 5 | Political society | 373 | 12.2 |
| 6 | Informal leaders | 391 | 12.8 |
| 7 | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 113 | 3.7 |
| TOTAL RESPONSES | | 3062 | 100.0 |

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question?

Table Q5.29. Reasons for opt to specific institutions and mediators

| NO | REASONS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|---|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | f | % | f | % |
| 1 | Quick and good results | 137 | 12.0% | 166 | 15.4% |
| 2 | Strategic calculation | 157 | 13.7% | 175 | 16.2% |
| 3 | Have good connection with people in the institution | 48 | 4.2% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 4 | Other institutions are not welcome | 8 | 0.7% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 5 | The institution has authority | 293 | 25.6% | 209 | 19.4% |
| 6 | The institution has strong influence | 175 | 15.3% | 135 | 12.5% |
| 7 | Lobby and personal contact | 2 | 0.2% | 1 | 0.1% |
| 8 | The institution is rooted in society | 10 | 0.9% | 30 | 2.8% |
| 9 | Need institutional based solution, not personal | 17 | 1.5% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 10 | The institution is under influence of main actors | 110 | 9.6% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 11 | The institution is independent | 18 | 1.6% | 39 | 3.6% |
| 12 | More trust to informal leaders | 8 | 0.7% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 13 | The institution can solve the problems effectively | 25 | 2.2% | 26 | 2.4% |
| 14 | Others | 60 | 5.2% | 63 | 5.8% |
| 15 | Unknown | 75 | 6.6% | 91 | 8.4% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

Table Q5.30. Indicators of successful in seeking participation and developing representation

| NO | DESCRIPTION | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|--|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | RESPONSE | PERCENT | RESPONSE | PERCENT |
| 1 | Successful Inclusive forum for public are available | 93 | 8.1% | 96 | 8.9% |
| 2 | Successful, There are more inclusive forum for public | 73 | 6.4% | 133 | 12.3% |
| 3 | Successful, increasing variation in the type of issues talking | 23 | 2.0% | 72 | 6.7% |
| 4 | Successful, More issues coming from society | 20 | 1.7% | 60 | 5.6% |
| 5 | Successful, People are more active | 84 | 7.3% | 133 | 12.3% |
| 6 | Successful, Influencing basis of civil society | 18 | 1.6% | 15 | 1.4% |
| 7 | Successful, Resulting policies | 104 | 9.1% | 38 | 3.5% |
| 8 | Successful, Resulting legitimate policies | 61 | 5.3% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 9 | Unsuccessful, more money using instruments | 4 | 0.3% | 2 | 0.2% |
| 10 | Unsuccessful, more use of the instruments of violence | 7 | 0.6% | 10 | 0.9% |
| 11 | Unsuccessful, more use of the instruments of office | 21 | 1.8% | 4 | 0.4% |
| 12 | Unsuccessful , more use of the instrument connection/nepotism | 30 | 2.6% | 8 | 0.7% |
| 13 | Unsuccessful, because it is dominated by government agencies | 17 | 1.5% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 14 | Unsuccessful, because formal regulations and practice are not in line | 20 | 1.7% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 15 | Unsuccessful, because of the enthusiasm of the community is still low | 43 | 3.8% | 13 | 1.2% |
| 16 | Unsuccessful, due to the participation of the institution's performance is getting worse | 17 | 1.5% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 17 | Unsuccessful, because the public interest did not materialize | 86 | 7.5% | 328 | 30.4% |
| 18 | Others | 312 | 27.3% | 98 | 9.1% |
| 19 | Unknown | 110 | 9.6% | 96 | 8.9% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

Table Q5.31. Causes of failure in using channels and mediator institutions

| NO | DESCRIPTION | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|--|---------------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|
| | | Number of responses | Percent | Number of responses | Percent |
| 1 | Public forum are still exclusive | 42 | 3.7% | 21 | 1.9% |
| 2 | Limited public forum is incusive | 34 | 3.0% | 36 | 3.3% |
| 3 | Limited variation issue type | 12 | 1.0% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 4 | Limited issue coming from society | 3 | 0.3% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 5 | People are more passive/apathetic/resistance | 146 | 12.8% | 102 | 9.5% |
| 6 | No influencing basis of civil society | 9 | 0.8% | 15 | 1.4% |
| 7 | Don't have money instrument | 44 | 3.8% | 96 | 8.9% |
| 8 | Don't have coercive and violence instrument | 1 | 0.1% | 11 | 1.0% |
| 9 | Don't have position / authority | 11 | 1.0% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 10 | Do not have conection or nepotism | 7 | 0.6% | 37 | 3.4% |
| 11 | Actors who can not be trusted | 43 | 3.8% | 29 | 2.7% |
| 12 | Actors who do not have a social base | 15 | 1.3% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 13 | Difference interest and understanding between actors | 170 | 14.9% | 128 | 11.9% |
| 14 | Lack of capacity | 84 | 7.3% | 67 | 6.2% |
| 15 | Inadequate regulatory support | 24 | 2.1% | 21 | 1.9% |
| 16 | Failed to consolidate collective action | 20 | 1.7% | 29 | 2.7% |
| 17 | The design policies fail to implement | 18 | 1.6% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 18 | Social structure of patronage | 5 | 0.4% | 9 | 0.8% |
| 19 | Bureaucratic resistance and no independet initiative | 46 | 4.0% | 46 | 4.3% |
| 20 | Others | 71 | 6.2% | 78 | 7.2% |
| 21 | Unknown | 338 | 29.6% | 248 | 23.0% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0 | 1079 | 100.0 |

Where in your judgement do ordinary people go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institution of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediators?

Q5.32. Institutions of governance where ordinary people go to solve their problems

| NO | INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENT OF RESPONSES | PERCENT OF INFORMANTS |
|--------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Institutions for private governance | 106 | 9.8% | 17.9% |
| 2 | Institutions for community and civil self-governance | 397 | 36.8% | 67.1% |
| 3 | Joint state- and stakeholders agencies | 214 | 19.8% | 36.1% |
| 4 | Civil and military administration | 79 | 7.3% | 13.3% |
| 5 | Judiciary and police | 170 | 15.8% | 28.7% |
| 6 | Political executive | 113 | 10.5% | 19.1% |
| TOTAL | | 1079 | 100.0% | N=592 |

Q5.33. Mediator that used by ordinary people to go to the institutions of governance

| NO | MEDIATOR INSTITUTION | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENT OF RESPONSES | PERCENT OF INFORMANTS |
|--------------|---|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Civil society organizations | 387 | 24.2% | 65.4% |
| 2 | Media | 360 | 22.5% | 60.8% |
| 3 | Issue and interest organizations | 157 | 9.8% | 26.5% |
| 4 | Individual direct participation | 134 | 8.4% | 22.6% |
| 5 | Political society | 218 | 13.6% | 36.8% |
| 6 | Informal leaders | 298 | 18.6% | 50.3% |
| 7 | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 46 | 2.9% | 7.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1600 | 100.0% | N=592 |

Table Q5.32-5.33. How ordinary people solve their problems

| NO | INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND MEDIATOR | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | PERCENT OF RESPONSES |
|--------------|---|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Institutions for private governance | 106 | 9.8% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 78 | 73.6% |
| | Via Media | 65 | 61.3% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 45 | 42.5% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 21 | 19.8% |
| | Via Political society | 23 | 21.7% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 61 | 57.5% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 7 | 6.6% |
| 2 | Institutions for community and civil self-governance | 397 | 36.80% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 304 | 76.6% |
| | Via Media | 247 | 62.2% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 114 | 28.7% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 99 | 24.9% |
| | Via Political society | 137 | 34.5% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 208 | 52.4% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 33 | 8.3% |
| 3 | Joint state- and stakeholders agencies | 214 | 19.80% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 145 | 67.8% |
| | Via Media | 141 | 65.9% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 58 | 27.1% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 58 | 27.1% |
| | Via Political society | 99 | 46.3% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 105 | 49.1% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 15 | 7.0% |
| 4 | Civil and military administration | 79 | 7.30% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 49 | 62.0% |
| | Via Media | 47 | 59.5% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 20 | 25.3% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 22 | 27.8% |
| | Via Political society | 39 | 49.4% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 41 | 51.9% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 5 | 6.3% |
| 5 | Judiciary and police | 170 | 15.80% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 114 | 67.1% |
| | Via Media | 113 | 66.5% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 41 | 24.1% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 38 | 22.4% |
| | Via Political society | 68 | 40.0% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 97 | 57.1% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 15 | 8.8% |
| 6 | Political executive | 113 | 10.50% |
| | Via Civil society organizations | 63 | 55.8% |
| | Via Media | 83 | 73.5% |
| | Via Issue and interest organizations | 25 | 22.1% |
| | Via Individual direct participation | 25 | 22.1% |
| | Via Political society | 55 | 48.7% |
| | Via Informal leaders | 69 | 61.1% |
| | Ways of bypassing democratic representation | 10 | 8.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1079 | 100.00% |

Q5.34. In your judgment, why do ordinary people go to the specific institutions and mediators etc.?

Box Q5.34. Why do ordinary people go to the specific institutions and mediators etc.?

Base on Informants perspective about public affairs governance institution is divided into two ways state intermediary institution such as bureaucracy and legislative and also extra-parliament intermediary institution such as media, traditional institutions, CSO and NGO.

Most of informants that used public affairs governance institution argue this institution more accessible- because only this institution who can solve their problems. The other informants reasoned that their problems are government responsibility, because government institution considered independent, strategic, accessible, more procedural, legitimate, effective, aspirational and habit.

The informants that chose extra-parliament intermediary institution argue that government institution slow respons and make people distrust. The other information in this case, argue that extra-parliament intermediary institution result of their socialization and advocacy.

On the other hand, the informant argue that impossible to solve the problems it self and more effective if they use the institution.

G. STRATEGIES (DYNAMICS) OF DEMOCRATISATION

Q6.1. What are dominant and alternative actors' main strategies to reach their own aims?

Table 6.1.a. Dominant actors' strategies to reach aims

| NO | DOMINANT ACTORS' MAIN STRATEGY TO REACH THEIR OWN AIMS | RESPONSES | |
|-------|---|-----------|---------|
| | | F | PERCENT |
| 1 | Inter-elite networking, alliance | 141 | 12.3% |
| 2 | Socializing program, media actions | 187 | 16.4% |
| 3 | Populist and charismatic actions | 179 | 15.7% |
| 4 | Getting support from party, parliament | 139 | 12.2% |
| 5 | To mobilize people, mass | 99 | 8.7% |
| 6 | Accumulating and to mobilize economic resources | 84 | 7.3% |
| 7 | Making use power to get support from bureaucracy | 125 | 10.9% |
| 8 | Getting support from clan, ethnic and religious groups | 66 | 5.8% |
| 9 | To develop economic growth programs, investment | 13 | 1.1% |
| 10 | Supporting good governance, law enforcement | 54 | 4.7% |
| 11 | No answer/Not relevant | 56 | 4.9% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0 |

Table 6.1.b. Dominant actors' strategies to reach aims (grouped)

| NO | STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS | GROUP OF DOMINANT ACTORS* | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|--|---------------------------|--------|--------------------------|--------|-----------------|--------|----------------|--------|---------|--------|
| | | STATE ACTORS | | POLITICAL SOCIETY ACTORS | | BUSINESS ACTORS | | SOCIETY ACTORS | | UNKNOWN | |
| 1 | Inter-elite networking, alliance | 77 | 12.0% | 30 | 12.3% | 13 | 17.8% | 16 | 11.5% | 5 | 11.1% |
| 2 | Socializing program, media actions | 77 | 12.0% | 39 | 16.0% | 10 | 13.7% | 51 | 36.7% | 10 | 22.2% |
| 3 | Populist and charismatic actions | 117 | 18.2% | 34 | 13.9% | 11 | 15.1% | 10 | 7.2% | 7 | 15.6% |
| 4 | Getting support from party, parliament | 72 | 11.2% | 46 | 18.9% | 6 | 8.2% | 9 | 6.5% | 6 | 13.3% |
| 5 | To mobilize people, mass | 56 | 8.7% | 18 | 7.4% | 7 | 9.6% | 14 | 10.1% | 4 | 8.9% |
| 6 | Accumulating and to mobilize economic resources | 41 | 6.4% | 21 | 8.6% | 15 | 20.5% | 5 | 3.6% | 2 | 4.4% |
| 7 | Making use power to get support from bureaucracy | 88 | 13.7% | 27 | 11.1% | 3 | 4.1% | 7 | 5.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 8 | Getting support from clan, ethnic and religious groups | 39 | 6.1% | 11 | 4.5% | 3 | 4.1% | 10 | 7.2% | 3 | 6.7% |
| 9 | To develop economic growth programs, investment | 10 | 1.6% | 1 | 0.4% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.7% | 1 | 2.2% |
| 10 | Supporting good governance, law enforcement | 39 | 6.1% | 9 | 3.7% | 4 | 5.5% | 2 | 1.4% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 11 | No answer/Not relevant | 26 | 4.0% | 8 | 3.3% | 1 | 1.4% | 14 | 10.1% | 7 | 15.6% |
| TOTAL | | 642 | 100.0% | 244 | 100.0% | 73 | 100.0% | 139 | 100.0% | 45 | 100.0% |

* Groups of dominant actor:

State actors: Public officials, bureaucrats, commissioners of state auxiliary bodies, military/police;

Political society actors: Members of parliament (local and national), party leaders/members; Business

actors: Businessmen; Society actors: CSO activists, public figure/adat leaders/ethnic group leaders, religious leaders, militia/preman, professional, academicians

Table 6.1.c. Alternative actors' strategies to reach aims

| NO | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' MAIN STRATEGY TO REACH THEIR OWN AIMS | RESPONSES | |
|-------|--|-----------|---------|
| | | F | PERCENT |
| 1 | To develop organizations, network, strengthening bases | 257 | 23.8% |
| 2 | Accumulating and making use economic resources | 32 | 3.0% |
| 3 | Advocacy people's interests | 143 | 13.3% |
| 4 | Campaign, media activities | 220 | 20.4% |
| 5 | To develop intellectual capacity, research, data collecting | 40 | 3.7% |
| 6 | Getting support from parties and parliament | 65 | 6.0% |
| 7 | Attending public seminar, discussions | 32 | 3.0% |
| 8 | Doing lobby, communicate with executives and influential figures | 115 | 10.7% |
| 9 | Entering political parties, elections | 8 | 0.7% |
| 10 | Mobilizing people | 39 | 3.6% |
| 11 | Getting support through cultural, religious and local community groups | 67 | 6.2% |
| 12 | No answer/Not relevant | 61 | 5.7% |
| TOTAL | | 1079 | 100.0 |

Q6.2. What are major challenges related to democratization that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

Table 6.2. Major challenges related to democratization that the Dominant and Alternative Actors face when implementing their strategies

| NO | MAJOR CHALLENGES | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|--------------|--|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Facing oppositions in parliament; legislative-heavy | 39 | 3.4% | 18 | 1.7% |
| 2 | Not getting enough support from public | 173 | 15.1% | 151 | 14.0% |
| 3 | Pressure and influence from business sector | 47 | 4.1% | 25 | 2.3% |
| 4 | Inter-elites competition, elites rivalry | 171 | 15.0% | 45 | 4.2% |
| 5 | Not getting support from bureaucracy; Bureaucracy still poor/weak | 60 | 5.2% | 61 | 5.7% |
| 6 | Facing opposition from NGO/civil society | 25 | 2.2% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 7 | Lack of economic resources | 31 | 2.7% | 68 | 6.3% |
| 8 | Law enforcement still poor/weak | 26 | 2.3% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 9 | Media attack, cynicism; How to make media as channel (top-down and bottom-up) | 20 | 1.7% | 17 | 1.6% |
| 10 | Geographic challenges | 6 | 0.5% | 3 | 0.3% |
| 11 | Elites/un-rooted leaders to monopolize politics | 123 | 10.8% | 46 | 4.3% |
| 12 | Money politics, corruption | 23 | 2.0% | 38 | 3.5% |
| 13 | Feudalism, patronism, incl. kesultanan, patriarchy, ethnic politics, still strong | 54 | 4.7% | 22 | 2.0% |
| 14 | Policies are unclear, always changing, discontinue, inconsistent | 36 | 3.1% | 13 | 1.2% |
| 15 | Regeneration and recruitment (cadre), difficult to find committed people | 22 | 1.9% | 46 | 4.3% |
| 16 | Unable to formulate good/right program and strategies | 77 | 6.7% | 136 | 12.6% |
| 17 | To link critical people, middle class, enlightened, into politics | 83 | 7.3% | 28 | 2.6% |
| 18 | Not getting support from government | 0 | 0.0% | 40 | 3.7% |
| 19 | Public awareness on democracy still poor | 0 | 0.0% | 31 | 2.9% |
| 20 | Discrimination | 0 | 0.0% | 11 | 1.0% |
| 21 | Premanism, coercive mass action, anti-democratic mass pressure | 0 | 0.0% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 22 | Fragmented movement | 0 | 0.0% | 60 | 5.6% |
| 23 | Pressure from government | 0 | 0.0% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 24 | Parties, politicians are not supportive | 0 | 0.0% | 15 | 1.4% |
| 25 | There's no serious challenge | 44 | 3.8% | 29 | 2.7% |
| 26 | Unknown | 83 | 7.3% | 103 | 9.5% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Q6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratization that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

Table 6.3. Effects of actors' strategies on problems and options of democratization

| NO | MAJOR EFFECTS | DOMINANT ACTORS | | ALTERNATIVE ACTORS | |
|-------|--|-----------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | <i>f</i> | % | <i>f</i> | % |
| 1 | Promoting transparency and good governance, improving law enforcement | 30 | 2.6% | 37 | 3.4% |
| 2 | People become aware of citizen's rights (including to get good public services) | 66 | 5.8% | 81 | 7.5% |
| 3 | Public services are improved, bureaucracy become more responsive | 33 | 2.9% | 12 | 1.1% |
| 4 | Difficult to implement program (incl. because of media cynicism, black campaign, intrigue) | 65 | 5.7% | 28 | 2.6% |
| 5 | Enriching public discourse, issues are more vary | 13 | 1.1% | 33 | 3.1% |
| 6 | Strengthening money politics, transactional politics, hi-cost politics | 43 | 3.8% | 7 | 0.6% |
| 7 | Improving relationship between public officials, politicians and the people, getting more support from public | 96 | 8.4% | 42 | 3.9% |
| 8 | Declining public support to democracy, people are more passive, pragmatic | 109 | 9.5% | 53 | 4.9% |
| 9 | Opening more access for public participation, people more active, initiating public control | 83 | 7.3% | 104 | 9.6% |
| 10 | Fostering the importance of political imagery, only to win elections, election-oriented politics | 54 | 4.7% | 26 | 2.4% |
| 11 | Fostering clientism, patronage, including feudalism, clan, ethnic politics | 59 | 5.2% | 23 | 2.1% |
| 12 | Sharpening conflict, competition as well as collaboration among elites, public interests being excluded | 81 | 7.1% | 23 | 2.1% |
| 13 | More influences from business | 19 | 1.7% | 8 | 0.7% |
| 14 | More pressures to civil society | 23 | 2.0% | 19 | 1.8% |
| 15 | Resulting better democracy (in general) | 116 | 10.1% | 125 | 11.6% |
| 16 | Bad effect for democracy (in general) | 76 | 6.6% | 41 | 3.8% |
| 17 | Situation not changed significantly | 50 | 4.4% | 77 | 7.1% |
| 18 | Strengthening civil society's position in relation to the government and parties | 0 | 0.0% | 61 | 5.7% |
| 19 | Eliminating discrimination, incl. promoting gender equality | 0 | 0.0% | 12 | 1.1% |
| 20 | Promoting development | 0 | 0.0% | 11 | 1.0% |
| 21 | Improving social bases' of CSO | 0 | 0.0% | 68 | 6.3% |
| 22 | Improving organized movement, community based initiatives (responding to environmental issues, building infrastructures, etc.) | 0 | 0.0% | 41 | 3.8% |
| 23 | Worsening fragmentation among CSOs | 0 | 0.0% | 20 | 1.9% |
| 24 | Unknown | 127 | 11.1% | 127 | 11.8% |
| TOTAL | | 1143 | 100.0% | 1079 | 100.0% |

Table 6.3a. Effects of the dominant actors' strategies on problems and options of democratization

| NO | MAJOR EFFECTS | GROUP OF DOMINANT ACTORS* | | | | |
|----|---|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------|
| | | STATE ACTORS | POLITICAL SOCIETY ACTORS | BUSINESS ACTORS | SOCIETY ACTORS | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Promoting transparency and good governance, improving law enforcement | 3.3% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 2.2% | 0.0% |
| 2 | People become aware of citizen's rights (including to get good public services) | 4.8% | 5.7% | 4.1% | 9.4% | 11.1% |
| 3 | Public services are improved, bureaucracy become more responsive | 3.3% | 3.3% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| 4 | Difficult to implement program (incl. because of media cynicism, black campaign, intrigue) | 5.9% | 5.3% | 5.5% | 6.5% | 2.2% |
| 5 | Enriching public discourse, issues are more vary | 1.2% | 1.2% | 0.0% | 0.7% | 2.2% |
| 6 | Strengthening money politics, transactional politics, hi-cost politics | 3.9% | 2.9% | 8.2% | 2.9% | 2.2% |
| 7 | Improving relationship between public officials, politicians and the people, getting more support from public | 9.5% | 6.1% | 6.8% | 7.2% | 11.1% |
| 8 | Declining public support to democracy, people are more passive, pragmatic | 11.2% | 7.0% | 9.6% | 7.2% | 6.7% |
| 9 | Opening more access for public participation, people more active, initiating public control | 8.4% | 5.3% | 1.4% | 9.4% | 4.4% |
| 10 | Fostering the importance of political imagery, only to win elections, election-oriented politics | 5.0% | 7.4% | 1.4% | 2.2% | 0.0% |
| 11 | Fostering clientism, patronage, including feudalism, clan, ethnic politics | 6.1% | 1.6% | 5.5% | 7.9% | 2.2% |
| 12 | Sharpening conflict, competition as well as collaboration among elites, public interests being excluded | 7.0% | 8.6% | 6.8% | 4.3% | 8.9% |
| 13 | More influences from business | 0.8% | 1.6% | 8.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| 14 | More pressures to civil society | 2.0% | 0.8% | 6.8% | 2.2% | 0.0% |
| 15 | Resulting better democracy (in general) | 9.2% | 14.8% | 2.7% | 9.4% | 13.3% |
| 16 | Bad effect for democracy (in general) | 5.5% | 10.7% | 12.3% | 4.3% | 0.0% |
| 17 | Situation not changed significantly | 3.7% | 7.4% | 2.7% | 2.9% | 4.4% |
| 18 | Unknown | 9.2% | 8.2% | 16.4% | 17.3% | 26.7% |
| | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

* Groups of dominant actor:

State actors (N=642): Public officials, bureaucrats, commissioners of state auxiliary bodies, military/police; Political society actors (N=244): Members of parliament (local and national), party leaders/members; Business actors (N73): Businessmen; Society actors (N=139): CSO activists, public figure/adat leaders/ethnic group leaders, religious leaders, militia/preman, professional, academicians; Unknown (N=45)

Table 6.3b. Effects of the alternative actors' strategies on problems and options of democratization

| NO | MAJOR EFFECTS | GROUP OF ALTERNATIVE ACTORS* | | | | |
|----|--|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------|
| | | STATE ACTORS | POLITICAL SOCIETY ACTORS | BUSINESS ACTORS | SOCIETY ACTORS | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Promoting transparency and good governance, improving law enforcement | 3.9% | 2.8% | 7.0% | 3.3% | 3.2% |
| 2 | People become aware of citizen's rights (including to get good public services) | 10.5% | 5.5% | 2.3% | 7.4% | 10.5% |
| 3 | Public services are improved, bureaucracy become more responsive | 2.6% | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.9% | 2.4% |
| 4 | Difficult to implement program (incl. because of media cynicism, black campaign, intrigue) | 5.3% | 2.8% | 0.0% | 2.6% | 1.6% |
| 5 | Enriching public discourse, issues are more vary | 6.6% | 2.8% | 4.7% | 2.9% | 1.6% |
| 6 | Strengthening money politics, transactional politics, hi-cost politics | 0.0% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 0.8% |
| 7 | Improving relationship between public officials, politicians and the people, getting more support from public | 2.6% | 3.4% | 2.3% | 4.5% | 2.4% |
| 8 | Declining public support to democracy, people are more passive, pragmatic | 6.6% | 6.9% | 7.0% | 4.8% | 1.6% |
| 9 | Opening more access for public participation, people more active, initiating public control | 18.4% | 9.0% | 4.7% | 10.1% | 4.0% |
| 10 | Fostering the importance of political imagery, only to win elections, election-oriented politics | 0.0% | 6.2% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 2.4% |
| 11 | Fostering clientism, patronage, including feudalism, clan, ethnic politics | 1.3% | 4.1% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 2.4% |
| 12 | Sharpening conflict, competition as well as collaboration among elites, public interests being excluded | 6.6% | 1.4% | 4.7% | 1.4% | 3.2% |
| 13 | More influences from business | 0.0% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 0.7% | 0.0% |
| 14 | More pressures to civil society | 0.0% | 0.7% | 2.3% | 2.5% | 0.0% |
| 15 | Resulting better democracy (in general) | 6.6% | 9.7% | 7.0% | 12.7% | 12.1% |
| 16 | Bad effect for democracy (in general) | 5.3% | 4.1% | 0.0% | 3.8% | 4.0% |
| 17 | Situation not changed significantly | 6.6% | 5.5% | 14.0% | 6.8% | 8.9% |
| 18 | Strengthening civil society's position in relation to the government and parties | 5.3% | 6.9% | 7.0% | 5.5% | 4.8% |
| 19 | Eliminating discrimination, incl. promoting gender equality | 1.3% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
| 20 | Promoting development | 0.0% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 0.9% | 1.6% |
| 21 | Improving social bases' of CSO | 2.6% | 9.7% | 0.0% | 6.8% | 4.0% |
| 22 | Improving organized movement, community based initiatives (responding to environmental issues, building infrastructures, etc.) | 0.0% | 2.1% | 2.3% | 4.9% | 2.4% |
| 23 | Worsening fragmentation among CSOs | 0.0% | 2.8% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 4.0% |
| 24 | Unknown | 7.9% | 7.6% | 30.2% | 10.1% | 21.8% |
| | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

* Groups of alternative actor:

State actors (N=76): Public officials, bureaucrats, commissioners of state auxiliary bodies, military/police; Political society actors (N=145): Members of parliament (local and national), party leaders/members; Business actors (N=43): Businessmen; Society actors (N=691): CSO activists, public figure/adat leaders/ethnic group leaders, religious leaders, militia/preman, professional, academicians; Unknown (N=124)

Table 6.3c. Effects of the dominant actors' strategies on problems and options of democratization – Comparison between Old Elites and New Elites

| NO | MAJOR EFFECTS | GROUPS OF DOMINANT ACTORS* | | |
|----|---|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | OLD ELITES | NEW ELITES | UNKNOWN |
| 1 | Promoting transparency and good governance, improving law enforcement | 1.1% | 3.4% | 2.7% |
| 2 | People become aware of citizen's rights (including to get good public services) | 3.2% | 7.1% | 5.8% |
| 3 | Public services are improved, bureaucracy become more responsive | 2.2% | 3.7% | 2.1% |
| 4 | Difficult to implement program (incl. because of media cynicism, black campaign, intrigue) | 4.7% | 7.1% | 4.3% |
| 5 | Enriching public discourse, issues are more vary | 1.1% | 1.5% | 0.6% |
| 6 | Strengthening money politics, transactional politics, hi-cost politics | 3.2% | 3.7% | 4.3% |
| 7 | Improving relationship between public officials, politicians and the people, getting more support from public | 10.4% | 7.7% | 7.9% |
| 8 | Declining public support to democracy, people are more passive, pragmatic | 9.3% | 8.2% | 11.9% |
| 9 | Opening more access for public participation, people more active, initiating public control | 6.8% | 7.5% | 7.3% |
| 10 | Fostering the importance of political imagery, only to win elections, election-oriented politics | 3.6% | 6.4% | 3.0% |
| 11 | Fostering clientism, patronage, including feudalism, clan, ethnic politics | 7.2% | 4.5% | 4.6% |
| 12 | Sharpening conflict, competition as well as collaboration among elites, public interests being excluded | 7.2% | 6.4% | 8.2% |
| 13 | More influences from business | 1.4% | 0.6% | 3.6% |
| 14 | More pressures to civil society | 1.4% | 1.3% | 3.6% |
| 15 | Resulting better democracy (in general) | 10.0% | 12.9% | 5.8% |
| 16 | Bad effect for democracy (in general) | 8.2% | 4.5% | 8.8% |
| 17 | Situation not changed significantly | 4.3% | 4.7% | 4.0% |
| 18 | Unknown | 14.7% | 9.0% | 11.6% |
| | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

* Groups of dominant actor:

Old elites (N=279) are the dominant actors who are involved in the New Order regime; New elites (N=535) are the rising dominant elites in the "reformasi" era; Unknown (N=329).