# Education, Conflict Histories and Social Cohesion-Building in Indonesia

Edited by **Mada Sukmajati**

# Education, Conflict Histories and Social Cohesion-Building in Indonesia

Edited by **Mada Sukmajati**

**POLGOV**
Research Center for Politics and Government

**Education, Conflict Histories and Social Cohesion-Building in Indonesia**

**Editor**: Mada Sukmajati
**Cover Design**: Galih Kartika
**Layout:** Yohanes Paulus Mahadma Khrisna

1st Edition Printing, April 2022

# ACKNOWLEDGMENT

UGM (Indonesia), KU Leuven (Belgium), and Universitaet Heidelberg (Germany) held a workshop under the theme of "Education, Conflict Histories and Social Cohesion-Building in Indonesia" as part of the collaboration in the middle of 2018. Before the workshop, a Call for Papers was sent to potential participants. In response to the Call for Papers, forty-four proposals in various disciplines of study and academic interests were sent to the workshop committee. After a review and selection process, 10 papers were selected and their authors were invited to attend the workshop, which was held in February, 2019, in Jakarta. In the workshop, the researchers provided and

received inputs to and from each other, so that that they could improve their papers. They then got research funding to follow up the inputs they received from the workshop. Discussions among the researchers and between the researchers and the reviewers continued until 2020. This anthology book is the output of that long intellectual process.

Overall, the studies reported in this book have at least three aims. The first aim is exploring the dynamics in the implementation of peace education in various regions in Indonesia in the democratization era. The second aim is explaining how far the inheritance of conflict memory has been incorporated into the learning process in the education system in Indonesia, be it in regions with the background of vertical conflict (between the state and the communities), in regions with the background of horizontal conflict (among community groups), or in regions that seem to be capable of maintaining peace, although they actually have quite high (horizontal) conflict potentials. The third aim is expanding interests in the study of the roles and contributions of education in and to conflict management and democratic deepening in Indonesia, especially the ones with interdisciplinary approaches. Therefore, it is hoped that the book will contribute to the development of studies in peace education and be followed up with further studies on the topic of the relationship among education, democratic deepening, and conflict management.

Many parties have contributed to the series of activities leading to the publication of this book. We owe special thanks to all of them. We offer special thanks to all the workshop participants – lecturers, researchers, and students - who have sent their paper proposals in response to our Call for Papers. Our deep gratitude goes to our colleagues, Prof. Arnim Langer, from KU Leuven, and Prof. Aurel Croissant, from Universitaet

vi

# PREFACE:
## EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY

*Abdul Gaffar Karim*

Perhaps, one thing that is not so widely discussed by academia is how Tocqueville emphasizes the importance of education for democracy from the perspectives of, and to, both community leaders and (social) scientists. In their highly acclaimed editorial work entitled *Conversations with Tocqueville: The Global Democratic Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, Aurelian Craiutu and Sheldon Gellar (2009) highlight that Tocqueville has developed a model of engagement for social scientists to teach democracy to citizens.

Brian Danoff discusses the subject further in his book *Educating Democracy: Alexis de Tocqueville and Leadership in America* (2010). Danoff writes that Tocqueville did not find participatory democracy in opposition to strong leadership. Instead, he argues that Tocqueville "embraces participatory democracy and leadership in a single, complex vision" (p.2) and that "Tocqueville's conception of leadership focuses our attention on the question: How can leaders educate their fellow citizens so that they are more fit for democratic self-rule?" (p.3-4). Tocqueville, without any doubt, believes that a democratic leadership must be primarily educative, in the sense that it focuses on spreading democracy as both ideas and practices. In the book, Danoff focuses on political leaders (i.e. "statesmen"), but he also maintains that one can define leaders as

"those who shape norms" (p.5). One can say that all educators are leaders in this sense, and educational institutions are leadership structures.

Based on such a view, I believe that educational institutions should be primarily educators of democracy, particularly in countries like Indonesia where democracy is yet still to be developed, and political leaders (along with political institutions like political parties) tend to play a very limited role in political education towards democracy.

At the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada, democracy has long been the core spirit for education. All teaching and learning activities in the Department aim to strengthen not only the students' cognition of democracy, but also their eagerness to implement democracy in every aspect of their lives, both while they are at the university and after graduation. Similarly, research and advocacies carried out by the Department are also underway in the same spirit.

As political education is our core business, we make use of it as a tool to promote the norms of democracy to the students. The Department's curriculum is reviewed regularly – and amended when necessary. We have an annual curriculum workshop to do so, and a five-yearly evaluation to assess the curriculum thoroughly. Since the demise of the authoritarian regime in 1998, the Department has been working on several applied research projects in many aspects of democracy, including demilitarization, political parties, elections, gender mainstreaming, and religious toleration. These activities were supported by national and international funding institutions, both state and non-state.

In the early years of political reform, we did research on demilitarization as a central endeavor in the Indonesian democratization process. The research results showed that

militarization was an essential tool for the authoritarian regime to discipline the society through several methods, including school and university curricula, uniforms, special trainings for first-year students and state employers, and the assignments of military officers to civilian positions. We recommended that all militaristic elements be removed from the civilians to enable more deliberative relationships at society levels.

Following the debut, we continued with other research and advocacy on various topics to strengthen democracy, both in electoral and non-electoral topics. Under the umbrella of power, welfare, and democracy, the Department conducted multi-year research, advocacy, and publication on democracy, including an academic journal called *Power, Conflict, and Democracy* (PCD). Along with those activities, we keep working closely with political and civil society actors to provide public education on democracy.

The fast-growing internet technology has to some extent provided new opportunities for us to provide public education on democracy. Social media can now be used to reach broader audiences, beyond our students and research partners. This opportunity, however, comes hand-in-hand with a threat: the spread of fake news that provokes conflict in societies. This is not a very healthy environment for democracy, and we work closely with other stakeholders to prevent further damages it may cause, particularly in electoral politics.

At this point, it is important to say that the Department works mostly with formal democratic institutions (e.g. political parties, the parliament, and electoral management bodies), civil society organizations (such as NGOs and religious institutions), and other universities both nationally and internationally. As an educational institution, part of a leading university in the country, it is unfortunate that we did not have a good chance to

work very closely with elementary and secondary educational institutions. We do have a regular visit to schools, particularly by our students, to introduce the undergraduate program. Some activities related to elections (for example voter education for young people) involve high school visits. However, we did not have in-depth research and advocacy regarding primary and secondary education – until we started the project resulting in this book.

The program that enables the publication of this book is a continuation of our commitment to educate for democracy, but also a breakthrough in the way we connect with other stakeholders. We manage this joint project entitled *Education, Democracy and the Legacy of Conflict: Prospects and Challenges of History and Civic Education in Indonesia* in cooperation with Leuven University and Heidelberg University managed by Dr. Mada Sukmajati at Gadjah Mada, Prof. Arnim Langer at Leuven, and Prof. Aurel Croissant at Heidelberg. The core activities in the project include an in-depth, participatory study on the school curriculum and radicalism in Yogyakarta, as presented in the chapter written by Sukmajati, Ningtyas, and Amrurobbi. Other chapters that constitute the book were the results of the call for papers in the mid of 2018 as part of this project.

As you can see, each chapter in the book discusses the results of intensified field research on the topics. Data and analyses presented in the book will be very contributive to the study on education in a multicultural country like Indonesia, which always faces challenges in its identity as a single nation. Education is extremely important in finding the best solutions to overcome the ever-growing challenges. The book shows us some aspects of education across Indonesia, which are useful

not only for informing the improvement of the educational system, but also for, more importantly, enhancing the quality of the democracy.

**Abdul Gaffar Karim** is Head of the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

# TABLE OF CONTENT

# EDUCATION, CONFLICT HISTORIES, AND SOCIAL COHESION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA: INTRODUCTION

*Mada Sukmajati*

## INTRODUCTION

This anthology of writings examines how far formal and informal education systems in Indonesia have contributed to the effort to develop democratic attitudes and behavior. The book also explains how the legacy of conflict from the democratization period has persisted in the secondary education system in Indonesia. More detailed questions to answer are: How far have the experiences of vertical conflicts (between the state and the communities) and horizontal conflicts (between communities) been incorporated into education? How far have the curriculums at the national level and the practice level in school classrooms developed democratic values and practices as materials in learning processes? How far is the dynamics in the development of learning methods related to democracy and the legacy of conflict? And, what factors have influenced learning processes related to democracy and the legacy of conflict?

The book discusses the roles of learning processes and the education system in Indonesia in overcoming the inheritance of conflict memory, as well as their roles in the reconciliation process. It is important to see the aspects of the inheritance of conflict memory and the conflict reconciliation in Indonesia's education system - among the students, the teachers, and other related groups. To make the elaboration of variations at the practical level more focused, each chapter in the book discusses three main aspects, namely curriculums, learning methods, and peace infrastructures.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Various existing studies investigated the relationship between peace education and conflict reconciliation efforts in some post-conflict areas. The concept of peace education is inherent in such concepts of education as coexistence education, human rights education, citizenship education, and multicultural education (Abdi, 2020). The studies above acknowledge the importance of combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches to avoid the assumption that peace education becomes merely an entrenchment of western values in the forms of democracy and civic values. The studies reported in this book share some experiences and dynamics in the development of peace education in some regions in Indonesia.

Tinker's study (2016) becomes an important basis for the studies to develop a concept of global peace education. The concept of peace education in the post-cold war era emphasizes the importance of considering the socio-political context of post-conflict areas. The concept of peace education commonly used focuses on the efforts made in the education sector to overcome the problems of structural and cultural violence. However, the lack of a standard definition of peace education has resulted in some problems, one of which is the difficulty in

developing appropriate learning materials and methods according to the contexts of post-conflict areas. Mainstreaming peace education in the global context is directed to instill liberal democratic values. This has also resulted in some problems. Therefore, it is not surprising that the concepts of market mechanism and democratic institutions become important bases for developing internal peace and external peace in post-conflict areas. Since there is no agreement among scholars on the concept of peace education, there are variations in the concept of peace education used by the studies reported in this book. Although its concept varies, peace education in post-conflict areas plays a crucial role in promoting harmonious interactions that are mutually beneficial and helping develop common goals that will be achieved by the communities in post-conflict areas (Finkel, 2014; D. W. Johnson & Johnson, 2006; Tinker, 2016).

Several studies show that the lack of clarity about the concept of peace education has made the implementation of many programs develop biases. However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, the variations in the concept of peace education in Indonesia reflect interesting and challenging dynamics. Some educational institutions have made a contribution to peace processes. However, some other institutions have strengthened the legacy of conflict.

Several studies also show the importance of the institutionalization of consensus among stakeholders to strengthen the contribution of schools in developing peace education. One of those studies is the one conducted by Johnson & Johnson (2006), which states that there are some important prerequisites for the institutionalization of consensus to occur, namely 1) there is public education that involves community members from different backgrounds; 2) there are interdependence and togetherness between the teachers and

the students in the learning process; 3) the students are involved in fair processes in decision making; 4) there are teachings about negotiation and mediation processes; and 5) there are activities to instill civic values in the students.

There have not been many studies investigating the comprehensive dimensions of peace education, namely curriculum designs, learning methods, and peace infrastructures. As a matter of fact, these dimensions strongly influence the development of peace education. The constellation of the dimensions may make conflict memory lead to strengthened conflict potentials or strengthened conflict management.

Previous studies conducted in the context of post-conflict areas in many countries may become an important basis for investigating several aspects that have contributed to the success or failure in the development of peace education in post-conflict areas. The first aspect relates to the importance of the design of an educational curriculum, the quality of facilitators, and learning methods. Integrating peace education into the curriculum also requires that the teachers have adequate capability. For example, teachers in Pakistan have developed educational curriculums that contribute to peace building, since peace education is one of the most important things for the country. The curriculums were integrated with other school subjects systematically (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Faheem & Iqbal, 2021; Opere, 2020; Ratu et al., 2019; Sahibzada, 2020; Saputra, 2016). Materials on peace education in the curriculums are aimed at preventing the inheritance of conflict or violence and promoting skills, values, beliefs, and hopes in peace building (Slyck et al., 2019). In addition, peace building in the education system becomes one of the factors that help transform a country into a more developed one (Ghanta, 2020).

One of the studies investigating peace education in the Indonesian context was conducted by Baidhawy (2006). The study focuses on the curriculums of religious education since the New Order era. According to Baidhawy, religious education in the New Order era reflects the regime's effort to homogenize social groups in order to maintain national stability. Similarly, Idris et al (2020) explain that educational institutions have important roles in providing peace education, although sometimes their contribution is not optimal. Sierra Lone has implemented the peace education curriculum designed by UNICEF in 2007-2008 (Higgins & Novelli, 2020). Meanwhile, in Kenya after the 2007-2008 election riots, the same curriculum started to be implemented by its ministry of education and UNICEF. Salamon & Bitton in Ratu et al (2019) also explain that in Palestine and Israel, peace education programs were incorporated into certain subjects, such as history, sociology, and religious education. A study conducted in Russia by Zamalieva (2020) shows that peace education can also be taught through the subject of language education.

In line with the facts above, Ubaedillah's study (2018) shows that civic education in Indonesia became an instrument of political power of the authoritarian regime. McGregor's study (2008) even shows that the memory of the Indonesian military's success in quelling the 30 September 1965 rebellion and its strong support for the formation of the New Order Government were made a narrative in books used for the subject of history education. This shows the important role played by the military in the development process. While in Cambodia, according to Harber (2019), the concept of education for peace building and conflict prevention has been incorporated into its national curriculum.

In the context of religious education, the study conducted by Hasan et.al. (2018) found some barriers to social inclusion in the contents of religious education books prepared by the Indonesian government. Ideas that contain radicalism were found in learning materials provided by teachers. The study conducted by Darraz & Qodir (2018) shows that teachers may become one of the doors through which ideas that develop religious exclusivism infiltrate students' worldview. Furthermore, several studies show that knowledge obtained from various literatures, materials taught by teachers, and information obtained from extra-curricular activities may strengthen conflict potentials (Darraz & Qodir, 2018; Handajani et al., 2019; Hasan et al., 2018; Maknun et al., 2018).

The second aspect that influences the development of peace education in post-conflict areas relates to the importance of donor agencies and peace education facilitators sharing an understanding of the concept of peace education. Since 1990, peace education has been widely adopted in various conflict contexts by donors and international aid agencies, such as the World Bank, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and INEE. For example, in 1997 and 2005, these institutions conducted various peace education programs in Kenya and Uganda (Higgins & Novelli, 2020).

A study conducted in Africa by Omeje (2015) explains that the agenda of mainstreaming peace education worldwide has given rise to various biases. Most of the scholars and educators who pioneered research on peace and conflict in Africa are African people who became an expratiate and were trained in Western countries. According to Omeje (2015), the fact that most of those pioneers of peace studies were trained in

Western countries may indicate that they used non-African conceptual tools, research methodologies, and perspectives that weakened their local knowledge capacity.

Furthermore, many training programs focusing on peace education in Africa conducted since 1990s have biases. They see problems from Western perspectives. More practical challenges are scholars' weak capacity, the lack of teaching materials (the lack of relevant libraries), and the stunted development of graduates' career, which is due to the weak absorption of the African economy and the short-term character of various projects of conflict resolution supported by donor agencies (Omeje, 2015).

The same things have occurred in Indonesia. One example is the distribution of international donor aid in post-tsunami Aceh in 2004. The management of prolonged social conflicts in Aceh gave rise to gap problems (Waizenegger & Hyndman, 2010). It is true that tsunami in a way contributed to the conflict resolution, but it also increased the potential for conflict among the communities due to the overlap in the distribution of international aid among disaster victims, the combatants of GAM (Freedom Aceh Movement), and conflict-affected residents (Waizenegger & Hyndman, 2010).

Shah and Cardozo's study (2014), in investigating problems related to the inheritance of conflict memory in Aceh, focused on four aspects, namely the distribution of and access to education, democratic representatives in decentralized educational structures, efforts to incorporate local contents into the curriculum, and the contradiction between the post-tsunami reconstruction in 2004 and the Hensinki Agreement in 2005. It was difficult to send international aid to conflict areas. Therefore, the aid was sent to tsunami-affected areas only. Many international donor agencies did not care about the situation.

The third aspect that has some influence on peace education developmet in post-conflict areas relates to the importance of the character education curriculum used in the areas. A character education curriculum, according to Davies (2005), may make a negative or positive contribution. A curriculum may make a negative contribution if:

1. the learning substance encourages the students to join a semi-military training or a conscription as a self-defense strategy;
2. through the curriculum, stereotypes against other identities are strengthened (prolonged conflicts have resulted in strengthened in-group feeling through a teaching process that tends to support self-identity and resistence to ohers);
3. it continuously conveys conflict messages;
4. it continuously conveys hate messages and emphasizes self-identity being suppressed; and
5. the teaching method obscures or even erases stories based on conflict realities in the past.

A curriculum may make a positive contribution to a peace process if:

1. it contains activities or materials that instill tolerance in the students to develop harmony with other groups;
2. it encourages conflict resolution through alternative understandings;
3. it encourages real action mobilization to promote an understanding about and protection of the right to health, security and defense;
4. it promotes critical literacy through a dialogue; and
5. it involves the students directly in democratic activities which include filing a petition for peace.

Several studies investigated the roles of peace infrastructures in education for conflict reconciliation. Peace infrastructures in the form of interactions among educational institutions, academics, and communities play an important role in conflict resolution (Johnson, 2018). Long-term measures for conflict resolution need to be understood as a result of structural factors causing the position of campuses to be vulnerable. The study conducted by Mutisi (Mutisi, 2016) in Zimbabwe shows how campus liberalization caused campuses to be fragile, which was due to the decreasing financial support from the government and the economy that was getting worse, which was caused by the turmoil inside the country resulting from free market forces.

Tobor and Odubo (2016) argue that education will contribute to conflict resolution in the long run only if structural economic problems that give rise to violence are overcome. The involvement of teachers, students, parents, and communities is important in the development of a curriculum focused on the teaching of cultural values. Technical skills for improving the quality of life become ingredients for conflict resolution. Different strategies have been applied by some African countries in implementing peace education (Barrios-Tao et al., 2017). Furthermore, Ettang's study (2016) shows that students' involvement and the integration of schools separated by group identities may make a contribution to conflict resolution. Abdi (2020) argues that peace education is a viable solution for dealing with escalating conflicts in Ethiopia, a society divided by ethnic conflicts. In the country, peace education was implemented in formal and non-formal educational institutions to change negative attitudes and perceptions, and encourage peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, and peace-building.

Meanwhile, Datzberger (2016) criticizes formal education that is prone to cause conflict escalation. In practice, a formal education system may contain an indirect form of violence, which reflects the existence of repression and structural problems. A fragile environment may lead to decreased access to education, which in turn will increase school dropout. Around the world, decreased access to education is addressed by providing non-formal education. This way, communities have widened access to education.

Regarding the learning methods used at formal schools, Quaynor's study (2012) shows that the discussion of past conflicts rarely occurs in the classroom learning. Students and teachers in many post-conflict countries tend to avoid 'making contact' with their past experiences. This causes them to be sceptical about democratic values. It can be seen that the relationship between power and customs strongly influences civic education in the classroom. For example, as explained by McLean Hilker in Harber (2019), teachers in Rwanda experience obstacles in developing peace education since it is still delivered by using teacher-centered approaches with one-way communication. Furthermore, the approaches do not help students develop critical thinking skills. Various criticisms against mainstreaming peace education in formal schools encourage alternative ways for the implementation of a learning process as part of conflict reconciliation. In Karamoja, Uganda, for instance, non-formal education has been developed in consultation with customary communities. The curriculum, which contains materials on environment and agriculture knowledge, is adjusted with the needs of local customary communities (Datzberger, 2016).

A case in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, also shows that the efforts made by non-governmental organizations to

promote multicultural education have not reached schools (Sukandar et al., 2015). Meanwhile, the dominant use of textbooks has a weakness. The students are introduced to diversity by using pictures only. The teachers do not encourage them to critically think about the structural violence that caused conflicts in West Kalimantan. Due to the teachers and schools' failure to form new knowledge construction through multicultural education, social sentiment and segregation still exist (Nakaya, 2018).

In Ambon and Poso, the efforts made by universities to develop a peace education module did not run well because there was no public space to bring the conflict-affected parties together (Hartomo et al., 2015). Meanwhile, the efforts to incorporate local wisdom materials into curriculums in promoting peace in Ambon and Poso are considered successful (Hartomo et al., 2015).

The experiences in several countries show that there are some weaknesses that should be addressed in mainstreaming peace education in formal, informal, and non-formal schools. The first weakness is that non-governmental organizations supported by international donor agencies face program discontinuity and social inequality, which, to some extent, is caused by uneven project implementation. The second weakness is that the programs of mainstreaming peace education supported by global actors are prone to patronize local communities and educational institutions without understanding the root of the problems causing conflicts. The third weakness is that in developing learning materials based on local knowledge, the internal condition of teachers, students, and communities affected by conflicts in various areas have not yet been properly considered. The fourth weakness is that relevant parties have not yet realized the importance of

dialogue in promoting the exchange of views between teachers and students and between schools and communities, which gives rise to a sense of belonging and a sense of mutuality.

It has been shown that various studies on peace education focused on curriculums, learning methods, and infrastructure as separate aspects. The studies reported in this book aim to enrich the findings of previous studies by seeing those three aspects as one whole, an understanding of which is important to explain the dynamics of peace education practices in post-conflict areas. Such an understanding is also crucial for helping us understand the important role of education in formal, informal, and non-formal schools in conflict reconciliation in Indonesia.

## ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

The studies reported here focus on three aspects, namely curriculums, learning methods, and peace education infrastructure in formal, informal, and non-formal schools in Indonesia. These aspects are seen as one whole; they cannot be separated from one another. An understanding of the relationship among the three aspects will help us see the role of education in the inheritance of conflict memory and conflict reconciliation in the long run.

Before the three aspects above are discussed in the following chapters, they need to be defined first. The first aspect is curriculum. Law Number 20 of 2003 about National Education System defines curriculum as a set of plans on and arrangements about the aims, contents, materials, and methods of a learning activity implemented to achieve certain educational goals.

Philip W. Jackson (in Muhammad, 2015: 118-119) explains that from 1633 to the end of the 19th century, curriculum was understood as a number of instructional materials that

had to be taken and learned by the students to obtain knowledge. Since then, definitions of curriculum have been developed. Some of the new definitions have been developed as a cricital response to some previous definitions. So far, educational institutions in Indonesia have defined curriculum as a learning plan that contains learning aims, materials, activities, media and tools, and schedule (Muhammad, 2015).

The second aspect is learning method. The Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture explains that there are five elements of a learning method, namely 1) *syntax*, the learning operation, 2) *social system*, the learning situation and norms (Directorate of the Development of Senior Secondary Schools, 2017), 3) *principles of reaction*, which relates to the ethics governing teachers in treating their students, 4) *support system*, any media and tools that support learning, and 5) *instructional and nurturant effects*, the learning outcomes in accordance with the set aims. These five elements become the criteria to understand the roles of education in the inheritance of conflict memory and reconciliation (Direktorat Pembinaan Sekolah Menengah Atas, 2017).

The third aspect is peace infrastructure. It is defined as cooperation among related parties in promoting peace by developing a sense of mutuality and strengthening the capacity to respond to conflict situations properly (Johnson, 2018). Peace infrastructure enables consensus and conflict resolution to happen through collaboration among all the stakeholders. Peace infrastructure can be seen as a network of educational organizations, the government, and communities in preventing violence by making use of local knowledge, creating peace education agents, and providing advocacy support at the local level (Johnson, 2018).

It is important to develop the three aspects above in such a way that peace can be promoted by instilling tolerance through education. According to Raihani (2014), tolerance can be defined as an attitude that respects differences. In some cases, the word 'tolerance' has a connotation of a passive attitude towards unfavorable things, which is often accompanied by the act of holding-back hatred. Tolerance may also cover respect towards and recognition of differences and a belief that all identities are equal. Tolerance needs to be defined by incorporating the fact that it is expected to emerge when there are differences that need to be negotiated.

The threes aspects of peace education that are discussed in the current studies operate as one whole. However, some facts need to be noted. The first fact is that collaboration between peace education and teachers will not necessarily lead to conflict reconciliation, especially when they are unable to select an appropriate learning method. The study conducted by Kuppens, Langer and Ibrahim (2018) in the context of schools in Nairobi, Kenya, for instance, investigated the roles of teachers and peace education in the inheritance of ethnic stereotypes through their behavior and learning processes. Although the teachers had made afforts to avoid subjectivity, the stereotypes were embraced without thinking. This shows that ethnic stereotypes had spread in classes and school environments.

Another study, conducted by Avery, Levy, and Simmons (2014), investigated the role of open discussion in helping secondary school students realize that there are different perspectives to see problems and that this situation is normal. Such a discussion brought positive attitudes in the students in that they started to respect differences in views.

The study did not incorporate the aspects of curriculum and peace infrastructure. It focused on the learning methods selected by the teachers.

The second fact that needs to be noted relates to the view of Reilly and Niens (2014) that becomes an important basis to see structural problems in post-conflict areas which have caused peace infrastructure to be unable to work properly. Reilly and Niens (2014), like Avery, Levy, and Simmons (2014), see the important role of learning methods in the forms of critical reflection and open dialogue in reconciliation in post-conflict North Ireland. They contend that promoting global civic education through curriculums, critical pedagogy, and learning processes needs to consider the relationship between the teachers and the social context. The major challenges in making a critical reflection and having an open dialogue are limited time, human resources, and educational structures, as well as issues concerning global civic education that are beyond local and national ones.

Solutions to structural problems in an education system that relate to such things as funding, ethnic segregation, access and equality, the national examination system, and the choice of languages play an important role in the success of conflict reconciliation (Cole & Barsalou, 2006). Some structural conditions need to be paid attention when seeing the role of peace infrastructure (Torney-Purta, 2002). The first condition is that education has to be accessible to the lower class and those having limited facilities at home. The second condition is that the collaboration between schools and professional organizations for teachers, school committees, and other community groups remains necessary to accelerate the success of conflict reconciliation in post-conflict areas.

The third condition is that, in line with the statement of Reilly and Niens (2014), we need to take into account the role of the emotional connection between teachers and students in the classroom learning to make reconciliation successful. Education systems, learning methods, and civic education infrastructure developed in top-down manner do not guarantee the success of a reconciliation process. The emotional involvement of curriculum makers, trainers, teachers, and students in post-conflict areas needs to be understood in order that the root of the problems can be learned. An understanding of it may contribute to reconciliation efforts.

Although around the the world the trend is the use of civic education to develop democratic and tolerant societies, without considering the role of the emotional connection among the stakeholders, such an effort will be futile. Rubin's study (2016), which investigated three schools in Guatemala, shows that a curriculum, learning process, and peace infrastructure that do not make connections to the history of violence and structural problems may contribute to social segregation. The researched students kept on social distancing according to their social identities, although the curriculum and the classroom learning introduced civic and democratic values.

Instead of managing conflict potentials properly, global civic education in top-down manner has even exacerbated the root of the problems. In Israel, for instance, civic education conducted unilaterally has exacerbated structural problems. Candidate teachers may have orientation to global values according to their social and ethnic classes (Yemini et al., 2015). It can be seen here that the curriculum, teacher training, and peace infrastructure institutionalize class discrimination. Such global civic education provides rooms for the upper class only. This has led to a limited understanding of the local context that

became the root of the problems. The lack of understanding about the conflict context caused the potential to use local values as reconciliation instruments to be left untouched.

Basically the effort to incorporate global values that do not have emotional connection with local communities into the learning process and educational curriculum in post-conflict areas may give rise to various challenges and contradictions. The first challenge is that tension among social groups may occur due to the lack of consensus on learning materials. Each of them defends their own point of view (Metro, 2013). The second challenge is that lower social groups may be alienated due to their low representation in the process of curriculum improvement to support peace processes. The third challenge is that language obstacles may lead to a misunderstanding on the part of the companion agencies helping develop curriculums and hold trainings.

The fourth challenge is the domination of participants from the upper social class (Metro, 2013). This may silence critical attitudes due to the fear of disturbing the upper social class. The last challenge is that tension may happen due to the domination of companion agencies as outsiders in developing educational policies. Some of them tend to patronize the local communities in post-conflict areas.

The emotional connection between the central government and the communities in post-conflict areas is reflected in the incorporation of local knowledge into the national educational curriculum. According to Paulson (2015), the narrative used in the national curriculum basically tends to be indoctrinating, instead of helping the students build a critical understanding about the root of the conflict problems and overcome it (Paulson, 2015). It can be seen that an understanding of the learning method used in post-conflict areas is crucial because

the narratives of history that have been developed in the state-run schools tend to use the perspective of only one of the involved parties. Often the narratives do not pay attention to the perspectives of the victims or the injured parties in an event (Cole & Barsalou, 2006). Schools have obstacles in bringing various points of view about existing narratives together. Therefore, they choose to take only one point of view.

**Picture 1.** The Three Dimensions of Peace Education



Like some previous related studies, the studies reported in this book also see the important roles of curriculums, peace infrastructure, and learning methods in supporting conflict reconciliation. The discussion on the aspect of curriculum is focused on the role of learning materials in introducing democratic values in formal, non-formal, and informal education systems in Indonesia. The discussion on learning methods is focused on the ways teachers, students,

non-governmental organizations, and communities carry out peace education. The discussion on peace infrastructure is focused on the relationship between schools and community groups, and the interactions between teachers and students in the learning process at schools.

## METHODS

As has been stated previously, there has not yet been a clear definition of peace education. This book will make a methodological contribution to the development of the concept of peace education. Actually the success of peace education is strongly influenced by the socio-economic-political context of the post-conflict area where it is carried out.

The studies reported here used qualitative field research and workshops on some selected articles on peace education in the formal and informal education systems in several post-conflict areas. Most of the studies collected data through field research in several junior high schools and senior high schools with qualitative method. The method was used to understand the contexts of the post-conflict areas in Indonesia by paying attention to the continuity of the three aspects of peace education. The method was also used to explore how the three aspects work in the researched conflict areas. Some of the studies used quantitative method to investigate the development of peace education in several areas in Indonesia. The articles from the contributors were improved through periodical workshops and reviews.

The current studies are directed to respond to the biases arising from global mainstreaming peace education by showing the role of education in overcoming the inheritance of conflict memory in several areas in Indonesia. The studies found such factors as internal and external conditions that contribute to

mainstreaming peace education in the formal, non-formal, and informal contexts. The internal factor in the form of educational politics influences the inheritance of conflict memory through curriculums, learning models, and peace infrastructure. The external factor in the form of peace education commissioned by global actors has some biases in its implementation in Indonesia.

## UNDERLYING CAUSES

Considering some relevant theoretical concepts, the book sees that there are three conditions that influence the curriculums, learning methods, and peace education infrastructure in Indonesia. Due to this, the first part of the book explores various phenomena related to the learning methods, which become keys in peace education curriculums and infrastructure in Indonesia. The second part of the book sees the strong emotional connection among the stakeholders, which is crucial for the success of the learning methods, curriculums, and peace education infrastructure in Indonesia. The last part of the book discusses the importance of understanding structural conditions to ensure that peace education infrastructure operates well, which contributes to the success of the curriculums and learning methods.

The first article in the first part of the book, written by **Sukmajati, Dian, and Azka**, discusses materials on tolerance in the curriculums of Junior High Schools and Senior High Schools in the Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, the society of which is heterogeneous. This part of the book shows that the national curriculum does not specify in detail materials on tolerance. Therefore, teachers have a wide range of choices when developing the materials. There are at least two subjects at Junior High Schools and Senior High Schools that are closely related to materials on tolerance,

namely the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Religious and Character Education (especially Islamic Religious and Character Education). The case in Yogyakarta shows that there are differences in the teaching of materials on tolerance in the two subjects. The teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education have differences in defining and teaching the concept of tolerance. Another important finding is that the teachers make efforts to obtain references from various contents in social media, including contents of radicalism and fundamentalism. It can be seen that the role of information and communications technology is crucial for developing peace education in Indonesia.

A discussion of curriculums cannot be separated from the role of teachers. The article titled *The Irony of Improvement: Education and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Aceh* elaborates the roles of Islamic clerics in *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in the Province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam with the background of the conflict between the Central Government (Jakarta) and the Province. Trying to get out of the debate whether *Pesantren* are institutions that promote peace or not, Permana argues that Islamic clerics as teachers at *Pesantren* are actually political actors who have enormous resources post MoU Helsinki. As political actors, they are influential not only to their students, but also to the local political constellation in Aceh. Therefore, it can be said that the influence of the clerics is beyond *Pesantren*. They are also influential to peace development processes in Aceh. This article is very important especially when we often position Islamic scholars more as the agency (objects) than the principal (subjects) in peace education development.

Good learning methods reflect good curriculums and peace education infrastructure in Indonesia. The article titled *History Education and Reconciliation Process in Transitional Indonesia* written by Głąb investigates how the New Order regime under Soeharto made use of films, textbooks, and museums to maintain narratives of his power in history education. According to Glab, the major themes in history education developed by the regime are the strengthening of nationalism, the military's role, and the position of PKI (the now-defunct Indonesian Communist Party) as the common enemy that has to be faced. The historical narrative developed by the New Order regime, according to Glab, still survives today. This has led to the survival of the historical myths that maintain trauma, influence emotion, and become propaganda tools. According to Glab, this can be overcome not only by developing new textbooks, but also by providing other perspectives to overcome the knowledge gap.

With the topic of the September 30th, 1965 Movement, the article *The Perils of Historical Truth in History Education: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the "Truth" in Historical Learning*, written by Abidin, classifies history teachers teaching the event of the 1965 Movement into two groups, namely the conformist and the objectivist. The conformist teachers see the 1965 event based on the power narrative developed by the government and their perception of the learning material. The objectivist teachers are able to see various versions of the historical narratives on the 1965 event, but they do not dare to express them in the learning process in the classroom. This silence of the objectivist teachers has made the narrative of history education created by the New Order regime survive.

The emotional connection among the stakeholders is crucial for the learning methods, curriculums, and peace education infrastructure in Indonesia to be successful.

In addition to the education at schools, the learning process in conflict-affected communities has also proven effective in developing togetherness, which is a key ingredient to prevent the emergence of conflicts. Gaspersz's study reported in the article *Peace Religious Education: Walking through Challenges and Possibilities in the Post-Conflict Maluku Society* investigated the role of the school of *pela*. *Pela* has proven more effective than the educational process at schools in promoting peace building horizontally (among citizens) in post-conflict areas. Social ties among villages reflected in *pela* are revived through the social bridge connecting Christian and Muslim citizens. In fact, social segregation and religious fanatism are inherent in formal education.

An understanding of structural conditions is important for assuring that peace infrastructure may run well, so that curriculums and learning methods can play their roles properly. The importance of maintaining peace infrastructure was studied by Hidayah and Ramadhany and the results are reported in the article titled "*Islamic Education and Social Cohesion: Situating Pesantren in the Island of God*". The study investigated the ways *Pondok Pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) Toleransi Bali Bina Insani build social cohesion in Bali post-Bali bombings. The *Pesantren* is trying to erase the stigma put on Muslims by the majority of Balinese people and build togetherness among the Balinese people. The *Pesantren* is also trying to build a 'social wall' for respecting different cultures by asking its studens to wear *sarong* only within the *Pesantren* compound, using internal *adzan* speakers, and recruiting local Balinese people to be its employees. Knowledge and culture sharing is also conducted by the *Pesantren* by incorporating traditional Balinese arts, i.e. Balinese dances, calligraphy, and martial arts, into its curriculums. The sense of belonging

created through knowledge and culture sharing is strengthened by joint activities, i.e. joint farms and meat distribution during Eid ul-Adha.

The article titled *Youths in the Post-Conflict Indonesia: The Emergence of Youth Peacebuilding Initiatives in Post-Conflict Ambon and Poso* reports a study conducted by Azca and Arrobi. The study investigated the roles of *Rumah Katu* in Poso and *Peace Provocateur* in Ambon in supporting the process of peacebuilding initiated by the young generation at the community level. The role of the young generation in the learning process is important since they were related to the emergence of religious conflicts in the two regions. Both *Rumah Katu* and *Peace Provocateur* make use of social media as a learning tool for instilling peace values in the post-conflict era. *Rumah Katu* has its own film production house that makes films and conveys various messages through social media. *Rumah Katu* has also pioneered an arts festival and a peace concert that promote togetherness and joint learning so that prejudice among social group members can be eliminated. *Peace Provocateur* in Ambon also makes use of various social media platforms to convey peace messages and counters with narratives various types of information containing hate speech against people with other identities.

Finally, the article by Wibowo *Supporting Teachers to Teach Peace: A Case Study of a School in Indonesia* discusses peacebuilding activities in schools established by donor agencies in post-conflict and tsunami Aceh. There is a relationship between teacher trainings conducted by donor agencies and the knowledge transfer to the students aimed at preventing the seeds of conflict. The schools hold various programs to socialize peacebuilding, although there are no indicators to evaluate the programs. Some of the programs are creating rules,

carrying out trainings, making posters, and holding dialogues among teachers. Unfortunately not all the teachers have received trainings, so that they still have different perceptions of peacebuilding. Due to their dependence on donor agencies, the schools are unable to independently develop education that supports the process of peacebuilding. After the donors stopped their assistance, the process of peacebuilding also stopped.

Based on the descriptions above, a common thread to all the discussions in the book can be seen. There are some important points about the dynamics in the implementation of peace education in secondary schools in Indonesia. The first point is that, in the regions with the legacy of vertical conflict, including Aceh, the curriculum development, especially the one in informal educational institutions, has not yet been fully directed to peace building. The curriculum development in such institutions may even increase the potential for conflict among community groups, so that the potential conflicts become not only vertical, but also horizontal. Meanwhile, in the regions with the legacy of horizontal conflict, such as Ambon and Poso, learning materials for peace building have even been developed in out-of-school institutions. In this context, the roles of various civil society groups become crucial. The implementation of peace education in Indonesia is not yet optimal. This may be due to the big challenges and obstacles faced by the teachers in implementing peace education, including the growing identity politics, which involves ethnic and religious identities. As a matter of fact, in certain regions, such as Bali, the government, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, has actually facilitated the development of curriculums that promote peace building in *pesantren* (Islamic educational institutions).

As to the role of curriculums in strengthening peace education in Indonesia, this book shows at least three important facts. The first fact is that the national curriculum for secondary education does not specifically regulates learning materials on democracy and conflict. Meanwhile, at the practice level in classrooms, we can see a contestation between two approaches, i.e. the liberal-secular approach and the religious-conservative approach. Therefore, teachers play a very important role in developing learning materials for peace education.

The second fact is that, as can be seen from the teaching of the topic of the Movement of 30 September 1965, teachers tend to teach only one version of the 1965 event, i.e. the version developed during the authoritarian period of New Order, although there are several versions of the event. Only a few teachers have tried to discuss the event more proportionally. As a matter of fact, the controversy about the 1965 event always repeats itself every year. In other words, debates about what actually happened in the event and its meanings and implications always occur annually in Indonesia. Furthermore, teachers tend to avoid discussing controversial issues, such as the ones on whether Muslim students may wish their Christian teachers and schoolmates Merry Christmas, the wearing of hijab as part of school uniforms, and whether it is permitted to shake hands with the opposite gender. Therefore, it can be said that the learning processes are not yet optimal in implementing peace education.

The third fact is that, like what happens to teachers in some other countries, teachers in Indonesia still need to build their capacity to teach materials on democracy, the legacy of conflict, and peace building. Teachers' capacity to teach such materials needs to be improved to ensure that the development of their professional careers goes hand in hand with

the development of the implementation of peace education. More broadly, this is closely related to how far schools are serious about implementing peace education.

With regards to learning methods, the book shows us some important facts and lessons. Peace values, tolerance, and social cohesion as parts of peace education actually need to be incorporated properly into all school activities, namely curricular, co-curricular, and extra-curricular activities since materials on democracy and tolerance developed for and used in curricular and co-curricular activities may be impaired by materials that are in conflict with democracy and tolerance used in extra-curricular activities. Actually some schools have collaborated with other parties, such as social organizations and community figures, in implementing peace education.

Teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education have actually implemented dialogic and participative learning methods. Some teachers enrich their students' learning by utilizing learning materials developed by some NGOs and community organizations, including youth organizations. Therefore, it can be seen that teachers have adopted multi-perspective approaches in implementing peace education.

Some of the experiences in the implementation of peace education in Indonesia show that the success or failure of the development of peace education is determined by many factors, some of which are identified by this book. The first factor is the social, political, and cultural contexts of the local community. The context of Aceh, which has special autonomy status to apply Islamic law, is different from the context of Bali, the society of which tends to be open. These different contexts may influence the process of learning peace building.

The second factor is teachers' capacity to translate curriculums into learning materials and methods that strengthen the dimensions of peace education in secondary schools. Such capacity is essential since teachers have a very strategic role in translating the national curriculum into daily learning practices in classrooms, including the teaching about controversial issues in the community. The third factor is synergy between schools and other related actors. Several chapters in this anthology reveal some community-based initiatives to develop peace education outside schools. The fourth factor is the utilization of information and communications technology as part of the development of peace education in Indonesia. The utilization of the technology for peace education is very important to counter its utilization for activities that increase conflict potentials in the community. Furthermore, the utilization of the technology should be carried out properly, so that the results will not be counter-productive.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The effort to maintain peace through education has become the attention of many scholars. Conflicts that have happened around the world are always related to their socio-political contexts. A study in Africa shows that global peace education gave rise to some biases and even weakened the capacity of local knowledge (Omeje, 2015). This was exacerbated by violence inherited in various domains. Considering these facts, peace education, as suggested by Johan Galtung, should be contextual, which means that efforts to create peace in post-conflict areas need to pay attention to their social and political contexts. Countries rich in local culture like Indonesia can develop a concept of peace education by optimalizing their local wisdom.

Considering all this, it is crucial to conduct a research on the development of peace education that is not only universal, but also rooted in local culture.

This book explains the dynamics in the development of peace education in Indonesia. Although there have been some achievements, in general, democratic values and practices, as well as conflict experiences, have not yet become parts of learning processes that support peace building. Based on the discussions, as provided in the book's chapters, we would like to provide some recommendations for strengthening peace education in secondary schools in Indonesia:

1. The government needs to strengthen the concept of peace education, especially the elements related to the learning substance, and internalize it in the curriculums for formal and non-formal secondary education;

2. Schools need to integrate values of social cohesion into curricular, co-curricular, and extra-curricular contents and activities in order to help the students develop awareness about their obligations and rights as citizens;

3. The government and schools need to carry out various efforts to improve teachers' capacity, so that they are able to translate the concept of peace education into lesson plans, incorporate conflic experiences into learning materials, and utilize information and comunications technology in learning processes;

4. The government and schools need to improve teachers' capacity to enrich learning methods by, for instance, developing a learning method that is more participative, that involves various perspectives, and that utilizes information and communications technology that is in accordance with learning purposes; and

5.  Schools need to strengthen synergy with other related actors, including NGOs and community groups, in order to strengthen the implementation of peace education.

It is hoped that, with the measures recommended above, we will be able to fully develop a concept of peace education and implement it properly in the education sector. This way, education will play a more decisive role in the management of conflict and the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia.

# REFERENCES

Abdi, M. T. (2020). The Role of Peace-Education as a Coexistence, Reconciliation and Peace-Building Device in Ethiopia. *Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, *2*(3), 61–74.

Abu-Nimer, M. (2001). Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious. *Journal of Peace Research*, *38*(6), 685–704.

Avery, P. G., Levy, S. A., & Simmons, A. M. M. (2014). Secondary Students and the Deliberation. *Political Science & Politics*, *47*(4), 849–854.

Baidhawy, Z. (2006). Building harmony and peace through multiculturalist theology-based religious education: an alternative for contemporary Indonesia. *British Journal of Religious Education*, *29*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200601037478

Barrios-Tao, H., Siciliani-Barraza, J. M., & Bonilla-Barrios, B. (2017). Education Programs in Post-Conflict Environments: a Review from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. *Revista Electrónica Educare*, *21*(1), 1–21.

Cole, E. A., & Barsalou, J. (2006). *Unite or Divide? the Challenges of teaching History in Societies emerging from Violent Conflict*.

Darraz, M. A., & Qodir, Z. (2018). *Osis Mendayung di Antara Dua Karang: Kebijakan Sekolan, Radikalisme dan Inklusivisme Kebangsaan*.

Datzberger, S. (2016). Peacebuilding through non-formal education programmes: a case study from Karamoja, Uganda. *International Peacekeeping*, 1–24. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2016.1214073

Davies, L. (2005). Teaching About Conflict Through Citizenship Education. *International Journal of Citizenship and Teacher Education*, *1*(2), 17–34.

Direktorat Pembinaan Sekolah Menengah Atas. (2017). *Model-Model Pembelajaran*. Direktorat Pembinaan Pendidikan Sekolah Menengah Atas Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI.

Ettang, D. (2016). Transformation Education Interrogating the Utility of Conflict Transformation Theory in Peace Education in Plateau State, Nigeria. In *Peace Education for Violence Prevention in Fragile African Societies: What's Going to Make a Difference?* (pp. 357–383). Africa Institute of South Africa.

Faheem, J., & Iqbal, M. Z. (2021). Peace Education: Perceptions of Secondary School Teachers of Province Punjab, Pakistan. *Pakistan Social Science Review*, *5*(1), 1154–1164.

Finkel, S. E. (2014). The Impact of Adult Civic Education Programmes in Developing Democracies. *Public Admin. Dev*, *34*, 169–181.

Ghanta, B. (2020). Need of Peace Education in Higer Education in Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Countries. *UGC Care Journal*, *43*(4), 162–168.

Handajani, A., Hasan, N., & Christiani, T. (2019). Islamic Religious Education, Student Activity and Intolerance in State Senior High Schools in Yogyakarta. *Jurnal Aqlam – Journal of Islam and Plurality*, *4*(2), 247–262.

Harber, C. (2019). *Schooling for Peaceful Development in Post-Conflict Societies: Education for Transformation*. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17689-1

Hartomo, O. D., Dewi, Y. T. N., & Pancasiwi, H. (2015). The Implementation of Peace Building Education Based on Local Wisdom in Indonesia's Post Conflict Areas. *International Journal of Humanities and Management Sciences (IJHMS)*, *3*(4), 217–221.

Hasan, N., Suhadi, Ikhwan, M., Ichwan, M. N., Kailani, N., Rafiq, A., & Burdah, I. (2018). *Literatur Keislaman Generasi Milenial: Transmisi, Apropriasi, dan Kontestasi* (N. Hasan (ed.)). Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Press.

Higgins, S., & Novelli, M. (2020). Rethinking Peace Education: A Cultural Political Economy Approach. *Comparative Education Review*, *64*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1086/706759

Idris, M., Willya, E., Wekke, I. S., & Makodenseho, S. (2020). Peace Resolution in Education and Application on Information and Communication Technologhy. *International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology*, *29*(06), 3349–3358.

Johnson, A. T. (2018). University Infrastructures for Peace in Africa: The Transformative Potential of Higher Education in Conflict Contexts. *Journal of Transformative Education*, *17*(2), 173–194.

Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2006). Peace education for consensual peace: the essential role of conflict resolution. *Journal of Peace Education*, *3*(2), 147–174.

Kuppens, L., Langer, A., & Ibrahim, S. (2018). A teacher is no politician: Stereotypic attitudes of secondary school teachers in Kenya. *International Journal of Education Development*, *62*, 270–280.

Maknun, M. L., Hidayat, R. A., Ridlo, S., Mustolehudin, Huda, N., Noviani, N. L., Khalim, S., Masfiah, U., & Ruchani, B. (2018). *Literatur Keagamaan Rohis dan Wacana Intoleransi* (M. L. Maknun (ed.)). Litbangdiklat Press.

McGregor, K. E., Oka, D., & Setyadi, R. (2008). *Ketika Sejarah Berseragam Membongkar Ideologi Militer dalam Menyusun Sejarah Indonesia*. Syarikat.

Metro, R. (2013). Postconflict History Curriculum Revision as an "Intergroup Encounter" Promoting Interethnic Reconciliation among Burmese Migrants and Refugees in Thailand. *Comparative Education Review*, *57*(1), 145–168.

Muhammad, I. (2015). Makna Kurikulum: Dari Materi Belajar ke Perencanaan Pembelajaran. *Intelektualita*, *3*(1), 117–126.

Mutisi, M. (2016). Mainstreaming Peace Education in the University Curriculum Assumptions, Approaches and Achievements of this Model in Zimbabwe. In *Peace Education for Violence Prevention in Fragile African Societies: What's Going to Make a Difference?2* (pp. 307–330). Africa Institute of South Africa.

Nakaya, A. (2018). Overcoming Ethnic Conflict through Multicultural Education: The Case of West Kalimantan, Indonesia. *International Journal of Multicultural Education*, *20*(1), 118–137.

Omeje, K. (2015). Strengthening Peace Research and Peace Education in African Universities. *African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie*, *19*(1), 16–33.

Opere, O. A. (2020). *Peace Education and its Contribution to Peaceful Coexistence among Students in Public Secondary Schools in Nairobi City County, Kenya*. Kenyatta University.

Paulson, J. (2015). "Whether and how?" History education about recent and ongoing conflict: A review of research. *Journal on Education in Emergencies*, *1*(1), 7–37.

Quaynor, L. J. (2012). Citizenship education in Post-conflict contexts: A review of the literature. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, *7*(1), 33–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197911432593

Raihani. (2014). Creating a culture of religious tolerance in an Indonesian school. *South East Asia Research*, *22*(4), 541–560.

Ratu, B., Misnah, & Amirullah, M. (2019). Peace Education Based on Local Wisdom Nosarara Nosabatutu. *JOMSIGN: Journal of Multicultural Studies in Guidance and Counseling*, *3*(2), 106–118. https://doi.org/10.17509/jomsign.v3i2.20958

Reilly, J., & Niens, U. (2014). Global citizenship as education for peacebuilding in a divided society: structural and contextual constraints on the development of critical dialogic discourse in schools. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, *44*(1), 53–76.

Rubin, B. C. (2016). We Come to Form Ourselves Bit by Bit: Educating for Citizenship in Post-Conflict Guatemala. *American Educational Research Journal*, *53*(3), 639–672.

Sahibzada, H. E. (2020). An Exploration of University Teachers' and Students' Attitudes Towards Peace Education. *The Dialogue*, *15*(2), 84–93.

Saputra, W. N. E. (2016). Pendidikan Kedamaian: Peluan Penerapan pada Pendidikan Tingkat Dasar di Indonesia. *Jurnal Care (Children Advisory Research and Education*, *3*(3), 88–94.

Shah, R., & Cardozo, M. L. (2014). Education and social change in post-conflict and post-disaster Aceh, Indonesia. *International Journal of Educational Development*, *38*, 1–12.

Slyck, M. R. Van, Nelson, L. L., Foster, R. H., & Cardella, L. A. (2019). Peace Education and Conflict Resolution Curricula for Middle School Students. *Scolarly Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences*, *2*(3), 184–194. https://doi.org/10.32474/SJPBS.2019.02.000138

Sukandar, R., Karib, F., Hutagalung, N. V., Cholid, S., Rasyid, I., Peranto, S., Putra, R. P. A., Ansori, M. H., & Efendi, J. (2015). *Kapasitas Lembaga dan Dinamika Pencegahan Konflik Studi Kasus Kalimantan Barat dan Nusa Tenggara Barat*. Kerjasama Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan (SNPK) The Habibie Center (THC).

Tinker, V. (2016). Peace Education as a Post-conflict Peacebuilding Tool. *All Azimuth*, *5*(1), 27–42.

Tobor, J. O., & Odubo, E. F. (2016). Education and Peacebuilding in Africa: A Critical Analysis on Post Conflict Niger Delta, Nigeria. *International Journal of Academic Research and Reflection*, *4*(1), 81–88.

Torney-Purta, J. (2002). The School's Role in Developing Civic Engagement: A Study of Adolescents in Twenty-Eight Countries. *Applied Developmental Science*, *6*(4), 203–212.

Ubaedillah, A. (2018). Civic Education for Muslim Students in the Era of Democracy: Lessons Learned from Indonesia. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, *16*(2), 50–61.

Waizenegger, A., & Hyndman, J. (2010). Two solitudes: post-tsunami and postconflict Aceh. *Disasters*, *34*(3), 787–808.

Yemini, M., Yardeni-Kuperberg, O., & Natur, N. (2015). The global–local nexus: desired history curriculum components from the perspective of future teachers in a conflict-ridden society. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, *47*(1), 26–48.

Zamalieva, A. I. (2020). Promoting Peace Education via Language Teaching. *VI International Forum on Teacher Education*, 2885–2893. https://doi.org/10.3897/ap.2.e2885

# CLASSROOMS AS ARENAS OF POWER CONTESTATION: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2013 CURRICULUM AT SECONDARY EDUCATION IN YOGYAKARTA

*Mada Sukmajati, Dian Nuri Ningtyas, and Azka Abdi Amrurobbi*

## INTRODUCTION

Radicalism has been still growing in Indonesia. Educational institutions are one of the places that become fertile ground for radicalism. This phenomenon is not new and, therefore, not surprising. The Government through the Minister of National Education actually has realized, since 2011, that seeds of radicalism have been sown and grown in schools (Kompas, 2011). The growth of radicalism can be seen from the rampant intolerant attitude and behavior in learning processes at educational institutions in Indonesia.

A lot of conceptual research on tolerance in Indonesia has been conducted. One of the optimistic studies on the development of tolerance in Indonesia is the study conducted by Hefner (2000), in which he proposed a label "civil Islam." According to him, Islam that has developed in Indonesia,

the world's largest Muslim nation, has characters that strongly uphold the values of civility, such as tolerance, pluralism, and inclusivity. Some other studies are not that optimistic. The study conducted by Menchik (2016), for example, which focused on the three biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, introduced the concept of "godly nationalism," in which the character of tolerance in Indonesia, according to him, is described as ambiguous. The tolerance in the country does not develop in the liberal-secular model because it does not work in the scope of individual freedom, but in the scope of shared responsibility. On the other hand, the tolerance is not fully in the religious-conservative model because the state acknowledges the existence of religions and beliefs other than Islam. Such an argument is supported by Mietzner and Muhtadi (2020), who showed the sides of intolerance of the Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Several studies found some indications that some aspects in Indonesia's education system have developed unfavorably, creating space for intolerance at schools. Setiana and Nuryadi (2020) explained that the curriculum in Indonesia is often considered as a 'magic' document that has to be used as guidance. However, many teachers are not creative and innovative in applying the curriculum. Due to this, most classroom learnings are focused on completing the teaching of learning materials. The teachers do not care whether the students have already mastered the learning materials or not. The studies conducted by Listia et. al (2007) and Raihani (2007) also showed that the learning methods developed for primary education and secondary education in Indonesia are still doctrinal and monotonous. Therefore, the methods do not meet democratic standards. As a matter of fact, teaching tolerance requires an appropriate curriculum, adequate teaching competencies, appropriate approaches, and learning methods

that are inclusive and open to differences (Mumin, 2018). However, some other studies showed that there are some schools in Indonesia that have been relatively successful in developing materials on tolerance for learning processes at secondary schools (Hoon, 2014; Parker, 2014; Raihani, 2014).

Several studies focused on the role of teachers in developing materials on tolerance for learning processes at secondary schools in Indonesia. Results of the study conducted by Center for the Study of Islam and Society, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah (PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta), in 2016, for example, showed that 78 percent of the teachers of Islamic Religious Education agree on the implementation of Sharia law. 77 percent of them also support organizations that fight for Sharia law. Another study conducted by PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 2018 showed that at least 59 percent of teachers in Yogyakarta support the establishment of an Islamic state (Tempo, 2019). Furthermore, Azyumardi Azra (2011) informed that quite a few teachers think that Indonesia has to change its form of state to be an Islamic state in the form of a caliphate in order to implement Sharia law. Some media coverage showed a fact that reading materials for the subject of Religious and Character Education at some secondary schools in Indonesia teach that the act of killing those who have a different belief is justified by Islam (halal) (Tribunnews, 2015). Another study conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISForm) UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta and PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 2019 revealed that 41.6 percent of the students of the Study Program of Islamic Religious Education, who are teacher candidates, have the opinion that the Government of Indonesia is *thaghut* (deviant) (NU, 2019).

With regards to the nature of tolerance among students, Parker, Hoon and Raihani's study (2014) showed that most of the students of senior high schools and other schools at the same level have a positive attitude towards those who have a different religion and/or ethnicity. However, most of them do not agree on an interfaith marriage. Meanwhile, Ali and Purwandi's study (2017) found some indications of ever-increasing intolerance among highly educated people, which is manifested in, for examples, the ever-increasing choice of Middle Eastern style Muslim dress, the stronger perception that polygamy and divorce are not taboos anymore, the less support for non-Muslim government leaders, the stronger formalization of Sharia law, and the stronger support for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.

The studies described above in general investigated the dynamics of the development of the concept of tolerance as one of the learning materials for Indonesian schools. However, those studies do not deeply explore the dynamics of the learning processes conducted daily in the classrooms from the perspective of power relations. Furthermore, many of the existing studies do not focus on the role of teachers in developing materials on tolerance for daily learning activities. As a matter of fact, teachers play a vital role in developing materials on tolerance to be taught in the classrooms. Teachers' understandings of the concept of tolerance vary greatly. Their understandings even often contradict each other. This certainly contributes to the dynamics in the learning of materials on tolerance. It is in such a context that classrooms essentially become arenas of contestation among teachers' various beliefs and perceptions of the concept of tolerance.

This study is focused on the dynamics in the development of materials on tolerance used for secondary education (junior high schools and senior high schools and other schools with the same levels) in Indonesia. The study is focused on the roles of teachers at some schools in Yogyakarta. The main question to explore is how far the teachers teach materials on tolerance in classroom learning processes. To answer the main question, the study is focused on three supporting questions. The first question is how far materials on tolerance have been developed in the national curriculum. The second question is how far the teachers understand and teach materials on tolerance in the classrooms, including how they deal with the following three issues: wearing hijab as part of school uniforms, shaking hands with the opposite gender, and a Muslim wishing a Merry Christmas. The third question is what factors influence the teachers in teaching materials on tolerance.

## TOLERANCE AND EDUCATION

Tolerance is a key prerequisite for democracy (Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton, 2007). As stated by Rapp & Freitag (2014), tolerance is one of the basic democratic principles that help society cope with the rising levels of diversity. Furthermore, according to Alzyoud et al. (2016), tolerance "helps states, societies, and people to live in peace and stability." Therefore, it is "crucial to eliminate conflicts and differences on the basis of respect and understanding." Although tolerance is a crucial democratic principle, scholars have different understandings of the concept of tolerance. They admit that tolerance is a moral concept that is complex and difficult to understand (Heyd, 1996; Mayorga, 2014). It is not surprising that tolerance is understood differently by scholars since they use different perspectives in seeing it. Their concepts of tolerance even often contradict each other.

The term 'tolerance' originated in the 16th century during a persecution against Catholics considered heretics (Doorn, 2014). Then, throughout the 18th century, a struggle for religious freedom and the strengthening of a secularization process made the term become even more developed. Israel (2001) explained that the birth of liberal democracy in Europe is the culmination of the secularization process, in which the concept of tolerance became even more widely developed.

Furthermore, Mill (1859) explained that in 1800s the concept of tolerance transformed from the one focused on issues on interreligious relations into the one focused on wider issues. Such transformation was required to accommodate broader differences not only in religions, but also in cultural, social and political aspects. At the beginning, the concept of tolerance was used in the context of the separation of church and state in England (Locke, 1989). In such a context, tolerance was understood as the state's willingness not to disturb the beliefs, attitudes, and behavios of its people. The state could not involve itself in someone's religious affairs.

Then, some scholars broadened the concept of tolerance. Vogt (1994) defined tolerance as a way of deliberate self-control in dealing with unfavorable things. He proposed a formula of tolerance, i.e. diversity + equality + peace (Vogt, 1994). Meanwhile, UNESCO in Declaration on the Principles on Tolerance (1995) defined tolerance as a form of expression and a way to help us be human. This definition is the one that has been mostly used up to now. The concept of tolerance was then related to the fulfillment of human rights and peace (Agius & Ambrosewicz, 2003; Baalbaki, 2001; Svanberg, 2015). Williams (1996) stated that acts tolerance are carried out voluntarily and without coercion.

As to the relationship between education and tolerance, many scholars argued that educational institutions are important in developing tolerant attitudes and behaviors in the community (Green & Janmaat, 2011; Isac, 2015; Isac et al., 2018). According to Chzhen (2013), educational institutions develop tolerant values and practices through civic and political education. In civic education, tolerance is useful for developing empathy and solidarity. Meanwhile, in political education, tolerance is useful for developing people' awareness of their rights and responsibilities when they are involved in a political system. Likewise, Green et al. (2006) stated that tolerance in education is often connected to one of the key civic principles, i.e. equal rights for all citizens. Therefore, educational institutions play a vital role in developing tolerant attitudes and behaviors.

Furthemore, Forst (2013) provided six important propositions about tolerance: (1) tolerance is contextual; (2) tolerance involves negative considerations; (3) tolerance involves acceptance; (4) tolerance contains a moral decision as a rejection component; (5) tolerance is not relative; and (6) tolerance is not the same as neutrality. Forst also proposed some realm limitations of the concept of tolerance. The first limitation is the normative realms of practice and faith embraced by a person. The second limitation is the realms of practice and faith that are considered wrong, but can still be tolerated. The third limitation is the realms that cannot be tolerated and that are obviously rejected. Further efforts to understand and translate tolerance have produced various different concepts of tolerance.

The facts above are also the case in the education sector. Conflicting concepts of tolerance like what are found in daily practice are also found among the stakeholders of educational institutions, especially teachers. Concepts of tolerance become contestative subjects among them. Furthermore, a review of

existing literature on the matter showed that there are two models for understanding tolerance, namely the religious-conservative model and the liberal-secular model (the first model transformed to be the second model). The two models, as shown in some of the subsequent sections, have influenced the understandings and beliefs of tolerance in secondary education in Indonesia.

## METHODS

There were some reasons why this study chose several schools in Yogyakarta. Nationally, Yogyakarta is an education barometer. It is popularly known as a city of education. In addition, school and university students in the city have various religious, ethnic, and regional backgrounds. In 2002-2003, the city was awarded the predicate of "Yogyakarta City of Tolerance." However, for the past five years, it has been ranked the lowest in the Index of Most Tolerant Cities in Indonesia made by Setara Institute, a non-governmental organization focusing on equality and tolerance issues.

The analysis in this study was based on data or information obtained by applying three data collection methods. Besides functioning as a form of triangulation, the use of the three methods was expected to provide more comprehensive information.

The first method is document study, which was carried out by analyzing the 2013 Curriculum, which is the current basis for learning processes in secondary education in Indonesia. Some policies are parts of the 2013 Curriculum, namely:

1.  Content/Curriculum Standards are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of Education and Culture 6 No 8/2013 on the Structures of the Curriculums of Junior High Schools / Islamic Junior High Schools;

2.  The Standards of Educators and Education Staff are regulated in:
    - Regulation of the Minister of National Education 1 No 2/2007 on the Standards of School Superintendents;
    - Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 16/2007 on the Standards of Teacher Qualifications and Competencies; and
    - Regulations of the Minister of National Education No 18 and No 40/2007 on Teacher Certification;

3.  Process Standards are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 65/2013 on Process Standards;

4.  The Standards of Facilities and Infrastructures are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 24/2007 on the Standards of Facilities and Infrastructures;

5.  Finance Standards are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 69/2009 on Finance Standards;

6.  Management Standards are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 19/2007 on Management Standards; and

7.  Assessment Standards are regulated in Regulation of the Minister of National Education No 67/2013 on Assessment Standards.

The second method relied on data and information obtained through Focus Group Discussion (FGD), which was conducted in three series. The first series of FGD was conducted with some stakeholders from the Office of Education, Youth, and Sports of the Province of Yogyakarta Special Region, the Office of Education of Yogyakarta City, the Quality Assurance Agency

for Education of the Province of Yogyakarta Special Region, and State University of Yogyakarta. Each of the institutions sent two representatives to the FGD.

The second series of FGD involved some teachers of Religious and Character Education (most of whom are teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education) from several schools, namely State Junior High School 5 Yogyakarta City, Senior High School 1 Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta City, Junior High School Taman Dewasa Jetis, State Islamic Junior High School 1 Yogyakarta City, Senior High School 1 Bopkri Yogyakarta City, Vocational Senior High School 3 Yogyakarta City, Vocational Senior High School Taman Siswa Jetis, and State Islamic Senior High School I Yogyakarta City. The third series of FGD was conducted with some teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics from several schools, namely State Vocational Senior High School 7 Yogyakarta City, Integrated Islamic Junior High School Abu Bakar Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Senior High School 2 Yogyakarta City, Senior High School Stella Duce 1 Yogyakarta City, State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Junior High School 1 Yogyakarta City, and Vocational Senior High School Perindustrian.

During the series of FGD, the participants provided some interesting information. However, they tended not to be open about the three issues that become the topics of this study and tended to avoid discussing them. To obtain further information, a series of in-depth interviews was conducted with six teachers of Religious and Character Education from State Senior High School I Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta City, State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Senior High School 2 Yoyakarta City, State Vocational Senior High School 3 Yogyakarta City,

and State Junior High School 5 Yogyakarta City. The team of researchers also interviewed 6 teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics from State Senior High School I Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Senior High School I Yogyakarta City, State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta City, State Islamic Senior High School 2 Yogyakarta City, State Vocational Senior High School 3 Yogyakarta City, and State Junior High School 5 Yogyakarta City; 2 Deputy Headmasters for Student Affairs (State Vocational Senior High School 3 Yogyakarta City and State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta City), 2 Deputy Headmasters for Curriculum Affairs (State Islamic Senior High School I Yogyakarta City and State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta City); 1 resource person from the Office of Education, Youth, and Sports of Yogyakarta City; 1 academic from State Islamic University Sunan Kali Jaga Yogyakarta; and 1 activist from an education-based NGO named Saranglidi based in the Province of Yogyakarta Special Region.

## MATERIALS ON TOLERANCE IN THE SECONDARY EDUCATION CURRICULUM

As stated earlier, there are many regulations underlying the design of the 2013 curriculum for secondary education in Indonesia. This shows that the themes of the design are not fully integrated. The themes are regulated with different policies. Field observations show that, when questions on materials on tolerance in the 2013 curriculum were asked, the teachers got difficulty in explaining them. Furthermore, the content analysis of the documents on the 2013 curriculum shows that the curriculum uses a normative and general approach in explaining materials on tolerance. The exploration shows that there are two school subjects focused on the teaching of

values and practices of tolerance, namely the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Religious and Character Education.

The 2013 curriculum explains core competencies that have to be mastered in each level of study and basic competencies that have to be mastered in each school subject. Core competencies have to be mastered by the students to meet Graduate Competency Standards at each level, class, and program. Core competencies consist of four dimensions, i.e. spiritual attitudes, social attitudes, knowledge, and skills. Meanwhile, basic competencies are the ones that the students have to master through learning that is focused on attitudes, knowledge, and skills, which are based on the core competencies that they have to master. According to some interviewees, the learning materials of each school subject in one study level is deeper in nature than the ones in the study level below. In other words, the higher the class level is, the deeper the discussion of the learning materials is.[1]

At junior high schools and other schools with the same level, the core competencies related to tolerance are "appreciating and implementing honest behavior, discipline, responsibility, care (tolerance and mutual cooperation), politeness, and self-confidence in effectively interacting in social and natural environments in one's social reach and according to their existence." These core competencies are translated into basic competencies, which are incorporated into school subjects, i.e. the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Religious and Character Education. The formulation of the competencies above shows that values of tolerance

---

1 Focus Group Discussion with junior high school teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics, 2018, and an interview with Trihartini (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Junior High School 5), 31 October 2018

are incorporated into the competencies in order to help the students develop appropriate social attitudes and care required for carrying out interaction in social environments.

**Table 1.** Basic Competencies Taught in the Subjects of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Islamic Religious and Character Education at Junior High Schools and Other Schools with the Same Level

| Class / Subject | Class VII | Class VIII | Class IX |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics | 1. Respecting the spirit and commitment of nationalism as shown by the founders of the nation when formulating and establishing Pancasila as the state foundation. | 1. Respecting the spirit and commitment nationalism as shown by the founders of the nation when formulating and establishing Pancasila as the state foundation. | 1. Respecting the noble values of Pancasila as the state foundation and the nation's view of life according to the dynamics of time. |
| | 2. Respecting behavior that is in accordance with social norms in interacting with peer groups and other community members. | 2. Respecting behavior that is in accordance with social norms in interacting with peer groups and other community members. | 2. Respecting the noble values of Pancasila as the state foundation and the nation's view of life. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3. Respecting tolerant attitudes towards ethnic, religious, racial, cultural, and gender diversity. | 3. Respecting tolerant attitudes towards ethnic, religious, racial, cultural, and gender diversity. | 3. Respecting the laws that are applicable in the community as a vehicle for the realization of justice and peace. |
| 4. Respecting the unity and unitary spirit in understanding one's own region as an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. | 4. Respecting the unity and unitary spirit in understanding one's own region as an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. | 4. Respecting tolerant attitudes and harmony in diversity in living a life in the Indonesian society, nation, and state. |
| | | 5. Respecting the spirit and commitment of Youth Pledge as the glue that binds nationalism as shown by the youth figures declaring the Youth Pledge in 1928. |
| | | 6. Understanding and implementing the unity and national unitary spirit and commitment in building and maintaining the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. |

| Islamic Religious and Character Education | 1. Respecting emphatic behavior towards human fellows as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. An-Nisa (4): 8 and related hadiths. | 1. Respecting pious behaviour and positive thinking as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al- Ashr (103): 2-3, Q.S. Al-Hujurat (49): 12 and related hadiths. | 1. Respecting tolerant behavior and diversity in social interactions at the school and in the community as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al-Hujurat (49): 13 and related hadiths. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 2. Respecting sincere, patient, and forgiving behavior as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. An-Nisa (4):146, Q.S. Al Baqarah (2):153, and Q.S. Ali Imran (3): 134, as well as related hadiths. | 2. Respecting behavior that avoids liquor, gambling, and quarrel as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al-Maidah (5): 90–91 and 32, as well as related hadiths. | 2. Respecting behavior that reflects good manners, politeness, and embarrassment stemming from doing something bad as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al-Baqarah (2): 83 and related hadiths. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 3. Respecting trustful behavior as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al-Anfal (8): 27 and related hadiths. | | 3. Respecting emphatic attitudes that make one care and like helping dhuafa (less fortunate) people as the implementation of an understanding of the meanings of Qurban and Aqiqah rituals |
| | 4. Respecting consistent (*istiqomah*) behavior as the implementation of an understanding of QS Al- Ahqaf (46): 13 and related hadiths. | | |

Two of the forms of tolerance taught at junior high schools and other schools with the same level are "respecting behavior that is in accordance with social norms in interacting with peer groups or other community members" and "respecting tolerant attitudes towards ethnic, religious, racial, cultural, and gender diversity." All this is inspired by the spirit of nationalism based on Pancasila, the state ideology of Indonesia, and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a shared commitment. In other words, materials on tolerance taught in the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics become an instrument to support nationalism and national integration. Meanwhile, in the subject of Islamic Religious and Character Education, materials on tolerance are focused on helping the students develop emphaty, positive thinking,

and social harmony; respect diversity when interacting with others at the school and in the community; and care for and like helping *dhuafa* (less fortunate) people.

At senior high schools and other schools with the same level, the core competencies that are related to tolerance are "understanding and implementing honest behavior, discipline, responsibility, and care (mutual cooperation, tolerance, peace); being polite, responsive, and pro-active; and developing attitudes that support the creation of solutions for various problems, so that the students may carry out effective interactions in social and natural environments and position themselves in international interactions as a reflection of the nation." These core competencies are translated to be basic competencies.

**Table 2.** Basic Competencies Taught in the Subjects of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Islamic Religious and Character Education at Senior High Schools and Other Schools with the Same Level

| Class / Subject | Class X | Class XI | Class XII |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics | 1. Implementing the values of the state philosophy of Pancasila in living a life in the society, nation, and state of Indonesia. | 1. Implementing the values of Pancasila in living a life in the society, nation, and state of Indonesia. | 1. Implementing the values of Pancasila as the nation's view of life and ideology in living a life in the society, nation, and state of Indonesia. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2. Implementing the values contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in living a life in the nation and state of Indonesia. | 2. Implementing the values contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in living a life in the nation and state of Indonesia. | 2. Implementing constitutional awareness based on an understanding of the background, formulation and ratification, development, and actualization of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. |
| 3. Implementing the values contained in the articles of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in various aspects of life in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, defence and security, and law domains. | 3. Implementing the values contained in the articles of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in various aspects of life in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, defence and security, and law domains. | 3. Implementing the values contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in living a life in the nation and state of Indonesia. |
| 4. Implementing tolerant attitudes towards people with different religions and beliefs in living a life in the community, nation, and state of Indonesia. | 4. Understanding various types of threats against the efforts to maintain *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) of Indonesia and their impacts on the state. | 4. Implementing responsibility as a citizen in helping overcome threats against the state. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 5. Implementing tolerant attitudes and harmony in diversity in living a life in the community, nation, and state of Indonesia. | 5. Implementing a democratic culture by emphasizing the principles of deliberation and consensus and the awareness of living a life as a citizen of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. | 5. Implementing a democratic culture by emphasizing the principles of deliberation, consensus, and national integration in the context of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. |
| | 6. Implementing democratic values and culture by emphasizing the principles of deliberation and consensus in daily life in the context of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. | | |
| Islamic Religious and Charater Education | 1. Showing *mujahadah an-nafs* (self-control), *husnuzzhan* (positive thinking), and *ukhuwah* (Islamic brotherhood) as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Al-Anfal (8): 72; Q.S. Al-Hujurat (49): 12 and 10 and related hadiths. | 1. Showing competitive behavior in doing good things and working hard as the implementation of an understanding of QS. Al Maidah (5): 48;Q.S. Az-Zumar (39) : 39; and Q.S. At Taubah (9): 105, and related hadiths. | 1. Showing critical and democratic attitudes as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Ali Imran (3) : 190-191 and 159, as well as related hadiths. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 2. Showing noble attitudes and strong principles, providing a sense of security, showing an attitude of surrender, and having a fair behavior as the implementation of an understanding of Asmaul Husna al-Kariim, al-Mu'min, al-Wakiil, al- Matiin, al-Jaami', al-'Adl, and al-Akhiir.<br><br>3. Showing strong and spiritful attitudes in upholding the truth as the implementation of an understanding of the strategies of *da'wah* (conveying Islamic messages) taken by the Prophet in Maccah.<br><br>4. Showing attitudes representing the spirit of *ukhuwah* (Islamic brotherhood) as the implementation of an understanding of the strategies of *da'wah* (conveying Islamic messages) taken by the Prophet. | 2. Showing the attitudes of tolerance and harmony, which avoid acts of violence as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Yunus (10) : 40-41 and Q.S. Al-Maidah (5) : 32, and related hadiths. | 2. Becoming a person who likes giving advice to and doing kind things for others (ihsan) as the implementation of an understanding of Q.S. Luqman (31) : 13-14 and Q.S. Al-Baqarah (2): 83, and related hadiths. |

In the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at senior high schools and other schools with the same level, some of the realizations of tolerance taught are "implementing tolerant attitudes among people with different religions and faiths in living a life in the society, nation, and state of Indonesia; implementing tolerant behaviors in living a life in the society, nation, and state of Indonesia; and implementing democratic values and culture by emphasizing the principles of deliberation, consensus in daily life in the context of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia." All this is inspired by the spirit of nationalism based on Pancasila as the state ideology and under the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a shared commitment. Meanwhile in the subject of Religious and Character Education, tolerant attitudes and behaviors are realized in, among others, developing positive thinking, maintaining brotherhood, showing noble characters, providing a sense of security, showing fair behaviors, maintaining harmony, avoiding acts of violence, upholding democratic values, providing advice to others, and doing kind things for others. Therefore, materials on tolerance in the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at junior high schools and senior high schools and other schools with the same levels become an instrument for supporting nationalism and national integration. Meanwhile in the subject of Islamic Religious and Character Education, materials on tolerance are focused on developing tolerant behaviors.

The above descriptions show that the 2013 curriculum for secondary education in Indonesia tends to apply the liberal-secular model for the teaching of materials on tolerance in the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics. Meanwhile, the curriculum tends to apply the religious-conservative model for the teaching of materials on tolerance

in the subject of Islamic Religious and Character Education. This is not the case with materials on tolerance taught in the subject of Religious and Character Education for students with religions other than Islam, for instance Christian students, as explained by Hoon (2014) and Doorn (2014).

**Figure 1.** Framework for the Preparation of the 2013 Curriculum



Such normative and general materials on tolerance become the references for all the relevant parties involved in classroom learning activities. Based on the 2013 curriculum, teachers design syllabuses. Materials at the syllabus level are

uniform in all schools. Furthermore, in the preparation of syllabuses, the role of the Forum of the Teachers of School Subjects (MGMP) is very important. However, this forum discusses only general matters. Teachers in the forum tend to avoid discussing matters that they think are controversial and difficult to agree with. This is in line with what Quaynor (2012) found in his research projects in Asia, especially the findings related to Indonesia and Laos. He found that both the curriculums and the teachers avoided discussing controversial issues.

> *The teachers in MGMP usually discuss learning materials to get a shared perception of learning materials and the administrative aspects of learning processes.[2]*

> *The teachers in MGMP only discuss how far the curriculum has been taught. The teachers never discuss their responses to sensitive issues arising at schools, because reponding to such issues is the autonomous right of the teachers and the headmasters.[3]*

Based on the syllabus that has been formulated, the teachers prepare Learning Implementation Plan (LIP). In preparing LIP, they individually translate materials on tolerance that will be taught in classrooms. Due to this, it is not surprising that the LIPs prepared by the teachers are not always the same from one school to another shool, because the teachers' interpretations of the materials on tolerance are different from each other. In other words, the teachers have much freedom in interpreting the materials.

---

2    Focus Group Discussion with Rini Setyani (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Islamic Junior High School 1), 15 September 2018

3    Focus Group Discussion with Ben Senang Galus (the Office of Education, Youth, and Sports), 29 September 2018

What is interesting is that in general the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics have different perceptions of materials on tolerance. Some of them realize that Indonesia is a diverse nation, so that the people need to maintain harmony. Therefore, tolerance is necessary. However, some other teachers believe that tolerant attitudes and behaviors can only be implemented in the context of relations among human beings. According to them, tolerance is not necessary in the context of *akidah* (faith) and *ibadah* (worship). One of the teachers said:

> *I emphasize that Indonesia is a diverse nation, so that we need to be tolerant towards each other, maintain the independence, and do the best for the nation.*[4]

> *I always instill that in the students. It is obvious that we are different from each other. We cannot equate our differences. What is important then is how in the midst of these differences, we can appreciate and respect each other.*[5]

Another interviewee provided a rather different statement:

> *Religions may make us in harmony with each other. It is the differences that make us strong, as long as we can respect each other. However, we respect different faiths. You respect my faith. I also respect your faith. All this is part of empathy.*[6]

---

4    Interview with Rini Setyani (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Islamic Junior High School 1), 15 September 2018

5    Interview with Trihartini (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Junior High School 5), 31 October 2018

6    Interview with Surya T.S. (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 1 November 2018

The teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education also have different perceptions of materials on tolerance, as can be seen from their statements:

> *In the subject of Islamic Religious and Character Education, as far as I know, there is a special material on tolerance. So, the students learn some concepts of tolerance and how to understand religious and ethnic differences, disagreements, and other differences. In the sub-subject of Fiqh, we also learn 'Islamic democracy', 'the history of Islamic culture', and 'power and Islam'.[7]*

> *We prevent tolerance from entering the domains of ibadah (worship) and aqidah (faith). It means that in the domain of aqidah (faith), there is no tolerance. It is also the case in the domain of ibadah (worship). Ibadah (worship) is a prayer.[8]*

> *Tolerance can be accepted in the domain of muamalah (relations among human beings and daily life). Tolerance does not touch the domains of ibadah (worship) and akidah (faith). We have to be able to differentiate which areas need tolerance and which areas do not accept tolerance.[9]*

The learning method applied in the 2013 curriculum is student-centered learning, which encourages the students to participate actively in teaching and learning processes. More specifically, the curriculum applies problem-based learning, project-based learning, and role playing.

---

7   Interview with Fajar Basuki (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 21 December 2018

8   Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1), 22 November 2018

9   Interview with Fajar Basuki (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 21 December 2018

In practice, the teachers have developed learning methods that are dialogic, that are case-based, and that use technologies. However, some of the teachers still believe that one-way lecture method is still effective for learning processes.

> *My teaching experiences show that the subject of Religious Education is different from the other subjects. I've found that learning by using videos is not interesting to the students. On the other hand, lecture method is more appealing to them. Because of this, in explaining materials, I prefer using lecture method, although sometimes it is interspersed with short films about natural events, including disasters, to support my explanations. It can be said that lecture method is used in 60 percent of the learning processes and visual presentations and discussions are used in 40 percent of them.*[10]

> *I explain the first principle of Pancasila (the state foundation) by using films. And, to introduce and instill the spirits of nationalism and diversity, I usually also ask the students to bring foods from various regions.*[11]

> *I think an audio visual method that is interesting is more effective in helping the students find something independently. This way, the students are not taught patronizingly and the task of the teachers is just providing directions.*[12]

---

10  Interview with Ahmad Fathoni (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 6), 21 November 2018

11  Interview with Trihartini (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Junior High School 5), 31 October 2018

12  Interview with Fajar Basuki (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 21 December 2018

The above data show two paradoxes. The first paradox is that substantially the teachers adopt different models. The teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and a few of the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education adopt the liberal-secular model in developing materials on tolerance for learning processes. Meanwhile, the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education tend to adop the religious-conservative model. Furthermore, as to the learning methods, the teachers still adopt models that are indoctrinatory and have not fully applied a participative method. In this context, we can see how the differences between the two models even become bigger in classrooms because the learning methods applied are not fully dialogic.

## THREE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

What is interesting is that during learning processes in the classrooms, the teachers often have to deal with controversial issues faced by the society in daily life. One thing that needs to be underlined, as has been explained earlier, is that the 2013 Curriculum and Learning Implementation usually do not cover such controversial issues. Therefore, the 2013 Curriculum does not provide detailed and concrete answers to questions about controversial issues.

### THE WEARING OF HIJAB AS PART OF SCHOOL UNIFORMS

The 2013 Curriculum does not regulate school uniforms in detail. School uniforms are regulated by the regional governments through their Office of Education. School uniforms at junior high schools and other schools with the same level are regulated by the regency/city governments according to their authority. Meanwhile, school uniforms at

senior high schools and other schools with the same level are regulated by the provincial governments. In Yogyakarta, all the junior high schools and senior high schools give freedom to their students in terms of the wearing of hijab. Meanwhile, all the Islamic junior high schools and Islamic senior high schools oblige their students to wear hijab according to the rule imposed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

In practice, schools have a dominant rule in determining school uniforms.[13] An increasing number of junior high schools and senior high schools in Yogyakarta City have encouraged their students to wear hijab because the schools consider that the wearing of hijab is a command of God and a social demand. The encouragement is not formal, but it is a kind of suggestion.

**Figure 2.** School uniform rules at
State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta City



_____

13   Interview with Ben Senang Galus (The Office of Education, Youth, and Sports), 29 September 2018

The teachers have different perceptions of the wearing of hijab as part of school uniforms. Such different perceptions occur among the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics, among the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education, and between the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education. Such differences occur not only among the teachers at the level of junior high school, but also among those at the level of senior high school. All this has influenced the behaviors of the students.

There are not many teachers, especially those teaching at junior high schools and senior high schools, who consider that the wearing of hijab is not a religious obligation. Most of the teachers consider that in Islam the wearing of hijab is a command of God, so that it is obligatory.

> *In discussing the wearing of hijab, I usually explain that what obliges it is not me, but the religion, because it is stated in Surahs (Chapters) An-Nur, At-Taubah. According to provisions of the Islamic law, the wearing of hijab is obligatory. There is no formal sanction for the female students who do not wear hijab. However, in assessing the students' implementation of religious values, I relate it the religious demand for the wearing of hijab.[14]*

> *In our school, there is no obligation for the students to wear hijab. Our school allows the students not to wear hijab and allows them to wear a knee-length skirt. During the class of Religious Education, the students are not obliged to wear hijab. I think the students*

---

14   Interview with Ahmad Fathoni (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 6), 21 November 2018

> *should do Godly things according to their ability and self-awareness.[15]*

Some of the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education include the wearing of hijab as one of the assessment aspects. The teachers consider that the way the female students dress reflect how far they understand the religious knowledge they have required in the classroom. The teachers also think that Islam, as stated in Al-Qur'an, obliges women to wear hijab. Due to this reason, the students who do not wear hijab are considered as being less able to put the religious knowledge that they have required into practice. Due to this, the teachers give them less favorable assessment. However, in some other schools, the female students who do not wear hijab may still get good scores as long as their scores for the knowledge and theory of Islam are good.

> *As to the wearing of hijab, certainly there is no knowledge score for it because knowledge scores are determined from the daily and task assessments. If the scores based on those assessments are high above the minimum completeness criteria, certainly the final score will also be high. Therefore, it is possible for a female student who does not wear hijab to get a high score.[16]*

The teachers' different perceptions of the wearing of hijab have led to the diversity in the female students' behaviors. Some students at some of the schools have even chosen to wear hijab only when they attend a class of Religious and Character Education or when they are at school. However, this phenomenon occurs in several schools only.

---

15  Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta), 22 November 2018

16  Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta), 22 November 2018

In many of the schools, all the female Muslim students tend to obey the suggestion from the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education to wear hijab as part of their school uniforms.

> *Some female students wear hijab everyday. However, some other students wear hijab during the class of Islamic Religious and Character Education only. What does this mean? Their religious knowledge is not deep. They wear hijab only when I am in the class. To address this, I cannot just play a film about the wearing of hijab. I cannot. Meanwhile, our school does not have a written rule that obliges the students to wear hijab.[17]*

## SHAKING HANDS WITH THE OPPOSITE GENDER

The teachers' perceptions also vary in terms of shaking hands with the opposite gender. At least there are four perceptions that have developed among the teachers in seeing the matter. The first perception is that shaking hands with the opposite gender is not forbidden in Islamic teachings. Some of the teachers consider that shaking hands with all people (including teachers and students) is a realization of an attitude of brotherhood. According to the teachers, this is related to strengthened nationalism, which is an output of the learning materials taught at secondary education in Indonesia.

> *Shaking hands may mean 'peace and prosperous'. If interpreted, "Assalamualaikum" means 'my wish for you is peace of mind and prosperity'. So, in other words, I pray for you through a greeting. And, when there is a teacher who shakes hands with a manner in which the hands do not touch each other,*

---

17 Interview with Fathoni (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta), 21 November 2018

*I ask myself, "Am I dirty?" Then, the perception formed is negative.[18]*

*Shaking hands, saluting a flag, and the like should not be a problem. I usually say to my students that they are not principal matters, so that we have to understand each other and maintain tolerance.[19]*

The second perception is that shaking hands with the opposite gender is an act forbidden in Islam. However, the teachers having the perception think that shaking hands with their students is not forbidden in Islam. According to them, all of their students are "their own children", so that they do not consider the students with the opposite gender as 'other people' (*muhrim*).

*I am accustomed to shaking hands with my students. Whenever they meet me, they always shake my hand. However, some of them do not want to shake my hand because their mother forbids it. If the situation is so, we have to respect each other. As a matter of fact, I consider that shaking hands with my students is the same as doing it with my own children.[20]*

The third perception is that shaking hands with anyone, including colleagues and students, with the opposite gender is forbidden in Islam. However, the rejection of a handshake should be conducted with a polite attitude and behavior, so that the other party will not be offended.

---

18  Interview with Purwanti (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Senior High School 6 Yogyakarta), 21 September 2018

19  Interview with M. Taufiqurahman (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 1), 1 October 2018

20  Interview with Trihartini (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of pancasila and Civics at State Junior High School 5 Yogyakarta), 31 October 2018

*I am accustomed to shaking hands with the
students. However, there are some male and
female teachers who are not willing to shake
hands because they want to keep their wudu
(ablution).[21]*

Due to the teachers' different percepceptions, the students'
behaviors also vary. General observations show that most of the
Muslim students are willing to shake hands with the opposite
gender. However, the number of the Muslim students who are
not willing to shake hands with the opposite will increase from
time to tome.

## MUSLIMS WISHING CHRISTIANS
## A MERRY CHRISTMAS

The teachers have different opinions on whether the Muslim
students may wish a Merry Christmas to their Christian friends
and teachers. Some of the teachers of Islamic Religious and
Character Education clearly have a perception that Muslims
are not forbidden from wishing their Christian friends and
teachers a Merry Christmas.

*When a student asks whether Muslims are
allowed to wish a holiday greeting to people
with religions other than Islam, I answer that
they are allowed to do so. However, not all
the teachers are able to explain the reason
properly.[22]*

Meanwhile, some other teachers believe that there is
no provision in Islam that commands Muslims to wish
Christians a Merry Christmas or that forbids Muslims from

---

21  Interview with Surya (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of
    pancasila and Civics at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 1 November
    2018

22  Interview with M. Taufiqurahman (teacher of Islamic Religious and
    Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 1), 1 October 2018

wishing Christians a Merry Christmas. Therefore, the decision to wish Christians a Merry Christmas should be left to every Muslim individual.

> *I cannot forbid the students from wishing a Merry Christmas. To maintain tolerance, we let them do it. However, if some students believe that Muslims are not allowed to do it, we respect their belief. It is up to them not to wish Christians a Merry Christmas as long as the avoidance of the wishing the greeting does not disturb harmony.[23]*

Despite the facts above, some of the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education have a perception that Islam forbids Muslims from wishing Christians a Merry Christmas. According to them, tolerance is important in social relations among human beings. However, it is not required when it comes to *akidah* (faith) and *ibadah* (worship), which are related to the relations between human beings and the God.

> *Tolerance is required in muamalah, which covers the relations among human beings and matters in daily life. Tolerance is not required in the domains of ibadah (worship) and akidah (faith). When there is a Muslim student wishing a Merry Christmas to a Christian, we say to the student that it should not be done. We should be able to differentiate which areas can accept tolerance and which areas cannot.[24]*

> *Regarding the wishing of a Merry Christmas, we have the opinion that if a Muslim is in doubt about whether they are allowed to wish*

---

23  Interview with Trihartini (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Junior High School 5 Yogyakarta), 31 October 2018

24  Interview with Fajar Basuki (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 21 December 2018

*a Christian a Merry Christmas or not, they should not do it. Considering this, I think we had better take a personal perspective. I have decided not to wish a Merry Christmas to Christians.[25]*

Some of the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education have an understanding that the wishing of a Merry Christmas or other holiday greetings for people with religions other than Islam by a Muslim should be done by a Muslim leader, not a Muslim individual as a community member.

*Muslim leaders may wish a Merry Christmas because, doing so, they represent their people. Therefore, they wish a Merry Christmas not as an individual, but as a leader - as a President, as a Sub-district Head, or as a Regent - representing all their people. However, as an individual, it is not necessary for a Muslim to wish a Merry Christmas. Tolerance can be manifested not only in the wishing of a Merry Christmas, but also in daily harmony, which is shown by, for examples, visting and helping each other.[26]*

Like what happen in the two cases discussed previously, differences in the teachers' perceptions of the wishing of a Merry Christmas by Muslims have led to differences in the students' behavior related to the issue. General observations show that some of the Muslim students are still willing to wish a Merry Christmas to their Christian friends. However, the number of such students will likely decrease from time to time.

---

25  Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta), 22 November 2018

26  Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta), 22 November 2018

## EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

Besides classroom-based learning activities (intracurricular activities) and supporting activities (cocurricular activities), junior high schools and senior high schools in Yogyakarta City also carry out various extracurricular activities. Relevant governmental regulations explain that extracurricular activities are the activities carried out by students outside intracuricular and cocurricular hours and guided and supervised by an educational unit, which in the case here is the school represented by its Students' Council. Extracurricular activities include scout, religious activities (the Islamic Religious Activity, the Christian Religious Activity, the Buddhism Religious Activity, and other religious activities), Core Platoon (an activity in which the students are trained in discipline, responsibility, and leadership), sports, martial arts, arts, and foreign language learning. Some of the schools oblige the students to join some of these extracurricular activities. Some other schools make the activities optional.

> *In our school, scout is an obligatory activity. Meanwhile religious activities are optional.[27]*

> *The Islamic Religious Activity in our school is joined by the class 10 students. This activity is obligatory. However, if a parent objects to their child joining the activity because the are afraid that their child will get radical influences, the child is allowed not to join the activity. If the activity is not made obligatory by the school, we are afraid that there will not be any student joining the activity.[28]*

---

27  Interview with Surya T.S (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 1 November 2018

28  Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1 Yogyakarta), 22 November 2018

Findings from the field show that there is no direct relationship between learning materials on tolerance taught in the subjects of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Religious and Character Education and those extracurricular activities. However, there is a general rule that every extracurricular activity has to be coordinated with and knowledged by the teachers of Religious and Character Education.

> *In the curriculum, the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics does not have extracurricular activities.[29]*

Another interviewee explained:

> *Extracurricular activities, including the Islamic Religious Activity, are not part of the curriculum. Therefore, often they cannot be fully controlled by the school. In Such a situation, radicalism and conservatism at schools may develop.[30]*

However, some other interviewees revealed a different situation.

> *At state schools, usually there are the Islamic Religious Activity, the Catholic Religious Activity, the Protestant Christianity Religious Activity, and/or the Buddhism Religious Activity. These activities are formally established by the schools. Because the schools tightly supervise the activities, radicalism cannot develop in them.[31]*

---

29 Interview with Nur (Vocational Senior High School Perindustrian) in the FGD of the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics on 15 September 2018

30 Interview with Inayah Rohmaniyah (Vice Dean for Student Affairs and Cooperation of the Faculty of Ushuluddin and Islamic Thoghts, State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga), 9 November 2018

31 Interview with Lusia (teacher of Catholic Religious and Character Education at Vocational Senior High School 3), 15 September 2018

> *We, teachers, are counsellors. We examine all plans of curricular activities. Therefore, the Students' Council need to consult with us when designing all the curricular activities.*[32]

> *We always control who will become the mentors for extracurricular activities. The school issues a letter of assignment for each of the mentors. Once such a letter is issued, we notify the school's security unit about the schedule of the activities and the identities of the assigned mentors.*[33]

One example of an Islamic religious activity is the one that uses learning materials on "the strengthening of the *akidah* (faith) and *akhlak* (morals) of Muslims"[34] in order that they "become Muslims who are kind, are pious, believe that there is no God but Allah, and have good morals"[35]. The form of the activity is, for example, the art of reciting Al-Qur'an[36] supported by some reading books.

> *There is a book that is used in some Qur'an recitations. The title is "Mari Kita Hilangkan Kemusyrikan di Indonesia" ("Let's Eliminate Mushrik Beliefs (beliefs in any entities other than the God, which is Allah) in Indonesia"). We allow the book to be used as a reading material since it contains Qur'anic verses and hadiths and their translations.*

---

32 Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1), 22 November 2018

33 Interview with Gigih (Deputy Headmaster for Curriculum of State Senior High School 6), 22 October 2018

34 Interview with M.Taufiqurahman (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 1), 1 October 2018

35 Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1), 22 November 2018

36 Focus Group Discussion with Sugiyono (stakeholder), 15 September 2018

> *The book does not contain any thing related
> to violence and radicalism.*[37]

The descriptions above show that materials on tolerance are also contested in extracurricular activities. What needs to be noted is that not rarely materials on intolerance have even been developed through such extracurricular activities (Salim HS et al., 2011). This phenomenon has often occurred in extracurricular activities related to Islamic Religious and Character Education. However, the government and most of the schools have been aware of the phenomenon. Therefore, unlike before, today headmasters and teachers play a bigger role in the design and implementation of extracurricular activities. This way, today the development of materials on intolerance through extracurricular activities is not as rapid as that in the previous period.

## SOME UNDERLYING FACTORS

Anything that happens in a school reflects how the headmaster plays their role. The role of a headmaster is very important in the learning of the values and practices of tolerance. A headmaster is the main representative of their school, the policy maker in their school, and the manager of the administration of learning processes in their school. These facts show that a headmaster plays a vital role in the process of making policies implemented in their school, including the development of materials on tolerance for learning processes at the school.

> *The Minister of Education and Culture
> has stated that a headmaster does not
> have to have an academic responsibility.*

---

37   Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Senior High School 1), 22 November 2018

*The responsibility of a headmaster is managing their school, instead of teaching.[38]*

*Because a homeroom teacher is an subordinate of a headmaster, a homeroom teacher is responsible to a headmaster.[39]*

*A headmaster as the highest leader in their school is the school's policy maker. No less important are the roles of deputy headmasters. If the manager is good, hopefully the subordinates will also be good.[40]*

Furthermore, the backgrounds of the teachers influence the materials used to teach tolerance, especially the ones related to controversial issues. An interviewee revealed that teachers who do not have a background in the science of teaching can be more tolerant than those with a background in the science of teaching. This is so because teachers whose backgrounds are not the science of teaching on average have broader knowledge than those whose backgrounds are the science of teaching.[41]

*I studied in an Islamic boarding school. Then I continued my study at State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. From the experiences I gained from my studies there, I understand how the indoctrination and internalization of values may influence someone's psychology and behavior.[42]*

---

38  Focus Group Discussion with Interviewee 3, 15 September 2018

39  Interview with Ben Senang Galus (The Office of Education, Youth, and Sports), 29 September 2018

40  Interview with Fajar Basuki (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 2), 21 December 2018

41  Interview with Sri Setyowati (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at Vocational Senior High School 3), 15 November 2018

42  Interview with Inayah (lecturer at State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta), 9 November 2018

*I graduated from the Faculty of Law, Gadjah Mada University. Then I took a master's degree in the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics. Now, I am a teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics.[43]*

*My background is not the science of teaching. However, due to my experiences in teaching in some regions and my general knowledge, I was asked by the school to teach the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics.[44]*

The teachers' backgrounds in societal organizations also strongly influence their perceptions of the values and practices of tolerance. According to an interviewee, in general the headmasters in Yogyakarta City have backgrounds in Islamic modernist organizations[45]. An interviewee, who in classroom learning processes introduces various perceptions to the students and who does not force them to take one perception only, said that some of her colleagues are from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which represents traditionalist-moderate Islam, and some others are from Muhammadiyah, which represents modernist Islam. She claimed that she is from

---

43  Interview with Ruri Kurniawati (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at Integrated Islamic Junior High School Abu Bakar) in the FGD with the Teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics, 15 September 2018

44  Interview with Danny (teacher of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics at Senior High School StellaDuce 1) in the FGD with the Teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics, 15 September 2018

45  Interview with Ben Senang Galus (The Office of Education, Youth, and Sports), 29 September 2018

"Muhammadi-NU", which is an allusion - that she has made - to her being not a member of NU and neither a member of Muhammadiyah[46]. Likewise, another interviewee revealed:

> *I studied in an Islamic boarding school for three years. I liked understanding and explaining various things from the Islamic faith perspective, so I studied at the Faculty of Ushuluddin (the science of Islamic faith) and Islamic Thoughts at State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, which is known by the public as a rather liberal faculty. It happens that I am an NU person. When someone asks me whether Muslims are allowed to wish non-Muslims a greeting on their holidays, I answer: yes, they are.[47]*

The series of field observations shows that the development of information and communications technology also strongly influences the ways the teachers develop materials on tolerance used in classroom learning processes. Some of the teachers said that not rarely they look for references on the Internet related to the controversial issues asked by the students, including the three issues that have been discussed earlier. However, usually the ways they choose and sort such information are influenced by their religious organization backgrounds. Therefore, the rapid and massive development of information and communications technology also influences the teachers' understandings of the concept of tolerance and beliefs about it. This certainly has some impact on the process of learning materials on tolerance in the classrooms.

---

46   Interview with Nurul Yaqin (teacher of Islamic Religious Education at State Senior High School 1), 22 November 2018

47   Interview with M.Taufiqurahman (teacher of Islamic Religious and Character Education at State Islamic Senior High School 1), 1 October 2018

## CLASSROOMS AS THE ARENAS OF CONTESTATION

The discussions above reveal some facts. The national curriculum for secondary education provides only general and normative guidelines for developing materials on tolerance for secondary education. Therefore, the curriculum does not cover practical issues of tolerance like the three issues that have been discussed earlier. In addition, it can be said that materials on tolerance in the national curriculum for secondary education are mainly taught in the two subjects, namely the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and Religious and Character Education. Materials on tolerance in the subject of the Education of the State Foundation and Civics tend to be developed and taught with the liberal-secular model. Meanwhile, materials on tolerance in the subject of Islamic Religious and Character Education tend to be developed and taught with the religious-conservative model.

The national curriculum is technically translated by the teachers into lesson plans to be used in their classrooms. They independently develop materials on tolerance for the two school subjects. Actually the teachers may discuss their lesson plans with their colleagues grouped together in the Forum of the Teachers of School Subjects. However, the teachers in the forum do not discuss controversial issues. They tend to avoid discussing controversial topics like the three topics that have been discussed earlier. Furthermore, learning methods that are not participative are still used by the teachers. All this shows that the teachers play an important role in translating the concept of tolerance and teaching materials on tolerance. Therefore, it can be said that classrooms are actually the arenas of contestation among various interpretations of the concept of tolerance.

In general, there are some patterns of the ways the teachers respond to the three major issues. The first pattern is that the teachers of the subject of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics respond to the three issues differently. Some of the teachers agree on the rule that obliges the students to wear hijab as part of school uniforms, forbid the students from shaking hands with the opposite gender, and forbid the Muslim students from wishing a Merry Christmas to their Christian friends and teachers. However, it can be said that in general the teachers of the subject tend not to agree on the rule that obliges the students to wear hijab as part of school uniforms, not to forbid the students from shaking hands with the opposite gender, and not to forbid the Muslim students from wishing a Merry Christmas to their Christian friends and teachers. Therefore, the teachers of the subject tend to adopt the liberal-secular model in teaching materials on tolerance in secondary education in Indonesia.

The second pattern is that there are differences among the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education in responding to the three major issues. Some of the teachers do not agree on the rule that obliges the students to wear hijab as part of school uniforms, do not forbid the students from shaking hands with the opposite gender (or at least do not ask the students to avoid shaking hands with the opposite gender), and do not forbid the students from wishing a Merry Christmas. However, in general, the responses from the teachers to the issues are the same, namely agreeing on the obligation to wear hijab as part of school uniforms, forbidding the students from shaking hands with the opposite gender (or at least asking the students to avoid shaking hands with the opposite gender), and tending to forbid the students from wishing a Merry Christmas. Therefore, it can be said that the teachers of

Islamic Religious and Character Education tend to adopt the religious-conservative model in teaching materials on tolerance in secondary education in Indonesia.

The third pattern is that in general there is a contestation between the materials on tolerance taught in secondary education by the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics and those taught by the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education. In teaching materials on tolerance at junior high schools and senior high schools and other schools with the same levels, the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics tend to adopt the liberal-secular model. Meanwhile, the teachers of Islamic Religious and Character Education tend to adopt the religious-conservative model.

The contestation in the classrooms has spread to extracurricular activities carried out by the schools, in which it has become more intense. Although extracurricular activities are based on Regulation of the Minister of Education and Culture No 62/2014, in practice the activities have broadened the dichotomy between the liberal-secular model and the religious-conservative model. Therefore, when they have to deal with daily issues in the community, the teachers have different understandings and beliefs. Such differences occur not only among teachers in one school, but also among teachers from different schools. As a consequence, not rarely, the students have developed various inconsistent attitudes and behaviors in responding to controversial issues. There is even a case in which some of the students wore hijab as part of their school uniforms when they attended a class of Islamic Religious and Character Education, but then they took off their hijab when then attended a class of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics.

The contestation among the concepts of tolerance in the classrooms is influenced by some factors. This study established that there are at least four factors underlying such a contestation. The first factor is the role of the headmaster in the learning of the values and practices of tolerance. This means that the headmaster as the representative, policy maker, and manager of the school plays a vital role in the preparation of classroom learnings. It can be said that if the headmaster adopts the liberal-secular model, they will tend to be tolerant in responding to the three major issues. On the other hand, if the headmaster adopts the religious-conservative model, they will tend to be intolerant in responding to the issues.

The second factor is the educational backgrounds of the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics. It can be said that the teachers with a background in the science of teaching are more intolerant than those whose backgrounds are not the science of teaching. It should be noted that the teachers of the Education of the State Foundation of Pancasila and Civics have a background in the Education of Social Sciences. Meanwhile, the teachers of Religious Education must have a background in Religious Education.

The third factor is the backgrounds of the teachers in societal organizations. This factor influences the ways the school actors (headmasters and teachers) understand and see the concept of tolerance. It can be said that in general the teachers who are from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are more tolerant than those who are from societal organizations other than NU. This is in line with the arguments proposed by some scholars, for example Menchik (2016), who stated that NU is more tolerant than other Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

The fourth factor is the development of information and communications technology. This factor also strongly influences the teachers' understandings and beliefs of the concept of tolerance. Not rarely, the teachers look for information on the Internet when developing materials on tolerance to be used in classroom learning processes. However, we have not investigated further whether references on the Internet have been made by the teachers to determine which model (between the liberal-secular model and the religious-conservative model) they use. Temporary observations show that the teachers may have chosen a certain model. The teachers use information and communications technology to explore more knowledge which is related to the model they have chosen and which is relevant for understanding and responding to daily issues that are controversial.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study aimed to investigate the dynamics in the process of teaching and learning the concept of tolerance in secondary education in Indonesia. The analysis shows that there is rich dynamics in such a process in the classrooms. One big question may arise from such dynamics: "Have the materials on tolerance taught in secondary education in Indonesia been well developed?" It seems that so far there have been only two models used in the education sector, namely the liberal-secular model and the religious-conservative model. Therefore, answers to the above question are always related to the two models. As a matter of fact, the two models see the concept of tolerance more as a result than as a process.

The experiences of developing and teaching materials on tolerance in Indonesia as described above show that we may need to redefine the two models and rethink how they should be used in the education sector. Regarding all this,

we may need to stop dichotomizing the two models. In other words, we can use both models at the same time in the classrooms. In this context, it is crucial to develop a dialogue or contestation between the two models in educational institutions. Furthermore, in the teaching of materials on tolerance, we may need to emphasize the process more, rather than the results. This way, the students will have more considerations before finally determining a response to controversial and contestative issues.

# REFERENCES

Agius, E., & Ambrosewicz, J. (2003). *Towards a Culture of Tolerance and Peace*. International Bureau for Children's Right.

Ali, H., & Purwandi, L. (2017). *Milenial Nusantara: Pahami Karakternya, Rebut Simpatinya*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama. https://doi.org/9786020375304

Alzyoud, M. S., Khaddam, A. F. Al, & Al-Ali, A. S. (2016). The Impact Of Teaching Tolerance On Students In Jordanian Schools. *British Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, *15*(1), 33–52.

Azra, A. (2011). Akar Radikalisme Keagamaan Peran Aparat Negara, Pemimpin Agama dan Guru untuk Kerukunan Umat Beragama. *Memperkuat Toleransi Melalui Institusi Sekolah*.

Baalbaki, R. (2001). *Al-Mawrid: A Modern Arabic English Dictionary*. Dar El-Ilm Lilmalayin.

Chzhen, Y. (2013). *Education And Democratisation: Tolerance Of Diversity, Political Engagement, And Understanding Of Democracy* (No. 4; 2013).

Doorn, M. van. (2014). *Accepting the disliked. The practice and promotion of tolerance*. Vrije Universiteit.

Forst, R. (2013). *Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present*. Cambridge University Press.

Green, A., & Janmaat, J. G. (2011). *Regimes of Social Cohesion: Societies and the Crisis of Globalization*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Green, A., Preston, J., & Janmaat, J. G. (2006). *Education, Equality and Social Cohesion: A Comparative Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Hefner, R. W. (2000). *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton University Press.

Heyd, D. (1996). *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*. Princeton University Press.

Hoon, C.-Y. (2014). God and Discipline: Religious Education and Character Building in a Christian School in Jakarta. *South East Asia Research*, *22*(4). https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0232

Isac, M. M. (2015). *Tolerance through education: Mapping the determinants of young people's attitudes towards equal rights for immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities in Europe*. Publications Office of the European Union.

Isac, M. M., Hernandez-Sandoval, A., & Miranda, D. (2018). *Teaching Tolerance in a Globalized World*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/9783319786926

Israel, J. I. (2001). *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750*. Oxford University Press.

Kompas. (2011). *Mendiknas: Perlu Pendidikan Karakter untuk Tangkal Radikalisme*. Edukasi. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/09/26/1758337/~Edukasi~News

Listia, Arham, L., & Gogali, L. (2007). *Problematika Pendidikan Agama di Sekolah: Hasil Penelitian tentang Pendidikan Agama di Kota Jogjakarta, 2004-2006*. Institut DIAN/Interfidei.

Locke, J. (1989). *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Oxford University Press.

Marquart-Pyatt, S., & Paxton, P. (2007). In Principle And In Practice: Learning Political Tolerance In Eastern And Western Europe. *Political Behavior*, *29*(1), 89–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9017-2

Mayorga, I. C. (2014). An Ethical Approach to the Concept of Toleration: Understanding Tolerance as a Political Virtue. *Open Journal of Philosophy*, *4*(4), 575–583. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.44059

Menchik, J. (2016). *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316344446

Mietzner, M., & Muhtadi, B. (2020). The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *42*(1), 58–84. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-1c

Mill, J. S. (1859). *On Liberty*. Longmans, Green, and Company.

Mumin, U. A. (2018). Pendidikan Toleransi Perspektif Pendidikan Agama Islam (Telaah Muatan Pendekatan Pembelajaran di Sekolah). *Al-Afkar: Journal for Islamic Studies*, *1*(2), 15–26. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3554805

NU. (2019). *41,6 Persen Mahasiswa PAI Pandang Pemerintah "Thaghut", Ada 2 Hal yang Harus Dilakukan*. Nasional. https://nu.or.id/nasional/416-persen-mahasiswa-pai-pandang-pemerintah-thaghut-ada-2-hal-yang-harus-dilakukan-9Sh5c

Parker, L. (2014). Religious Education for Peaceful Coexistence in Indonesia? *South East Asia Research*, *22*(4), 487–504. https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0231

Parker, L., Hoon, C.-Y., & Raihani. (2014). Young People's Attitudes towards Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, *22*(4), 467–486. https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0230

Quaynor, L. J. (2012). Citizenship education in Post-conflict contexts: A review of the literature. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, *7*(1), 33–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197911432593

Raihani. (2007). Education Reforms in Indonesia in the Twenty-First Century. *International Education Journal*, *8*(1), 172–183.

Raihani. (2014). Creating a culture of religious tolerance in an Indonesian school. *South East Asia Research*, *22*(4), 541–560.

Rapp, C., & Freitag, M. (2014). Teaching Tolerance? Associational Diversity and Tolerance Formation. *Political Studies*, *63*(5), 1031–1051. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12142

Salim HS, H., Kailani, N., & Azekiyah, N. (2011). *Politik Ruang Publik Sekolah: Negosiasi dan Resistensi di SMUN di Yogyakarta*. CRCS (Center for Religious & Cross-cultural Studies.

Setiana, D. S., & Nuryadi. (2020). *Kajian Kurikulum Sekolah Dasar dan Menengah*. Gramasurya.

Svanberg, L. (2015). *Tolerance of Diversity and the Influence of Happiness Pt. 6*. Klastard Bussines School.

Tempo. (2019). *Survei UIN: 59 Persen Guru Muslim Dukung Negara Islam*. Nasional.

Tribunnews. (2015). *Isi Buku Pelajaran SMA yang Disoroti Mendikbud "Menghalalkan Pembunuhan."* Pendidikan. https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2015/03/21/isi-buku-pelajaran-sma-yang-disoroti-mendikbud-menghalalkan-pembunuhan

Declaration of Principles on Tolerance Proclaimed and signed by the Member States of UNESCO on 16 November 1995, (1995). http://www.oas.org/dil/1995 Declaration of Principles on Tolerance UNESCO.pdf

Vogt, W. P. (1994). What Is Tolerance and Why Should We Teach It? *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, *16*(3–4), 277–296. https://doi.org/10.1080/1071441940160304

Williams, B. (1996). Toleration: An Impossible Virtue? In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*. Princeton University Press.

# PEACE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: WALKING THROUGH CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE POST-CONFLICT MALUKU SOCIETY

*Steve Gerardo Christoffel Gaspersz,*
*Nancy Novitra Souisa, and Jusuf Nikolas Anamofa*

## INTRODUCTION

Ambon is the capital city of Maluku Province and situated in Ambon Island. This is an archipelagic province which was administratively separated into two provinces – Maluku and North Maluku – by President B. J. Habibie, who replaced Suharto after his three-decade-long regime, on October 12, 1999. Historically, Ambon and Ternate were two important cities in the history of spice trade even before the seventeenth century when the European merchants arrived and started to be involved in the trade at the beginning of the long history of trade monopoly and colonization throughout the archipelago, particularly by the Dutch.

The socio-economic dynamics of Ambon as an important port and commercial city at that time fundamentally constructed multicultural encounters between Ambonese communities and other ethnic/religious groups from

other parts of the archipelago, even the South East Asian communities. The demography of Ambon society was composed of multiple ethnic and religious identities that constructed the society as an open pluralistic one. However, according to some historical studies, this social pluralism had potentially high-degree tensions. Nevertheless, the colonial politics, particularly after the VOC (East India Company) succeeded in kicking the Portuguese out from Maluku, was able to create a socio-political mechanism to cope with potential inter-group conflicts among communities in Ambon.

The importance of Ambon and Ternate as the centers of spice trade gradually decreased when the economic attention of the Dutch colonial government, especially after the bankruptcy of VOC due to corruption, shifted to Sumatera and Java, which can be seen from the development of massive plantations in those islands to meet global market demands. This economic colonial model remained during the two post-colonial national state administrations, especially under Suharto's New Order regime.

Suharto's administration affirmed the marginalization of eastern areas of Indonesia through a national development program which was more centered on Java Island and exploited periphery islands as mere suppliers of natural resources. The unjust development circumstance in the eastern areas is one factor that has triggered social frictions over natural resources, such as ocean, forest, and mining ones. Meanwhile, at the same time, results of the exploitation of natural resources were enjoyed only by the small groups of Jakarta's political elites, as they were protected by the New Order military. The orientation of the national development under Seharto's presidency focused on national economic growth that required security and political stability through

the so-called security approach. Socio-cultural plurality was recognized limitedly and controlled strictly through the ideology of uniformity in all domains of society, including social consciousness. Such an ideology formed a social mindset that considers differences as threats to national harmony and hindered the management of the cultural diversity of Indonesian society.

After 32-year administration, the fall of Suharto and his New Order regime by the reformation movement in 1998 bequeathed huge conflicts of interest and increased inter-group tensions among ethnic and religious parties. The quasi-democratization processes during the post-Suharto periods experienced the ebb and flow of political interests between the national elites and the grassroots aspirations for fundamental social transformation. The socio-religious conflict that erupted in Maluku during the period 1999-2005 was one manifestation of the accumulative political-economic conflicts involving national and local actors, exacerbated by the structural impoverishment and social injustice suffered by the communities in Maluku for hundreds of years since the colonial era and the independence of Indonesia.

## TRACING-BACK CULTURAL FOOTSTEPS FOR PEACE

Though since the colonial period, most of the cultural institutions in Maluku have changed and been transformed by force, the society is still able to partly preserve its cultural strategy for managing socio-cultural diversity through *pela* institutions. An extensive study on *pela* was conducted by an American anthropologist, Dieter Bartels, who has dedicated his life for Maluku studies until today. Bartels (1977) states:

> *"The keystone, among several centerpieces, is an inter-village alliance system called pela. Pela, as it exists in Ambon today, is a system of relationship tying together two or more villages, often far apart and frequently on different islands. The pela system is the most important institution integrating Ambonese society beyond the village level. … The main ideas underlying pela are that (1) villages in a pela relationship assist each other in times of crisis (natural disasters, wars, etc.); (2) if requested, one partner village has to assist the other in the undertaking of larger community projects; (3) when visiting one's pela village, food and particularly agricultural products, cannot be denied to the visitor; (4) all members of villages in a pela relationship are considered to be of one blood, thus marriage between pela partners is considered incest. Any transgressions against pela rules are severely punished by the ancestors. … The majority of pela pacts involve two villages, but there is no restriction on the number of villages participating in any one pela pact."*

Since completing his dissertation in anthropology on *pela* in 1977, he has consistently carried out anthropological studies in Maluku and tested his thesis about *pela* during the Maluku conflict. In 2017, he critically revised his works on *pela* by doing a contemporary research on the post-conflict *pela* in Maluku society. Based on his study, Bartels categorized *pela* institutions in Central Maluku into three: (Bartels, 1977)

1.  **Pela Keras** or **Pela Tuni**. **Pela Keras** means **"hard pela"** and **"pela tuni"** means "genuine" or "true <u>pela</u>". As this term indicates, the ties between the partners are supposed to be very strong, and this type of **pela** is considered to be authentic or original.

2. **<u>Pela Gandong</u>** or "**<u>pela</u>** of the uterus". While this type of **<u>pela</u>** is not considered "genuine", it is just as "hard" as **<u>pela keras</u>** or **<u>pela tuni</u>**. The main criterion of a pela gandong is a formal extension of the special relationship between clans in different villages bound by common descent to cover everyone within these villages, usually after some event occurs which involves people of both villages.

3. **<u>Pela tampa sirih</u>**. "**<u>Tampa sirih</u>**" is a box containing the ingredients for betel-chewing. Traditionally, **<u>sirih</u>** was chewed for pleasure, just as most Ambonese men smoke cigarettes now. Chewing **<u>sirih</u>** together was a sign of friendship, and friendly relations between people were formally established by exchanging **<u>sirih-pinang</u>** and chewing it together.

Since the Maluku conflict broke out in January 1999 and spread to various regions, many people have had doubts about the cultural power of *pela* alliances, which have always been seen as an ideal picture of socio-religious relations and brotherhood of Ambonese society. However, for most Ambonese, *pela* alliances still function as the foundation for making a breakthrough in the efforts to make a reconciliation and rebuild peace in Maluku. Muslim-Christian communities through their *pela* pacts negotiated with each other and finally agreed to organize adat meetings for strengthening their collective memories about the meanings and functions of *pela* during the conflict. Some have been successful, but the others have failed. The primary factor is that Ambonese youngsters no longer see *pela* as the prime social capital for reconciliation and peace-building since they do not live in such a cultural atmosphere in which *pela* is a key cultural resource for the Moluccans.

Another factor is that not everyone sees a cultural approach has the capability to resolve a social conflict with its complex characteristics. George Aditjondro, for instance, sees critically that *pela-gandong* institutions, especially the hard type of blood-drinking *pela*, have a certain historical context different from the dynamics of the contemporary conflict. He reminded that the tendency to return to customary institutions such as *pela-gandong* may lead to cultural and ahistorical romanticism. Therefore, instead of helping resolve the conflict, it may exacerbate it since the involvement of state actors has never been anticipated by such traditional institutions. Accordingly, he offers a way out, i.e. synthesizing "traditional" and "modern" institutions for resolving conflicts and keeping the peace, by revealing the actors who were most responsible in triggering and maintaining the conflict and tensions. (Aditjondro, 2007)

Some other scholars – based on cultural analysis – still believe that *pela-gandong* institutions have intrinsic values that can be used as a medium to build cross-religious partnerships in attempts to reconcile various social groups in Maluku. As confirmed by Birgit Bräuchler (2015)[48]:

> *"As pela transcends Islam and Christianity it became a symbol of brotherhood, reconciliation, and peace for the war-torn Central Moluccan society… In Maluku, peace activists and academics are currently making proposals to found new partnerships, as must have frequently happened in the more distant past in colonial times and times of crisis and war, and to reconstruct, extend, and adapt the concept to make it more inclusive."*

---

48    See also John Chr. Ruhulessin, Etika Publik: Menggali dari Tradisi Pela di Maluku (Salatiga: Dissertation at the Satya Wacana Christian University [UKSW], 2005).

Criticism against and support for a cultural approach in the reconciliation process in Maluku, especially the one involving the relationship between Christians and Muslims, should become a consideration for rethinking and reconstructing new meanings of the local cultural instruments in Maluku. Such an effort has been carried out by two Christian-dominated and Muslim-dominated public schools on Ambon Island, which is the focus of this paper.

## SEARCHING FOR POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE AMONG YOUTHS

The socio-religious conflict in Ambon during 1999-2005 has left deep scars on social relations among Muslims and Christians in the archipelago. It is an atrocious human tragedy in the archipelago since the Japanese military occupation in 1942-1945 and the local rebellion by the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) in 1950 with thousands of casualties and huge material damage (Chauvel, 1990). However, very few parties have paid attention to some potentials that may keep the peace after the conflict. One such potential is religious education, which becomes the focus of this article. The article will answer how formal and informal religious education is practiced during the post-conflict era?

The above research question becomes a triggering issue for any efforts to trace dimensions that actually are residues of the past conflict. The question also becomes a challenge since the inheritance of conflict-related narratives has been passed down silently, preserving such segregated structure of consciousness and viewpoints to understand self and others in the context of multicultural society of Maluku and Indonesia. To answer the research question, we conducted a field research and a qualitative literature review of religious communities, schools,

and youth peace activist groups in Maluku. Phenomenological interpretations towards collected data were made to understand the construction of socio-cultural knowledge that contributes to the development of sustainable peace education curriculums in Maluku and Indonesia.

The most impacted, however, are the socio-psychological aspects of the Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku. Various approaches to conflict resolution have been used by many institutions and actors to restore the socio-economic conditions of the post-conflict Maluku communities. However, some of those institutions and actors were not successful in carrying out such measures due to various psychological, sociological, cultural and technical obstacles. Nevertheless, many of them successfully carried out the measures even though the coverage was small and the number of the participants was limited. The sustainability aspect opens up the possibility that reconciliatory processes and peace movements between the Muslim and Christian communities who experienced conflict traumas can be conducted gradually with the increasing scope of participation by larger social groups.

One approach to conflict resolution is education - religious and public. Religious education in Indonesia is considered an important ideological system that constructs people's mind and behavior in relation to others. Being concerned with the impact of the conflict on the Maluku people, some schools and universities have developed and introduced peace education. They have incorporated it into their curricula (Amirrachman, 2017). However, there are challenges in implementing peace education. The main challenges are (1) conflict traumas inherited through terror narratives from the older generations to the younger generations who never experience any social conflict directly and (2) the segregation of consciousness

about others already shaped firmly due to the segregation of settlements and educational institutions based on religious identity affiliation. (Al Qurtuby, 2013)

## TRUST-BUILDING AS THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE-BUILDING

One of the main causes of a protracted socio-religious conflict in a complex society is the loss of trust. Therefore, the hardest attempt for peace-building is all about trust-building, i.e. reconstructing a sense of trust on a higher level beyond that before the conflict.

Some philosophical reflections affirm that trust is an important dimension in relationships among human beings. What is meant by trust here is the one in, at least, its two forms: (1) trust in institutions (money, political processes) and (2) personal trust between individuals (friends and colleagues). Furthermore, there is obviously some element of distrust in trust.

Schools and higher-educational institutions are institutions where trust-building and distrust-building occur and the ones that are formally accepted and trusted by the society. In schools, teachers and students learn together through an interactive process with mutual respect for nurturing trust. Through learning processes at schools, teachers and students also construct knowledge that helps them doubt plain facts as an attitude of distrust against uncertainty.

Niklas Luhmann (1979) suggests trust in its broadest sense as "confidence in one's expectation". Whereas Diego Gambetta (1988:217) summarizes the definition of trust as follows:

> *"Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that*

*another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action... When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him."*

The definition highlights trust as a form of reliance on other people or a belief about the likelihood of their behaving or not behaving in certain ways. It fails, however, to capture the kind of trust that exists in relationships between parents and children, and between lovers. Here trust seems to involve reliance on others' goodwill towards one (Baier, 1986:234). Generally, thus, trust has been understood as a form of belief within uncertainties. Therefore, there is an extent of what Patricia White calls as "a continuum of consciousness of the trust relationship" which culminates in a risk taking attitude. For instance, I really trust a bus driver when I get on the bus though I realize that something bad, for instance, an accident, can happen while he is driving the bus.

There is also another continuum of trust relationships, i.e. a continuum of feelings or commitments. We may take relationships between lovers and longstanding relationships between friends as examples. We feel upset when our expectations fail to be fulfilled or feel disappointed when we are betrayed. Trust incorporates a belief that you can rely on someone (specifically, their beliefs, dispositions, motives, goodwill) or something (the efficiency of a piece of equipment)

where there is a greater or lesser element of risk. One may or may not be conscious of their trust relationship and it will involve varying degrees of personal commitment.

Trust-building is one of the cultural categories that explain social relations in a society based on cultural concepts that are internalized and practiced by certain communities. The process of building trust must be placed as an effort to establish equal communication and social agreement in which everyone feels accepted in all their various identities. These processes dynamize social relations in a complex society. Conflict is an inseparable part of daily social relations. It can be seen not as a source of division, but as an arena for building new consensuses between social groups in a society. That is why multicultural education covers not only formal education (schools and campuses), but also daily education based on the local wisdom of a community. Multicultural education is the cultural capital of a pluralistic and complex society. Cultural dimensions can be used as main references for managing potential conflicts in society.

In his article "Multicultural Education: Development, dimensions, and challenges" (1993: 22-28) and book "Race, Culture, and Education: Selected works of James A. Banks" (2006: 130-137), James Banks explains five dimensions of multicultural education:

a. Content Integration: multicultural education integrates various data and information obtained from various disciplines and theories, especially from the social sciences and humanities.

b. The knowledge construction process: the process of constructing knowledge includes the procedures through which social, behavioral, and natural scientists create knowledge in their scientific disciplines. Multicultural education focuses on the construction of knowledge

including the discussion of ways in which implicit cultural assumptions, terms of reference, perspectives and biases in a discipline affect the construction of knowledge.

c.  Prejudice reduction: this dimension focuses on the characteristics of children's racial behavior and on strategies that can be used to help learners develop more positive racial and ethnic behaviors.

d.  An equity pedagogy: this occurs when teachers use teaching techniques and methods that facilitate learners' academic achievements from various racial, ethnic and social classes.

e.  Empowering school culture and social structure: this requires restructuring the culture and organization of the school so that learners from various racial, ethnic and social classes can experience educational equality and feel empowered. This dimension involves the conceptualization of schools as a unit of change and carrying out structural changes in the school environment.

## FORMAL AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN AMBON

The most impacted by the 1999-2005 social conflict in Maluku is the education sector.[49] For the purpose of this paper, education refers to formal education and religious education delivered at schools (from elementary to college levels). Most of the educational infrastructures were destructed for no reason at all, so that learning activities have been paralyzed for a long time.

---

49  This paper focuses on the education sector in Ambon city, which to some extent reflects the general condition of education in Maluku Province.

## FORMAL EDUCATION: PUBLIC
## AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS (MADRASAH)

During the conflict, the social life in Ambon city was not conducive to the residents, including students. Although the central government of Indonesia deployed unimaginable numbers of police and military forces to Ambon, the security fluctuation was difficult to control. In general, the residents had difficulty in understanding the main causes of the conflict and factors that brought about such a protracted conflict. The living conditions of the residents were miserable, being exacerbated by by uncertain conflict resolutions by the central and provincial governments (civil and military).

In such a perplexing situation, daily activities of the residents became paralyzed. Economic activities still were running at several public spots considered safe for each community even though they were segregated into Christian and Muslim boundaries, e.g. *pasar kaget Kristen* (Christian incidental market) and *pasar kaget Muslim* (Muslim incidental market). Most educational activities were not running normally. Muslim students and teachers were afraid of going to their schools because the schools were located near or in a Christian residential area. Likewise, Christian students and teachers felt the same fear as their schools were situated in a Muslim residential area. The situation, then, changed the composition of students according to their religious identities.

Students and teachers from both Muslim and Christian communities tended to participate at safe schools around their religious boundaries, so that the composition of the students and teachers at some public schools became more homogenous religiously. This had never happened before the conflict since the students and teachers at many public schools in pre-conflict Ambon had various cultural and religious backgrounds,

so that they had experiences of daily encounters with those having different ethnic and religious identities. It also changed the composition of the numbers of students in the schools since some schools accepted more students than others. As a consequence, several other schools faced a shrinking number of students since some of their students moved to other schools. This was also the case with the teachers.

Most public schools had administrative problems in managing an unexpected increase and decline in the number of students and teachers. It greatly affected the learning process because each of the schools adjusted the curriculum structure according to the availability of teachers and the number of students. Learning contents were largely influenced by somehow primordial sentiments and sectarianism nuances due to the social context during the conflict. The religiously homogenous composition of students and teachers contributed to the fostering of religious fanaticism and stiffening of hatred against other ethnic and/or religious identities. Segregative and discriminative educational activities not only separated schools as a social space in which interpersonal relationships among students and teachers develop, but also segregated the social consciousness of Ambonese communities directly and indirectly.

Similar conditions of segregation occurred and internal tensions developed in campuses, such as Universitas Pattimura (Unpatti), which is the only public university in Maluku Province. Unpatti is a higher educational institution whose students mostly come from the archipelago and have various cultural and religious backgrounds. Due to the conflict, the students, lecturers, and administrative staff experienced traumas and fear, which affected the academic atmosphere and interactions in the campus. The traumatic fear intensified

after most of the main buildings in the campus were burned down. This was also the case for Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (UKIM) (the Indonesian Christian University of Maluku), the only private Christian university in Maluku, which is owned by Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM) (the Protestant Church of Maluku) and located near the Muslim neighborhoods of Waringin and Waihaong.

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In general, the condition of the religious education in Ambon was not much different from the condition of the public education. Religious facilities – in this case, churches and mosques –suffered damage due to the conflict. Regarding the impact of the conflict on the religious education in the area, this research investigated not only the impact on the infrastructure and facilities, but also the impact on the psychological traumas experienced by the people involved in the religious education, which influenced their social perspectives and attitudes towards their own religion and/or other religions. Thus, it is more about the construction of personal and interpersonal consciousness during the conflict shaped by sectarianism and exclusive religious indoctrination.

Ambon city is a geographical locus that brings together multiple identities of individuals and communities of diverse cultures, religions, languages, and professions. Gerrit Knaap, a Dutch historian, calls Ambon a "city of migrants" to illustrate the various social elements that have structured its social demography since the beginning of the Western colonization in the 17th century (Knaap, 1991). As a commercial city at the time, Ambon was highly pluralistic and its demographic composition was scattered and mingled. However, today, there are several spots of urban residential areas that are dominated by

certain ethnic groups (Arabs, Buginese, and Butonese) and other spots dominated by religious groups, e.g. the Muslim-dominated spots from Waihaong to Jalan Baru, which are near the Ambon port and the great mosque of Al-Fatah, and the Christian-dominated spots in Pulogangsa, around the central area of the city that borders with the Merdeka Square. Sociologically, from the 1950s to the 1990s, social interactions among the groups took place normally. Although there were small tensions, there was not any massive-scale violent conflict among the groups like the conflict that broke out on January 19, 1999. Thus, there was no precedence for violent ethnic and/or religious conflicts in Ambon.

It can be seen that the social conflict of 1999-2005 was a new massive traumatic experience with a tremendous shocking effect on the social psychology of Ambonese communities in the archipelago, even in Indonesia in general. As recorded by some researchers and our experiences, in the earlier stage of the conflict, most ordinary people in Ambon did not think that a simple quarrel between an Ambonese bus driver and a Buginese youngster at a local market suddenly developed to be an extremely violent conflict with very destructive effects on the social cohesion of the different groups living in Ambon and surrounding islands of Maluku.

The destruction resulting from the Ambon conflict was very critical, especially the destruction of the construction of personal and interpersonal consciousness involving the affiliation of ethnic and religious primordial identities. Settlement and school segregations strengthened in-group identity vis-à-vis out-group identity. There were some social implications resulting from the social perception about groups or identities that were at the time categorized to be opposite to each other: out-group and in-group, immigrants and natives,

and Muslims and Christians. There were also some social implications resulting from the social perception about the economic injustice done by other ethnic groups, rivalry for existing political positions dominated by certain ethnic or religious groups, etc. In the case here, religious group affiliation was a determinant factor that enlarged the inter-community social distance in Ambon. The settlement enclaves were increasingly homogenous and decreasing the opportunity to engage in quotidian experiences with various people having different backgrounds and identities.

The crystallization of identities in turn occurred in the educational process, as seen in the learning contents of the courses of Islamic and Christian religious education. The contents of the non-formal learning process at the Sunday school and Catechism during the conflict were more laden with exclusive teachings in discussing the existence of other religious communities. Teachers affected by the conflict (as a victim or perpetrator) had biased and negative sentiments about others. A similar phenomenon occurred in the field of Islamic religious education as shown by the results of a dissertation research project conducted by Sumanto Al Qurtuby at IAIN Ambon in 2010 (Al Qurtuby, 2013). The existence of the Laskar Jihad paramilitary group, especially its members from places outside Ambon led by Jafar Umar Thalib, aggravated sectarian sentiments among Muslim communities. They introduced hardliner Salafi Islamic teachings and practices, which at the grassroots level brought about an internal conflict between local members of laskar jihad and those outside the group.

## METHODS

This research used library research, qualitative field research, interviews, and participatory observation. The units of observation were grassroots social groups, teachers, students, reconciliation actors in the field during the conflict, peace-building activists and participatory observers at several schools and campuses who agreed to form *school-pela* and *campus-pela* with the jargon of "*kampus orang basudara*" (brother-/sisterhood campus). The observation was focused not only on the new form of *pela* affiliation among schools and campuses, but also on the curricula and courses at the selected schools and universities involving the concepts and practices of pluralism and multiculturalism developed and carried out by the teachers and students. Library research was carried out to detect data used by previous researchers by exploring journal articles, books, theses, and dissertations. Participatory observations were carried out to observe the ongoing peace-keeping movements and processes within different religious communities, especially Muslim and Christian communities.

We interviewed some key informants who have direct experience of the conflict to know their insights regarding the inter-religious approaches they have implemented, especially the ones for peace education at schools. We carried out an experiment with the method of encounter in which Muslim and Christian teachers and students visited each other. This way, we were able to observe directly the interaction between the two groups and their responses as youngsters who did not experience the conflict.

This paper focuses on the reconciliation process by teenagers in Ambon by considering that they were one of the vulnerable groups during the conflict of Ambon. They were potentially involved both as perpetrator and victim,

who suffered the conflict trauma for the rest of their lives. In a normal circumstance, teenagers are often seen by the community as unstable groups and trouble-makers. However, in conflict situations like the one in Ambon, they appeared as if heroes who dared to risk their lives for their respective religions. Özerdem and Podder (2015) state:

> *"Post-modern conceptualizations of youth situate them as actors in the fields of power, knowledge and rights. Notions of agency and personhood privilege the actions of people exercised through the various and contradictory discourses through which they are constituted… From a post-modern perspective, youth are seen as a social shifter… From a post-colonial perspective, youth offer an entry point for unraveling the ways in which processes of change involve people's agency."*

We agree with Özerdem and Podder (2015) presupposition that "young people are viewed as a window to understanding broader socio-political and economic transformations in developing societies… primary lens for understanding the dynamics of social conflict and peace processes… in which young people are mobilized into collective violence in order to relate these experiences to their potential role in peacebuilding."

## SCHOOL–PELA: BRIDGING THE GAP

There were initiatives for reconciliation and peacebuilding by peace activists and institutions formed voluntarily to carry out peace and reconciliation works. One such institution, among others, is the Ambon Reconciliation and Mediation Center (ARMC) initiated by Abidin Wakano (Islamic scholar and lecturer at IAIN Ambon) and Jacky Manuputty (GPM pastor and peace activist). In 2010, they introduced a live-in program which was attended by Muslim and

Christian volunteers. Among the volunteers were Heny Liklikwatil (Heny), a Christian teacher at Public Junior High School (SMP Negeri) 9 Ambon in Lateri and Muhammad Yusuf (Cecep), a Muslim teacher at Public Junior High School (SMP Negeri) 4 Salahutu in Liang. Heny had a live-in at the home of a Muslim family in Wakasihu, a Muslim village in the northern part of Ambon Island; Cecep at the home of a Christian family in Hatu, a Christian village on Ambon Island.

The live-in experiences, though only for two days, changed their perspective about others. They never imagined, especially during the conflict, that they would have such experiences. Soon after the live-in program, Heny and Cecep agreed to disseminate the spirit of such encounters in the field of education they are involved in. Lateri School is dominated by Christian teachers and students and Liang School is dominated by Muslim teachers and students. The teachers and students of these schools had no experience of direct encounter with colleagues/friends having different faiths. Even the stories narrated by their parents, who had bitter experiences during the conflict, show that they had negative attitudes towards and views on others.

Heny and Cecep, then, attempted to negotiate with their respective principals about their ideas to conduct joint activities between Lateri School and Liang School. The plan finally was approved. As a further step, they brought together the student councils of the two schools and provided opportunities for the students to design their activities together. In June 2013, the two schools held sports and arts activities (PORSENI) together with Lateri School as the host. Christian families living around the school provided their houses as accommodation for Muslim teachers and students during their participation in the event. Familiarity and collaboration between the Christian and Muslim students during the activity sparked the idea

to advance their relationship by adopting the traditional alliance system of *pela*, which was given a new meaning to be a school alliance called *pela sekolah* or school-pela. After having agreed to form an alliance, on the last day, the two schools made a *pela* pact by carrying out the traditional ritual of chewing *sirih-pinang* (betel-nut) and then read *pasawari* (declaration in the local language) about the existence of the inter-school *pela*. Heny stated[50]:

> *"We want to unite these two schools because both are dominated by students with different religions (Liang: Muslim and Lateri: Christian). The schools are located in areas with different religious communities. We want to unite them, so that Muslim students can get along with Christian students and vice versa. Therefore, there will not be an assumption that Muslim students associate only with other students with the same religion and vice versa. During the conflict, residential areas and schools were segregated into sections according to the religions of the people: Muslim and Christianity, but we want to show that, now, when there is no conflict, through the indigenous wisdom of pela-gandong, they can be united. We want to show that we are actually genuine brothers and sisters, who have been separated due to some certain problems that brought us into the conflict. But actually, we are one, like the Maluku proverb "sagu salempeng dipata dua" (one sago shared into two pieces)."*

Based on the school-pela pact, these schools adopted and reinterpreted the *pela-gandong* institution, which traditionally is a system of inter-village alliance. Now the schools have transformed it into an inter-school pela or education pact.

---

50    Interview with Heny Liklikwatil at SMP Negeri 9 Lateri, January 8, 2019.

When this new concept of *pela* was introduced to some schools dominated by teachers and students with a certain religion (Islam or Christianity), there was a lot of support from various parties, especially parents. However, some parents initially refused because they were still affected by the conflict trauma and due to a certain understanding of their religion. As experienced by Cecep in Liang[51]:

> "Not all the parents supported this idea. I faced disagreements and somehow religious fanaticism, which certainly influenced the ways they saw things. But, the percentage of such parents was small. Most of the parents supported the program I offered in our joint meetings. What I offered them was part of the character development program for the students. I myself conducted the program introduction. I invited the parents to have a talk at school. Most of them understood the program eventually. Indeed, there were some things that made them unable to join the program, but they did understand the goodwill behind it."

With persistence and hard struggle, we managed to develop a concept and model for the school-pela, and it becomes a cultural bridge for building cross-religious relations and communication between the two schools. Graduates of the schools have promoted the narratives of school-pela in their higher level learning places (schools or universities). The parents of some former students even still provide financial support for the school-pela activities because they think that the activities greatly help the students excel in the academic field and build in themselves noble characters. Some students

---

51   Interview with Muhammad Yusuf (Cecep) at SMP Negeri 4 Liang, January 7, 2019.

who actively participate in the school-pela activities shared their impressions. Dimas and Nela, Muslim students from Liang, affirmed[52]:

> *"We really enjoy the whole activities in the school-pela program. We have got to know our limitedness as a human being and our positive talents. We have got to know each other, encountered each other and discussed various opinions. Indeed, we recognize that we are religiously different but in these program activities, we have the opportunity to converse and build friendships with those who come from another school and have a different religion. During the activities, we feel we are no longer just friends, but we are like brothers and sisters."*

The stories arising during the activities of the school-pela between Liang School, dominated by Muslim students, and Lateri School, dominated by Christian students, as an alternative culture-based model for peace education for the post-conflict youth groups are then being increasingly recognized as social narratives by the wider community and public parties. Furthermore, such narratives have contributed to the development of an identity: a narrative-based shared identity; as Robert Schreiter stated:

> *"One of the most important issues is establishing a shared identity between the two aggrieved or separated parties… Moreover, the purpose of a shared identity is not just to create a common past, but also to provide a platform for a different culture… One of these is the cultural patterns that form the context in which the process of reconciliation is to be worked out."*

---

52 Interview with Dimas, Nela, Miska and Apu at SMP Negeri 9 Liang, January 7, 2019.

Heny and Cecep were even invited to act as the main actors in one documentary movie entitled "Peace Provocateur", which was awarded the "Eagle Award" from one of the Indonesian national private TV stations.[53]

Through the school-pela, Lateri School and Liang School support each other. There are 25 Muslim students at the Lateri School. The national curriculum requires that students must get the lesson of a certain religion by a teacher of the religion. The principal of Lateri School submitted several requests to the Office of Religious Affairs of Maluku Province, but the requests received no response. The principal of Lateri School then contacted the principal of Liang School to ask for an Islamic teacher to help teach 25 Muslim students at Lateri School. Liang School then sent an Islamic teacher to regularly teach "Islamic Lessons" at Lateri School.

All school-pela activities are self-funded by the two schools. There has been no official assistance, particularly financial support, from the government. Through an interview, John Manuputty, the secretary of the Education Office of Ambon, said that his office supports constructive educational programs.[54] Heny and Cecep acknowledged that they are struggling to manage the resources they have, and to lessen the burden, they have asked some parents who are willing to help to take some responsibility by providing some needed materials.

---

53   See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOHD5s-stXY.
54   Interview with John Manuputty at his office in Lateri, January 9, 2019.

## CAMPUS–PELA: DECONSTRUCTING SEGREGATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

In 2015, UKIM and IAIN collaborated with cross-religious organizations from the Netherlands to hold an international seminar on religions and peace in Ambon.[55] The collaboration was then followed up with the *pela* pact – campus-pela – in the forms of academic cooperation and lecturer/student exchanges. However, due to the tight schedule, since the seminar, joint activities on a massive scale have been rarely carried out. Only lecturer exchanges are conducted regularly. Some examples are the program of inviting Dr. Abidin Wakano to teach the course of "History of Islam" at the Faculty of Theology and the Graduate Program of UKIM, and the program of having discussions on religious and cultural issues, or contemporary issues related to Ambon society.

In mid-2018, two lecturers from UKIM and IAIN agreed to invite their students to visit each other, and study and discuss together the materials of the courses they taught: "Public Theology" (Steve Gaspersz) and "Religion and Minority Issues in Indonesia" (Abdul Manaf Tubaka). The epistemological foundation of these courses, according to Gaspersz and Tubaka, provides an opportunity for an inclusive encounter and encourages cross-religious students to look at the social aspects of the shared learning process in a pluralistic society. Tubaka explained the reason for presenting the subject of his course, as follows[56]:

---

55   Indonesian Maluku Christian University or Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (UKIM) is the only private Christian university in Maluku. It is established by the Protestant Church of Maluku or Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM) through the Higher Education Foundation (Yayasan Perguruan Tinggi – Yaperti GPM) since 1985. IAIN Ambon or the State Islamic Institute in Ambon is the public religious college established by the Ministry of Religion, as well as IAKN Ambon or the State Christian Institute in Ambon.

56   Interview with Abdul Manaf Tubaka at IAIN Ambon, 10 January 2019.

> *"The basic idea to present "Religion and Minority Issues in Indonesia" as I did is to place a paradigmatic issue that there are problems when people observe about religions and power, in which there are multidimensional aspects, such as political, economic, social and cultural aspects. In the reality of social plurality, there is a possibility that collisions occur because there are constructs of thinking that tend to be monolithic, feeling dominant over others. Then, there is a tendency to impose the will of the majority on those who are considered minorities in the society. Therefore, we need to develop a paradigm based on an inclusive and cross-faith understanding."*

Meanwhile, Gaspersz, explained the idea behind his "Public Theology" course, as follows[57]:

> *"The subject "Public Theology" opens the opportunity for the students to see the inclusive sides of theological learning, which usually tends to be exclusive. The learning process should not only be done in a homogeneous classroom, but also confront the students with the realities of pluralism and interaction in diversity. That is the reason why I invited the students to discuss public theology together with Muslim students from IAIN Ambon. Theology is not only an exclusive matter, but also a public expression of the Christian faith. This is a kind of relational-faith, being a person of faith in relation to others, not only human beings but also the universe, such as the environment, politics, sciences, and so on. Religious persons need to consider their living context as the arena of encounter that strengthens their belief that they have to be a good person in relation to other existences."*

---

57   Personal opinion.

At the beginning, during the joint learning processes, small tensions arose. The tensions were triggered by the Muslim and Christian students' exclusive thoughts and attitudes and because they had not yet been accustomed to discussing their religious concepts and practices in a pluralistic environment. However, after several joint lectures, the students began to be able to express their ideas appropriately, appreciate other ideas and attitudes, and learn to abandon the stigmas that had been inherent in their consciousness about others.

## EDUCATION AS AN ARENA FOR NEGOTIATING RELIGIONS AND CULTURES

During the colonial period, education was part of the colonial political strategy in Indonesia, especially Maluku. The Dutch colonial government, through the schools they established, implemented educational segregation, which separated the local elites and the ordinary people. The Dutch schools implemented language segregation: Dutch for the Dutch and Moluccan elites, and Ambonese Malay for the ordinary people. The impact of this educational political policy was the extinction of *bahasa tanah* (the native language of Ambon) among converted Christian communities because they were required to speak the dialect of Ambonese-Malay at the Dutch schools. On the contrary, because the VOC was considered an economic threat against their trading activities, the local Muslim communities refused to deal with or participate in colonial affairs or activities, such as government administration and education (Dutch schools). They even developed their own mechanism of Islamic religious education exclusively and kept speaking in *bahasa tanah* as a means of socio-political-economic communications and symbolic resistance against the Dutch education system.

The system and pattern of post-independence education has not really shifted far away from the format of colonial education. The Indonesian government has built more public schools with a centralized education system and provided more well-trained native teachers with better educational backgrounds. However, the learning contents and methods are still based on the patron-client paradigm, which is intended to enforce student compliance. Many school or university graduates wish to occupy administrative positions in governmental institutions, so that the content and curricula of both general education and religious education are constructed in such a way to fulfill such an *ambtenaar* orientation.

Due to the above condition, the education system in Indonesia has become vulnerable and failed to be a medium of enlightenment that may encourage students and teachers to think innovatively and creatively in facing the socio-political reality. Educational institutions and actors prefer to be in a comfort zone with less confrontative responses toward government policies and be passive in responding to social changes. They like carrying out instructions from the authorities and do not realize that the local knowledge-based education may become part of the process for strengthening cultural strategies to face major social changes. As a result, educational institutions and actors found it difficult to understand and overcome the conflict of Ambon in 1999-2005. They also found it difficult to position education as an alternative medium for reconciliation and peace-building based on local cultural knowledge.

The aforementioned model of peace education actually was based on the initiatives and independent efforts of some local Muslim and Christian communities of Ambon who saw that – whatever the results of the conflict analysis regarding its main cause are – they actually had a local mechanism of

wisdom-based peace education. They realized that the forms and meanings of their local cultural knowledge had been increasingly eroded by various socio-political-economic changes over time both in evolutionary and revolutionary ways, e.g. the social conflict of Ambon. Nonetheless, they remain convinced that a cultural approach is a proper bridge for reconciliation and a strategy for building peace when religions cannot be relied on because they themselves have become one of the driving forces of the social conflict.

Conflict potentials remain within social relations in the pluralistic society of Indonesia, in particular Maluku. However, the social conflict of Ambon has radically changed the approaches, methods, and contents of the curricula of many schools in Maluku for religious education and public education. Religious education and public education in Maluku nowadays have become political media for preserving peace by helping students and teachers develop alternative perspectives and mentality required by them as agents of reconciliation and peace-builders. This contextual orientation should be pursued in the midst of the reality of labor competition among university graduates. This reconciliatory mindset and mentality could be a cultural capital for entering competitive and pluralistic public spaces. It means that the competition among youngster groups for better job opportunities tends to see ethnic and religious differences as a potential to build constructive networks rather than as an arena of conflict in public spaces.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper is based on a small research that has been conducted in educational institutions (schools and universities) in the post-conflict Ambon. The 1999-2005 social conflict has fundamentally changed the structure of consciousness and social structure of the Ambonese community.

By focusing on the dynamics and activities of these educational institutions, the research has tried to map out problematic situations faced by educational actors (teachers and students) and strategies for overcoming communication deadlocks due to the segregation of residential areas and school environments resulting from the conflict.

The chosen strategy is about reinterpreting and transforming the values and forms of the traditional alliance system of *pela-gandong*. This institution has become part of the Moluccan cultural strategy to manage conflicts in their shared life. Various traditional *pela* forms show the degree of social cohesion in different contexts regarding the occurrence of *pela-gandong* alliances. *Pela-gandong* was once an icon of tolerance among people with different faiths and religions in Maluku. However, the social conflict in Ambon and the surrounding islands has made many people assume that *pela-gandong* has lost its social cohesion power and been dysfunctional. Due to such an assumption, they doubt that a cultural approach based on *pela-gandong* will be an effective medium of social reconciliation in Maluku. Some others are optimistic that *pela-gandong* is still functioning, especially when religious ties, especially those between Muslims and Christians, are increasingly segregated into primordial camps. Various reconciliation experiments have been carried out by utilizing the alliance system of *pela-gandong*.

Transformative experimentation has been carried out in the form of school-pela or education-pela, which was initiated by some educators who thought that formal education must play an important role for, first and foremost, minimizing the effect of segregative cross-religious consciousness. The transformative experimentation has to be carried out through inclusive and interactive educational programs.

This paper has shown that the transformative experimentation in the form of training has not yet been perfect and a final solution. However, the school-pela has proven to be a cross-religious learning model that emphasizes creative interactions between learners having different religions. One important finding of the paper is that the school-pela was driven by a shared desire to get out of traumatic circles within intergenerational social consciousness in Maluku. Efforts to overcome traumas of the conflict have been done programmatically through formal learning processes in schools, even without financial support from the local government. The initiative was based on the motivation to free Muslim and Christian teenagers from the trap of conflict narratives that hinder the process of building a shared life in the context of pluralistic societies in Maluku and Indonesia. Each section of this paper has demonstrated the unfinished works for reconciliation and peace-building by identifying and explaining challenges and possibilities in raising basic consciousness for living together in the midst of differences.

## REFERENCES

Al Qurtyby, S. (2013). *Interreligious Violence, Civic Peace, and Citizenship: Christians and Muslims in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia*. Boston: Boston University.

Amirrachman, Alpha. (2017). *Peace Education in the Moluccas, Indonesia: between global models and local interests*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

Banks, James A. (2006). *Race, Culture, and Education: the selected works of James A. Banks*. New York: Routledge.

Bartels, Dieter. (1977). *Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage alliances, religious syncretism and ethnic identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas*. Ithaca: Cornell University.

Bartels, Dieter. (2017). *Di Bawah Naungan Gunung Nunusaku: Muslim-Kristen Hidup Berdampingan di Maluku*. Jakarta: Gramedia.

Bräuchler, Birgit. (2015). *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chauvel, Richard. (1990). *Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists: the Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt 1880-1950*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Gambetta, Diego (Ed.). (1988). *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Gaspersz, Steve G. Chr. (2016). *Negotiating Religious Identities, Cultural Authorities, and Modernity in Leihitu, Ambon Island*. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Horton, John (Ed.). (2001). *Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration*. New York: Routledge.

Kim, Sebastian C. H., Kollontai, Pauline, and Hoyland, Greg (eds.). (2008). *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*. New York: Ashgate.

Knaap, Gerrit J. (1991). "A City of Migrants: Kota Ambon at the end of the seventeenth century". *INDONESIA* Vol. 51: 105-128.

Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and Power*. John Wiley & Sons.

Özerdem, A. & Podder, S. (2015). *Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ruhulessin, John Chr. (2005). *Etika Publik: Menggali dari Tradisi Pela di Maluku*. Salatiga: Satya Wacana University Press.

Schreiter, R. (2008). Establishing a Shared Identity: The Role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrativee. In *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*. Ashgate.

Souisa, Nancy N. (2017). *Makan Patita: Nilai dan Maknanya dalam Membangun Pendidikan Kristiani yang Kontekstual*. Salatiga: Satya Wacana University Press.

# THE IRONY OF IMPROVEMENT: EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT ACEH

*Yogi Setya Permana*

## INTRODUCTION

In one evening in mid-October 2017, the situation at the beginning was no different from that in other ordinary evenings. However, suddenly a group of people burned and destroyed an unfinished mosque building. They also threatened and intimidated people who were buildi the mosque. Ironically, the burned mosque is located in a region renowned as the heart of Muslims in Aceh, i.e. Samalanga, a subdistrict in the regency of Bireuen. For decades, some prominent *dayah* (traditional Islamic schools) have been founded in the area. The persecution also occurred in other parts of the Aceh region. What is going on with the Veranda of Mecca? To some degree, these situations reflect intra-religious tension that occurs in contemporary Aceh.

This paper will discuss the educational aspect which arguably has contributed to the intra-religious tension in Aceh. This paper will investigate the role of *dayah* in peacebuilding through an analysis of conflicts among Muslim groups in Aceh. As other post-conflict areas, Aceh has faced serious problems

related to the adoption of democratic norms and awareness of social cohesion to ensure the substantive democracy and social justice in the future (Quaynor, 2011: 33). A society which has experienced violent conflicts on a massive scale tends to become a divided society, causing it to have the potential for conflicts in the future (Quaynor, 2011: 33).

At this point, the elaboration on *dayah* is provided because education is widely assumed as being useful for conflict transformation and, therefore, being able to help create sustainable peace (Gill & Niens, 2014: 13; Husin in Satha-Anand & Urbain (eds.), 2017). *Dayah* as traditional religious institutions that have historical roots and a prominent social status have a crucial and privileged position to act as a peacemaker that helps the process of peacebuilding in Aceh. Some scholars stated that *dayah* have played a significant role as an agent of peace (peacemaker). They have been involved in mitigating conflicts and become the backbone of peacekeeping in Aceh. *Dayah* was used as a sanctuary to protect civilians and played an important role as a mediator between GAM and the TNI during the conflict (Husin in Satha-Anand & Urbain (eds.), 2017).

However, our findings show a different fact. *Dayah* arguably is not functioning as a peacekeeping institution if not contributing to the creation of tension. Instead of secessionist conflicts as before, problems that are threatening the peace in Aceh today are horizontal conflicts among groups within Islam. Mainstream Muslim groups, which are the traditionalists, exclude the other Islamic groups such as the modernist / reformist and Salafi-Wahabi which often resort to acts of intolerance with violence. It strongly appears that the traditionalists uphold Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, renowned as Aswaja, which they consider as the only Islamic basic view

recognized and implemented in Aceh. The domination of Aswaja outlook cannot be separated from the contemporary presence of *dayah* as traditional religious institution which has historical roots and important social meanings in Acehnese society.

Those explanations lead to the question of whether education in Aceh, through *dayah*, has supported peacebuilding? To what extent *dayah* is able to play a role in creating sustainable peace in Aceh? I would argue that despite having taken modern interventions after the implementation of the Special Autonomy Status and the signing of Helsinki Peace Agreement, education in Aceh has not fully supported sustainable peace. This is evidenced by the absence of *dayah* in the efforts to prevent contemporary conflicts including intra-religious tension between the traditionalist and reformist-Salafi groups. It can be seen that dayah community supported persecution against other Islamic religious groups. *Dayah* has not yet succeeded in becoming a transformative element for the creation of sustainable peace. Moreover, funding allocation from the state has increased the level of competition among Islamic educational institutions, including *dayah*. The competition to obtain funds has increased the tension. Without a fundamental reform in the education system of *dayah*, including its formal and non-formal curriculums, it is quite difficult for them to contribute to sustainable peace. If there is no improvement, in the end, it will be a big loss for the efforts to resolve conflicts in Aceh.

I organize the paper into several sections. In the first part, I will describe the research methods used in collecting data. In the second part, I will elaborate conceptual discussions on education, peacebuilding, and post-conflict. In the third part, I will explain the involvement of *dayah* in the production of

controversial fatwas. I will also explain street mobilization in the intra-religious tension. The fourth part will be a review of the *dayah* community's responses to the socio-political dynamics. In the fifth section, I will conduct a review of education in Aceh after the implementation of the special autonomy status and the signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement by focusing on the modernization that has taken place in *dayah*. In the sixth section, I will elaborate the role of *dayah* in the creation of sustainable peace in Aceh. In the final section, I will provide some lessons related to the previous discussions that can be learned.

## METHODS

I conducted a field research in Aceh from May to October 2018 and once in May 2019 to collect data. The durations of the visits vary. Some visits have a duration of two to three weeks and the others have a duration of less than a week depending on the data collection needs. In the very first place, it was not easy to conduct a fieldwork in post-conflict Aceh, especially for me coming from Java and working for a state research institution. During the Aceh conflict, anti-Javanese campaigns took place massively as a consequence of the injustices perpetrated by the Soeharto Regime against the Acehnese people (Aspinall, 2009). However, establishing relationships with strategic stakeholders was very helpful in approaching informants and gaining trust.

In the process of collecting data, in-depth interview was the dominant method because the method helped reveal the worldviews, ideas, knowledge, and intentions of the informants on certain phenomena. How each of the actors understands and interprets reality was mapped. The method of document analysis was also used because there were many written documents containing a lot of important information related to the research. Some examples of such documents are

various policy documents and government archives, which help show the change and continuity of education in Aceh. Published journals both in Indonesian and English also provide a lot of important information. Apart from the national media, I also collected news from the local media in Aceh to find out more in detail the chronology of an event. The local media that are relatively trustworthy to use in this study include Serambi and Tribun Aceh. Observation was also used in the research to collect data. Observation is useful for getting insights into social life in natural settings. I would not have been able to write about *dayah* without observing them in their real situations. Furthermore, it would have been impossible for me to know the impact of the exclusion of the Salafi community without observing how they live. Data that had been collected from multiple sources then went through a triangulation process, so that a high level of accuracy could be achieved.

However, the use of those research methods shows that this research has limitations especially in terms of generalisability. This is because the situation in Aceh is difficult to replicate in other regions. Aceh, with its status as a special autonomy region, has a distinct context, even when it is compared with the other regions in Indonesia. However, the theoretical insights and conceptual findings produced from the research might be used to look at other regions, especially post-conflict regions. Thus, the results of the research can enrich the discussion on education and peacebuilding in post-conflict areas, especially regions that have had problems with intra-religious tension.

## CONCEPTUAL INSIGHTS ON EDUCATION, PEACEBUILDING, AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

Basically, education must be interpreted as a crucial part of social transformation after a violent conflict occurs (Gill & Niens, 2014: 12). Education has two faces which can play a role in mitigating or exacerbating conflict (Unicef, 2011: 10). Therefore, there are many studies that elaborate aspects of education which have implications for conflict in the last few decades (Unicef, 2011: 19). Education is an effective medium for the transmission of social and cultural values over generations. However, it is prone to being used to spread negative stereotypes that can justify violence and conflict. There is a serious concern about the destructive role of education that fosters inequality, exclusion, and negative behavior in intergroup relations (Gill & Niens, 2014: 14). In addition, education can also become a political and ideological instrument such as through the determination of curriculum content (Unicef, 2011: 20). Referring to the literature discussion, it is important for us to examine an education system in terms of its potential to eliminate or escalate conflict (Gill & Niens, 2014: 14).

Decentralization of education not only promises to improve participation and autonomy, but also prevents destructive effects if used as a tool of manipulation in local politics (UNICEF, 2011: 20). Therefore, there is a need to conduct studies that identify political and economic influences in the education system in post-conflict areas (Unicef, 2011: 20). Education can be a source of conflict when only promoting a single ideology or dominant value so that it contributes to creating a social cleavage in society (Ahonen, 2001). Thus, it is important to include the political and economic dimensions of education in post-conflict areas as a significant influence in the effort to transform the society in order to realize

sustainable peace. The transformation of a society for peacebuilding is not likely to occur when its education system is dragged down by economic interests and political contestation.

It cannot be denied, in a more optimistic tone, that education plays a significant role for peacebuilding. In the literature on peacebuilding, it is suggested that education has a crucial role in supporting the transformation process related to changes in security, political institutions, economic improvement, and social development in post-conflict societies (Unicef, 2011: 7). In the literature on peace and conflict, the roles of education in conflict-affected areas are grouped into three categories. The first role relates to the phase of 'education in emergencies' where education is carried out with the main task of protecting children from the negative effects of conflict. The second role relates to the need for conflict-sensitive education where education ensures the attitude and practice of 'do no harm', which may prevent social segregation, antagonism, and hatred. The third role relates to peacebuilding in which education encourages the practice of 'do some good' and is involved in making a constructive impact on political, economic and social transformation in post-conflict societies (Unicef, 2011: 7).

Education can contribute to the transformation of post-conflict societies by changing behavior, norms, and values, which will cause a reform in political and economic systems (Gils & Niens, 2014: 13). Education is relevant in social transformation in post-conflict areas because it can be a medium that focuses on installing the principles of justice and peace (Gils & Niens, 2014: 13). Furthermore, education also has implications for local communities, economic improvement, sustainable livelihoods, and the change of social relations between

different groups involved in the conflict, which is the most important (UNICEF, 200: 8). Therefore, in the context of this study, I have to underline that education for peacebuilding goes beyond 'do no harm' and contributes to a post-conflict transformation.

The concept of peacebuilding cannot be separated from John Galtung with the publication of "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, peace-making, and peacebuilding" in 1975. Galtung framed peacebuilding as an activity that eliminates the roots of violence including structural and cultural factors with the ultimate goal of realizing sustainable peace (Unicef, 2011: 13). The concept of peacebuilding then developed and gained a variety of new meanings, including the one emphasizing the dynamic aspects of social processes along with transformative relations that emerged (Unicef, 2011: 13). In addition to scholarly discussions, international institutions also have their own definitions of peacebuilding. In 2007, the UN defined peacebuilding as an intervention activity that was carried out to reduce the risk of conflict by strengthening national capacity at all levels of conflict management and building the foundation for sustainable peace (Unicef, 2011: 14). Whereas OECD / DAC compiled a guideline for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in 2008 by interpreting peacebuilding as a variety of measurable steps that could be applied to potential, on-going and post-conflict areas based on the commitment to conflict prevention and realizing sustainable peace (Unicef, 2011: 3).

## THE PRODUCTION OF CONTROVERSIAL FATWAS AND STREET MOBILIZATION IN INTRA-RELIGIOUS TENSION

The modernization of *dayah* seems unable to help them install values of inclusive humanism, which has resulted in the practice of exclusion. It can be said that *dayah* representatives

who sit in Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama Aceh (MPU) (Aceh Ulema Council) do not have an inclusiveness view. The controversial fatwas that MPU has issued show that it is just a representation of one dominant religious group that marginalizes other intra-religious groups. The issuance of such fatwas has a counterproductive impact on efforts to create sustainable peace. Intra-religious tension is easy to occur in a society which often involves violence. As said by my informant, one of the *dayah* leaders, that if the government does not respond to the rejection of non-Aswaja groups including the Salafi, it will be the responsibility of each individual to do so. [58]

The traditionalist ulema have dominated the membership of MPU and its board of leaders since the institution was established. Based on the results of his fieldwork, Ichwan (2018: 5) estimated that the number of traditionalists ulema who were members of MPU increased from 85% to 90% of the total membership from 47 people. Furthermore, they were mostly affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). [59] One of the MPU leaders was the chairperson of Aceh provincial branch of NU. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the traditional ulema have a crucial role in the production of fatwas. The traditionalist ulema is able to play significant roles because they have the necessary credential requirements. The candidates of MPU members must comprehend Kitab Kuning (the Yellow Book), a set of classical religious texts, as a compulsory requirement.[60] Comprehension of the yellow book is what mainly differentiates the traditionalist ulema from the reformist-modernist ulema.

---

58    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 25, 2018.

59    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 26, 2018.

60    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 26, 2018.

The mainstreaming of Aswaja has actually occurred since 2002 with the issuance of Qanun or Regional Regulation No. 11 / 2002. The Qanun stated that the implementation of Sharia law must be based on the principles of Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah. In the early beginning, the explicit adoption of the Aswaja principles in the Qanun was opposed by the reformist/modernist ulema. However, it was later approved after some senior traditionalist ulema threatened not to enforce the Qanun (IPAC, 2016: 6). In 2007, MPU issued a fatwa that strongly implies the 'endorsement' of the Syafi'i school of thought or Aswaja as the 'official' Islamic principles in Aceh. The fatwa explains the guidelines for identifying deviant religious groups. The guidelines contain standard criteria to judge whether a certain religious group is deviant from Aswaja principles.

Furthermore, MPU issued fatwa No. 4 / 2011 which contains clearer and detailed Aswaja criteria. The fatwa was urgently needed because MPU observed the development of deviant religious groups in the society that claimed themselves as upholding Aswaja principles. MPU also wanted to remove the people's confusion regarding Aswaja.[61] It is obvious that MPU recognized Aswaja as the official 'mahzab' in Aceh through the 4/2011 fatwa. At the same time, the fatwa explicitly excludes other Islamic religious schools of thought outside that of the Shafi'i. Ichwan (2018: 6) noted that the fatwa was issued to ban Shia, Khawarij, Murji'a, Mu'tazila, Ahmadiyah, and Salafi-Wahabi. MPU released the fatwa through the Ulema Plenary Session (DPU) III on August 11, 2011.

In addition to the two major Muslim groups (traditionalist-Aswaja and reformist-modernist), there has been a so-called Salafi-Wahabi group that has developed aggressively since

---

61  Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama Aceh. Kriteria Aqidah Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, 2011, p.1.

the tsunami disaster in 2004. Along with the Salafi's growth, the resistance from Aswaja has been even stronger. The resistance of the traditionalist Muslim groups is triggered by the strict doctrine of purification among the Salafis. The Salafis are considered as disturbing the Aswaja communities because they have protested and even banned practices of local Muslims that have been carried out over generations in Aceh. [62] The first Salafi preachers came from Java and some of them had been educated at the Ja'far Umar Thalib Islamic boarding school in Yogyakarta. Ja'far Umar Thalib is a well-known Salafi figure who founded the infamous Laskar Jihad. In addition, some preachers were also the first returnees from Yaman after the 2004 tsunami disaster.[63]

Considering that the previous fatwa is insufficient, MPU issued fatwa No. 9 / 2014, which states explicitly that the Salafi group is deviant or heretical and prohibits its worship activities. The issuance of the 9/2014 fatwa was triggered by tension that occurred in Gampong Pulo Raya Village, Pidie District. The village, which is located on the east coast of Aceh, was widely known as a stronghold of the Salafi group (IPAC, 2016: 13). The existence of the Salafi group in the village was strengthened especially after the renovation of the village mosque using aid funds from Qatar Aid. The village head asked one of the Salafi preachers who graduated from Yemen, Ustadz Abu Rifqy, to permanently lead the recitation and prayers in the mosque. Then, the recitation program held at the mosque started to grow. The Salafi people frequently invited other Salafi preachers to visit. The participants were proliferating. Some participants began to conflict with other residents who came from traditionalist backgrounds. This is because members of

---

62   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 26, 2018.
63   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 22, 2018.

the Salafi group started to refuse to join mass prayers and other traditional religious events. They seemed to be an exclusive and arrogant group in many local conversations (IPAC, 2016: 13). The community responded by blocking the road to the mosque in Gampong Pulo Raya on Friday, April 11, 2014 (IPAC, 2016: 13). They did not want Abu Rifqy to lead Friday prayers in the mosque.

The 9/2014 Fatwa became the justification for HUDA, FPI, and the government to forbid Salafi group activities and even for violent attacks that occurred in some cases. (IPAC, 2016: 15). This is what happened in the case of September 4, 2014, in which the police had to send more than 100 of its members to Gampong Pulo Raya. The police had to prevent violent conflicts between anti-Salafi villagers and sympathizers of the Salafi groups. The fatwa of MPU contributed to 'social acceptance' for intolerant actions against religious groups that are considered deviant by Aswaja.

At least, we can use public survey results to capture the impression of the Acehnese people on religious deviance issues. Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) (the Indonesian Institute of Sciences) has conducted a survey on tolerance issues in the nine largest and most heterogeneous provinces, including Aceh. The total number of the respondents is 1,800 with 200 respondents being from each province. More than 80% of the respondents from Aceh agreed that they felt threatened by religious groups who were considered heretical. The total percentage is the highest among the ones in all the surveyed provinces. Furthermore, nearly 75% of the respondents supported violent actions against religious groups that were considered heretical (Seftiani & Nadhiroh, 2018). The results of the survey reveal that the majority of the respondents in

Aceh believed that a religious heresy is a serious public issue. Therefore, to some extent, a heresy has strong potential for triggering street mobilization in Aceh.

Controversial religious fatwas undeniably become a crucial factor contributing to the occurrence of intra-religious tension. The worship activities of intra-religious minorities are often disrupted.[64] They have difficulties organizing collective prayers. Mosques accused to be affected by "heretical notions" or considered to be incompatible with Aswaja are also prone to being destroyed. However, we also need to underline that it is difficult for intolerant actions to occur without mobilization. Thus, the MPU fatwa is not the only cause of intolerance actions. They also depend on the presence or absence of mass mobilization for street vigilantism.

The most updated case that has attracted massive public attention is the burning of an unfinished mosque in the subdistrict of Samalanga, the regency of Bireuen, on Tuesday, October 17, 2017. The Muhammadiyah community was building the mosque. Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization in Indonesia that has a reformist-modernist orientation. Hundreds of people came to the mosque construction site at around 8 pm in the evening. They immediately burned the rest area for the construction workers (DetikNews, 2017). They also burned and destroyed the foundation pillars of the mosque, which had just been finished in the afternoon. To respond to the attack, the MPU of Bireuen Regency issued a decree that Muhammadiyah had to stop the mosque construction (Ardi, 2018). The MPU issued the decision based on two reasons. The first reason is that, in their opinion, the destruction of the mosque's foundation indicated that the local community was anxious about the existence of Muhammadiyah.

---

64    Interview with an anonymous informant. May 22, 2018.

Therefore, the Muhammadiyah community should stop the mosque construction for the sake of security and to avoid chaos. The second reason relates to the fact that Muhammadiyah is a minority. The MPU thought that because Muhammadiyah is a minority, it is obliged to follow the majority (Ardi, 2018). One of the MPU leaders explained further that the construction of the mosque had to be stopped because in the area where the mosque was being built there had already been a mosque, so that there was no need to build a new mosque.[65]

Nevertheless, the Muhammadiyah community in Samalanga was unwilling to follow the decision made by the MPU. They continued to build the mosque despite the continuing threats, intimidation and protests from traditional Muslim groups. They claimed that the construction of the mosque had fulfilled the requirements specified by the government, including a permit letter. Furthermore, they suspected that there were people who stigmatized the Muhammadiyah community as a Salafi-Wahabi group, which provoked prejudice and hatred from mainstream Muslim groups (Hidayatullah.com, 2018). Some members of Muhammadiyah assumed that the attack had something to do with the location of the mosque being constructed. [66] It is located in Samalanga, which is widely known as a stronghold of traditional Acehnese Muslims.

The mosque attack reflected its rejection by some people of Samalanga who disagreed with the existence of a mosque that adheres to an Islamic school of thought other than Aswaja. Samalanga is a stronghold of traditional Muslims who adopt Aswaja (CNN Indonesia, 2018). Since the early 20th century, there have been around 19 *dayah* in Samalanga (Feener, 2013: 75). One of the prominent *dayah* is Ma'had al Ulum

---

65   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 26, 2018.

66   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 22, 2018.

Diniyah Islamiyah Mesjid Raya, which is popularly known as 'Mudi Mesra'. Mudi Mesra can be regarded as one of the most influential *dayah* in Aceh today. Among all the *dayah*, it has the largest number of students.[67] The alumni have spread all over Aceh and built their own *dayah*. In addition, they have had important positions in government offices and MPU.

The attack on the Muhammadiyah mosque in Samalanga was a residue from the anti-Salafi campaign in contemporary Aceh. The anti-Salafi sentiment was triggered by the anxiety of traditional Muslim groups or Aswaja about the growth of Salafi groups, especially after the tsunami disaster in 2004 (IPAC, 2016: 1). The traditionalists were disturbed by various Salafi preachers who forbade traditionalist rituals such as the Prophet's birthday sermon (Maulid) and praying at graves. The Aswaja group saw that Muhammadiyah and Salafi were similar in that both, following their purification concepts, rejected the traditional practices (IPAC, 2016: 1). However, Muhammadiyah activists stated that such an accusation arose because some of the Salafi members infiltrated many of Muhammadiyah's sermon events. Therefore, the sermon substances became violent and radical.[68] Muhammadiyah teaching activities tend to be conducted in an elitist manner, which makes their grassroots networks easily taken over by Salafi groups.[69]

The anti-Salafi campaign cannot be separated from the strengthening of the traditionalist or Aswaja existence in Aceh. Having been previously marginalized, the traditionalists want to achieve dominance in religious life, and of course social practices. Religious public spaces in Aceh, including mosques, especially Baiturrahman Mosque, are a locus of

---

67    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 25, 2018.

68    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 22, 2018.

69    Interview with an anonymous informant, May 22, 2018.

competition among Islamic groups. Baiturrahman Mosque is the most iconic and historical symbol of Aceh. In 2013, HUDA demanded that the management of Baiturrahman Mosque enforce Aswaja practices in the mosque. Such practices include the use of *qunut* during dawn prayer and the holding of a stick by a preacher while he is giving a sermon on a Friday prayer (Ichwan, 2018: 4). To ensure that the demand would be fulfilled, HUDA allied itself to FPI and they occupied Baiturrahman Mosque on June 11, 2015 to force the implementation of the Aswaja way of delivering a sermon during Friday prayer (Ichwan, 2018: 4).

In the same year, thousands of people, most of whom were from the *dayah* community, especially HUDA, RTA, and FPI, held a demonstration called the Aswaja Parade. They organized the Aswaja Parade twice, on 10 September and 1 October. In the first parade, the participants came from various regions in Aceh. They filled the main streets of Banda Aceh. The parade was held in several locations, namely Sheikh Kuala's tomb, the Governor Office, the Building of DPR Aceh, Baiturrahman Mosque, and the governor's official residence (Serambinews, 2015). They demanded Governor Zaini Abdullah to sign a petition containing 13 demands which basically banned all the activities of the Salafi-Wahabi, Shia and communist groups. They wanted the Syafi'i or Aswaja manner of worship to be implemented in every mosque in Aceh. The traditionalists used anti-Javanese sentiments as well, so that they were able to carry out mass mobilization more effectively.[70] They framed Salafi as an influence from Java because some of the early generation preachers came from there.

---

70   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 22, 2018.

The participants of the Aswaja Parade failed to meet Governor Zaini as planned. The Aswaja Parade was held on October 1, 2018, with more participants (IPAC, 2016: 18). The Deputy Governor of Aceh, Muzakkir Manaf, was willing to meet with the mass. He signed the petition submitted by the mass. An ulema then spontaneously gave him the title of 'Umar bin Khatab' of Aceh. It was one of his political maneuvers aimed at embracing the *dayah* community in the preparation for the 2017 Aceh Governor Election.

Intolerant actions and street mobilization in contemporary Aceh are the results of a competition for social control and moral authority (Kloos, 2014: 61). Differences in the interpretation of Islamic law may lead to persecution because they are intertwined with political-economic interests. The Sharia project implemented in Aceh provides religious authorities with privileges in social life and, of course, political economy of access. Therefore, it is a sufficiently rational reason for religious groups in Aceh to obtain a hegemonic religious authority position.

## LOCATING THE *DAYAH* COMMUNITY IN ACEH SOCIAL SETTING

Before discussing *dayah* and intra-religious tension, we need to review the presence of *dayah* in contemporary Aceh. Without such a review, it is difficult to comprehend how *dayah* can contribute to the tension. Apart from that, we cannot separate *dayah* from their community, comprising both *dayah* ulema and their students. Therefore, in understanding the behavior of *dayah*, we need to look at the movements of the community, especially the ulema.

This is due to the strong patronage relationship within traditional *dayah* in which the students always obey and follow the orders and views of their ulema.

The critical juncture of the *dayah* community occurred during Indonesia's political transition in the late 90s. The *dayah* community or the traditionalist camp initiated to articulate political aspiration in the transition period (1998-1999). *Dayah* students began to organize themselves through the Rabithah Thaliban Aceh (RTA) (*Dayah* Students of Aceh) in April 1999 (Salim 2008: 151). It was their first action to voice their interests. Meanwhile, the ulema gathered in Himpunan Ulama *Dayah* Aceh (HUDA) (the Association of *Dayah* Ulema of Aceh), which was formed in September 1999. RTA and HUDA wanted to re-establish the religious identity of the Acehnese people. They considered the previous efforts to do so had not been successful. Therefore, it can be said that both organizations were the driving forces of the implementation of Sharia Law in Aceh.

The emergence of HUDA strengthened the tension between traditionalist ulema versus the modernist/reformist who had previously gained a lot of privileges during the New Order period. In the transition period (1998-1999), the Acehnese government chose MUI over HUDA as a cooperation partner because of MUI's moderate views on the relations between Aceh and Jakarta and its support for the gradual implementation of Sharia law in Aceh. On the contrary, HUDA agreed on the holding of a referendum and the holistic implementation of Sharia law. Due to this, Governor Mahmud refused to provide support for the events organized by HUDA (Ichwan, 2011: 198).

The existence of HUDA and the massive support it received from grassroots communities and rural areas made ex-members of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (Free Aceh Movement)

surprised. They were worried about the growing popularity of HUDA and they thought that it would be a potential rival in their struggle for political domination (Ichwan, 2011: 197). Moreover, the traditional ulema held political authority based on Aceh historical precedent. GAM's concern about the traditional ulema in HUDA was mainly triggered by the plan to implement Sharia law in Aceh. Jakarta's offer to implement Sharia Law in Aceh placed GAM in a dilemmatic and difficult position (Aspinall, 2009: 214). GAM could not refuse the plan to implement Sharia law because refusing it would make them lose social legitimacy. However, GAM knew that the offer was only a 'trick' from the central government to deceive ulema and the community (Aspinall, 2009: 214). The implementation of Sharia law was Jakarta's strategy to gain sympathy from Acehnese Muslims who did not support GAM's secular ideology. As such, GAM could not claim itself as the only entity that represents the identity of the Acehnese people. In other words, the application of Sharia law was also an elusive tactic of the central government to isolate GAM within Aceh society itself (Aspinall, 2009: 211). Jakarta used power from Islam to bind Aceh into Indonesia (Aspinall, 2009: 2019).

GAM based their ideology on secular values and principles. This is different from the previous secessionist Acehnese movement, DI / TII, which aspired Aceh to become an Islamic state. GAM ideologue, Tengku Cik Di Tiro, changed the basis of the secessionist Aceh movement struggle from an Islamist movement to a secular one. He formulated the basis of GAM's struggle based on the principles of human rights and social justice as resistance to Java colonialism and economic deprivation (Aspinall, 2009: 200-201; Salim, 2018). In addition, GAM amplified the nationalism of the Acehnese as the justification basis for the struggle to separate Aceh from Indonesia. However, observers believe that

the rejection of Islam was GAM's strategy to gain international support, especially from Western countries (Aspinall, 2009: 200). Therefore, from the early beginning, GAM did not like the offer of a special autonomy status to implement Sharia law because they considered it as Jakarta's strategy to weaken their influence in Aceh.

Parallel with GAM's concern about the existence of HUDA, they refused to be involved in the planned referendum of the Acehnese people. The referendum was planned to be held by HUDA on April 22, 2000. The government and security forces were also worried about the planned referendum, so they did not approve the event. They considered that the event had the potential to threaten the regional security (Ichwan, 2011: 197). HUDA chose to cancel the referendum because they did not have a strong political support. The failure to organize a referendum for the Acehnese revealed the declining influence of HUDA and the *dayah* community. However, they did not take long to rise back.

Through Law 44/1999, Aceh obtained the permission to implement Sharia law. At the same time, the law provided constitutional justification for the involvement of the ulema in regional policies related to social, religious, economic and political aspects. Thus, the ulema obtained the opportunity to restore their political leadership like in the past. In addition, the regulation also provided an expansion of the institutional design of an ulema organization which is not only at the provincial level, but also at the district/municipal level.

The granting of significant political privileges to ulema in the Sharia law was the central government's tactic to balance GAM's domination in Aceh. This is consistent with the opinion of Salim (2008: 153) that ulema, especially those from the traditionalist camps, are the appropriate opponent

against GAM in contesting legitimacy in the context of political transition (1998-1999). The government realized that they needed the traditionalist ulema because they had a strong influence on rural communities to help win the battle against GAM (Ichwan, 2011: 198). GAM would also think twice if they were to attack ulema because they had similar supporters living in villages. Considering the facts above, the government established a new ulema institution, Majelis Permusyawaratan Aceh (MPU) (the Aceh Ulema Council), which incorporated dayah ulema in it (Ichwan, 2011: 198).

In June 2001, hundreds of ulema who were *dayah*-based leaders in the countryside gathered to form MPU, which replaced MUI. The domination of the traditional ulema can be seen in the composition of the elected leaders for the 2001-2006 period (Salim, 2008: 154). Muslim Ibrahim and Daud Zamzami were elected as chairman and vice chairman respectively. They defeated Al Yasa 'Abubakar, an urban-modernist who was later appointed by the governor to become the Head of the Sharia Office (DSI) in 2002. Thus, it can be said that the dominance of the MPU leadership by traditional Islamic ulema has occurred since the organization was formed.

MPU, through its board of leaders, has the authority to issue fatwas in the framework of Sharia law relating to development matters, government issues, and social life. The board of leaders has the obligation to supervise and provide advices to both the legislative and executive institutions in the formulation of provincial government policies. The ulema council initially consisted of twenty-seven people from various regions in Aceh. The council included three MPU leaders. The twenty-seven people were selected from 180 ulema who were recruited from the lower levels of society, namely *gampong, mukim*, and district/municipality. The ulema who are

members of the council receive a monthly salary from the government. In addition, they also acquire the right of immunity, so that they cannot be prosecuted legally related to what they have conveyed in public meetings.

Law 18/2001 concerning the Special Autonomy of Aceh and Provincial Regulation 3/2000 renewed the rules regarding MPU and the Ulema Council, especially their rights and authority. MPU was established as an equal partner of the Aceh Government in the administration and development matters, especially those related to Sharia law. MPU has some rights and authority, such as the right to access information on Aceh government policies, the authority to issue legal fatwas, the right to supervise and evaluate regional policies related to the implementation of Sharia law, and the right to summon legislative and executive members. With the enactment of the regulation, the authority possessed by MPU was greater than the one possessed by the previous official organization of ulema, the MUI. It can be interpreted that all policies must be considered by MPU before being implemented by the provincial government. The MPU, more or less, functions as a social legitimacy provider to government policies. Law 11/2006 revised all the previous regulations which oblige the regents, mayors and governors to participate in enforcing the implementation of Sharia law.

## *DAYAH* MODERNIZATION AFTER SPECIAL AUTONOMY AND PEACE AGREEMENT

Education in Aceh began to experience fundamental changes when the Decentralization Act was enacted in 1999. The Act marked the end of the heavy centralization system of the New Order Regime. The law provides autonomy to the regions in carrying out public services, including education.

With the special autonomy status obtained through the 2001 Law, Aceh has greater autonomy in carrying out education. At present, there are three types of educational institutions that are recognized in Aceh, namely public schools, madrasa, and dayah. Fitriah (2017: 181), based on multiple authorized sources, stated that the number of public schools in Aceh Province is 4,904 or 69% of the total number of educational institutions. The number of dayahs is 1,031 (14%) and the number of madrasas is 1,211 (17%).

Public schools are religiously neutral learning institutions run by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC), so that they do not provide faith-based education. Public schools follow the national school system and they have a strong attachment to the national government in terms of fund and curriculum. Public schools also provide basic education for 6 years in primary school, 3 years in junior high school, and 3 years in senior high school. At the level of senior high school, the students may choose academic education or vocational education.

**Table 1.** Types of Educational Institutions in Aceh

| Public School | Madrasa | Dayah | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | **Traditional** | **Integrated/modern** |
| Under MoEC (decentralized) | Under MoRA (centralized) | Independent (private) | Private |
| formal | formal | Non-formal | Formal |
| Following the structure of the school system | Following the structure of the school system | Not following the structure of the school system | Combination of the *dayah* system and the school system |
| National curriculum | National curriculum plus Islamic curriculum | Limited to the study of '*Kitab Kuning*' (the Yellow Book) | Study of *Kitab Kuning* and national curriculum |

Source: Fitriah, 2017: 85

A *madrasa* was originally a *dayah* which underwent a change because the Dutch colonial government required that it adopt the western education system, which certainly excluded the role of *dayah* ulema. Therefore, *madrasa*s adopt a modern Islamic school system that contains a secular knowledge curriculum. Based on Law No. 8/1989, the *madrasa* curriculum comprises a national secular curriculum (70%) and a religious education curriculum (30%) (Fitriah, 2017: 84). *Madrasa*s are run by the Ministry of Religious Affair (MoRA). Therefore, to some extent, they are similar to public schools, which have a strong affiliation with the central government. This is what differentiates *madrasa*s from *dayah*. The curriculum of *madrasa*s is centralized while that of *dayah* is non-centralized. Madrasas do not have autonomy and a privilege to manage curriculum materials. They have to follow the national curriculum and school structure based on MoRa educational policies.

*Dayah* is an indigenous form of religious education institution in Aceh. A *dayah* is led by an ulema assumed to have respected knowledge and nobility. A *dayah* ulema is fully authorized to determine the contents of the curriculum applied in his *dayah*, so that the curriculum can reflect his religious orientation (Ilyas, 2016: 481). Because a *dayah* is a boarding school, the pupils live in a kind of dormitory. They study a collection of classical religious texts famously called '*Kitab Kuning*' (the Yellow Book). Most of the *dayah*s are located in rural areas and supported by a traditional Islamic community. They strictly adopt the Syafi'i Mazhab, which is widely known as Ahlussunnah Wal-Jamaah (Aswaja). They usually have associations with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), and other local communities. In general, there are two forms of *dayah* that can be found today, namely traditional *dayah* and

modern/integrated *dayah*. The difference between traditional and integrated *dayah*s lies in the curriculum and teaching methods (Fitriah, 2017: 83).

In a traditional *dayah*, the students study only *Kitab Kuning*. Meanwhile, in an integrated *dayah*, the students also study secular knowledge. The learning methods in traditional Islamic schools do not involve a classroom and grading system. The students just sit around the teacher when they study *Kitab Kuning*. This learning method is known as *sorogan* or *bandongan* (Ilyas, 2016: 479). Meanwhile, the teaching methods in modern or integrated *dayah* are similar to those in formal schools where the learning process is conducted in English and Arabic. Modern or integrated *dayah* amount to only 10% of the total number of *dayah* in Aceh (Fitriah, 2017: 83).

One significant trend in the *dayah* education system is curriculum modernization. The modernization is realized in the integration of a secular curriculum and secular knowledge into the *dayah* curriculum (Fitriah, 2017: 145). Feener (2013: 79) noted that in the post-disaster and post-conflict period, a number of schools that promoted models of reformed Islamic education in Aceh emerged. The modernization of *dayah* is conducted by an institution called Badan Pembinaan dan Pendidikan Dayah (BPPD) (the *Dayah* Development and Education Agency). BPPD received the mandate from the Aceh Government to improve the quality of education in *dayah* by improving their infrastructure and management, empowering their students, and enhancing the quality of their teachers (Fitriah, 2017: 178).

The establishment of BPPD in 2008 was a turning point for the existence of *dayah*, which had previously been marginalized. Previously, traditional *dayah* had been recognized as non-formal educational institutions which could not access

public spending regularly. However, three years after the signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement, *dayah* became formal education institutions through the Aceh Government Regulation No. 11/2006. Therefore, *dayah* has the same position as the other formal educational institutions, causing them to have the right to obtain funding from the government. The Special Autonomy Law No. 44/1999 ensures that Aceh has autonomy over the management of religious, cultural and educational life and Sharia law enforcement. Therefore, the Aceh government has the right to develop its own institutional designs, which are different from those developed by the other regions in Indonesia. BPPD is an institutional arrangement in the education sector that amplifies the uniqueness of Acehnese history and identity (Fitriah, 2017: 76). Furthermore, the establishment of BPPD is convincing evidence of how traditional *dayah* ulema have been able to condition the government to accommodate their interests. It was difficult for traditional *dayah* communities to achieve that kind of privilege in the previous decades.

The aim of the modernization of *dayah*s' curriculum is to reform their teaching methods and management (Fitriah, 2017: 155). There is no standardization of *Kitab Kuning*, so *dayah* use *Kitab Kuning* from different sources. Therefore, the BPPD sees the need for supervision of the curriculum applied in each *dayah*, although the standardization of the curriculum and *Kitab Kuning* is carried out according to the Ahlusunnah wal Jamaah school of thought as adopted by the traditionalists. This is not surprising because almost all members of the *dayah* curriculum supervision team are traditionalist *dayah* leaders who adhere to Aswaja.

The BPPD has integrated some additional subjects into the *dayah* curriculum although at the same time *dayah* ulema have been granted authority to determine

the *dayah* curriculum content. To complement the main subjects, the BPPD has added some subjects which teach modern life knowledge and skills, such as English language skills, journalism, information technology and computer skills (Ilyas, 2016: 473). In integrated and modern *dayah*, secular knowledge such as math is taught because they adopt the public-school curriculum, although the students still have to learn the subjects taught in traditional *dayah*. They learn secular knowledge in the morning and classical religious texts in the evening (Fitriah, 2017: 144).

One of the prominent *dayah* in Aceh which is often used as a reference in *dayah* modernization is Ma'had al Ulum Diniyah Islamiyah Masjid Raya, located in Samalanga, Bireuen. It is famously known as MUDI MESRA (Feener, 2013: 78). MUDI MESRA is currently under the leadership of Tengku Hasanul Bashry HG, who is better known as Abu Mudi. Under his leadership, some changes and developments have been made to MUDI MESRA, including the establishment of a *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam* (STAI) (Islamic College), which is equivalent to a university. This institution is intended as a place of learning for the students of MUDI MESRA who want to continue their study at a university level (Abubakar, 2011: 8). MUDI MESRA even has a special building for Arabic and English learning activities. The students live in the building for three years to learn foreign languages intensively (Barrulwalidin, 2017: 67). Another well-known activity carried out at MUDI MESRA is writing skills training. The students are trained to use basic writing techniques and their writings are published on various *dayah* media and the official website of MUDI MESRA: www.mudimesra.com (Barrulwalidin, 2017: 67). The *dayah* has also established an Islamic law research laboratory, which regularly reviews various religious issues to find

recommendations and solutions. Its recommendations on various religious issues are uploaded to the website of MUDI MESRA (Barrulwalidin, 2017: 67).

Another focus of the modernization of *dayah* is their management. *Dayah* has improved their management by strengthening their financial capacity. Previously dayah had to manage their funds independently. Today, Dana Otonomi Khusus (Special Autonomy Fund) allocated by the central government to the Aceh government is the main source of funding for *dayah*. The Special Autonomy Fund has been the largest source of funds for the Aceh Government (Fitriah, 2017: 178). The Indonesian government has allocated abundant financial resources to Aceh by providing 2 percent of the total Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) (General Allocation Fund) for 15 years since 2006 (Aspinall, 2014: 475). The World Bank estimated that the Special Autonomy Fund channelled by the central government to Aceh for 20 years has reached Rp. 78.6 trillion (Aspinall, 2014: 475).

With the abundance of special autonomy funds, the provincial government has no serious obstacle in providing sufficient funds to BPPD. Then BPPD can easily distribute resources to *dayah*. As an illustration, the provincial government allocated 16% of the total education budget, which reached 1.2 trillion rupiahs, to BPPD in 2013 (Fitriah, 2017: 179). At the same time, 44% of the total education budget was allocated to non-*dayah* educational institutions run by the Provincial Education Office. Seen at a glance, the amount of the funds allocated to *dayah* seems to be less than the amount of the funds allocated to non-*dayah* educational institutions. However, it should be noted that the number of non-*dayah* educational institutions was four times

the number of *dayah*. In 2014, the number of *dayah* was 1,031 while the number of non-*dayah* schools reached 4,904 (Fitriah, 2017: 180).

BPPD formulated a *dayah* accreditation system in 2011, which is used as the basis for the allocation and distribution of funds. The *dayah* accreditation system divides *dayah* into four categories: A – D. The *dayah* is categorized based on the size, availability of facilities, number of students, and other administrative requirements (Fitriah, 2017: 183). An accredited *dayah* has the right to obtain funds the amount of which depends on the *dayah*'s status. The bigger a dayah is and the more students it has, the more funds it will have. Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been strong competition among *dayah*.[71] They compete with each other to get students because the number of students determines the amount of funds allocated by BPPD to them. It is suspected that the competition to get students has to some extent contributed to the creation of tension especially the tension between the traditionalist (Aswaja) and non-traditionalist groups.

In addition to the formal procedure, the decision of BPPD to allocate funds to *dayah* is influenced by political connections. In her study, Fitriah (2017: 189) found that a *dayah* that has a good political connection will relatively gain more resources. This can be seen especially in the distribution of funds for the development of infrastructure and facilities. A *dayah* that is close to political elites does not even need to submit a proposal to request funding assistance from BPPD. Thus, patronage relations with political elites are crucial for a *dayah* to access resources. The state patronage has resulted in the political involvement or expansion of the *dayah* community into the political domain. *Dayah* has previously served

---

71   Interview with an anonymous informant, May 21, 2018.

the community primarily in religious life and education, but today it is difficult for them to escape from political gravity. In return, political elites cannot ignore the importance of the *dayah* community because it is a solid base of political support. *Dayah* ulema become a reference to approach grassroots communities and a source of social legitimacy.[72]

## *DAYAH* AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE
## IN ACEH: IS MODERNIZATION ENOUGH?

The intra-religious tension in Aceh shows that the relationship between education and sustainable peace is far more complex than imagined. The signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005 officially ended the secessionist conflict that had been running in decades. Aceh then carried out a linear phase of the post-conflict reconstruction alongside with the reconstruction after the tsunami disaster. Collapsed school buildings were rebuilt, teachers returned to teach at schools, and students were no longer afraid to go to school. However, after the reconstruction phase is over, Aceh must step into a further phase of peacebuilding in which peace can be achieved sustainably.

Theoretically, peacebuilding requires structural and relational transformation (Gill & Niens, 2014: 12). Transformation is a keyword in the peacebuilding context. Education is an entry point for transformation efforts because it is a medium to install values of justice, peace and inclusiveness that contribute to changes in not only individual behavior but also society. Education, especially in *dayah*, may contribute to changes in the social relations among the groups that have previously been involved in the conflict. Therefore, it can be said that *dayah* is crucial agents in the creation of

---

72   Interview with an anonymous informant, July 12, 2018.

sustainable peace in Aceh. Scholars are also optimistic that, with their crucial role, *dayah* will contribute to peacebuilding in Aceh (Husin in Satha-Anand & Urbain (eds.), 2017).

However, we are faced with a different fact. Educational institutions can actually be used to channel negative stereotypes that may disrupt social cohesion. The *dayah* community has been drawn into the dynamics of political-economic interests, which makes it prone to doing exclusion practices rather than inclusion practices. The issuance of controversial fatwas directed at the Salafi community is an example of exclusion practice. The right of such groups as the Salafi community to exist is not recognized because they adhere to religious views that are different from those of the mainstream group. Promoting the ideologies of a dominant or mainstream group through education is very dangerous because it will leave a residue that makes social segregation difficult to handle in several generations. Moreover, the competition over access to funds allocated by the government has contributed to the escalation of the tension. *Dayah* afraid that they will lose students, which will negatively affect the amount of funds allocated to them by the government. Due to this, they can easily be overreactive with the growth of other groups of Islamic educational institutions.

The crucial position of education in a post-conflict society makes it one of the sectors that need most improvement. In the case of Aceh, the modernization of *dayah* is carried out in order to improve the quality of human resources, which in turn will advance competitiveness. This way, the society's welfare will be increased while the socio-cultural and Islamic values are still upheld. We are witnessing many improvements in education infrastructure that carried out by the Aceh Government. We also see the application of modern knowledge in the *dayah* education system. In addition, the government also supports

the financial capacity of *dayah* through various funding schemes, so that they can develop further. However, situations which deviate from the objectives of *dayah*' improvement have occurred. Although *dayah* has undergone modernization, they are unable to install values of inclusive humanism. Therefore, exclusion practices still continue. As a matter of fact, in the context of a post-conflict society, the internalization of norms and values that support peacebuilding is urgently needed.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The case of *dayah* in Aceh shows us that education does not lie in a vacuum. Education, especially the one in post-conflict areas, lies in a social space that is full of dynamics and interests. The legacy of conflict will always be a threat in the future if the process of societal transformation fails to take place. It is important for the strategic stakeholders, such as the central and local governments and international donors, to ensure that improving education in Aceh contains an agenda for internalizing the principal values of peacebuilding. Therefore, the improvement made is in line with the efforts to mitigate conflicts, which will prevent conflicts from reappearing in the future.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

# REFERENCES

Abubakar, M. (2011). Pendidikan Islam di Dayah: Antara Modernisasi dan Tradisi. (Proceeding) Sekola Tinggi Agama Islam Aziziyah Samalanga Tahun 1.

Ahonen, S. (2001). 'Politics of Identity through History Curriculum: Narratives of the past for social exclusion – or inclusion?'. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2001, pp. 179–194.

Ardi, M. M. (2018). *Ramai-Ramai Bungkam soal Pembakaran Masjid Muhammadiyah di Aceh*. Accessed on December 25, 2018, from https://tirto.id/ramai-ramai-bungkam-soal-pembakaran-masjid-muhammadiyah-di-aceh-cHDk.

Aspinall, E. (2009). *Islam and Nation: Separatist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia.* Standford: Standford University Press.

Aspinall, Edward. "Special autonomy, predatory peace and the resolution of the Aceh conflict" in Hal Hill (ed). 2014. *Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Barrulwalidin. (2017). *Manajemen Pendidikan Pondok Pesantren di Dayah Mudi Mesjid Raya Samalangan. (*Unpublished Thesis). Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatera Utara, Medan.

Barter, S. J. (2011). Ulama, The State, & War: Community Islamic leaders in the Aceh Conflict. *Contemporary Islam*, *5*(1), 19-36.

CNN Indonesia. (2018). *Tak Sesuai Aswaja, Fondasi Masjid Muhammadiyah Aceh Dibakar*. Nasional. Accessed on November 30, 2018, from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20171018183000-12-249287/tak-sesuai-aswaja-fondasi-masjid-muhammadiyah-aceh-dibakar.

DetikNews. (2017). Ada Kabar Masjid Dibakar Massa di Bireuen, Ini Penjelasan Polisi. Berita. Accessed on December 25, 2018, from https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3689966/ada-kabar-masjid-dibakar-massa-di-bireuen-ini-penjelasan-polisi.

Feener, R. M. (2013). *Shari'a and social engineering: The implementation of Islamic law in contemporary Aceh, Indonesia*. OUP Oxford.

Fitriah, A. (2017). *Decentralization, Identity Construction, and Conflict: Education under Aceh's Special Autonomy.* (Unpublished Dissertation). Massey University, New Zealand.

Gill, S., & Niens, U. (2014). Education as humanisation: a theoretical review on the role of dialogic pedagogy in peacebuilding education. *Compare*, *44*(1), 10–31.

Hidayatullah.com. (2018). Pembangunan Masjidnya Dirusak, Distigma Wahabi, Warga Muhammadiyah Terus Lawan Intoleransi. Nasional. Accessed on December 26, 2018, from https://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2018/06/28/144967/masjidnya-dirusak-distigma-wahabi-warga-muhammadiyah-terus-lawan-intoleransi.html.

Husin, A. (2017). Conflict and Nonviolence: Ulama in the Aceh Peace Process. In Satha-Anand, C. & Urbain, O. (Eds.). *The Promise of Reconciliation? Examining Violent and Nonviolent Effects on Asian Conflicts*. London & New York: Routledge.

Ichwan, M. N. (2018). "Fatwa and Difference: Official Ulama, "Aswaja" and Salafism in Aceh, Indonesia." *Paper presented at the Religious Authority in Indonesian Islam: Contestation, Pluralization, and New Actors Conference*, ISEAS-Singapore.

Ichwan, M. N. (2011). Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, Sharī atization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order Aceh. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, *22*(2), 183-214.

Ilyas, M. (2016). Pendidikan Dayah Setelah Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh. *Kanun Jurnal Ilmu Hukum,* 18(3), 459-484.

Institute For Policy Analysis Of Conflict (IPAC). (2016). The Anti-Salafi Campaign In Aceh. IPAC Report No. 32, 6 October 2016.

Kloos, D. (2014). In the name of syariah? Vigilante violence, territoriality, and moral authority in Aceh, Indonesia. *Indonesia*, (98), 59-90.

Mayoux, L. (2006). Quantitative, qualitative or participatory? which method, for what and when? In V. Desai & R. B. Potter (Eds.), *Doing development research* (pp. 115-129). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Marhamah, M. (2018). Pendidikan Dayah dan Perkembangannya Di Aceh. *At-Ta'dib: Jurnal Ilmiah Prodi Pendidikan Agama Islam*, 71-92.

Noor, F. A., Sikand, Y., & van Bruinessen, M. (2008). *The Madrasa in Asia. Political Activism and Transnational Linkages,* Amsterdam University Press.

Quaynor, L. J. (2012). Citizenship education in post-conflict contexts: A review of the literature. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 7 (1), 33-57.

Salim, A. (2008). *Challenging the secular state: The Islamization of law in modern Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Salim, A. (2018). The special status of Islamic Aceh. In Hefner, Robert W. (Eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*. London & New York, Routledge.

Seftiani, S., & Nadhiroh, I. (2018). *Public Survey and SEM (Structural Equation Modeling) on Intolerance and Radicalism in Indonesia.*

Serambinews. (2015). *Massa Aswaja Sesaki Kota*. Kutaraja. A https://aceh.tribunnews.com/2015/09/11/massa-aswaja-sesaki-kota.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2011). *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Literature Review.* New York: United Nations Children's Fund.

CHAPTER 5

# HISTORY EDUCATION AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN TRANSITIONAL INDONESIA

*Katarzyna Głąb*

## INTRODUCTION

This article aims to consider the participation of history education in the transitional justice process and an attempt to answer the question of how teaching history can contribute to reconciliation.

The history of 1965-66 in Indonesia, mass killings of members of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people suspected of favouring the communists, for a long time was silenced and mystified by the anti-communist mythology of the military regime. The oppressive rule of General Suharto in 1967-1998 and its politics of history dominated the politics of memory, thus affecting teaching history at school.

The Analysis of strategies undertaken by the public all over the world to rectify the consequences of human rights violations is still very current ('the age of transitional justice', Adler, 2012). The Indonesian case represents a different perspective on the legal, socio-cultural and political consequences of

how different communities live - or are forced to live - with permanent trauma after state-sponsored crimes. In this sense, it gives us a broader insight into the consequences of mass violence in contemporary world history and the possibility of (re)building a civic society.

Although the links between history education and transitional justice process have been generally recognised, the detailed mechanisms by which this process unfolds in various local contexts remain under-researched. Drawing on qualitative research carried out on Java and Buru islands in 2018, the study shows how the Suharto regime built the official narrative, how the state-sponsored history is still strongly present in public schools, enacted and resisted by the teachers in school practice and how throughout controls make reconciliation impossible. The article presents theoretical insights as it links three strands of studies: peace and conflict studies, memory studies and transitional justice studies. The paper refers to the theoretical assumptions of the impact of formal history education on the formation of the identity of subsequent generations, as well as on the process of reconciliation in a post-traumatic society (restoring social cohesion and social healing).

## METHODS

My research was a part of the project 'When memory challenges history. Memory in the transitional justice process in post-Suharto Indonesia'. Because the data do not exist independently of a methodological framework, I would like to discuss the research process.

Qualitative research was based on semi-structured interviews, which facilitate the asking of a prepared list of several main questions while at the same time allowing the interviewees to raise themes that are important to them.

My choice of method was also determined by the fact that my interweb was challenging to access due to the sensitive topic of my investigation related to painful Indonesian past. That is why I usually started from a general question about the past related to Suharto's regime time. It was time-consuming to obtain consent to take part in the research. I usually needed several days to start with the purposes of my visit in a given place, previously living with my interlocutors, working with them, caring for their children. I recruited the respondents through personal networks and snowballing technique, respecting all the limitations of this method. The group of subjects is heterogeneous. In total, I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews and over a dozen open conversations (like for example, during a meeting with Dialita Choir, created by former prisoners, their daughters and granddaughters). I distinguished the following groups from among my interlocutors:

1. the oldest, former political prisoners (Tapol) and their spouses,

2. bystanders who remember the past crimes (in 1965 they were teenagers),

3. representatives of the next generation, i.e. today usually in their thirties, forties, born and grew up in times of the regime, and

4. grandchildren of former political prisoners on Buru, born a few years after the collapse of the authoritarian regime.

The interviews took place from February to April 2018 in several locations on Java: Temanggung Regency, several villages in Bansari Subdistrict, Plantungan, Jakarta, and Buru (Moluccas Archipelago, Eastern Indonesia). The choice of Temanggung and Bansari was intentional because this sub-district consists of small villages with a traditional lifestyle, and the population living there was a witness to the tragedy

that took place in 1965-66. Another reason was its proximity to Plantungan, a former prison for Gerwani, a women's organisation associated with PKI. Buru, a small island, was used as a prison for 10,000 political prisoners following the mass killings of an estimated half a million Communists in the mid-1960s. Just as the Moluccas archipelago is often called a 'mini Indonesia', so do the microcosms with which we deal in Buru reflect the ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of the country. In many ways, Buru's history reflects the broad spectrum of problems faced by Indonesian society since independence. The island's past is connected not only with the history of thousands of these political prisoners (known as 'Tapol'), but also its indigenous people, its new migrants who arrived through the Transmigrasi program, members of the army and other security services. Some of Tapols still live there with their families. Currently, the island has approx. 33,000 residents. Transmigrasi, a transmigration program, was an initiative of the Dutch colonial government and was continued by the Suharto regime. Its purpose was transferring (sometimes by force) landless people from more densely to less populated islands. Tapols were also part of the Transmigrasi project.

Most of the interviews lasted on average around 90 minutes, except one, which lasted over four hours. I conducted all the interviews myself, but always with the assist of a local inhabitant which played the role of my guide, introducing me to the local community. It was usually a woman close to my age, with similar family status. In the case of fieldwork on Buru and Kecamatan Bansari (Bansari Subdistrict), it was necessary before starting to interview to 'check-in' by the local head of the village (kepala desa) and obtain his acceptance for conducting research.

All of the semi-structured interviews were recorded and then transcribed with the help of an Indonesian. I wanted to be sure that I understand the talks correctly because most often, conversations took place in the company of several people and noisy, difficult circumstances (noise of farmed animals, the noise of scooters, calling from the mosque, etc.). My interlocutors used the Javanese dialect very often, which made it difficult for me to understand words and prolong the interview (I had to ask for translation or repetition in Indonesian).

I have obtained consent to use the interviews only for academic purposes under the condition of not revealing the identities of my respondents. Consequently, I do not provide more detailed personal data which could be used to trace the identity of my respondents. My method of analysis was open coding, which involves close and multiple re-readings of transcripts to allow themes to emerge from data.

Supplementary for my research was an observation in Museum Pancasila Sakti in Jakarta, Museum HM Soeharto (Memorial Jenderal Besar) in Yogyakarta and Benteng Vredeburg Museum also in Yogyakarta. My study aim there was to explore how conflicted history is presented in the most known national history museums of Indonesia, who is the audience for these museums, and how it reacts to museum exhibitions. During my visit to Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) Temanggung (public Islamic senior secondary day school[73]), I got acquainted with school textbooks for history and sociology for the XII class.

---

73 There are two major types of Islamic school in Indonesia: *madrasah* or Islamic day schools, and *pesantren* or Islamic boarding schools (see: Raihani, Gurr, Drysdale 2013).

## HISTORY EDUCATION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Violent transformation in a state—following an armed conflict or the fall of an authoritarian rule—should ideally be accompanied by transitional justice. Its purpose is to disclose and account for crimes against humanity committed as a result of depriving one or several social groups of dignity and rights, including, above all, the right to existence. In the generally applicable narrow sense, the mechanisms of transitional justice are focused on explaining past crimes (in the forms of retributive and punitive justice). Applied legal and judicial tools will lead to the conviction of offenders and then to reconciliation. It is an effort to restore peace and solidarity in a divided society. It is a complex social process that primarily involves mutual recognition of past suffering and change of destructive attitudes in order to preserve long-lasting peace. In this way, the understanding of transitional justice has grown considerably. It is also a process involving telling the truth, restoring dignity and preserving the memory of victims, building peace, creating respect for human rights and democracy and reconciliation (Cole, 2007). The overarching goal is to build (or rebuild) a stable civil society and a stable state using legal and non-legal means. It is not possible without restoring the ethical order, truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), material or symbolic compensatory programs, structural and systemic reforms in the field of constitutionality, lustration, activities aimed at establishing and revealing the truth about past crimes, making archives and sources available, conducting politics of history and 'get through' politics of a traumatic past, and creating a culture of memory.

With this background, we can ask what dynamics are at work in the case of the 1965–68 violence in Indonesia? The transition process started in 1998 after the collapse of the Suharto's regime.

Although many attempts have been made to resolve past crimes with respect for human rights, and Indonesia has implemented more than one of the mechanisms of transitional justice, the process ultimately did not succeed, and currently, the situation is called as ongoing impunity (McGregor, 2017).

Cases of some countries show, however, that measures of narrowly understood transitional justice are not always effective (Bachmann & Fatić & Lyubashenko 2018) and require a comprehensive, non-legal approach. In the case of Indonesia, an overtly legalistic view does not give insight into the nature of relationships between people or complex historical and sociological processes and is primarily interested in qualifying the act and attributing it to the person to establish 'guilt' or 'innocence' (Üngör, Adler 2017). Also, history often showed that people could be a victim or a victim, a perpetrator and/or a bystander.

The verdict does not help understand the process of genocide and reconciliation. Also, criminal reactions are often direct products of a political compromise between perpetrators and third parties. Legal actions do not even give relative independence from power and do not always offer a useful direction of reconciliation. What is more, in the opinion of others, one cannot speak of a universal 'reconciliation toolkit' (Bräuchler, 2009) through which a 'standard' democratic society can be achieved: there is no 'peace from IKEA' (Mac Ginty 2008: 145). It is essential that the transitional justice tools are Western world products, and are not entirely universal, and what works well in one cultural and social circle will not necessarily be beneficial for a society at different latitude and longitude.

In transitional justice studies, it is emphasised that the right to truth is a fundamental human right and the beginning of justice in the transition period (Chapman, 2009). In this sense, seeking for facts of what happened to thousands of disappeared people in 1965 or telling openly about Tapols tragedy on Buru may be a prerequisite for understanding the process of reconciliation by the Indonesians, and, thus, influencing the democratisation of society. On the other hand, history has provided us with many cases in which the perpetrator is both a victim and bystander at the same time. In Indonesia, Buru with all its social groups living there is an excellent example of this kind of a situation.

Justice should include truth recovery, recognition, reparations, as well as the restoration of civic trust and the building of social solidarity or cohesion. However, there will always be a big risk that by doing an act of justice in the form of discovering the history of one group, we will make an act of injustice towards another group. Most conflicts, however, concern not only victims and perpetrators; they include beneficiaries (i.e. those who benefit from the unjust political, economic and social order prevailing and during the conflict), as well as other actors. Uncovering all these 'truths,' coming from all conflicted groups, brings the risk of a new, even more, dangerous social conflict.

The way to minimise this risk could be adopting a multi-perspective approach, admitting that justice could take multi-dimensions, building a shared narrative of the country's past and thus ensuring a common set of premises from which to build for the future.

In this way, history education is closely related to the justice of the transition period. Now, it is a situation in which there is a significant gap in knowledge, and thus the collective memory

of Indonesians about facts of crucial importance to society. The lack of multi-perspective in official historical narrative and education causes misunderstandings in all reconciliation activities. In a humanitarian context, the victim's or survivor's testimony calls for empathic reactions - recognition of wrongdoings or at least respect for their suffering.

Moving away from the legal and judicial dimension, one can also say that in a post-authoritarian state, we observe certain rituals connected with wrongs committed within one nation. They usually follow a political transformation and take on several dimensions: truth-oriented rituals and rituals oriented to justice, reparation, or public apologies. Apologies as a political intra-national strategy do not have to be inauthentic and devoid of truth, even if it is only a political game (for example pre-election game). Such tactics should, however, meet certain conditions. Authenticity is built through a long and intense impact on the consciousness of society through the undertaken discussions (even controversial), leading to inspiration in social thinking and awakening social awareness. What is important here is the search for non-political language, referring to supra-group, supra-ethnic and inter-religious values, recognised by diverse communities.

The symbolic and gesture language can be useful here. The use of non-political language carries a message of connecting nature and points to the existence of areas that do not divide: in Indonesia, it can be a reference to the Pancasila ideology, the motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or just a testimony that we all are human. Taking into account the religious, ethnic and cultural diversity of individual communities in Indonesia, the separation of fields connecting them can be problematic. However, appealing to symbolic language and universal words

such as 'forgiveness' and 'repentance' that have religious connotations common to many religions can make political declarations inherently understandable to everyone.

This concept also perfectly fits with history education as one of the main ways of resolving the traumatic past of the nation beyond legislation. It also houses the construction of sites of memory and museum education. The significance of these three elements manifests itself in the possibilities of the gradual transformation of negative stereotypes and the mitigation of disputes arising as a result of interpretations or ideas about the past. School is the best place for this kind of activities. However, this is not about replacing one narrative with another, but about creating disputes and discussions, creatively affecting the social consciousness, in this case, especially the awareness of young people. Deep educational reform, changes to history textbooks and curricula, can function as a kind of secondary phase that reflects and embodies the state's involvement in the institutionalisation of transitional justice processes, such as truth commissions and official recognition gestures, apologies and corrective actions.

## HISTORY EDUCATION AS THE LEGACY OF THE POLITICS OF HISTORY OF SUHARTO'S REGIME

Throughout the years of *Orde Baru* existence, school textbooks had to follow the imposed version of events strictly. How the regime built the official narrative, which is still visible and lawful today, explains its strength and rooting in the consciousness of society. Speaking of Gerakan *Tiga Puluh September* (the Movement of 30 September), shortened to G30S, the acronym Gestapu was deliberately used. It was associated with the Third Reich secret police

and created a terrifying aura around the G30S (Roosa, 2010). G30S is the most elaborate event of the Cold War. However, as Robinson writes, only one aspect of the attack is clear: it has served as a pretext for the killing of half a million people, the mass imprisonment of over a million other people and the total elimination of the left by the General Suharto regime (Robinson, 2018). Detailed descriptions of torture, which the generals allegedly had before death, influenced the image of the masses. Their eyes were to be torn out, and the genitals were cut off by the Indonesian Women Movement activists (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, GERWANI), associated with PKI (Roosa, 2006: 6). The Army has fabricated many such 'facts' during the campaign against the PKI. This prepared official historical narrative has been pressed into the consciousness of the Indonesian society for many years through all available media (radio, press, cinema, school textbooks) and celebrated during national holidays.

Since the fall of the regime and after the transformation began in Indonesia, some actions have been taken to investigate and explain the crimes of 1965. An unprecedented 'explosion of interest' in the context of events from 1965-66 and other state-sponsored crimes has opened a space for discussion. Human rights activists, anthropologists, historians, journalists, writers and artists were involved in obtaining testimonies of crimes from the long-silent victims of the regime. In this way, counter-stories and counter-memory were slowly emerging, so crucial in shaping the new identity of Indonesian society.

During the *Reformasi* (Reformation) period, scholars, government officials and history teachers discussed what content should be included in history textbooks and made a decisive step of opening up the national curriculum for history education during 1998 (Vickers & McGregor, 2005: 44-7), but there was no question of developing

a coherent strategy for history education. As Suwignyo notes, despite the freedom of expression in scholarly exploration and thinking Indonesian historians have enjoyed, this new atmosphere has not fundamentally changed the way the national history of the country is presented. As results, the nation is understood as a permanent and static being with a small space for a multiplicity of voices and no attempt is made to place Indonesia in the broader context of global connections or relations with neighbours from Southeast Asia (Suwignyo, 2014: 129).

It is therefore not surprising that today there is a lack of full narratives about the events of 1965-66 in history education. In practice, most people who feel the need to learn about these dramatic events reach hard-to-find publications, often depicting different interpretations of the coup and the post-conflict period. Teachers are not authorised to determine the truth of these various historical relationships and are often overwhelmed by students' questions. Regardless of what students learn from various sources outside of school, exam answers still refer to the 'truth' determined by the government. The next generation of school-age children still learns history from Suharto's evolution (Johnson Tan, 2008), which is visible today.

All school history textbooks with which I became acquainted in Indonesia, containing mater related to the period immediately preceding the establishment of the Orde Baru, presented the same narrative: PKI accused of political revolution. Although there is still no clear and significant evidence that PKI was in existence in 1965, the term 'G30S/PKI'[74] can still be found in Indonesian history textbooks for SMA/MA/SMK

---

74  For example: Sejarah Indonesia. Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan. Jakarta: Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2015. Untuk SMA/MA Kelas XII, ISBN 978-602-282-107-6.

for class XII, which means assigning all responsibility for the upheaval of PKI members. I have found the same term in the Sociology Handbook for Class XII, in which we read about the 'PKI rebellion in 1948 and 1965' (Atik Catur Budiati, Sosiologi Kontekstual XII Untuk SMA & MA). In addition, the student book titled 'Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan Untuk SMP/MTs Kelas VIII' (Pancasila and Civic Education for SMP/MTs Class VIII) shows Monumen Pancasila Sakti as historical evidence for 'G30S/PKI rebellion' (p. 156).

A critical analysis of some national history textbooks used in Indonesia after the fall of the Orde Baru regime has been done by Agus Suwignyo (2014). The author points out how historians changed the interpretation of the G30S event in different ways. One of the examples is *Sejarah National Indonesia* (The Indonesian National History) published in 2008, which is actually not a school history textbook, but is also intended for students. In this book, the content about the crushing of PKI was moved from the chapter on the origins of the *Orde Baru* to the chapter on Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Thus, the interpretation of these events was changed. The crushing of G30S by army perceived as a Suharto's legacy switches to become all but a case of a violent sub-episode stemming from Sukarno's Guided Democracy. In this way, the events of 1965 were removed entirely from Suharto, as if he had nothing to do with them (Suwignyo 2014: 120).

In exchange for what is immediately noticeable, there is an absolute lack of history of thousands of victims who have suffered a cruel punishment in the forms of loss of life, property, and family, and long-term imprisonment or deportation to a forced labour camp. Stories that do not have their representation in the official narrative form a kind of drifting gap. As Traverso writes, one must recognise the complexity of the past,

which cannot be reduced to a mere confrontation between persecutors and victims, and at the same time, one must be aware of belonging to these spaces of memory (Traverso, 2014). It is hard to say that historical narratives themselves will lead to social consent and may be the main argument in the settlements between perpetrators and victims. Instead, it seems to be more about creating conditions that would guarantee the individual and discursive creation of historical narratives in the public sphere.

How accurate is the statement of Rosa that 'Memory, Identity and History are a trinity impossible to disentangle' (Rosa, 2012: 64)? The leading organisation accountable for influencing the policy of commemoration was Pusat Sejarah ABRI (Armed Forces History Center), established in 1964 to produce and expand its interpretation of the history of the nation. Within two months after the coup, as ordered by ABRI, the team of General Nugroho Notosusanto (later Education Minister) wrote a book titled *40 Hari Kegagalan G30S 1 Oktober - 10 November* (40 Days of the Failure of the Movement of 30 September 1 October – 10 November), establishing indisputable dogmas, repeated for decades (McGregor, 2007:39). The Suharto regime, creating a new national history, removed everyone else from the official narrative circle, thus constructing the collective national memory. The vision of Suharto's attack was additionally promoted by the movie *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (The Treachery of the G30S/PKI) produced in 1983, in which the most important figure is Suharto himself, the saviour of the nation. The film was screened at public schools and on TVRI public television, on 1 October each year, from 1984 to 1997. The annual ritual included watching the movie by school-age children, which then had to present a report to the school. Fragments of this movie are still displayed to the visitors in the Museum Pancasila Sakti in Jakarta.

Studying history textbooks is a way to enter a much more complex reality. Specific cultural, social and political codes that transfer textbooks mean that they are often disputed after a period of conflicts, mass violence and widespread violations of human rights. In both authoritarian and democratic countries, textbooks and history teaching tend to track specific images of 'ourselves' and images of the alleged 'others' in the past, transfer them to the present and give them unique values, up to the legitimacy of national superiority and collective sacrifice (Lässig, 2013: 2). The state politics of history and its imaginarium have a real influence on what society should remember and forget about its national history. In this way, teaching history means teaching the desired version of national history and identity. On the other hand, it is the teaching of history that is considered a powerful tool for building peace and blurring the boundaries resulting from this always dividing attitude of 'us-them', promoting mutual understanding and reconciliation between the parties to the conflict. Understood as a peace tool, teaching history aims to facilitate understanding of the emergence of violence, reducing mutual prejudices and developing a shared perception of the same values (Korostelina, 2013), as well as building a superior (sub-group) identity.

It should be noted that in this sense, history education is part of a more extensive system, which includes formal education, school culture, and interaction between teachers and students (Cole, 2007: 120). Looking at it more holistically, the system also includes governance, financing, education coordination, curriculum and issues of pedagogy and didactics. So understood, it aims to restore the rights and dignity of the marginalised population (Ramírez-Barat & Schulze, 2018). Historical narratives shape social representations. They also have a massive power to evoke specific feelings, as well as to evaluate events and people. Cognitive skills are a prerequisite

for learning history, but emotions often play an incredibly important role in the process of historical understanding. Focusing only on evidence and rational explanation would ignore the impact of excitement, euphoria, fear, pain or trauma. The emotions and irrational actions of history agents seem to be incomprehensible to historians, but they still have the power to influence future generations and contribute to the creation of their identities.

Morin argues that teaching history is necessary to establish a national identity (Morin, 2000), but this claim can be extended to a generally understood cultural identification (Carretero, Rodríguez-Moneo & Asensio, 2012). Therefore, if history education fulfils the function of identity-forming and culture-forming, and allows for shaping the identity of individuals and social groups in relation to the past, for discussing and constructing the senses of socially given historical events, then the next generation, growing up after a painful past, are preparing for entering the future as a community (even leading internal disputes), not a set of conflicted units. In the concerns of the present, the future is also often forgotten (Satish Mishra, 2002: 4). Foner writes that the study of history is not simply a collection of facts, not a politically sanctioned listing of indisputable 'truths,' but an ongoing means of collective self-discovery about the nature of our society (Foner, 2002: 88).

Teachers are required to teach in such a way that students learn about the history of the world, the history of the country in which they grow up, and the skills of historical reasoning to understand the fortuitousness and complexity of the past. A record of similar content can be found in the book for history teachers, *Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia*, written in accordance

with the current Indonesian curriculum (the 2013 curriculum), containing methodical guidelines for teaching this subject at school, in class XII:

> *"In shaping character, history teaching has a strategic meaning and position, given that: no man can free himself from history, because human life itself is filled with past experiences that continue to grow over time. Each time we take a step forward, the steps we have left have become history. However, not everything in our past can become history; only our past that has a meaning can be called history. It is a lesson for us to understand the present life and build a better future life." (Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia, 2015: 2).*

In this guide for history teachers, we read further:

> *"History education aims to build our collective memory as a nation so that we can get to know its population and build a sense of unity and harmony in the life of the nation and the state. Through history, we have managed to shape the character of the Indonesian people, so that they have a sense of love and pride in their country, nation and fatherland." (Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia, 2015: 3)*

Apple is correct in describing that school textbooks are essential carriers of views that a particular hegemony attempts to disseminate in a particular society. As a source of prescribed knowledge, they were used in state schools, i.e. institutions which, after all, were never created solely for priceless and neutral transfer of knowledge (Apple, 2004). Tsabit Azinar Ahmad points out similarly that, among the numerous and different objectives formulated about the subject matter of each curriculum, history education has not been separated from the political interest of specific groups.

Firstly, history education is perceived as a tool to promote nationalism and awareness of national identity. Secondly, history teaching serves as a means of legitimising authority and is affirmative, but unfortunately it is also compulsive and manipulative. This is due to the use of history education to emphasise the higher position of power and the reduction of history, which is not consistent with the official narrative. The latter tendency, in the author's opinion, prevails, and the control of history teaching (and also all other spheres of life) and its use as a tool of power took place during the time of the *Orde Baru* (Tsabit Azinar Ahmad, 2016: 67).

Shaping the contents of history textbooks is even more complicated, given that the source of history textbooks is an academic history that provides a guarantee of historical correctness after passing through adaptation associated with the goals of teaching. Burszta indicates that many educators believe that the relationship between 'academic knowledge' and 'knowledge taught in schools' is based on a series of significant changes that must first occur in order for the latter to be considered successful. It is for two main reasons. First of all - it is assumed that academic, professional and historical knowledge is too complicated and abstract. Secondly, methods of teaching at school must, in principle, transform these complex issues by the strategy of 'didactic transposition', which gives a specific tone of teaching history. The strategy focuses on instilling emotional and even intimate feelings (essentially metonymic), 'adherence' to symbols of national identities. It is always accompanied by a loss of critical thinking, because historical knowledge, as it is taught at school, goes even to simulate the real potentiality and complexity of the described events (Burszta, 2018).

A different problem that we encounter in history education, which is a derivative of politics of history, is the fact that often every collective national identity depends in a significant way on the concept of 'Others' who do not belong to the nation. It is almost impossible not to build a positive look at self without building a negative look at the 'Others' (Berger, 2012).

Referring again to the aforementioned methodical guide for history teachers, we find an explicit reference to nationalism as one of the goals of history teaching:

> "*Strengthening nationalism. The formation of the nation results from the similarity of the great history of the past and the similarity of the desire for a common great history in the future. For example, the Indonesian nation has had a shared history since prehistoric times. Then we had a golden age in Srivijaya, Mataram Hindu-Buddha, Majapahit and Islamic Mataram. Then, the Indonesian people survived the period of colonialism for hundreds of years. The history of the Indonesian nation has become a collective memory that can create a sense of solidarity and strengthen the spirit of nationalism.*" (Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia, 2015: 4).

How often do we find in textbooks focusing on national achievements and triumphs, harms suffered, and belittling, ignoring or concealing failures and wrongs inflicted on other nations? How wide it can be, and how smooth the move is sometimes between xenophobia, intolerance and nationalism, we have had many examples in global history. A question arises, how can we dissipate the high potential negative impact of such a constructed national history?

The current politics of history of the Indonesian authorities focuses on avoiding problems. The military supported groups frequently disrupt or intimidate truth-seeking and

reconciliation efforts concerning 1965, still claiming to represent societal outrage at the 'revival of communism' (Eickhoff, van Klinken & Robinson, 2017: 454). In order to avoid potential conflicts in society, a specific type of memory persists, which Rothberg describes as a screen memory (Rothberg, 2009). The Lubang Buaya story is a traumatic event that masks other (incomparably more significant) traumatic events to which, due to the specific politics of history, there is no direct access. The situation in Indonesia can be described as still a hegemonic control of the sectors of ideological production, such as education and the media (Teitel, 2000: 162). It results in repression and the functioning of specific memory oblivion in public life. The act of memorising certain events is accompanied by forgetting about others. Soe Tjen Marching, as well as many other authors before her, indicates that Indonesia is one of the examples of a nation in which fear is so convincing that it becomes like a dangerous virus that mutates and becomes accepted by many people as 'natural' (Vltchek, 2012; Soe Tjen Marching, 2017).

One of the goals of Suharto's politics of history was also the creation of sites of memory in the sense of *lieux de memoire* (Nora, 1996/1998). It means institutionalised forms of collective memories of the past and its material and symbolic depositaries, but it is not only a place in the geographical sense. These are also events and processes, imaginary and real characters, artefacts, symbols and other phenomena. One of the great examples is Museum Pancasila Sakti, the most recognisable museum complex from the Suharto era. The museum space composition, dioramas, collages from photographs, solemn music, dazzling death, as well as strict commandments of behaviour are aimed at exerting specific effects. General Suharto's regime 'perfectly' used the murder of generals. Around the event of

September 30, 1965, it built a historical anti-communistic narrative[75] as a permanent foundation for the *Orde Baru*. What is more, it continues to this day.

During my visit to this museum, I observed that many Indonesians come to the museum in groups, with families, and especially numerous school trips are visible. Significantly, over twenty years after Suharto's regime fall, this place is still vibrant. The museum exhibitions are based on the anti-communist myth and the death of generals. Remains replacement and their reburial and 'formation' of positive and negative heroes are closely related to political changes. In this case, we are dealing with a specific situation, because there are no human remains in this place. There are, however, some photographs of killed generals' corpses during exhumation and transported corpses in coffins in military vehicles. The general's dead bodies (though only in the pictures) should be considered as agents who make a significant contribution to the creation and development of the Indonesian history of culture, collective memory and identity. It is a tool of power used to stimulate the transformation of society into a society controlled by the authorities. 'Political life of dead bodies' is, in Verdery's opinion, an important element of national construction (Verdery, 1999). In this way, the Suharto regime entered the public and private sphere, politicising these spheres more and more and making them instrumental. The last two invitations to the visitors of the Paseban Museum underline the danger posed by communism. One of them is: 'The threat against Pancasila's ideology is a matter of the survival of the nation and the state of Indonesia. The museum is built as one of the reminding methods that there is still a danger of latent communism for a nation'. The second is: 'Thank you for watching the dioramas showing the barbaric events caused by

---

75   We can find the same official narration related to the 1965 in Museum HM Soeharto (Memorial Jenderal Besar) and Benteng Vredeburg Museum.

the PKI, do not let this event happen again, enough blood and tears that wet our homeland to preserve and increase the unity of our nation. Good road and freedom!'

There is no regulation in the curriculum that would require schools to visit this historic place, as Agus Suwignyo notes. Despite this, the *New Order* discourse of national identity related to the Monumen Pancasila Sakti (and the anti-communism ideology it symbolises) remains in the mind of many people, including some school teachers. Moreover, many teachers try to organise a 'field study trip' by taking for granted the political meaning of having their students visit a 'politically controversial' monument, and some school teachers (or even historians working at universities) in Indonesia hold tight that *New Order* discourse until now, twenty years after the regime was gone (correspondence with Agus Suwignyo, June 2019).

## THE ELEPHANT IN ROOM. CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL DENIAL IN HISTORY EDUCATION FOR THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS

History teaching in Indonesian state schools is still stagnant (Tsabit Azinar Ahmad, 2016: 71), and education is considered the most conservative sphere in the Reformation era (Tilaar, 2002: 101). Publications about 1965 are not available in significant sales networks[76], but rather in small bookstores, often issued by independent small publishing houses[77]. Regardless of what students learn from various sources outside of school, exam answers still refer to the government's version of history. This military government, which lasted until 1998, created and policed a hegemonic official narrative of these events, in which the eradication of Communists was necessary to save

---

76  For example: POST Bookshop in Jakarta or Radio Buku in Yogyakarta.
77  For example: Ultimus in Bandung.

the nation from their treachery. During the military regime (1966-98), challenges to this narrative were harshly repressed, the events of 1965 becoming a 'public secret'. Two decades on, this official narrative has outlived the military regime, though it is often contested by survivors. To this day, the remaining victims, perpetrators and witnesses to the mass killings live side-by-side, and the silence surrounding these atrocities remains strong.

According to my field research, the memory of past events is still alive and evokes extreme emotions, while at the same time the young generation often knows little or nothing at all about the events of 1965, which would not be related to the propaganda of the regime. It applies not only to current high school students but also to people aged 30-40. It is the result of the politics of history that has been carried out for years, reflecting in the history teaching.

The divisions between the various groups are still visible. The official narrative about the necessity to eliminate the atheistic, ominous PKI ideology is still accepted by members of society who repeat the Suharto regime version from the events of 1965 in private homes. All my respondents from Bansari, I describe as witnesses, because they remember the 1965 event, stressed with absolute certainty how cruel the communists were. In Plantungan, when I have been asking about female prisoners, the first story I have heard was about murders committed by communists who threw bodies of the murdered into a nearby river: *This river was often red from communist victims before 1965*[78]. When I started to ask about details, my interlocutor did not want to give me an answer (or maybe he did not know the answer). The same situation took place several times during my interviews in Rejosari village (Bansari sub-district).

---

78    Interview with an anonymous informant in Plantungan, March 02, 2018.

My respondents always felt obliged to give me first the 'truth about communists and their cruelty'. When I asked about the details of these 'communist' crimes, I embarrassed them. They usually started telling generally available stories about the atrocities in Madiun or other events that they were not direct witnesses, and they knew about them from regime propaganda and school education. When I asked what, in this circumstance, it had to do with the tragedy of their neighbour, who was imprisoned on Buru, their embarrassment deepened. The conversation ended with the statement that the regime was responsible for the 'brainwashing' that was done to ordinary people: *it is all because of the Suharto fault, because of his politics*[79].

Another conviction, explicitly drawn from propaganda, concerned the strong rejection of the existence of God by communists. One such story, which was supposed to be proof of it, was about a teacher who, while giving children at school candies, at the same time, asked: *Who gives you this candy? God? No. He does not exist, and I am who gives you this candy*[80].

Interestingly, this propaganda, however, seems to be losing its power slowly. Those who uncritically say that the communists had to die because they rejected Pancasila and God, at the same time regret the fate of a neighbour who returned from Buru and lived in terrible conditions until his death, or was crippled so that he could not set up a family. This crack in the narrative can be seen when one of the respondents in Rejosari, after some thought, stated that *maybe not all communists were bad people*[81].

79  Interview with an anonymous informant in Bansari sub-district, February 11, 2018.

80  Interview with an anonymous informant in Bansari sub-district, February 11, 2018.

81  Interview with an anonymous informant in Rejosari (Bansari sub-district), February 12, 2018.

In statements of respondents who at the time of tragic events were over a dozen years old, a pattern is also noticeable, made present during a long conversation with them. Initially, they underline the criminal PKI activities, which led in consequence to the coup in 1965, for which they then received their deserved punishment. As the conversation continues, however, a picture emerging from 1965, which seems to be a situation where, in the face of Suharto's ruthless regime and cruel policy, there was a simple choice: 'kill or be killed.' Ultimately, the respondents perceive it as a tragedy on both sides and blame Suharto's propaganda for the whole of the tragedy. One of them said: *Nobody could say anything, do it. No one could help anyone, because he would have been taken to prison*[82].

The situation of former prisoners from Buru is not the same. During the interviews, they emphasised that they feel good among the family, but still as so-called 'communists' are outside the political community. They seem to be still excluded by the stigmatisation ritual and are in principle still outside the structure; they are in a specific liminal state: *Now we are getting old. It is important that now we can be useful for the environment, and our children can find food themselves. We do not have to be so suspicious*[83]. Former prisoners still living on Buru are restored to all civil rights, but from conversations with them, it appears that they are still treated as potentially suspicious people who would like to revive the communist movement in Indonesia[84]. In turn, former prisoners who returned to Java, until recently had to report regularly to the police station

---

82   Interview with an anonymous informant in Bansari, February 14, 2018.

83   Interview with an anonymous informant in Savanajaya, Buru, April 07, 2018.

84   Interview with an anonymous informant in Savanajaya, Buru, April 08, 2018.

in order to submit a report. It is all the more absurd that most of them were not even a PKI member or affiliated with the party organisation.

Interestingly, when asked what they would expect from the Indonesian government, the prisoners had difficulty responding quickly and even embarrassing them. After a long while, they replied that they had everything they needed because they are with their family and their only desire is to *reach old age in peace and health*[85]. They do not make any claims for damages or compensations. It is evident that they feel wronged and their wish is that as many people as possible learn the truth about mass murders and their imprisonment on Buru, and especially the young generation, for the brutal conflict will never happen again. Ex-prisoners on Buru have complained that it is painful for them that before each parliamentary or presidential election their history is used for political purposes and once again the media are debating the alleged rebirth of the communist movement, while they want to forget about everything and live peacefully.

The result of the exclusionary politics of history is evident in conversations with people aged thirty-forty. The generation born in the 70s and 80s of the twentieth century very often does not know another version of events than official narration. An example would be the story of Aminatun (female, aged 38) and Yani (female, aged 35), from Rejosari (Bansari sub-district), who grew in the sense of communist treachery and communist threat. The message, which was officially received at formal school education from an early age, was strengthened by the media and outside the school by older family members, primarily their fathers. The fortuity made them participate

---

85  Interview with an anonymous informant in Savanajaya, Buru, April 06, 2018.

as observers during interviews with former prisoners from Buru, currently living in the same area. Both emphasised how much they felt cheated by the school and the immediate surroundings. Contact with live, oral history made them both immediately eager to learn more about the 1965 events. Because their families do not belong to the affluent, both have completed their education at high school. They deal with agriculture and lonely raising of children, and the distance of their towns from the main centres means that they do not have sufficient access to the Internet[86].

Differently in Jakarta, students and the representatives of the middle class, usually educated at the best national and foreign universities, are convinced that Suharto and his army are directly responsible for the death and the subsequent difficult situation of prisoners and their families. Such an unofficial history was most often known only during studies, which were an opportunity for them to meet with independent opposition circles. Among the well-educated people of today's thirty-forty-year-olds, grief and even anger are visible - education has done them *complete brainwashing* - like in the case of Jaka (male, aged 40) and Siti (female, aged 35), a well-educated couple, now managers in foreign companies located in Jakarta. There is no idea among them, however, who will solve this problematic situation connected with reconciliation. They are conscious that opening these old, unhealed wounds would cause new conflicts, and it would not lead to the dissolution of the old ones. It is what Jaka put it like *opening Pandora's box*[87].

---

86  I have spent two weeks with Aminatun, living wit her family, and Yani as well, in Rejosari (Bansari sub-district) from 9 to 22 February 2018.

87  Interview with Jaka in Jakarta, March 12, 2018.

It would seem that who, if not the young generation on Buru, knows what happened at the beginning of *Orde Baru*. Nothing could be more wrong. It is not general knowledge, and there are at least two reasons for this. Some former political prisoners, as well as members of their families from Savanajaya village, pointed out that the tragic past and events that met them are essential. However, as one of the interviewees from the Savanajaya said: *in order to continue to live, one has to forget about the past*, trauma, *which you cannot work through, must be forgotten. Otherwise, it would not allow us to continue living*[88].

In this situation, an open discussion about the island's past seems to be impossible. Zilva, currently a teenager, high school student, granddaughter of political prisoners and transmigrants, notes: *People here have a tough character, so teachers in history lessons do not tell us what happened here, because it would be perceived as controversial and would lead to new conflicts, and my mother does not want to talk about what happened to her, it immediately causes her to cry*[89].

Indeed, one of the weaknesses of transitional justice is a possible situation in which resolving past conflicts can cause new conflicts, with an even more significant impact than the previous ones. How, then, to pass intricate knowledge about the past without causing further conflicts? One way is to give voice

---

88   Interview with an anonymous informant in Savanajaya, Buru, April 09, 2018.

89   Interview with Zilva in Savanajaya, Buru, April 15, 2018.

to all groups. Recalling only about the history of Tapol, however cruel fate has come to them, leaving aside what happened to indigenous people seems not entirely fair[90].

There is no reliable evidence for the existence of PKI in any way in present-day Indonesia. However, the decades of anti-Communist propaganda under Suharto's New-Order regime have allowed the development of conspiracy theories about secret PKI plans today. The enemy myth, which is PKI, is supported continuously. One of the visitors, talking with me at the Museum Pancasila Sakti said: *it is said that we would fear the communists, but none of us saw the communists, so whom should we be afraid of*[91]? The whole structure is, therefore, social collusion in which the Indonesian society participates more or less consciously.

To explain the mechanism of social collusion, Zerubavel chose the tale 'The Emperor's New Clothes' (Zerubavel, 2006). It, thus, demonstrates the emergence of a universally accepted fraud, initiated for one's benefit and upheld by the conformism of the participants, the king who is ashamed to admit that he does not see these robes, courtiers who do not want to expose themselves to the king, and the crowd who refuses to resist elites.

---

90   Geba Bupolo, the indigenous inhabitants of the island. For them, Buru is like a 'living human' (Pattinama 2005). This is perfectly visible if we look at the map of the island with the most important points highlighted, which gather the indigenous population. Places forming the head, trunk and members of this 'human' constitute a sacred area closely related to the natural environment that maintains the identity of Bupolo. Mountains and water are two forces that inspire their lives. Foreigners can exceed their space on the condition that they ask for permission to enter and receive it. Meanwhile, the forced placement of Tapol, and then Transmigrasi, destroyed this cosmological whole.

91   Talk with one of the visitors in Museum Pancasila Sakti in Jakarta, March 15, 2018.

Two phenomena interact in the collusion understood in this way: silence and denial. There is a firm conviction among the people on Buru that saying untruth results in the loss of the senses. That is why people prefer to be silent than to say false stories. Denial, however, is something more. It concerns generally known truth, but one that cannot be uttered. It is like the title elephant in the room that is growing in size, taking up space. According to Zerubavel, we are engaging in social collusion in an unconscious, instinctive manner. It is a fundamental tension between knowledge and acknowledgement, personal awareness and public discourse. Paradoxically, the silence conspiracy is established not around what is not visible. On the contrary, around these striking issues that we are trying to ignore.

> *"What society expects us to ignore is often articulated in the form of strict taboos against looking, listening, and speaking. Essentially designed to "keep [our] state of knowledge at a low level" (in fact, the very first prohibition mentioned in the Bible is the one against eating the proverbial fruits of the tree of knowledge), such prohibitions constrain the way we process information."* (Zerubavel 2006:26).

In this silence conspiracy, which seems to dominate the Indonesian society, there are slow, but successively cracks filled up by historical narratives until recently not available. What happened as a result of the 1965 coup becomes a 'public secret' or truth hidden under the ever thicker layer of lies. It should be noted that in today's Indonesia, repeating Suharto's narration is becoming more and more problematic. On the one hand, it signals a suppressed awareness of the problematic nature of certain social practices, and on the other hand, it activates a conspiracy of silence. It is facilitated by the activities of non-governmental organisations, including events managed by

them related to the commemoration of regime victims. The development of electronic media and widespread availability of the Internet forces to tell the truth about the lies that have been transmitted over the past two generations. Young city residents, well educated, are no longer afraid of communism; they do not react as emotionally as their parents and grandparents when they hear the PKI name. What is more, they do not believe that communism can be reborn in any form. On the other hand, politics do not interest them too much. Self-realisation and professional career are more essential for them too[92].

Interestingly, the military, as an institution continues to enjoy recognition at the highest levels of national politics and society itself. Probably the perpetrators will never be accused, and crimes will never be judged, but social acts of reconciliation and remembrance, often against existing threats, take place in many places and change the perception of people who for a long time have been demonised as national traitors. Moreover, due to the lack of a change in history, school education is increasingly noticeable and contrary to these bottom-up acts of justice.

## CONCLUSION

History education is heavily dependent on many external factors, such as political and geopolitical stability, political culture, social stability and economic well-being. All these factors undoubtedly shape the framework of educational and textbook reform. In Indonesia, it is easier to reform the conditions of economic prosperity and political stability, which is currently lacking in this country than history education. When the nation achieves self-awareness of its separateness and the need to shape (or maintain) the country within certain geographical boundaries, then the teaching of history becomes

---

92  Observation and notes prepared during the meeting with Jaka's and Siti's friends in South Jakarta, March 13, 2018.

a perfect tool for injecting patriotism and identity into young heads. State schools act as extremely socialising factors and provide an institutional framework for the dissemination of nationalised worldviews and collective memory (Smith, 1999), thereby making pupils a citizen, in the belief that 'well-taught children will make wise citizens' (Weber, 1976: 336 ). In the conditions of constant transformation, liquidity and crisis, history acquires a unique compensatory character. Such periods are conducive to the politics of memory, which offers a simplified and polarising historical exegesis and provides straightforward answers to complex phenomena. It creates considerable dangers of simplifying history, which, for example, in the case of Indonesia, may have significant effects. Simplification can be avoided, unilateral depicting or cursory treatment of topics related to social conflicts. It prevents students from perceiving the history process as a complex and multifaceted consequence of the collective actions of people, often motivated by very different ideas; nor does it explain the role of social conflicts in history. It transfers into not only a lack of understanding of the essence of contemporary democracy as a space for discussion, but also often a dispute and conflict, clashes between various ideologies, attitudes, values, and interests. The unreal and mythologised version of history taught in schools is contradictory to the need to educate future citizens who should be aware of the complex functioning and evolution of societies, including through conflict (Burszta, 2018).

Teaching history in schools is, therefore, political and ideological, but in a broader and more profound sense, it is an expression of the preferred versions of national mythology. However, this does not necessarily mean a negative impact on young generations if it is assumed that education is to serve peace. However, in the case of Indonesia, we are still dealing with the teaching of one mythologised story from

the Suharto regime. Ferro in the Preface to his famous book writes that 'our image of other peoples, or ourselves for that matter, reflects the history we are thought as children. This story marks us for life. Its representation, which is for each one of as a discovery of the world, of the past of societies, embraces all our passing or permanent opinions, so that the traces of our first questioning, our first emotions, remain indelible' (Ferro, 1984: VII).

Tsabit Azinar Ahmad points out that there is no good intention to seek to learn historical facts (2016: 200). The situation with which we are dealing in Indonesia resembles the title 'elephant in the room', which is becoming bigger and takes up more and more space. Looking through Indonesian history textbooks for the 1965 event finding, we can know more about contemporary times than about history itself. What distinguishes history textbooks from other media is their persuasiveness and highly selective choice of content that the state makes with the help of officials responsible for history education. The problems Indonesia is facing are often found in other parts of the world. In many countries school textbooks present an overly nationalistic vision of history and contain one 'best' and 'most appropriate' authoritative narrative model (see, for example, Jaskułowski, Majewski, Surmiak, 2018). Historical content is perceived as indisputable, not subject to discussion and objective. As a result, textbooks constructed in this way become a propaganda tool, not an instrument enabling constructive and critical thinking and reflection (see: Carretero, Rodríguez-Moneo & Asensio 2012). Indonesian history textbooks set students against a narrow, selective, uncritical vision of the world around them. Methods and techniques of accentuating or silencing certain aspects of Indonesian history play an important role in building a specific vision of collective identity, for which it is legitimised ideologically based on 'national history'.

To counteract this shortage, it is argued that in an increasingly globalised world, it is essential that students have a deeper understanding of the interpretive, questionable or disciplinary nature of history. It is an approach that has the potential to help students understand different, often contradictory, versions of the past and present.

Currently, reflexivity in education is becoming the focal point in key competencies, allowing for a response to rapidly changing social, economic and information reality. It is an alternative to education focused on theoretical teaching content defined by traditional academic disciplines. Such competencies are treated as universal cross-curricular skills preparing learners for good, prosperous and community life, and are particularly useful in conditions of high dynamics of change and an increased risk of conflicts. Also, it should be noted that teaching history is not based only on cognitive assumptions, but also firmly based on affective and emotional educational assumptions (Carretero, Rodríguez-Moneo & Asensio, 2012). The affective nature of education can be considered an advantage and play an essential role in the reconciliation process. Only in this way, one can arouse the attitude of empathy or compassion for past violations of certain social groups.

In the broadly understood education, the adverse effects can be mitigated by practical history with such phenomena as public history (popularisation of history outside the academic environment, historic tours, workshops, field lessons), living history (communication such as poetry, storytelling and drama, reconstruction of historical events, sound and visual installations, exhibitions), and histotainment (popular television and Internet productions, the use of

modern technologies). All the above forms of practical history refer to the presence of history in public space, setting new directions for its presentation and impact (Traba, 2014).

Already today, Indonesian teachers can use ready-made audiovisual materials prepared by non-governmental organisations collecting testimonies of people who survived the mass murder of 1965 or other traumatic events[93] ('history from below,' local history and the 'history of everyday life', micro-history which is particularly useful in allowing students to engage with their painful pasts). In practice, this could be the adoption of a multi-perspective approach, which is necessary for the process of understanding and reconciliation.

It is vital that popular educational programs are designed to create an 'awareness', a critical state of consciousness based on the general experience and knowledge of people about their structural conditions of oppression. It is based on a fundamental philosophical proposition that in order to overcome the reproduction of the conditions of alienation and oppression, it is necessary for people to identify them and then imagine collective actions based on this knowledge to overcome them (Lundy & McGovern, 2008: 108). In this way, history education may be one of the forms of reconciliation in post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, including in the field of history teaching. It plays a vital role in the process of understanding the causes of conflict and removing prejudices and hatred in society. It strives for different communication strategies that promote the equality of different groups and the equivalence of different views, thereby fostering mutual respect.

---

93   For example, audiovisual sets, documents and didactic materials: Komnas HAM, KontraS, AJAR, "Kotak Hitam", the IPT 65 Foundation, ELSAM and many others.

The role of history education lies in the fact that reconciliation aims to reconcile the painful past with a better future through the present. However, it is not enough to start by changing the content in the school textbooks. Reforms require the whole system, including the uneasy position of teachers, often struggling with low levels of school resources, low level of training for teachers, and political and social pressure associated with teaching a problematic past. Without this process, reconciliation and peacebuilding, even taken in different forms from the bottom up locally, has no chance.

# REFERENCES

Adler, N. (2012). "The Bright Past", or Whose (Hi)story? Challenges in Russia and Serbia Today. *Filozofija i Društvo*, XXIII (4). DOI: 10.2298/FID1204119A.

Ahmad, Tsabit Azinar (2016). *Sejarah kontroversial di Indonesia: perspektif pendidikan*. [*Controversial History in Indonesia: Educational Perspective*]. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.

Apple, M. W. (2004). *Ideology and Curriculum. Third Edition*. New York–London: Routledge.

Bachmann, K., Fatić, A., Lyubashenko, I. (Eds.) (2018). *Transitional Justice in Troubled Societies*. Rowman & Littlefield International.

Berger, S. (2012). *De-Nationalizing History Teaching and Nationalizing It Differently! Some Reflections on How to Defuse the Negative Potential of National(ist) History Teaching*. In: Carretero, M., Rodríguez-Moneo, M., Asensio, M. (Eds.). *History Education and the Construction of a National Identities*. pp. 33-47. International Review of History Education. Information Age Publishing.

Bräuchler, B. (2009). *Introduction: Reconciling Indonesia*. (pp. 3-33). In: B. Bräuchler (Ed.). *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace.* London/New York: Routledge.

Burszta, W. J. (2018). Silencing the Past, Retrotopia, and Teaching History. *Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa*, 2018 (50). DOI.org/10.11649/sn.1656.

Carretero, M., Rodríguez-Moneo, M., Asensio, M. (2012). *History Education and the Construction of a National Identity*. In: Carretero, M., Rodríguez-Moneo, M., Asensio, M. (Eds.). *History Education and the Construction of a National Identities*. pp. 1-16. International Review of History Education. Information Age Publishing.

Chapman, A.R. (2009). *Truth Finding in the Transitional Justice Process*. In: H. van der Merwe, V. Baxter, & A. R. Chapman (Eds.). *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice.* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Cole, E. A. (2007). Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*. Vol. 1, pp. 115-137. DOI:10.1093/ijtj/ijm003.

Eickhoff, M., van Klinken, G., Robinson, G. (2017). 1965 Today: Living with the Indonesian Massacres, *Journal of Genocide Research*, 19:4, 449-464, DOI:10.1080/14623528.2017.1393 931.

Ferro, M. (2003). *The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught to Children*. New York: Routledge Classic.

Foner, E. (2002). *Who Owns the Past? Rethinking the Past in a Changing World*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Jaskułowski, K., Majewski, P., Surmiak, A. (2018). Teaching the nation: history and nationalism in Polish school history education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 39:1, 77-91.

Johnson Tan, P. (2008, May 4). Teaching and remembering. *Inside Indonesia*, 2008 (92: April-June). Retrieved from http://www.insideindonesia.org/teachingand-remembering.

Korostelina, K. V. (2013). *Introduction Part 2: Peace Education and Joint History Textbook Projects*. In: Lässig, S., Korostelina, K. V. (Eds.). *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation. Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects*. pp. 19-25. London-New York: Routledge.

Lässig, S. (2013). *Introduction Part 1: Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Joint History Textbook Project*. In: Lässig, S., Korostelina, K. V. (Eds.). *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation. Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects*. pp. 1-18. London-New York: Routledge.

Leach, F., Dunne, M. (Eds.). (2007). *Education, conflict and reconciliation: International perspectives*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Lundy, P., McGovern, M. (2008). *The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional Justice*. In: McEvoy K. & Mcgregor L. (Eds.). *Transitional Justice from Below. Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change*. pp. 99-120. Oxford-Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.

Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace. *Cooperation and Conflict* 43 (2): 139-63.

McGregor, K. E. (2007). *History in uniform: Military ideology and the construction of Indonesia's past*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

McGregor, K. E. (2017). Exposing Impunity: Memory and Human Rights Activism in Indonesia and Argentina. *Journal of Genocide Research*. 19:4, 551-573.

Muluk, H., Malik, I. (2009). *Peace Psychology of Grassroots Reconciliation: Lessons Learned from the "Baku Bae" Peace Movement*. In: C. J. Montiel, N. M. Noor (Eds.). *Peace Psychology in Asia*. Heidelberg-London-New York: Springer Dordrecht.

Nora, P. (1996/1998). *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pattinama, M. J. (2005). *Les Geba Bupolo et leur milieu, Population de l'île de Buru, Moluques, Indonésie. Liwit lalen hafak lalen snafat lahin butemen «Vannerie virile, sarong féminin et émulsion qui flue»*. Thèse de Doctorat de l'école doctorale du Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle. Paris: Unpublished manuscript.

Raihani, Gurr, D., Drysdale, L. (2013). *Leading an Islamic school in a multicultural setting in Indonesia*. In: Day, C., Gurr, D. (Eds.). *Leading Schools Successfully: Stories from the field*. pp. 184-193. Routledge.

Ramírez-Barat, C., Schulze, M. (2018). *Preface*. In: Ramírez-Barat, C., Schulze, M. (Eds.). *Transitional Justice and Education. Engaging Young People in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation*. pp. 9-16. Göttingen: V&R Unipress.

Robinson, G. (2018). *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres*. Princeton.

Roosa, J. (2006). *The pretext for mass murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's coup d'état in Indonesia*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Roosa, J. (2010, January 24). Dictionary of a disaster. *Inside Indonesia*, *2010*(99: January-March). Retrieved June 7, 2018, from http://www.insideindonesia.org/dictionary-of-adisaster.

Rosa, A. (2012). *Commentary. What History to Teach? Whose History?* In: Carretero, M., Rodríguez-Moneo, M., Asensio, M. (Eds.). *History Education and the Construction of a National Identities*. pp. 63-72. International Review of History Education. Information Age Publishing.

Rothberg, M. (2009). *Multidirectional memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the age of decolonization*. Stanford University Press.

Satish Mishra. (2002). History in the Making – A Systemic Transition In Indonesia, *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, 7:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/13547860120110443.

Smith, A. D. (1999). *Myths and memories of the nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Soe Tjen Marching. (2017). *The End of Silence. Accounts of the 1965 Genocide in Indonesia*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Suwignyo, A. (2014). Indonesian National History Textbooks after the New Order: What's New under the Sun? *Bijdragen Tot De Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde,* 170 (1), 113-131. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43817929.

Traba, R. (2014). *Pożyteczność uczenia się z historii. Historia stosowana: między „History sells" a „Public history".* [*The Usefulness of Learning from History. Applied History: Between 'History sells' and 'Public history'*]. In: R. Traba (Ed.). B. Dziewanowski-Stefańczyk (Cooper.). *Historia wzajemnych oddziaływań* [*The History of Mutual Interactions*]. Berlin-Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa.

Traverso, E. (2014). *Historia jako pole bitwy. Interpretacja przemocy w XX wieku* [*History as a battlefield. Interpretation of violence in the 20th century*]. Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa.

Üngör, U. Ü., Adler, N. (2017). Indonesia in the Global Context of Genocide and Transitional Justice. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 19:4, 609-617.

van Klinken, G. (2005). *The battle for history after Suharto*. In: M. S. Zurbuchen (Ed.). *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present* (pp. 233-255). Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Verdery, K. (1999). *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Vickers, A., McGregor, K. E. (2005). Public Debates About History. *History Australia*. 2:2, 44-1-44-13. DOI. org/10.2104/ha050044.

Vltchek, A. (2012). *Indonesia: Archipelago of Fear*. Chomsky, N. (foreword). New York: Pluto Press.

Weber, E. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen: The modernization of rural France: 1870-1914*. Standford, CA: Standford University Press.

Zerubavel, E. (2006). *The elephant in the Room. Silence and Denial in Everyday Life*. Oxford.

# THE PERILS OF HISTORICAL TRUTH IN HISTORY EDUCATION: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE "TRUTH" IN HISTORICAL LEARNING

*Nur Fatah Abidin*

## INTRODUCTION

Scholars and educators concerned with issues in history education agree that the main objective of learning history at formal education is to instill historical consciousness to students. Historical consciousness refers to students' ability to establish historical significance and connections between past events and their interests and visions in the present and future times (Jeismann, 1979; Rüsen, 2004). This ability is useful to construct their social identities (Clark, 2018; Korostelina, 2013), moral and ethical values (Ammert, Edling, Löfström & Sharp, 2017; Edling, 2017; Seixas & others, 2004), and civic intelligence to be a good person and civilian (Najbert, 2012; Thompson & Dean, 2017). The ability is also useful for some socio-practical uses, such as strengthening social cohesion, conflict reconciliation, and transformation (Korostelina & Lassig, 2014; McCully, 2012; Paulson, 2015). It is assumed that if students become aware of their past, they will get a good sense of history

in the present time and visions for their future (Ahonen, 2005; Rüsen, 2004). It can be said that history education educates people to understand and contextualize the past for present and future interests. Substantially, some aspects of historical consciousness touch essential issues regarding the axiological dimension of history education. The dimension deals with the question of how students can acquire moral lessons, ethical values, and wisdom after learning history. It deals with the benefits of learning history and the extent students use history for either personal or collective interests. Thus, learning history can be understood not only as the process of reconstructing past events, but also as the process of searching values of the past by understanding, examining, and reflecting the legacy of the past. Synoptically, it can be expected that students will be wiser and have better personality after learning history.

Unfortunately, the main objective of learning history, i.e. to instill historical consciousness, seems hard to achieve by the students. Some researches, such as the ones conducted by Ferro (2003), Davison (1988), and Howard (1993), identified the abuse of history education in which the learning process tends to be used for legitimizing political power and interest rather than educating people to be a good person or strengthening the spirit of nationalism and patriotism. Motives for the abuse of history education may come from, among others, political power and interest, and the security of a political regime or state (Ferro, 2003). According to Nietzsche's (2006), it may come from personal desire and lust. Traces of political interest in history education can be identified in the curriculum, textbooks or other learning materials used for history learning. It can be sensed that the borders between the abuse of history education and the efforts of history education to strengthen nation-building and state empowerment are much

intermingled and cannot be strictly identified. Undoubtedly, the purpose of history education at the socio-political level is to promote nationalism, patriotism, and cultural heritage to the people (Zajda, 2015). However, it certainly becomes wrong if the practice of history education is merely intended to legitimize the regime or marginalize the others, which threatens social cohesion, conflict reconciliation and transformation, and historical justice in society (Cole, 2009; Korostelina & Lassig, 2014; McCully, 2012).

Besides structural problems, there are also challenges in the promotion of historical consciousness at the practical level in history learning. Wineburg's (2010) study of history education in the US context provides a detailed portrait of the challenges faced by the teachers and students. Wineburg mentioned that both the teachers and students had their own problems about their understanding and interpretation of multiple perspectives in history teaching and learning. The teachers found it hard to use different lenses to understand history, especially the lenses related to the questions about historical facts, interpretation and evidence, chronology and continuity. Another type of practical challenge is also found in the history of the Holocaust in the European area. Levy and Sheppard (2018) mentioned teachers' difficulties in teaching the Holocaust because it was embodied with intense emotions and deep traumas. The problems lie in how society defines itself and creates present realities and visions of the future based on this traumatic history. The complexity of the psychological aspect and the memory of the past has the potential to deflect moral lessons and ethical values from the history of the Holocaust. There are certainly other various problems at the practical level because teachers and students respond to and interpret history in various ways. However, we can highlight the existence of the macro and micro levels of problems of historical consciousness.

In the context of Indonesia, the development of students' historical consciousness also has crucial problems. One example can be seen in the process of learning the 1965 tragedy. Narratives of the 1965 tragedy have been long constructed by the structural intervention of the past political regime and proliferated at the grassroots level as the specters of the past. They operate unwisely as stigmas from the past to disregard the presence of particular groups, either the perpetrators or the victims. Most of the scholars agree that it is caused by political interest. However, I perceive that the unwise practicality of the 1965 tragedy at the present time could be an indication of the failure of history education in nurturing the wisdom and moral lessons from the past. About fifty years after the tragedy, the society could not enlighten the narrative from the darkness of anger and revenge (Eickhoff, van Klinken & Robinson, 2017). Synoptically, at least, we can ensure that the narrative of the 1965 tragedy has been used politically to legitimize power or seek for justice (Santoso & van Klinken, 2017) and impunity (McGregor, 2017).

My personal experience in dealing with the narratives of the 1965 tragedy in history education shows that the tragedy is perceived as an unresolved problem threatening the axiological dimension of history education in which the teachers tend to be more judgmental by using mono-perspective lenses regarding the issue. In 2017, I was invited to Yogyakarta by some history teachers of vocational high schools to attend their discussion about the role of history teachers in promoting nationalism and preventing radicalism. During the discussion, I was impressed by their debate about historical truth. One of the teachers believed that the historical narrative in the history textbooks, particularly in the section of the 1965 tragedy, is fully wrong. She said that her stance on the issue was influenced by his teacher, G. Moedjanto, a historian famous for

his critical thinking, especially the one on the 1965 tragedy. On the contrary, another teacher disagreed that the narrative of the 1965 tragedy in the textbook is wrong. Even if it is wrong, this teacher would remain using the narrative in the classroom to minimize the students' confusion. This debate dominated the discussion. In another moment, I had a conversation with some history teachers teaching at senior high schools in Surakarta, one of the cities in Central Java, Indonesia, which used to be a site of contestation between communism and nationalism for a long time. I was surprised to know that the debate about historical truth also occurred with different topics and issues related to the roles of teachers between directing and liberating the learning process. Therefore, my personal experience, at a certain degree, reflects a common situation in Indonesian education in which the official narrative of the 1965 tragedy still becomes problematic for the teachers and the students.

With this background, this paper will discuss the axiological dimension of history education, particularly how history education deals with the processes of conflict reconciliation and transformation in society. The main question is why it seems hard for historical learning, as the process of learning the past, particularly some controversial topics including the 1965 tragedy, to promote wisdom and moral lessons in society. To answer the question, the paper will examine more deeply the term 'historical truth' as a form of discourse in the field of history education. In my perception, the discourse of historical truth should be analyzed more deeply because it relates to the axiological dimension of history education and teachers' ideologies affecting the process of learning history. Here, historical truth is posited as a discourse in history learning and it is considered that, in some certain contexts, historical truth has the potential to bring about some perils of history learning.

## HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRACTICALITY OF THE PAST

As has been mentioned before, the axiological dimension of history education intermingles with historical consciousness. Therefore, to answer the research question, constructionism approach is used. This approach perceives that knowledge and meanings result from the construction of human mind and social world; in other words, knowledge and meanings are constructed, not discovered. Knowledge and meanings are developed through interactions and transmissions within a social context (Berger & Luckmann, 2016; Searle, 1995; Vygotsky, 1978). Consequently, the analysis should consider the dialectics between historical consciousness and the historically situated interpretation of teachers' social lifeworld. Thus, historical consciousness cannot be generated directly through a historical narrative. Within the framework of psychological perspectives, Straub (2005) and Kölbl (2009) defined that historical consciousness can be derived from the process of a narrative act in which students tell and understand historical narratives. Pandel (1987), based on the mental structural approach, stated that historical consciousness can be achieved through seven levels of consciousness: time, reality, historicity, identity, politics, economy-society, and morality. Rüsen and Duvenage (1993), based on the narrative perspective, stated that narrating history and understanding historical narratives play an essential role in the construction of historical consciousness. From a different perspective, Seixas (2004) articulated historical consciousness in association with historical thinking that can only be achieved by students by establishing historical significance, using primary source evidence,

identifying continuity and change, analyzing cause and consequence, taking historical perspectives, and understanding ethical dimensions of historical interpretation.

The above studies show the complexity of the construction of historical consciousness not only through the understanding of history, but also the dialectics among historical narratives, psychological processes, and mental cognitive processes. In my perspective, historical consciousness can only be generated through a learning process that accommodates three levels of transmission: knowledge, values, and virtues. Knowledge transmission refers to the level of learning through which students know history in the form of historical narratives. With such knowledge, they may be able to value history by calibrating historical narratives with moral lessons and ethical values. Therefore, at this level, they get values from history. The ability to value the past constructs students' practicality of history and scaffolds them in getting virtues from past events. This level of transmission covers the transmission of virtues that represent how students use history in their daily life for their personal or collective interests, such as nationalism and patriotism.

Under Thorp's (2014) framework, the representation of historical consciousness and, at a certain degree, the axiological dimension of history education, can be seen from historical narratives and the uses of the history of an individual. The uses of such history refer to the practicality of the past which covers the problem of how an individual can understand moral lessons and ethical values and get wisdom after learning history. The practicality of the past questions the benefits of learning history and to what extent students use history wisely for either individual or collective interests. Conceptually, the practicality of the past as the construction of the axiological problems of history education is associated with the idea of

Speck and Oakeshott (2007), which was further developed by
Hayden White (2011) in the aspects of the practical past and
the practicality of history. Oakeshott divided the past into the
historical past and the practical past. The historical past refers
to the past that has been mapped and written by historians
in a systematic way in the forms of books or scholarly essays.
Meanwhile, the practical past refers to versions of the past
that have been practically used by people in their daily tasks
and memories. I believe that these two terms are naturally
connected to each other. People understand the past from
the works of historians, besides their life experiences and
memories. Historical memories come up in a specific situation
in which people recall their historical knowledge and memories
for particular reasons and purposes, such as pursuing the truth.
In such a situation, the works of historians are seen by people
as their practical past accompanied by some specific interests.
This means that the practicality of history can be defined as how
people use their historical knowledge about past events in their
daily tasks and activities. Oakeshott's framework is employed to
explain the practicality of the 1965 tragedy in the present time.

In the context of the discourse of the 1965 tragedy in
history education, history textbooks, which are written by
professional educators and historians, stand as the historical
past. This form of historical past is then transformed by
teachers and students into the practical past by elaborating the
historical past with their personal memories of and interests
about the 1965 tragedy. In more detail, it leads to the analysis of
teachers' interpretation of the 1965 tragedy narrated in history
textbooks and the historical truth represented in the learning
process. Therefore, this paper analyzes the axiological problems
of history education by mainly discussing the practicality of
the 1965 tragedy in the classroom. The discussion is focused
on the levels of teachers' interpretation and objectification of

the 1965 tragedy, particularly how they admit pursuing the historical truth. In accordance with Oakeshott and White's frameworks, the paper will then examine the presence of the historical truth in history textbooks as the representation of the historical past.

Based on the theoretical considerations above, I organized the paper into three sections. In the first section, I will report some empirical findings regarding the presence of the historical truth in teachers' discourse on the 1965 tragedy as the representation of the practicality of history. In the second section, I will trace the genealogy of the historical truth, which is identified in teachers' articulation and the history textbook as the representation of the historical past. In the third section, I will verify the presence of the historical truth in the learning process by reporting my classroom observation. At the end of the paper, I will give some recommendations regarding the axiological problems of history education, particularly those related to the narratives of the 1965 tragedy. The recommendations include the one for using a useful framework to understand the positions of past events and history.

## METHODS

The socio-cognitive approach in van Dijk's (2017) framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used as the research method. The method was used because it covers three analytical layers, i.e. textual analysis, socio-cognitive analysis, and social analysis. Conceptually, CDA provides a set of analytical tools to reveal the ideologies, mental models, discourses, and implicit meanings of the teachers. CDA covers textual analysis, contextual analysis, cognitive analysis, and social structure analysis.

The research subjects are 25 history teachers selected proportionally from Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Palembang, and Medan. Detailed profiles of the research subjects can be seen in table 1 below:

**Table 1.** Detailed profiles of the research subjects

| Research sites | Number of teachers | Average of age | Status and information | Average Years of experience |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surakarta | 5 | 25.4 years old | Teachers in state senior high schools and members of *MGMP Sejarah* (Forum of History Teachers). Mostly fresh state university graduates. | 3.4 years |
| Yogyakarta | 5 | 27.8 years old | Teachers in state senior high schools and members of *MGMP Sejarah*. Actively attend discussions on history conducted at university campuses in Yogyakarta. | 5.8 years |
| Surabaya | 5 | 25.6 years old | Teachers in state senior high schools and members of *MGMP Sejarah*. Mostly fresh state university graduates. | 1.4 years |
| Palembang | 5 | 28.4 years old | Teachers in state senior high schools and members of *MGMP Sejarah*. | 5 years |

| Medan | 5 | 27 years old | Teachers in state senior high schools and members of *MGMP Sejarah* | 3.8 years old |

The number of the research subjects is small in quantity, but the research used the idea of epistemic community (Foucault, 1972) and the idea that an ideology is a set of beliefs, norms, and values shared by a community (van Dijk, 2006). Based on the ideas, teachers should be perceived as living in an epistemic community where they share their beliefs, knowledge, opinions, argumentation, and interests. The research is not intended to generalize or simplify the discourse of the historical truth by taking the epistemic dimension as the representation of the ideologies and beliefs of all the history teachers in Indonesia. However, information from the research subjects may reflect the collective tendency regarding the 1965 tragedy. The number of the research subjects is limited. Despite the limitation, results of the research may provide a rich depiction of the practice of history learning in Indonesia, particularly the learning about the 1965 tragedy.

Data, particularly the one on the learning topic of the 1965 tragedy, was collected through unstructured interviews and classroom observations. The learning topic of the 1965 tragedy is controversial and it is an actual issue that is still problematic nowadays. At least seven versions of the 1965 tragedy have been presented in the compulsory history textbooks. Due to this, teachers have to make a decision in the classroom whether they select one narrative as the "historical truth" or accept all the narratives in an equal position. Thus, this issue has effectively encouraged teachers to objectify the historical truth. The collected data was analyzed discursively by considering three interplay layers: discourse, cognitive, and

social ones. The analysis was conducted to reveal the memories, mental models, social cognition, attitudes, and ideologies of the teachers, particularly those related to the historical truth and the axiological dimension of history education.

## THE PURSUIT OF TRUTHFULNESS

Unlike the finding from my earlier observation, I found that the teachers did not explicitly mention the term 'historical truth' in their utterances. Some teachers mentioned similar terms such as "truth", "a clear explanation", or "enlightenment" in their statements, but no one openly spoke about historical truth. Although it did not explicitly appear, the tendency to pursue historical truth can be traced in the logic of the teachers. I found two typologies of teachers' interpretation of the 1965 tragedy: conformist and objectivist. Each type shows the teachers' typical tendency in responding to the interview questions.

### CONFORMIST TEACHERS AND THEIR CONFUSIONS

During the interviews, some teachers said that they taught one narration of the 1965 tragedy, which they considered as the "best", "safe", or "appropriate" narrative. I categorize those teachers as the conformist. This term represents the logic of the teachers who tend to use binary logical thinking. Examining their binary logical thinking, we can trace the opposition in their logic, such as "bad", "dangerous", or "inappropriate". Moreover, the teachers have to choose one of them, which they believe as the good side or the truth. The teachers' assumption is as follows:

> *"If a narrative of the 1965 tragedy strengthens nationalism, it will be the best or safe narrative, as well as the common one."*

The above statement shows that the assessment of teachers' conformity or whether a narrative of the 1965 tragedy can be considered the good or the bad is related to the standard of nationalism. Nationalism can be seen as a living ideology in the minds of the teachers that affects their logic in making a distinction between the historical truth and the historical wrong. Using the standard of nationalism, the truth in historical learning is seen as being closely associated with normative prejudices rather than scientific qualification. Consequently, it will eliminate the discussion about historical events and facts during the learning process. Therefore, it can be concluded that historical truth cannot be defined terminologically, but should be understood as a historical logic that operates to make a binary distinction between the truth and the wrong based on normative qualifications, unrelated to historical facts or scientific truth.

Although the teachers had already chosen one narration and clearly had an understanding about the historical truth, they seemed to be still confused, which was reflected in their inconsistent statements about the 1965 tragedy. When talking about the 1965 tragedy, they often took a pause and carefully picked words to represent their personal statement. During the interviews, they tended to protect themselves by using rhetorical and apologia words. They seemed to know that there are historical wrongs, but they were afraid of expressing their opinions. I think such behavior represents a mental model in which they realized that the narrative of the 1965 tragedy is important and a debatable issue. They also admitted that the issue attracts their students' attention in the classroom. Most of the teachers told me that many of their students ask about the truth of the 1965 tragedy. The confusion as to whether telling the historical wrongs or supporting the existing narrative and the pressure from the students haunt the teachers when

they teach the 1965 tragedy, producing cognitive dissonance and it shapes their mental model and willingness to pursue the historical truth. A citation from Novi, a history teacher, below represents the teachers' confusion:

> "I think … [pause] the narration of the Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party on September 30, 1965 is important for students … [pause] It relates to their nationalism... Let us imagine, students at twelfth grade, they do not have a lot of knowledge about this … [pause] betrayal. As a history teacher, I think, we should give … [pause] a clear explanation to the students. Thus, they will not … [pause] feel tossed around and will not be easily … [pause] agitated by other groups in society. There is one case in Tebing Tinggi, my hometown; my friend told me that a week after he taught materials on the Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party, the symbol of hammer and sickle appeared on the school wall. In the classroom, some students stated that communists were not guilty... [long pause]. I think it is very dangerous... [pause]. Of course, I already know many versions of this tragedy. If there is an invalid version, we should not … [pause] judge it. We should not make it a big problem ... [pause]. It does not mean that I support the New Order's or Old Order's narrations … [pause] but I think we, as history teachers, have a responsibility to teach that by following the direction provided by the government. Anyway, the most important thing is strengthening our nationalism, right?"

The above citation indicates that Novi has historical knowledge about the 1965 tragedy. She also already knows the political interests behind the narratives of the tragedy and

can even mention the weakness of each version. She also told me that she got many references when studying Indonesian history at university. Another teacher, Ari, a history teacher from Surabaya, also knows the various narratives of the 1965 tragedy. He even explained to me the weakness of Nugroho Notosutanto's narrative of the 1965 tragedy by relating it to the discourse of Gilchrist Document. He also mentioned some books and journals written by such scholars as John Rossa and Benedict Anderson that critically revise the official narrative of the 1965 tragedy and that are usually used as references by his colleagues in Surabaya. Some other teachers confirmed that they also knew and and had read those works. However, although they know about the historical wrong, they tend to follow the official narrative and claim that it is the historical truth when teaching about the 1965 tragedy in the classroom.

We should come back to Novi's statement to scrutinize such a confusion and avoid thinking that the history teachers seem to be a hypocrite. Having considered Novi's statement, I put attention to the aspects of personal memory and social cognition that affect Novi's mental model. The personal memory is associated with the historical references that construct her thought about the risk to teach the 1965 tragedy. Furthermore, the personal memory relates to the historical knowledge of the students and even their personal experiences. Nia, a history teacher from Yogyakarta, has a different construction of personal memory. She believed that the 1965 tragedy is a "*kudeta merangkak*" (crawling coup). She explained that her understanding of the tragedy is informed by the results of the research conducted by one of her colleagues. She uses such a narration to teach the 1965 tragedy in the classroom. Even more, the version is not so much different from the official history; thus, she believed that her narration will not get resistance from the students. The above cases give us a clear depiction about the role of

personal memory in constructing the mental models of the teachers. Unlike Novi, who constructs her mental model with empirical experiences, Nia's mental model tends to be developed with her personal experiences and historical knowledge. Although there are differences among the teachers, they seem to agree with one rule that the narrative of the 1965 tragedy should not make the students confused and resist the narration.

## OBJECTIVIST TEACHERS AND THEIR CHALLENGES

Another remarkable finding is the fact that the teachers also realize the current condition, which is related to their responsibilities and consequences in teaching the 1965 tragedy. In the circumstances, some teachers tried to be objectivist in teaching the 1965 tragedy.

Dany, a history teacher from Medan, told me that his students nowadays know a lot of information about the 1965 tragedy:

> *"I face so many challenges when teaching the 1965 tragedy. Many of my students already know the tragedy from social media or television. Consequently, there are many versions circulating in the classroom. Some of my students ask sensitive topics regarding the 1965 tragedy, such as the definition of communism, the murder of seven generals in one night, and so forth. I think, as history teachers, we should read many references to answer those questions. We should answer their questions in a moderate way to avoid interruptions or criticisms from students. We should answer their questions with good explanations. This way, we will be able to achieve our learning objectives. Regarding this, some of my students have ever been unsatisfied with my answers. It is, I think,*

*a bad experience. One of my students even accused me of defending communism."*

Dany's statement shows that his students are critical. They often ask him critical and difficult questions. His students, he said, usually clarify the information that they have got from social media to him. They also like asking which one is the truth when they get much false and asymmetric information that is distracting their beliefs. Dany added that he should make a decision to answer his students' questions. On the one hand, Dany is in doubt about using one narrative, but on the other hand, he does not want to make his students disappointed. He feels that he is risking his reputation by potentially making some mistakes. Therefore, he has decided to give a safe, moderate answer, which follows the official history, while providing an understanding that other narratives may also be correct.

Meanwhile, some teachers are trying to escape from the existing narrative by bringing their own discourse. Ali, a history teacher from Palembang, explained to me that he has a unique method to teach the 1965 tragedy:

> *"I always try to present new notes and make … [pause] a new discourse. For example, if the narrative tells … [pause] the cruelty of members of the Indonesian Communist Party, I will ask my students about the possibility of the party to organize such a big military operation. Then they usually ask me some questions and I give them new understandings. I just want to equalize the narrative. However, if there is a task, I always ask my students to choose the right answer based on the explanations provided in the textbook. It is because the tasks are practically derived from the textbook."*

Ali's information shows that he usually tries to provide a new discourse. Unfortunately, it is like a vicious circle in which in the end, he has to choose one narrative. Ali's statement shows that the evaluation process also forces the students to follow the official narrative. Commonly, in the final examination, questions on the topic of the 1965 tragedy are multiple choice or essay ones. The students have to pick up one best answer. Unfortunately, the question must not be critical. Thus, the official narrative will come as the source for the right answers. Therefore, the evaluation, to a certain degree, limits the teacher and students' creativity to escape from the absolute narrative.

It can be seen that there is a contestation between the history teachers' personal memories and social cognition and the structural system of education, which forces them to pursue the truth in history learning. Furthermore, the teachers may have known many versions of the 1965 tragedy and found the historical wrongs in the narrative of the 1965 tragedy. However, the frequent pauses they took during the interviews may indicate dissonance in their cognitive process. The teachers' experience of the past and social cognition construct a mental model that causes them to make a safe decision when teaching about the 1965 tragedy by following the official narrative. When the teachers try to escape from one official narrative, they will be limited by the evaluation process that forces them to use the official narrative provided used in the official history textbooks. It means that there is a configuration among the teachers' decisions, the evaluation process, and the official history textbooks. Such a configuration indicates that the official history textbooks become representatives of the official narrative of the 1965 tragedy.

In sum, a synopsis of the typology of the teachers teaching the 1965 tragedy and the presence of historical truth can be seen in table 2 below:

**Table 2.** A typology of the teachers dealing with the 1965 tragedy

| Typology | Characteristic | Logical thinking | Tendency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conformist | Pursuing historical truth in history learning | Binary oppositional logic | 1. Accepting and confirming the official narrative<br><br>2. Being confused when dealing with other perspectives and narratives of the 1965 tragedy |
| Objectivist | Questioning the historical truth but being afraid of expressing it in the learning activities | Moderate logical thinking | Criticizing and trying to escape from the official narrative, but failed |

## THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE IN THE OFFICIAL TEXTBOOK AND THE GENEALOGY OF THE HISTORICAL TRUTH

Based on the empirical findings of the teachers' objectification of the 1965 tragedy in their teaching activities, which at some points exposes the presence of a historical truth, the genealogy of the historical truth was analyzed by focusing on the historical narrative in the official history textbook as the representation of the historical past.

The 1965 tragedy is taught in the current history textbook for twelfth grade students under the topic of "The Struggle against the Nation Disintegration" and the tragedy is labeled as "a series of events caused by the conflict of ideologies". The remarkable aspects of the textbook are the acts of emphasizing one narrative and denying the others. The textbook narrates the 1965 tragedy by providing seven versions: (a) the internal problem within the Indonesian Army, (b) the CIA intervention, (c) the competition between the United States and British, (d) the role of Soekarno, (e) the theory of chaos, (f) the role of Soeharto, and (g) the role of the Indonesian Communist Party. Seven theories of the 1965 tragedy are unequally narrated to emphasize the weakness of Soekarno and the role of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1965 tragedy.

The act of denying can be found in a theory of the 1965 tragedy that exposes the internal problem within the Indonesian Army as the main factor that caused the 1965 tragedy. According to the theory, the tragedy 1965 was caused by the internal problem within the Indonesian Army. The textbook denies the theory by providing an irrelevant reason in the form of a discourse of the simple life of General Nasution:

> *"One example is the argumentation of Lieutenant Untung that Indonesian Army Generals lived in luxury and liked collecting wealth. This accusation defiled the good name of the Indonesian Army. The argumentation is actually wrong and opposite to the fact that General Nasution, for instance, lived with simplicity".[94]*

---

94   See the current history textbook published by the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, page 16.

The textbook also denies a theory about the role of Soekarno in the 1965 tragedy. The textbook exposes that Soekarno wanted to diminish the opposition that came from the Indonesian Army. However, the textbook rejects the theory by providing a fact that Soekarno rejected to support the 30 September Movement. Although it denies the theory, further narratives in the textbook give a critical turning point to all the whole narrative:

> "*The theory presented by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh can be categorized as the common narrative accepted by the Indonesian society. However, aside from the debate about the representative theory of the 1965 tragedy, actually since the Guided Democracy started to be implemented in 1959, Soekarno had dominated the political constellation by presenting himself as the absolute leader of Indonesia. He also became a moderator between two powerful groups in Indonesia at that time: the Indonesian Army and the Indonesian Communist Party.*"[95]

The next description then exposes the wrongs of the Indonesian Communist Party, the weakness of Soekarno, and the presence of Soeharto and the Indonesian Army contributing a lot to stabilizing the situation. At the end of the narrative, the textbook makes a distinction between the Communism and Pancasila, which reflects the official narrative of the 1965 tragedy.

We can easily identify the similarity between the logic of the textbook and the teachers' logical thinking. The textbook provides a logical framework that can be used by the teachers in dealing with the seven theories of the 1965 tragedy.

---

[95] See the current history textbook textbook published by the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, page 18.

The logic leads to one absolute narrative which covers the wrongs of the Indonesian Communist Party and the weakness of Soekarno. This logic can be traced back to the previous history textbook. The history textbook published in 1974 established a logical framework that is similar to the one used in the current textbook, but in a more extreme way:

> "*The chance received by the Indonesian Communist Party during the era of Guided Democracy reached its climax in the middle of 1965. In an alliance with President Soekarno, they divided the political constellation into friends or foes. If ones were considered friends, the Indonesian Communist Party would embrace then, but if ones were considered foes, they would be eliminated by the party*"[96]

A comparison of the narrative used in the current textbook of Indonesian History with the one used in the previous textbook published in 1974 shows a similarity between them. The narrative of the 1974 textbook was derived from a national project initiated by some scholars to write a national history. The project was carried out after a long debate about the philosophy of Indonesian history and the demand to write a national historical narrative. Nugroho Notosutanto led the project. Unfortunately, the project was debated by many critical historians, including some contributors of the textbook including Sartono Kartodirdjo. The root of the debate can be traced back to the First Conference of Indonesian History held by Gadjah Mada University and the University of Indonesia in Yogyakarta in 16-17 December 1957. In the conference, some historians and academics tried to formulate a future framework and direction for Indonesian historiography.

---

96  This citation is taken from the book *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk Sekolah Menengah Tingkat Atas*, *Jilid III* (the National History of Indonesia for Senior High Schools, Volume 3), page 213.

Mohammad Yamin brought the discourse of national philosophy of history closely associated with the willingness to impart the spirit of nationalism to the minds of the Indonesian people by providing a national history. Soedjatmoko, who came to the conference to replace the position of Mohammad Hatta, criticized Yamin's conception and provided a critical perspective on the philosophy of history. Soedjatmoko believed that historians should be able to make a clear distinction in their work between the political interest and the development of historical knowledge and historiography.

Explicitly, the discourses brought by Yamin and Soedjatmoko represent the framework of the debate on history education that has continued until today. According to Yamin, the national history demands an absolute narrative to strengthen the nationalism of the people. Meanwhile, Soedjatmoko proposed a critical history that allows multi-interpretation to understand history. He warned that nationalism with a certain political interest may bring negative results and people supporting such nationalism tend to scapegoat others to strengthen the nationality. In fact, Yamin's conception was accepted by the society at the time. It was because, before 1957, there had been many historical narratives in the society politically used to criticize the government. As a result, the society demanded one representative narrative that could be used to strengthen nationalism and nation-building. Although the conference was unable to produce any decision, historians continued working on the issues debated during the conference and revisited them in the Second Conference of Indonesian History in 1970. One result of the second conference was the project to write a national history that could be used for educational purposes. The project successfully organized six volumes of Indonesian History. In 1974, these six volumes were reorganized into three volumes of book intended for educational purposes at

junior and senior high schools. Until today, Yamin's conception has been reflected in the textbooks that emphasize the spirit of nationalism and nation-building. Currently, such a textbook framework is still used with some enrichment and revisions.

Results of the textbook analysis show that the discourse of the historical truth in Indonesia can be traced back to the 1950s. The narratives of the textbooks not only bring historical knowledge, but also influence the society in constructing their logic and minds, and, therefore, in finding the historical truth. As shown before, the textbooks have been designed to encourage the students to pick up one narrative and make a distinction between the truth and the wrongs. Therefore, the practicality of the 1965 tragedy has been driven by the minds and logic of the Indonesian society extensively constructed by history learning in educational institutions. I suppose that, since the New Order era, history learning has tended to be used only as a political tool to legitimize the power, which is proved the genealogy of the historical truth in history education. With the presence of the prescribed historical truth, the history learning fails to nurture the wisdom and moral lessons from the past.

## HISTORICAL TRUTH AND MONO-PERSPECTIVE IN THE LEARNING PROCESS: CLASSROOM VERIFICATION

Results of the analysis of the teachers' cognitive interface and the genealogical analysis of the historical truth used in the textbooks have led to the formulation of the main question of this research, i.e. how the historical truth is presented in the learning process. Fortunately, Satria, a teacher of a senior high school in Surakarta, allowed me to observe the activities of teaching and learning about the 1965 tragedy in his classroom. Satria divided his teaching and learning activities into two sections. He used the models of Discovery

Learning and Discussion-Based Learning, which are recommended by the 2013 Curriculum. He opened the class by providing apperception in a regressive style. Firstly, he explained the current condition of the Indonesian society and explained some important current issues surrounding the 1965 tragedy. Then, he divided the students into seven groups. Each group had the task of analyzing one version of the 1965 tragedy. Satria's dividing the students into seven groups can be seen as the act to reproduce the official narrative used in the textbooks. The students were allowed to search relevant information from the textbooks, other history books in the library, or even scientific journals from the Internet.

In the second meeting, the students started debating about the 1965 tragedy. Each group had to defend a theory. In doing it, they tended to reproduce the historical narrative used in the textbooks. For instance, during the debate about the role of the Indonesian Army, the group who expressed their opinions based on the official narrative dominated the debate. Meanwhile, the other groups who relied on the Internet or other history books were not confident of the information they had got from those sources. It seems that they depended on the information provided in the textbooks. Some groups were unable to give appropriate answers to counter the official narrative.

At the end of the learning process, Satria made a conclusion by verifying and summarizing the narrative of the 1965 tragedy. Then, he provided another narrative of the 1965 tragedy to enrich the students' knowledge about the tragedy. He elaborated the whole narrative that explicitly reproduced the narrative used in the textbook. He contextualized the 1965 tragedy by using analogical thinking and then directed the students to collect nationalism values from the 1965 tragedy. He emphasized that in the present time the students must prevent internal conflicts

like the 1965 tragedy from occurring. At the end of the learning process, he gave the students a task of reading more references related to the 1965 tragedy.

During the classroom observation, I had a chance to confirm the presence of the historical truth in the learning process. The teacher seemed to be confident in teaching the topic. As has been mentioned before, the historical truth is unobservable in the narrative used in the textbook and the teacher's confession. The presence of the historical truth could be identified when the students reproduced the historical narrative used in the textbook – to be precise, at the end of the learning process when most of them mostly believed that the Indonesian Communist Party is guilty to the 1965 tragedy. It can be seen here the influence of the official history textbook on the logical thinking of the teacher and the students.

Considering the results of the classroom observation, I came to a conclusion regarding the presence of the historical truth in history learning. The results of my analysis show that historical truth refers to the truthfulness based on a common normative aspect that does not require scientific evidence that is believed by the students. This kind of truthfulness leads the practice of education into monologues that only emphasize the official narrative and mono-perspectivization of history. This kind of mono-perspectivization threatens the presence of other lenses of analysis and historical narratives in the learning process. Affectively, it can cause a dilemmatic problem in which the students might become ruder when dealing with a clash or conflict with others. This attitude certainly does not support conflict reconciliation and social cohesion in society.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the main challenge in teaching and learning the narrative of the 1965 tragedy and acquiring moral and ethical values from the narrative is finding the historical truth. Historical truth is the truthfulness that is based on a common normative aspect that does not require scientific evidence believed by the students. By using nationalism, the truth in history learning is closely associated with normative qualifications rather than scientific qualifications. Consequently, it will eliminate the discussion about historical events and facts during the learning process. Therefore, it can be concluded that historical truth cannot be defined terminologically, but should be understood as a historical logic that operates to make a binary distinction between the truth and the wrong based on normative qualifications, unrelated to historical facts or scientific truth.

In the above circumstances, we cannot expect too much from the practice of history education to give more contribution to conflict reconciliation. As has been explained before, binary logical thinking seems to preserve conflict by silencing the narratives other than the official one with the discourse of historical truth. Until nowadays, the 1965 tragedy is one of the unresolved issues in Indonesia because it has been thought with binary logical thinking that demands truth in its historical narrative. An effort to introduce a historical truth through a historical narrative will not provide any moral lesson since such an effort tends to be accompanied with a desire to scapegoat other groups or people who believe in other historical truths. Therefore, in order to have a narrative that is enlightened from the darkness of anger and revenge, we should use new approaches to history learning.

To counter the perils of historical truth, I propose a philosophical foundation of history learning that emphasizes the empowerment of teachers' pedagogical skills. The ability of teachers to make a distinction between the past, the historical event, and the historical narrative is very useful to reduce their confusion. I agree with Hayden White's concept developed to understand the past, the historical event, and the historical narrative. In his concept, a history textbook is categorized as the historical narrative that cannot be associated directly with the historical event in the past. History teachers should realize that a historical narrative is written by a historian as a reflection and interpretation of the past. Therefore, it is full of subjectivity. This philosophical foundation destabilizes the position of the official historical narrative as the absolute representation of the past by giving history teachers an understanding that there is no absolute narrative and that there are actually many lenses that can be used to perceive the past through history learning.

## DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

In accordance with the ethics of research, only the participants' initial names are disclosed. The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

# REFERENCES

Ahonen, S. (2005). Historical consciousness: a viable paradigm for history education? *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, *37*(6), 697–707.

Ammert, N., Edling, S., Löfström, J., & Sharp, H. (2017). Bridging Historical and Moral Consciousness: Promises and Challenges. *Historical Encounters: A Journal of Historical Consciousness, Historical Cultures, and History Education*.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (2016). The social construction of reality. In *Social Theory Re-Wired: New Connections to Classical and Contemporary Perspectives: Second Edition*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315775357.

Clark, P. (2018). History education debates: Canadian identity, historical thinking and historical consciousness. *Arbor: Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura*, *194*(788), 2.

Cole, E. A. (2009). *Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education*. *SSRN*. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijm003.

Davison, G. (1988). The use and abuse of Australian history. *Australian Historical Studies*, *23*(91), 55–76.

Edling, S. (2017). Historical and moral consciousness in the light of ethics of dissensus: One approach to handle plurality in education. *Historical Encounters-A Journal Of Historical Consciousness Historical Cultures And History Education*.

Eickhoff, M., van Klinken, G., & Robinson, G. (2017). 1965 Today: Living with the Indonesian Massacres. *Journal of Genocide Research*. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393931.

Ferro, M. (2003). *The use and abuse of history: Or how the past is taught to children. The Use and Abuse of History: Or How The Past Is Taught To Children*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203425701.

Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge & The discourse on Language*. *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470776407.ch20.

Howard, M. (1993). The use and abuse of military history. *RUSI Journal*. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849308445676.

Jeismann, K.-E. (1979). Geschichtsbewusstsein. *Handbuch Der Geschichtsdidaktik*, *1*, 42–45.

Kölbl, C. (2009). What Can a Developmental Psychology of Historical Consciousness Look Like? In *Interpersonal Understanding in Historical Context* (pp. 81–96). Brill Sense.

Korostelina, K., & Lassig, S. (2014). *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation*. *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Reconsidering joint texbook projects*. London and New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203072608.

Korostelina, K. V. (2013). *History education in the formation of social identity: Toward a culture of peace. History Education in the Formation of Social Identity: Toward a Culture of Peace*. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137374769.

Levy, S. A., & Sheppard, M. (2018). "Difficult Knowledge" and the Holocaust in History Education. In *The Wiley International Handbook of History Teaching and Learning*. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119100812.ch14.

McCully, A. (2012). History teaching, conflict and the legacy of the past. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*. https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197912440854.

McGregor, K. (2017). Exposing Impunity: Memory and Human Rights Activism in Indonesia and Argentina. *Journal of Genocide Research*. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393948.

Najbert, J. (2012). Historical education in the process of democratic transition: The Czech case. *Filozofija i Drustvo*, *23*(3), 45–55.

Nietzsche, F. W. (2006). *The use and abuse of history*. Cosimo, Inc.

Pandel, H.-J. (1987). Dimensionen des Geschichtsbewusstseins. Ein Versuch, seine Struktur für Empirie und Pragmatik diskutierbar zu machen. *Geschichtsdidaktik*, *12*(2), 130–142.

Paulson, J. (2015). *"Whether and how?" History education about recent and ongoing conflict: A review of research. Journal on Education in Emergencies.*

Rüsen, J. (2004). Historical Consciousness: Narrative, Structure, Moral Function and Ontogenetic Development. In *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*. https://doi.org/10.1353/jer.2014.0028.

Rüsen, J., & Duvenage, P. (1993). *Studies in metahistory. HSRC series in methodology ; 32.*

Santoso, A., & van Klinken, G. (2017). Genocide Finally Enters Public Discourse: The International People's Tribunal 1965. *Journal of Genocide Research*. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1393970.

Searle, J. R. (1995). *Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press* (Vol. 1).

Seixas, P. C., & others. (2004). *Theorizing historical consciousness* (Vol. 8). University of Toronto Press Toronto.

Speck, W. A., & Oakeshott, M. (2007). On History and Other Essays. *The Modern Language Review*. https://doi.org/10.2307/3730019.

Straub, J. (2005). Telling stories, making history. *Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness*, 44–93.

Thompson, T. L., & Dean, K. T. (2017). National Identity, Historical Consciousness, and Historical Preservation. *International Journal of Bahamian Studies*, *23*, 49–66.

van Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310600687908.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Interaction between learning and development. *Mind and Society*. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0006-3495(96)79572-3.

White, H. (2011). The Practical Past. *Historein*. https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.2

Wineburg, S. (2010). Historical thinking and other unnatural acts. *Phi Delta Kappan*. https://doi.org/10.1177/003172171009200420.

Zajda, J. (2015). Nation-building and history education in a global culture. In *Nation-Building and History Education in a Global Culture*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9729-0_12.

# ISLAMIC EDUCATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: SITUATING *PESANTREN* IN THE ISLAND OF THE GODS

*Siti Nur Hidayah and Alifian Ramadhany*

## INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, invited 69 countries' delegates of Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) IX to visit a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Bali, Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI). Retno Marsudi had discussions with some of the teachers and students of the *pesantren*, and she gave the *pesantren* a nickname 'Pesantren *Toleransi*' (*Pesantren* for Tolerance). Her invitation for the delegates to visit the *pesantren* was not without a reason. The *pesantren*, which was established in 1996, is considered a model for Islamic education institutions. The *pesantren* is religiously tolerant, which is shown by the fact that it employs not only Muslims but also Balinese Hindus to teach at the institution. In addition, the *pesantren* welcomes non-Muslim students to learn in it. Furthermore, the existence of this Islamic institution within such a Hindu majority society for a considerable period of time indicates its ability to maintain peaceful relations with the society (Pedersen, 2014).

The existence of the pesantren in the middle of the Hindu community is in itself an interesting phenomenon. Furthermore, the inclusion and willingness of Hindu teachers to contribute to the educational process within the pesantren is another interesting fact given the movement of Ajeg Bali. Ajeg Bali (Bali stand up) is a slogan raised after Bali bombings in 2002. It aims to reinforce the sense of religious, ethnic and cultural identities of the Balinese people (Picard, 2011; Hauser-Schaublin & Harnish, 2014). The movement emerged in 2003 and has exerted the consolidation of the Hindu Balinese in order to empower their culture, protect their territory from the domination of new comers and the infiltration by the outsiders, and restore the image of Bali as a safe island for tourists (Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007). The movement deploys the politics of fear by othering non-Hindu existences in Bali (Tamatea, 2011).

The movement has resulted in the marginalization of some Muslim communities in Bali regardless of their long historical existence in their villages. A Muslim village in Candikuning, near Ulun Danau Temple in Tabanan, for example, is not regarded as desa pakraman (customary village) by the provincial government because it does not use the three-temple system. As a result, the villagers become disadvantaged in terms of politics and economics (Rieger, 2014). In addition, the Muslims are called nak Jawa (Javanese) just because they are Muslims, even though their ancestors, together with their fellow Hindus, were the first generation opening the village long before the colonial era (ibid: 208). In this regard, the involvement of Hindus and Balinese traditional elements in the educational process at the pesantren depicts how the institution is informed about building social cohesion within the Hindu majority community, which has caused it to initiate considerable efforts to retain its coexistence.

The effort made by pesantren to strengthen cohesiveness among community members with different religions, to a certain extent, has made Islam in Indonesia earn a reputation as Islam that is peaceful, which may become a model for Muslims in the world (Abbas, 2012). Compared with Islam in other Muslim countries in Asia and Africa, Indonesian Islam is relatively 'peaceful, inclusive, tolerant, open toward differences, and in line with democratic values' (Barton, 2005). In Indonesia, the process of democratization cannot be separated from the contribution of Muslims particularly those who are members of the two most prominent civil society organizations, i.e. Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (Azca et.al, 2019).

In the midst of studies that aim to find out limitations in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and that tend to criticize them, highlighting the effort made by an Islamic education institution to build cohesive relations with the Hindu community in Bali is important, given the 'growing' inter-religious intolerance and the escalation of radicalism and violence in Indonesia. Regarding this, a survey by PPIM UIN Jakarta (2018) shows that more than 50% of teachers have intolerant opinions, whereas 46.09% them embrace radical opinions. Emphasizing another side of Islam that promotes social cohesion through an educational institution offers a new insight on how cohesion is negotiated by Muslims in a community in which they are a minority, and such an educational and social phenomenon may become a model for the implementation of Islamic education that promotes social cohesion in other areas.

Studies about Islamic education, especially *pesantren* within an Indonesian community where Muslims are a minority, have been focused on such various aspects as *pesantren* curriculums and the concept of minority in

Islam itself. Curriculum development and teaching strategies in *pesantren* in Muslim minority regions including West Papua have been investigated by Wekke (2015; Wekke et al., 2017; Adawiyah & Jamaluddin Z. (2016) and Makbuloh (2012). Another interesting research on Islamic education in a Muslim minority setting has been conducted by Mu'ti and Riza ul Haq (2009). The research investigated Muhammadiyah schools in Ende (East Nusa Tenggara), Putussibau (West Kalimantan), and Serui (Yapen Waropen, Papua), where Christians are the majority. Results of the research show that Muhammadiyah as an Islamic civil society organization has successfully performed tolerance by respecting religious diversity and including a number of Christian students in their schools. The authors even created a new term 'Kristen Muhammadiyah' (Muhammadiyah Christians) to show the inclusiveness of the organization in providing education.

In Indonesia and Malaysia, where Muslims are the majority, Islamic educational institutions often become a positive power in the community by instilling in their students tolerance values required for dealing with diverse religious viewpoints, understandings and societies (Hwang, 2008: 144). A considerable number of *pesantren*s also provide community development assistance to the surrounding communities through formal or informal programs, such as community service programs and programs in which *pesantren* students teach in communities. Moreover, the leaders of the *pesantren* (*Kyai*) are commonly civic leaders who are capable to lead in the efforts for the resolution, conciliation, and reduction of such conflicts as the inter-communal-conflicts in Situbondo (East Java) and Tasikmalaya (West Java) (Bertrand, 2004). *Pesantren*s in Indonesia not only provide Islamic education and knowledge, but also influence social change and community life, particularly those in rural areas (Mustari, 2013).

In some areas, *pesantren*s also serve as active agents for participatory community development (Budiwiranto, 2009). This study will highlight the role of a *pesantren* in Bali and its contribution to the creation of social cohesion in the region.

Firstly, this study will analyze how education may become a means of and a medium for building a cohesive society. Secondly, the study will investigate the underlying values, formal curriculum and co-curricular activities adopted/carried out in Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI), which have contributed to the instilment of tolerance values among the students and the cultivation of peaceful relations between Muslims and other religious believers. Finally, the study will examine the activities, practices and programs developed by the *pesantren* to situate itself as a societal institution within the Hindu majority community to maintain peaceful relations with the community. This paper suggests two ways an educational institution may contribute to the building of social cohesion, firstly through their positive influence on the students and secondly through their actions as a societal institution.

## EDUCATION AND SOCIAL COHESION

Education has proven to bring about economic and social benefits to the society. A better educated person will likely have a better job and a better life. Investment in education is essential to reduce poverty. Socially, education is a powerful means of cultivating values required to build a cohesive society and fostering the norms of tolerance and pluralism in the classroom (Hwang, 2008). In addition, education has a direct impact on social cohesion and civic engagement (Putnam, 2005; Mujani 2003). Mujani (2003: 247). It is argued that educated people are more likely to be supportive to the values of fairness, freedom of choice and tolerance and are less likely to be narrow-minded towards the groups they do not like. In addition,

educational processes may help students learn factual information about public life and inculcate them with norms of open mindedness (Putnam, 2005:6).

The role of education for social cohesion can be detected from its contribution to the socialization of social values and norms to the new members of society (students), providing them with knowledge and skills required for their social participation (Vasiliki, 2011). In other words, an educational institution contributes to the building of social cohesion through its influence on the students and its actions as an institution with social missions, as stated by Order that "schools foster or retard student tolerance, respect for diverse others, and sense of overarching common identity and values. They prepare citizens with the knowledge and skills needed to participate effectively in a democracy" (Order, 2005). The active involvement of a school in instiling manners can be seen from its curriculum and its teaching about social contract to the students, as well as its activities and programs. Furthermore, one of the objectives for establishing public education is to promote tolerance through daily routines starting from the students' act of going to school every day. Heyneman (2000) asserted that the effort to enlighten a nation through public education is concerned more with attitudes and values rather than with literacy and numeracy skills only. Will all this in mind, I am interested in examining how Islamic education in Pesantren Bali Bina Insani inculcates social norms of tolerance and respect for other people in its students to prepare each of them to be a good member of society.

A cohesive community is characterized by tolerance and respect for other individuals and cultures, as well as active civic cooperation and participation (Green & Janmaat, 2011: 6). In other words, social cohesion involves the capacity of a society

to safeguard the wellbeing of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding marginalization. It is such a tradition of tolerance towards all religions and cultures that becomes the basis of peace, progress and harmony (Khan, 2016). Harmonious life can be achieved when trust and reciprocal relations are maintained among society members (Putnam, 2005).

In certain communities including the Germany community, reciprocity within social cohesion is based on certain standards of values and trust (Storving, 2012). This is also the case in communities with a set of divergent social norms like Bali where people with different religions and cultures coexist. Informal norms often strengthen bond among community members and are part of the community's culture and sometimes unconsciously followed. Such norms include *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation) and *tepo seliro* (being thoughtful and respectful towards each other), which are practiced in Indonesia. Informal norms as part of the culture of a society are the strongest tie for building social cohesion. Kinship or the web of social relationships is another bedrock for social cohesion (Chidester et al., 2003). However, cohesiveness is more a process rather than an end. Social cohesion involves a sense of commitment and a desire to live together in harmony (Jenson, 1998: 1). Therefore, social cohesion can be understood as the harmonious live of a community based on trust and reciprocal relations relating to certain values in the community.

Social cohesion is dynamic and complex, and it involves different levels of human existence. In this study, we adopt the framework developed by Fonseca et al. (2018) to characterize social cohesion. The framework covers three different but intertwined levels to form social cohesion as shown in Figure 1. Those levels are individual, community, and

institutional ones. The three levels are interconnected and interdependent. The building of social cohesion by PBBI in fact occurred in all the levels. Whereas, the elements of the framework developed by Fonseca et al. coexist in the investigated communities and strengthen one another to retain social harmony.

The building of social cohesion requires that society members have self-motivation to belong to their society or group. The motivation is based on perceptions of the environment, norms and values, so that society members may have a bond with their group, actively participate in group-related activities, and perform those activities well.

**Figure 1.** Social cohesion framework adopted from Fonseca et al. (2018 p. 16)



At the community level, social cohesion is built in regard to the environment of the organization. Synthesizing others concepts, Fonseca et al. (2018) highlighted factors of community relationships and ties, such as social capital and

trust, friendship networks, reciprocal loyalties and solidarity, moral support, and reward values in the group. Whereas, the last layer is institutional level, which relates to the factors of conflict management and decision making, and human rights, and the factors related to the environment including the structure, norms, and values which the formal institutions and actors in society are responsible to maintain.

## METHODS

This study examines how a *pesantren* as an Islamic education provider and as a societal institution contributes to social cohesion building in Bali, Indonesia. Bali is an island in the southern part of Indonesia well known as the Island of the Gods. This island is considered as a 'tourism paradise' due to its natural beauty and traditions.  Bali has a long history of interactions between its Hindu majority population and Muslim minority population. According to the 2010 census held by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the number of Muslims in Bali is 520,244 or around 13.4 % of the total population (bali.bps.go.id). The number has increased dramatically from around 9.7% in 2000 (the 2000 census).

The study is focused on Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI), which is located in Karambitan, Tabanan, a regency in the southeastern part of Bali. Tabanan is a house for about 26,000 Muslims who interact with the Hindu population (bali.bps. go.id). Our interest in studying the coexistence of Muslims and Hindus in the area began from one of the courses that I teach, *Pesantren* Management, in which we collaborated with the students to conduct participant observations in various *pesantren*s in Indonesia. We found that PBBI was interesting to observe since it is located in the middle of a Hindu majority community. When we first came to the *pesantren*, people living in the surrounding area hardly knew its location.

However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia invited her guests from around the world to the *pesantren*, and called it 'Pesantren Toleransi' (*Pesantren* for Tolerance). We applied a qualitative approach in conducting our investigation. It is argued that a qualitative approach may help researchers understand a social world through the eyes of its participants (Bryman, 2001). In addition, as Denzin and Lincoln (2000) asserted, a qualitative study involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach to study things in their natural settings, and attempts to interpret phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to them.

Data for the study was gathered through semi-structured, in-depth interviews and participant observations as the methods for collecting main data. We also gathered documents related to the *pesantren*, such as its profile and curriculum, and news about it. Participant observations were conducted in March 2018 and January 2019. To carry out each observation, we stayed for one week in the *pesantren*. The interviews were conducted during the observations. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the *Kyai* (Islamic scholar and leader) of the *pesantren*, the headmasters of the *pesantren*'s schools, and some of the teachers, staff and students. The method of semi-structured interview was chosen to allow us stick to the themes developed in the research and at the same time give space for the participants to express themselves and to define and redefine the topics under discussion (Kirk, 2015). The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and then reviewed immediately to determine the themes that emerged from the narratives and determine the technique used for collecting subsequent data. The collected data was then coded and categorized by applying the method of Grounded Theory. Sociological analysis was employed to investigate the coexistence of the *pesantren* within

the Hindu majority community and the interactions between the *pesantren* dan the surrounding community in building social cohesion.

## ISLAMIC EDUCATION AND SOCIAL COHESION IN A BALINESE *PESANTREN*

### ABOUT THE PESANTREN

Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI) was established in Tabanan in 1996. Actually PBBI was the result of the development of Pesantren Yatama, which was established in 1991. The word 'Yatama' comes from the Arabic word '*yatim*', which means 'orphan'. Pesantren Yatama was focused on taking care of and educating Muslim orphans. The *pesantren* was founded following its *Kyai*'s concern about the backwardness of Muslims in Bali, particularly those living in the inland part of Bali. The *pesantren* aimed to educate Muslims and instill Islamic values in young Muslim generations. Following the values, they can live properly in society. Even though the first Muslims of Bali arrived on the island long before the colonial era (Pedersen, 2014; Rieger, 2011), they remain second-class citizens in some aspects, especially in the aspect of provincial government policies.

H. Ketut Imaduddin Djamal (Kyai Ketut Jamal or Kyai Ketut), the founder of the *pesantren*, is a civil servant. He is the Head of the Religious Court in Denpasar. A Balinese Muslim, he has rich experiences of Islamic boarding school education since his young age. He was educated in Pesantren Nahdhatul Wathon in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, for his primary and secondary education before continuing his religious education at Pesantren Asy-Syafi'iyah Jakarta. Kyai Ketut (also called *abah*, which means 'father', in PBBI) is affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama

(NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia (to know further about NU, see Feilard, 1997; Hefner, 1997). He obtained his bachelor's degree in Islamic Law from Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta. During his study at the university, Kyai Ketut Jamal was a member of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) (Muslim Students' Association) (interview with Y; the profile is also available in www.pesantrenbali.com). It is argued that HMI, with its leading figure Nurcholish Majid, provides a 'middle way' in terms of relations between Islam and the state (Effendy, 1995).

Before founding PBBI, Kyai Ketut had considerable experience of managing *pesantren*. In 1988 he founded a *pesantren* named "Pesantren Al-Iman" in Pegayaman. Because the *pesantren* was located in the inland part of Bali, it was hardly developed. However, his reputation as a *Kyai* and a Muslim community leader has led him to teach Islam in various parts of Bali. In the late 1980s he taught the interpretation of Qur'an Shura al-Maun to his Qur'anic recitation group in Denpasar. The Shura tells about the obligation of Muslims to care for orphans and the destitute. Hj. Sofia Dewa Pere, one member of his recitation group, was touched by the meaning of the Shura. She offered her unused house in Tabanan to the *Kyai* and asked him to use it to care for orphans.

Pesantren Yatama was founded in 1991, which was then followed by the legalization of its foundation named La Royba. At the beginning, the *pesantren* had only 9 students and was managed in a very modest condition with limited financial resources. Support from the community, particularly Muslims in the area strengthened the *pesantren*. Solidarity among people with the same identity, such as kinship, country of origin, or religion, remains strong, particularly when they meet and live as a minority group. This is in line with the statement of

Cloete (2014) that religion is the ultimate unity factor in the building of social cohesion. This shows that active civic participation characterizes the existence of social cohesion (Green and Janmaat, 2011).

As the number of the students increased, Pesantren Yatama expanded its buildings into wider areas and widened its scope by transforming itself to be a new pesantren named Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI), which provides Islamic education not only for orphans, but also for general students. From 1994 to 1996, the management of the new *pesantren* expanded the *pesantren*'s  complex by buying land from the Hindu community in Karambitan, Tabanan. The land procurement was not without negotiation. The late Mr. Jumhari, one of Kyai Ketut's fellows, was a Muslim living in the area. He helped Kyai Ketut by helping negotiate with Mr. Sunar, a prominent Hindu figure in the area. It is partly due to the assistance of Mr. Sunar that made the procurement process go smoothly (interview with Y).  Support from a leading and prominent community figure like Mr. Sunar functions as a social capital that supports social cohesion in the community.

In 2018, PBBI educated 409 students in all levels of school education (kindergarten, primary school, junior high school, and senior high school). Most of the students come from Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, and Madura, and some of them come from Java. There are 19 Hindu teachers working in the *pesantren*. Nine of them teach at the junior high school and the rest teach at the senior high school. Those teachers teach non-religious subjects, such as mathematics, chemistry, physics, English, the Indonesian language, arts and cultures, the Balinese language, sports, and multimedia (Observation and interview with Y).

Like the building complexes of other modern *pesantren*s, the building complex of PBBI is surrounded by cement walls, which separate the *pesantren* from the local community in the surrounding village. This separation has resulted in spatial segregation, which in turn has enabled the *pesantren* to develop its own culture. *Pesantren* in Indonesia is a kind of sub culture, and some researchers describe it as a 'little kingdom' because of its relative autonomy to 'organise' its own community (Dhofier, 2011). However, despite such spatial segregation, there is still some flexibility for the interaction between the *pesantren* and the local community. The *pesantren* has a quite large yard where young people from the local community meet together to play sports every afternoon (interview with Y). The security of the PBBI is a Hindu and one of the villagers who usually play volley ball in the *pesantren* yard. When he was asked about the reason that he chose to work at PBBI, he replied that the *pesantren* is like his own home since he has been there since his youth. This argument is supported by Pedersen (2014) that even though people live in separated neighborhood structures, due to some reasons, they may still feel attached to each other. The community of the *pesantren* is spatially separated by cement walls from the local community, but a part of the *pesantren*, i.e. its large yard, provides flexibility for both Hindus and Muslims to exchange and interact with each other.

To some local people who have never visited cities outside Bali, the Muslim students' activities in the boarding schools next to their houses seem strange. At the beginning, sometimes local people came only to observe what was going on in the *pesantren*, what they were doing, why they had built long houses unlike their houses. After a long observation, they became familiar with the activities in the *pesantren* and started developing good interactions with the *pesantren* community (interview with Y). The case is different for local people who

have more experiences of interaction with other communities, other places, or cities in Indonesia. One example is Mr. Sunar's family. Since they have worked in Jakarta, Surabaya and other areas outside Bali, they are familiar with and understand such differences.

PBBI is a modern Islamic boarding school with English and Arabic as the languages for their daily communication. The *pesantren* adopts the curriculum of Pesantren Gontor combined with the curriculum of Pesantren Darun Najah (stated in the profile; interview with Y, Wekke, 2018). Given the reputation of Pesantren Gontor, PBBI intended to become the Pesantren Gontor of Bali, but in its development, the *pesantren* has also collaborated with other *pesantren*s, such as Pesantren Al-Amin (Sumenep, East Java), Pesantren Nurul Jadid (Probolinggo, East Java), Pesantren Nahdhatul Wathan (Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara), Pesantren Al-Imam (Central Java), Pesantren Al-Ikhlas (Taliwang, West Nusa Tenggara), and Pesantren Lirboyo (East Java). This network of *pesantren*s gives evidence to the finding by Zamakhsyari Dhofier (2011).

## THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION

In Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI), the values of tolerance and respect for other differences are inculcated within its formal and informal curriculums. The curriculums are also tailored to local contents, such as the Balinese language, which, in part, aims to preserve the local traditions. The Balinese language is not only taught as a subject, but also practiced during the reading of Kitab Ta'lim Muta'alim, an Islamic classical literature about ethics and moral conduct that have to be practiced by

Muslim students (the book is taught in most of *pesantren*s in Indonesia). In addition, the students also practice public speaking by using the Balinese language.

PBBI emphasizes three core philosophical orientations, namely 1) society and nationalism, 2) intellectuality and ulama studies, and 3) leadership and teaching. All these orientations are reflected in the *pesantren*'s curriculums. PBBI believes that its curriculums are not only about the content taught in the classroom, but also about its integration into all the students' learning processes and activities in the *pesantren* and all the aspects of their daily life, and about the practice of the taught content for 24 hours each day (interview with Y, interview with W, and observation).

In regard to societal and nationalism orientations, values of tolerance, solidarity, and respect for other people and differences are instilled in the students during the teaching and learning processes of the subject of Civic Education and Pancasila in specific and other subjects in general (interviews with Y and W). One Hindu teacher said, "I teach the Indonesian Language. Language teaching is about humanity. Usually I insert the values of tolerance within the stories or themes discussed in the subject." (Interview with W) He also asserted that the students practice ethics and life skills required for living in a broader community throughout their activities in the *pesantren*. He explained that "the rules and code of ethical conduct in the *pesantren* were set to prepare the students to live with other community members." The *pesantren*'s education system adopts the concepts of *pengajaran* (teaching and learning) and *pendidikan* (education). *Pengajaran* pertains to cognitive knowledge which is gained from learning in the classroom, whereas *pendidikan* means all educational processes in the *pesantren* that involve curricular activities and activities of daily living.

Through the educational processes in the *pesantren*, especially through the *pesantren*'s law enforcement, the students unconsciously build their personality, attitudes, and habits. Teachers assigned to be boarding school supervisors usually patrol around the *pesantren* complex to provide guidance to the students and control their conduct. In doing the task, they are assisted by the students' organization committee.

In general, the education in PBBI involve seven areas, namely faith education (aqidah and shari'a); personality and character education (akhlaq); civic, nationalism and human rights; intellectuality / scientific education; arts and vocational skills; sports, health and environmental education; and education related to *pesantren* matters. In line with the three orientations of the *pesantren*, the curriculum is supported by co-curricular and extracurricular activities. The activities are designed to make the students meet and interact with the local community and Balinese culture by utilizing synergy and apply a collaborative approach (Wekke, 2018).

The *pesantren* adopts Balinese traditions and cultures and adapts its curriculums to them, incorporating them into educational and daily activities in the *pesantren*. The development of the *pesantren*'s curriculums that incorporate local elements exemplifies its strategy to retain a harmonious life with the surrounding community. The Balinese traditions and cultures that are taught in the *pesantren* are the Balinese language, Balinese dance, Balinese calligraphy, and Balinese martial arts. PBBI employs Balinese Hindu teachers to teach the Balinese language, among other subjects, to the students. One of the *pesantren*'s activities is public speaking. Every student has to practice public speaking before their friends. In other modern *pesantren*s, the students usually practice public speaking in either English or Arabic.

Some *pesantren*s add a local language, such as Javanese and Sundanese. The local language used in public speaking at PBBI is the Balinese language. One main reason that this local language is used is to respect and preserve Balinese culture, which is the culture of the community in which the teachers and students of the *pesantren* live. The Balinese language is incorporated into a formal subject taught in the classroom.

Another cultural form taught in the *pesantren* is Balinese dance. PBBI is considered as the first *pesantren* in Bali that trains the students to perform Balinese dance. The original dance costumes worn by the students have been modified in such a way that they have some Islamic elements, for example headscarf and long-sleeved dresses, while still having complete Balinese accessories. A teacher of the *pesantren* said:

> *"In 2007, we held a meeting that invited a number of government officials in the region, such as the governor, the regent, and some police officials. In that occasion, PBBI students performed a Balinese dance. The audience was impressed and said, "This is the first time that an Islamic institution is willing to perform a traditional dance." As a result, they gave more respect to the pesantren."*

In another occasion, a Balinese dance trainer was very thankful to the *pesantren* because it has contributed to preservation of Balinese culture and happily offered herself to teach Balinese dance at the *pesantren*. Preserving Balinese dance means maintaining Balinese traditions, and, to Balinese people, traditions and religion are two inseparable identities of Balinese Hindu (Picard, 2009). While the coming of Islam and Christianity in Bali has been considered a threat for Balinese traditions, the effort of PBBI to preserve Balinese dance

is respected. The dance is taught as an extracurricular activity, mostly followed by female students. The initiative has then been followed by other Islamic institutions in Bali.

Local culture is the glue that holds the different elements of a society together in a harmonious life. To strengthen such social glue, PBBI also nurtures Balinese martial art, *pencak silat*, by inviting a Hindu teacher to teach it to the students. *Pencak silat*, which was originally created by people in Nusantara islands, has been developed by incorporating some different local characteristics into it. The Indonesian martial art is different from that of Malaysia, Thailand and other neighboring countries. In Indonesia, there is a considerable number of streams of *pencak silat*, e.g. Silat Cimande, Kera sakti, Pagar Nusa (developed by Nahdlatul Ulama), Tapak Suci (developed by Muhammadiyah), Persinas Asad, and Setia Hati. Most regions in Indonesia, such as Madura, Aceh, West Java, East Java, Bali, have also developed their own stream of silat. At first, *pencak silat* was (and is still) based on the philosophy of *budi pekerti luhur* (noble character) used to help realize religious goals and nurture the morality of the society. *Pencak silat* it is also utilized as self-defense. In its development, *pencak silat* became a sport branch (Kriswanto, 2015).

In Bali, one of the streams of martial art is Bhakti Negara. Bhakti Negara combines arts, sports, dance, and self-defence techniques (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1985: 29). PBBI teaches arts to the students and its *Kyai* believes that teaching the martial art of Bhakti Negara in the *pesantren* will strengthen social cohesion because it is a kind of 'cultural glue'. Teaching the martial art is 'cultural glue' because the teacher is non-Muslim and it is a manifestation of cultural heritage preservation. The *Kyai* explained:

*"Why may silat Bhakti Negara become cultural glue? Because it is an original product of Bali, a wisdom from here. It has been acknowledged internationally. If we have to choose between two options, local wisdom or a foreign product … and then if we choose a foreign product, it will result in hostility. On the other hand, if we choose a local product, it will become a social tie. Indonesia has many streams of pencak silat, including Tapak Suci, developed by Muhammadiyah, but such streams of pencak silat will not interest Balinese people, particularly Hindus. We chose Bhakti Negara because it is taught and practiced by many Balinese people here. I chose a Hindu to be the teacher of Bhakti Negara in the pesantren because I thought that he would become social glue. I hope that, by interacting with him, my students will get a positive impression about him, who is a Hindu, and, therefore, develop respect for him, and other people with a different religion."*

Besides learning Balinese dance and martial art, a student of the *pesantren* is able to marry Arabic calligraphy with Balinese calligraphy. He even won Balinese Calligraphy Olympics. After that, a number of his neighbors asked him to teach them calligraphy (interview with Y).

In general, the orientation of modern *pesantren* cannot be separated from the educational system in Indonesia. Islamic education started a long time before the colonial era through Qur'anic teaching and *pesantren*. After the European education system was introduced, some *pesantren*s were developed to become madrasah which taught only religious knowledge, and some others adopted the European system and developed schools that taught secular knowledge (Steenbrink, 1974). A *pesantren* as an Islamic education provider plays three roles.

Firstly, a *pesantren* plays the role of a school as a public organization which must obey the laws, not only laws on national education system, but also laws on child protection, religious preaching, and other related matters. Secondly, a *pesantren* plays role of an agent of missionary. Thirdly, a *pesantren* plays the role of a social organization that is bound by the socio-cultural context and the community's religions. As a social organization, a *pesantren* has to maintain social harmony and provide services for all society members (Mu'ti and Riza Ulhaq, 2009).

In this study, PBBI is considered as building social cohesion by providing a kind of 'capital' for the students and playing its role as a social organization that promotes activities and initiatives to maintain harmony and social cohesion. Regarding the second role, PBBI develops a number of initiatives to situate its existence within the Hindu majority community in Bali.

## SITUATING A PESANTREN WITHIN THE HINDU MAJORITY COMMUNITY IN BALI

As a societal institution that is committed to maintaining peaceful relations with the Hindu majority community in Bali, Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI) has initiated a number of programs and activities. Borrowing the theory of social cohesion developed by Fonseca et al. (2018), the analysis of this study is focused on three different but intertwined levels of social cohesion, namely community, individual, and institutional levels. Social cohesion can be achieved through the dynamic interaction among the three different levels.

## SOCIAL COHESION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

PBBI strongly holds the principle of reciprocity to maintain good relations with the Hindu majority community in Bali to contribute to the building of a cohesive community. A harmonious life and social cohesion at this level can be achieved through the principle of reciprocity (*mubadalah*). *Mubadalah* is a principle in Islam that emphasizes the strengthening of the relationship between two different parties by promoting partnerships, cooperation, mutual relationships, and reciprocal activities (Abdul Kodir, 2019). The interviewed Hindu respondents also emphasized the importance of this principle in that the community can accept the development of the *pesantren* in its area, yet hopes that "*nak Jawa*" should contribute to maintaining harmony and that the *pesantren* and Hindu communities should respect each other (interview with W). Another factor that strengthens social harmony and assists the development of *pesantren* in Bali is the nature of Hinduism. Unlike Islam, Christianity and Catholics whose adherents have a mission to spread their religion, Hinduism is regarded as a non-missionary religion. Hinduism tends to stress more on personal piety. Because of this, the establishment of the *pesantren* did not disturb their rituals and traditions. The *pesantren* and Hindu communities have benefited from such nature of Hinduism (interview with K).

Charitable activities are also carried out to develop social cohesion with the surrounding community. During Eid al-Adha, Muslims are required to conduct prayer and those who have wealth are commanded to sacrifice before God by slaughtering cattle like cow or goat to symbolize their pure obedience to God. The meat from the cattle was given to the poor and all people considered as recipients of zakat (alms). PBBI usually gives the meat not only to Muslims but also to

Hindus living around the *pesantren*. To some Hindu people who do not eat cow meat, the *pesantren* gives them goat meat. Solidarity and understanding for each other will contribute to the building of social cohesion among society members.

At this level, the environment and societal culture of a community contribute to the attainment of a cohesive society. Situating a *pesantren* within the Hindu Balinese community must be done carefully and gradually, and by fully respecting the local community, even though the dynamic nature of the efforts cannot be underestimated. Hindus and Muslims in Bali have a long history of peaceful relations. Some Muslims who came mostly from Lombok were brought as slaves to Karangasem village in the eastern part of Bali. They were among the first Muslims in Bali. They were employed in *griya* (priestly houses) (Pedersen, 2014: 188), which are parts of *Brahmana* (Brahmin) compounds. The *Brahmana* in the area "continue to assert that the distinction between castes is more significant than that between Hindus and Muslims." (Pedersen, 2014). In addition, both Hindus and Muslims consider themselves as "people of religion", and many of them stress more on the similarity between their religion. One of Hindu teachers in the *pesantren* stated that religions are like clothes, saying, "we don't need to stress on the clothes that we wear, because the essence of all religions is to promote goodness." (Interview with W) Furthermore, he remembered that both Muslims (regarded as *Nak Jawa*) and Hindus come from the same ancestors living in Java, so both should remember their history to retain harmony. This argument is supported by the statement of Pedersen (2014) that one key factor for the peaceful relation between the *pesantren* and the Hindu majority community is their historical memory of the 'good connection' between Muslims and Hindus in the area, which is influential in the negotiation of their contemporary relationships (Pedersen, 2014: 197-198).

PBBI is not only concerned about the wellbeing of the Islamic community members or people involved in the institution, but also shared economic resources with the surrounding community. Since 2008, the *pesantren* has received support from the Directorate General of Animal Husbandry and Animal Health, the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia, to assist the development of the people's economy through two programs: (1) cow husbandry, and (2) cow fattening. The *pesantren* has received 40 cows for each program. The *Kyai* informed the programs to the community members and they were enthusiastic about the programs. Therefore, the cows were distributed to the group of people willing to fatten the cows and the group of people willing to breed the cows.

The coordinator for the programs is from the Hindu community. She is a daughter of a prominent figure in the community and graduated from the Faculty of Animal Husbandry, Udayana University. She agreed to manage the programs and has organized them with the system of profit sharing (interviews with Y and K). The *Kyai* have chosen this strategy that involves the surrounding community in order that the *pesantren* community can build good relations with it. Inclusive approach in social and economic interactions is essential in building trust and social capital.

## SOCIAL COHESION AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

At the individual level, the motivation of people to participate in a tolerant and harmonious life, and their perception of norms assist them to take part in maintaining cohesion. Comfortable feeling and the absence of discrimination encourage individuals within a community to actively contribute to the building of social cohesion. To build social cohesion, PBBI, which is also known as

'*Pondok Toleransi*' (Islamic Boarding School for Tolerance), has recruited Hindu teachers to participate in educating the Muslim students. In total, there are 19 Hindu teachers working in the *pesantren*'s schools. Nine of them teach at the *pesantren*'s junior high school and ten of them teach at the senior high school. They teach non-religious subjects, including mathematics, chemistry, physics, English, the Indonesian language, arts and cultures, the Balinese language, sports, and multimedia. Some of them were recruited after they were asked to teach at the *pesantren* because they are friends of the *Kyai*, and the others were recruited after they applied to teach at the *pesantren* due to some practical reasons. Some of them have been working at the *pesantren* for more than ten years. Two of them have been working there for 14 and 18 years respectively. They keep teaching in the *pesantren* because they feel that the working environment is excellent and comfortable, all the staff including the Muslims and the students welcome them warmly, and there is no discrimination. A teacher narrated:

> *"I chose to teach at the pesantren by myself. At that time, I was a student of a university near here, majoring in economics education. While still studying at the university, I applied to teach at this school, and until now I am still here. I enjoy working here, I feel comfortable […] one of my friends offered me to teach at another school in Denpasar. I was offered 12 teaching hours, but I chose to keep working here. I know the people here and working environment in this school, and I feel comfortable."*

A sense of belonging, feeling at home, the nice environment, and the great working team make the teachers feel comfortable to work at the *pesantren*. One of the important factors for

the building of social cohesion is a sense of belonging, which is followed by the existence of interpersonal trust and institutional trust (Green & Janmaat, 2011).

In line with the statement of Fonseca (2018), the desire to belong to PBBI has contributed to the decision of those Hindu teachers to keep working in the *pesantren*, actively participate in educational activities, and do their best to teach the students. Feeling at home resulting from the mutual and social interaction has also contributed to their decision to keep working in the *pesantren*.

Another factor that strengthens social cohesion is the absence of religious discrimination. The students in the boarding schools respect their Hindu teachers at the same degree as they respect their Muslim teachers. A teacher said:

> *"When the pesantren students meet me on the street or other places, they always come closer, greet me, and shake and kiss my hand to show their respect for me, just like what they do when they meet the other teachers. This is not the case with students of public schools, who only bow their heads and greet when they meet their teachers."*

The teachers like the *pesantren* environment and the students' attitude. Feeling comfortable, respected, and liked promotes positive attitudes among individuals in an institution (Fonseca, 2018). One of the roles of PBBI is equipping the students with knowledge and skills required for their future life, while the intense harmonious interaction with the non-Muslim teachers has provided them with an actual example of how to live in a larger community later on and how to build a cohesive community.

## SOCIAL COHESION AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

At the institutional level, actors within an institution make decisions to retain social harmony. They respect human rights, and the norms within the institution support the environment for social cohesion. PBBI has made a policy that encourages the students to live a harmonious life with other people and avoid conflict with the Hindu community. After the Bali bombings in 2002, the students started to be banned from wearing sarong when they are outside the *pesantren* complex, because it may trigger conflict. One student said that they ever went outside the *pesantren* complex wearing sarong, and then some people called them Amrozi (one of the Bali bombers). Since then, sarong has been worn only within the *pesantren* complex. Furthermore, the *pesantren* does not use any external speaker for *adzan* (the Islamic call to prayer) to prevent disturbing the local community, although in other areas like Karangasem, *adzan* for the five daily prayers is still performed by using load speakers from mosques, and so far this has not resulted in any tension with the Hindu majority community (Pedersen, 2014). Preventing conflict, in many contexts, is the best way to maintain good relationships with other communities.

At a glance, the *pesantren*'s policies regarding adzan and sarong can be seen as survival strategies taken as a minority. However, these strategies have been taken to retain social harmony, respecting other believers in the surrounding village. Before, the *pesantren* had used external speakers for performing *adzan*, and the people in the surrounding area had not had any objection to the noise. Even to a local Hindu ragpicker, the *adzan* became a reminder for him to start picking up used items in the *pesantren* complex (interview with Y).

However, the external speakers of the *pesantren* then were not used, and since then the *pesantren* has used only its internal speakers for performing *adzan* to respect the local community.

The *pesantren* has initiated trust to build cohesion with the Hindu community. The initiated trust has resulted in solidarity. Trust and solidarity have been developed through dialogical processes and intertwined to each other. According to the *Kyai* of PBBI, there are two principles in Islam that he applies to maintain social cohesion with the surrounding community. He made an analogy by using the phrase "lips and teeth" to illustrate that soft and hard approaches are needed to implement Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin*. The principle of peaceful Islam is taken from the Islamic teaching that commands Muslims to pay back negative attitudes with good deeds. However, if people use a despotic approach against Islam and the *pesantren*, as a Muslim, he will fight against them. However, he highlighted that harmony and cohesiveness in the society should be maintained with wisdom. He further asserted:

> "*Sincerity is required to demonstrate that Islam is rahmatan lil alamin. We are sincere about this. Back to the era of the prophet, he developed a community, which resulted in Piagam Madinah (Madina Charter). This charter is truly about tolerance, pluralism. There have been historical records of what the prophet did and said, but I wonder why many people have found it difficult to implement in the real life. In fact, if we focus on similarities, we will see a beautiful life, yet if we focus on differences, problems will arise … […] … If religious differences in this community are not managed in a good manner, frictions may occur, so the differences need to be approached with wisdom. The concept from Islam that is suitable for dealing with such differences is required here.*"

In the context of PBBI, trust is also built indirectly from the social and spiritual activities of and in the Islamic boarding schools. Those activities form social and spiritual capitals to help build a cohesive community. The *Kyai* dan teachers of PBBI are highly sociable and friendly to all the community members. Whenever they are informed that someone from the surrounding community is sick, they quickly visit the sick person and pray for them. Other social activities they do include visiting the family of a deceased person, attending community meetings in *Banjar*s (administrative areas below village), and socializing with people from the local community in coffee stalls located in the surrounding area. These activities promote respect, connection, and trust, which together become the basis for social cohesion (Green & Janmaat, 2011).

The *pesantren*'s spiritual milieu is trusted by the leaders of the local Hindu community for its ability to spiritually cure diseases. The Hindu people living in the surrounding area believe in spiritual medication. They often come to the *Pengulu* (Hindu religious leaders) to ask for medication. Sometimes, the *Pengulu* give them water or other media to cure the sick person. PBBI is believed to have a spiritual milieu that can heal some illnesses. Sometimes some Hindus come to the *pesantren* to ask for water for medication. Even though such medication is scientifically questionable, it is believed by the people, so that the *pesantren* has gained trust and respect from them. A teacher of the *pesantren* recalled an event:

> "One day, some Hindu people came to the pesantren to ask for tirta (pure/holy water). They said that a Pengulu suggested them to come to the pesantren to be cured. We didn't have holy water, but considering their belief, I took some water for ablution near the mosque, recited a prayer, and gave the to them. Fortunately, they got well after

> *drinking the water, and eventually since then more and more people have come here to ask for water."*

The fact shows that the spiritual capital of the *pesantren* has also contributed to the building of social cohesion.

The good social relations between the *Kyai* and teachers of the *pesantren* and the surrounding community have resulted in a good network and have made the *pesantren* gain trust from the community. All this has made members of the local community assist the *pesantren* on their own initiative. At the beginning, the *pesantren* did not have any school, so its students were sent to study at public schools outside the *pesantren*. Knowing the situation, the headmaster of a state junior high school in Denpasar offered the *Kyai* his help to open a school in the *pesantren*. The headmaster, who has a kinship with one of the founders of the *pesantren*, Hj. Sofia Dewa Pere, assisted the newly founded school by sending some of his school teachers to teach there. Today, the school has developed to be junior and senior high schools with around 400 students. It can be seen that networks and trust have facilitated the cooperation for mutual benefit between the *pesantren* and the surrounding Hindu community, and kinship is one of the factors that have contributed to the building of social cohesion, which is in line with the argumentation by Chidester et al. (2003).

Social and cultural interactions, and daily practices also help the *pesantren*'s community strengthen social cohesion. One teacher of the *pesantren* told about his experience of sharing with his Hindu friend about a good manner that needs to be considered before conducting a prayer. He told about the way Muslims perform their prayers and contextualize it into his Hindu friend's way of worship. He further explained:

*"One of my friends, a Hindu, experienced a bad trance during his worship. He uttered bad words unconsciously during his trance. After he gained consciousness, I told him, "You experienced a bad trance because you had not cleaned yourself before performing worship." He replied that it was true. Then I suggested him to clean his body and soul before performing worship and sit in a good manner before the God. Following my suggestions, he experienced a very good trance. All three days long, he advised many good things during his trance. After he gained consciousness, his neighbors and pengulu asked him how he could do that. He replied that he followed the suggestion given by a nak Jawa (a Muslim). After that, so many people from his kampong came to me to ask for advice."*

To the Balinese people, trance or spiritual possession proves the presence of supernatural power, and has the potential to purify their soul, prevent destruction, and ward off witchcraft (Hornbacher, 2009). The spiritual being which possess a human body can be either dewa or kalla. Dewa (god) can enter a human body only if it is spiritually pure (Hornbacher, 2009). Because of this, someone's being possessed by dewa makes other people curious and want to experience the same. The interesting thing here is the ability of the pesantren community to tailor Islamic traditions to Hindu practices without changing other religious beliefs and practices, but by strengthening them.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Pesantren Bali Bina Insani (PBBI) as an Islamic education institution is by no means the largest contributor to the building of social cohesion in the Hindu majority community in Bali. However, it continuously negotiates with the local community to maintain its coexistence.

As a Muslim living in the Muslim majority community in Java, I particularly learn that contributing to social cohesion, to a *pesantren* or perhaps a Muslim community as a minority group, may face many challenges, because it has to struggle to co-exist within a larger community and it must instill tolerance values, respect other differences, and retain harmony in the society, which are sometimes mixed together interchangeably and continuously negotiated. PBBI is a unique institution in that it has its own sub-culture, but because Muslims are a minority group in the Hindu majority community in Bali, the *pesantren*'s experiences and strategies to maintain peaceful relations with the surrounding community can be learned by other educational institutions in similar contexts. In the context of PBBI, as a provider of education, social cohesion values are inculcated within curricular, co-curricular, and extra-curricular contents and activities to prepare the students to live a civic live as part of a larger community. Meanwhile, as a societal organization, the *pesantren*'s contribution to the building of social cohesion necessitates an active role of the leader and teachers to cooperate with and involve the local Hindu community in the educational process, so that the students can interact and meet with other people with different cultures and religions. A cohesive environment can be built when the individual, institutional and community levels of existence interact with and support each other to maintain peace and harmony. The roles of an Islamic education institution within this constellation are to help the students develop their social capital, to equip them with knowledge and skills required for their social participation as a society member, and to initiate social activities in its capacity as a public institution. The limitation of this study lies in the lack of information from the Hindu people living in the surrounding village regarding

the existence of the *pesantren* in their area. Further research is needed to investigate more deeply the Hindus' perspectives of the existence of *pesantren* in Bali to gain a more complete picture about Islamic education and social cohesion in Bali.

# REFERENCES

Abbas, M., (2012), "Indonesia is model Muslims-Cameron," taken from https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-indonesia-britain-islam-idUKBRE83A1HP20120411. Accessed on January 20, 2019.

Abdul Kodir, F., (2019). *Qira'ah Mubadalah Tafsir Progresif untuk Keadilan Gender dalam Islam,* Yogyakarta: Ircisod.

Adawiyah, R., Jamaluddin Z, W., (2016). "Rekayas pendidikan Islam di daerah minoritas muslim," *Tadris: Jurnal Keguruan dan Ilmu Tarbiyah*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 119-133.

Azca, M. N., Salim, H., Arrobi, M.Z., Asyhari,B., Usman, A., (2019). *Dua Menyemai Damai Peran dan Kontribusi Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama dalam Perdamaian dan Demokrasi,* Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Keamanan dan Perdamaian Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Bertrand, J., (2004). *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bryman, A., (2001). *Social Research Methods,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budiwiranto, B., (2009). "Pesantren and participatory development the case of the Pesantren Maslakul Huda of Kajen, Pati, Central Java," *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Vol. Vol.3, No.2, pp. 267-296.

Chidester, D., Dexter, P. & James, W., (2003). *What holds us together: social cohesion in South Africa*, Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Cloete, A., (2014), "Social cohesion and social capital: possible implications for the common good," *Verbum et Ecclesia*, vol. 33. no. 2.

Denzin, N.K., and Lincoln, Y.S. (ed), (2000). *Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edition,* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, (1985). *Pencak silat daerah Bali*, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah (Indonesia), www.book.google.co.id. accessed on January 10, 2019.

Dhofier, Z., (2011). *Tradisi Pesantren Studi Pandangan Hidup Kyai dan Visinya Mengenai Masa Depan Indonesia,* Jakarta: LP3ES.

Effendy, B., (1995). "Islam and the state in Indonesia: Munawir Syadzali and the development of a new theological underpinning of political Islam," *Studia Islamika,* Vol 2, No 2, pp. 97-121.

Evers, A., Ewert, B., & Brandsen, T. (eds.), (2014). *Social innovations for social cohesion, transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities*, Nijmegen: LIEGE.

Feillard, A., (1997). "Traditionalist Islam and the state in Indonesia: the road to legitimacy and renewal," in Hefner, R.W and Horavitch, P.,( eds.) *Islam in an era of nation state: politics and religious renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia.* Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, pp. 129-153.

Fonseca, X., Lukosch, S. & Brazier, F., (2018). "Social cohesion revisited: a new definition and how to characterize it," *Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science Research*, DOI: 10.1080/13511610.2018.1497480.

Fontana, G., (2015). "Religious education after conflicts: promoting social cohesion or entrenching existing cleavages?." *Compare: a Journal of Comparative and International Education*, DOI: 10.1080/03057925.2015.1099422.

Forrest, R. & Kearns, A., (2001). "Social cohesion, social capital and the neighborhood," *Urban Studies*, vol. 38, no. 12, pp. 2125-2143.

Green, A. & Janmaat, J.G., (2011). *Regimes of social cohesion: societies and the crisis of globalization*, New York: Plagrave Macmillan.

Green, A., et al. (2001). "Education and social cohesion: recentering and debate, *Peabody Journal of Education,* vol 76, no 3-4, pp. 274-284.

Green, A., Preston, J. & Sabates, R., (2003). "Education, equality and social cohesion: a distributional approach," *Campar*, vol. 33, no. 4.

Hauser-Schaublin, B. and Harnish, D., D. (Eds.), (2014). "Negotiating religious identities within majority-minority relationship in Bali and Lombo." In Hauser-Schaublin, B. and Harnish, D., D. (Eds.), *Between Harmony and Discrimination Negotiating Religious Identities within Majority-Minority Relationship in Bali and Lombok,* Leiden: Brill. Pp. 2-31.

Hefner, R.W., (1997). "Islamization and democratization in Indonesia." in Hefner, R.W and Horavitch, P.,( eds.) *Islam in an era of nation state: politics and religious renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia.* Honolulu: Hawaii University Press. Pp. 75-127.

Heyneman, S.P., (2005). "Organizations and social cohesion," *Peabody Journal of Education*, vol. 80, no. 4, pp.1-7.

Hornbacher, A., (2009). "The withdrawal of the gods remarks on ritual trance-possession and its decline in Bali," in Picard, M. and Madinier, R. (eds.), *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali,* London: Routledge, pp. 167-191.

Hwang, J. C., (2008). "Education and social cohesion in Malaysia and Indonesia." in Turner, B.S. (ed.), *Religious Diversity and Civil Society a Comparative Analysis.* Oxford: The Bradwell Press.

Jenson, J., (1998). *Mapping social cohesion: the state of Canadian research*, Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Network Inc.

Khan, Z. N., (2016). "Role of education in building social cohesion," *International Journal of Secondary Education*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 23-26.

Kirk, W. F., (2015). 'Reaching the top of ivory tower: exploring the leadership journey of women in UK higher education', PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, viewed 26 October 2018, <http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/6770/>.

Kriswanto, E.S., (2015). *Pencak silat*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Baru Press.

Loader, R. & Hughes, J., (2016). "Balancing cultural diversity and social cohesion in Education: the potential of shared education in divided contexts," *British Journal of Educational Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/0071005.2016.1254156.

Makbuloh, D., (2012). "Kultur minoritas dalam perspektif pendidikan Islam," *Analisis*, vol. 12, no. 1.

Mu'ti, A., and Riza ul Haq, F., (2009). *Kristen Muhammadiyah Konvergensi Muslim dan Kristen dalam Pendidikan,* Jakarta: Al Wasat Publishing House.

Mujani, S., (2003). "Religious democrats: democratic culture and muslim political participation in post-Soeharto Indonesia." Dissertation, Ohio State University.

Mustari, M., (2013). "The role of the institution of pesantren in the development of rural society: a study in Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, West Java, Indonesia," *International Journal of Nusantara Islam*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-35.

Nordholt, H.S. and Van Klinken, G., (2007). *Renegotiating Boundaries, Local Politics in Post-Soeharto Indonesia.* Leiden: KITLV.

Order, E., (2005). "The social cohesion role of organizations: primary and secondary schools," *Peabody Journal of Education*, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 78-88.

Pedersen, L., (2014). "Keeping the peace: interdependence and narratives of tolerance in Hindu-Muslims relationship in eastern Bali," in Hauser-Schaublin, B. and Harnish, D., D. (Eds.), *Between Harmony and Discrimination Negotiating Religious Identities within Majority-Minority Relationship in Bali and Lombok,* Leiden: Brill, pp. 165-196.

Picard, M., (2009). "From agama Hindu Bali to agama Hindu and Back: toward a relocalization of the Balinese religion?, in Picard, M. and Madinier, R. (eds.), *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali,* London: Routledge, pp. 117-141.

PPIM, "Survey PPIM 2018: Menyibak Intoleransi dan Radikalisme Guru" accessed on January 31, 2019 from https://ppim.uinjkt.ac.id/category/2/post/survei-ppim-2018:-menyibak-intoleransi-dan-radikalisme-guru.

Putnam, R., (2005). "Education, diversity, social cohesion and social capital." *Meeting of OECD Education Ministers: Raising the Quality of Learning for All.* Dublin. 18-19 March.

Rieger, M., (2014). "We are one unit: configurations of ciitizenships in a historical Hindu-Muslim Balinese setting," Hauser-Schaublin, B. and Harnish, D., D. (Eds.), *Between Harmony and Discrimination Negotiating Religious Identities within Majority-Minority Relationship in Bali and Lombok,* Leiden: Brill. Pp. 197-220.

Steenbrink, K. A., (1991). *Pesantren Madrasah Sekolah Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Modern*, Jakarta: LP3ES

Storving, K., (2012). "the cultural prerequisites of social cohesion: with special attention to the nation of Denmark," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, vol. 32, no. 3/4, pp. 134-152.

Suaedy, A., (2018). *Islam, minorities and identity in Southeast Asia*, Yogyakarta: INKLUSIF and ISAIs.

Suwindia, I.G., Machasin, and Parimartha, I.G., (2012). "Relasi Islam dan Hindu dalam perspektif masyarakat multikultur di Bali studi kasus tiga daerah: Denpasar, Karangasem, dan Buleleng," *Jurnal Forum Ilmu Sosial,* Vol 39, No 1, pp. 97-118.

Tamatea, L., (2011). "Ajeg Bali discourse: globalization, fear and othering- online." *Asian Ethnicity,* Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 155-177.

Vasiliki, K., (2011). "The relation of education to social cohesion," *Social Cohesion and Development,* vol 6, no 1, pp.37-50.

Wekke, I. S., (2018). "Pembelajaran Bahasa Arab di masyarakat minoritas muslim Bali," *Sosio Humanika Jurnal Pendidikan Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan,* Vol 11, No 1, pp. 79-96.

Wekke, I.S., (2015). "Curriculum development in madrasa: exploration from Muslim minority of West Papua," *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, vol.1, no.3.

Wekke, I.S., Siddin, Kasop, I., (2017). "Pesantren, madrasah, sekolah dan panti asuhan: potret lembaga pendidikan Islam minoritas muslim," *Jurnal Ilmu Tarbiyah At-Tajdid*, vol. 6, no. 1.

CHAPTER 8

# YOUTH IN POST-CONFLICT INDONESIA: THE EMERGENCE OF YOUTH PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN POST-CONFLICT AMBON AND POSO

*M. Najib Azca and Moh Zaki Arrobi*

## INTRODUCTION

The study attempts to discuss the roles of youth in communal conflict and peacebuilding initiatives in the post-conflict areas of Ambon and Poso, Indonesia. The research departs from two interrelated questions, namely (i) what the roles of youth during the communal conflict and peacebuilding process in Ambon and Poso are, and (ii) how young people have engaged in peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict Ambon and Poso. The study aims to address these two critical questions throughout the paper.

As the regions where bloody conflict occurred during the communal war, Ambon and Poso have suffered prolonged and protracted conflict. During the time of war, the youth in the regions were victims as well as perpetrators of violence. They were involved in the conflict since the conflict erupted. Youth brawls were the main triggers of the conflict in both cities.

Several factors contributed to the involvement of youth in the violent conflicts, such as high rate unemployment, identity crisis, and chaotic transitional period.

After the communal conflicts ended, several peace initiatives, including grassroots movements, emerged in Ambon and Poso. Some of the leading actors within the grassroots peacebuilding initiatives in Ambon and Poso are young people. In both cities, young people have been actively engaged in various activities to promote peace, reconciliation, and cross-cutting interaction. They have also become important actors in countering and defusing violent narratives and provocations that remain to exist and circulate in the post-conflict cities. Rumah Katu in Poso and Peace Provocateur in Ambon have been behind such interesting phenomena.

Although the emergence of youth-based peace initiatives in post-conflict Ambon and Poso has marked such a positive development, the phenomenon is still understudied. The role and potential of youth agency in peacebuilding are frequently underestimated by scholars (Felice & Wisler, 2007). This tendency to overlook the role of youth in peacebuilding is also reflected within the scholarly debates on the communal conflict and peacebuilding in Indonesia. The existing studies on the communal conflict in Ambon and Poso have been dominated by the study on the root causes of communal conflict and its subsequent post-conflict violence manifested in terrorism in Poso and sporadic violence in Ambon.

The above studies have successfully identified the root causes of communal conflict in Ambon and Poso, such as political-economic competition between migrant and indigenous communities, the legacy of authoritarianism from Suharto's new order, the history of Muslim-Christian rivalry, and the partisan role of security forces especially military and

police that created a prolonged conflict (Azca, 2006; Bertrand, 2004; Klinken, 2007; Qurtuby, 2015; Rae, 2013; Sidel, 2006; Trijono, 2004). Meanwhile, studies on peace initiatives in the Moluccas and Poso have been predominantly occupied by the accentuation of cultural dimensions, such as religions, *Adat*, customs, women, or religions in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Bracuhler, 2015; Brauchler, 2009, 2014; Muluk & Malik, 2009; Qurtuby, 2013; Sarapung & Ven, 2016; Trihartono & Viartasiwi, 2015).

While the roles of religions, *Adat* or culture, and women in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes have been widely acknowledged by scholars, the role of youth in peacebuilding has been rarely seen as equally important as those three actors. This lack of recognition over the role of youth in peacebuilding may be due to the fact that too often young people are portrayed either as the perpetrators or victims of violence during the communal war while their positive role in post-conflict contexts largely remains overlooked. The study attempts to fill such a lacuna by focusing on two youth-led peace movements, namely Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur in post-conflict Poso and Ambon respectively. Such a study will complement previous studies on grassroots peace initiatives by bringing back the youth into peacebuilding debates.

As argued by Johan Galtung (2006), youth have a unique potential to be creative and idealistic since they are often more open-minded than adults. Given these advantages, young people are more likely to take the initiative and change the established condition rather than adults, who are usually pro-status quo. Del Felice and Wisler (2007) have also demonstrated that young people are not only the victims and perpetrators of violence as widely reported by media, but also the peacebuilders and peacemakers throughout historical moments in the world.

This argument is supported by Cursi and Marzo (2017) who contend that young people are always in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, young people might be easily mobilized to participate in conflict and violent actions, especially in those contexts with high unemployment rates and post-conflict situations. On the other hand, they are regarded as having specific qualities and features that are particularly conducive to peacebuilding. Therefore, it is worth to consider youth as distinct actors in both conflict and peacebuilding.

Against this backdrop, the paper attempts to bring back youth in the contemporary debates on communal conflict and peacebuilding. Starting with the introduction and methodological section, the paper then moves to the brief background of the communal wars in the two cities of Ambon and Poso. It continues with a delineation of the emergence of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives in both cities. Then, the paper presents its main argument that both Peace Provocateur in Ambon and Rumah Katu in Poso have facilitated young people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds to interact with each other and make meaningful cooperations mostly by utilizing artistic and creative methods. The paper concludes with a reflection on both the achievements and limitations of Peace Provocateur and Rumah Katu in promoting and sustaining peace in both cities.

The paper is based on fieldwork and desk study research. Fieldwork research was done in Poso in 2018 and 2019, while in Ambon, fieldwork was conducted in 2013. Several in-depth interviews were also conducted in Ambon through the help of our research assistant in 2019. The data was gained through in-depth interviews and observations on several key and relevant actors in Ambon and Poso, such as the activists of Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur, peace activists,

local government representatives, religious leaders, and mass organization representatives. Meanwhile, a desk study was conducted by collecting and analyzing documents and writings in media that are relevant for the study.

We chose two youth-led peace initiatives, Rumah Katu in Poso and Peace Provocateur in Ambon, to illustratre how young people are actively engaged in peacebuilding. Of course, there are several other youth-led organizations that have emerged in Ambon and Poso in the post-conflict period, but we decided to take Peace Provocateur and Rumah Katu as our case studies. Our choice of these two organizations is based on two main arguments. First, these two organizations have been dominated by young people who use creative methods in their campaigns for peace and reconciliation at the local level. Second, both organizations represent grassroots peace movements which are not directly supported by the state. Therefore, it can be said that the two organizations are non-state peace initiatives in a post-conflict area. By focusing on these two organizations, we have a possibility to look at the experience of young people who are actively engaged in non-state peace initiatives in post-conflict Ambon and Poso.

## BACKGROUND OF THE COMMUNAL WARS IN AMBON AND POSO

A protracted religious communal violence unfolded in two areas of eastern Indonesia, namely Ambon, the capital city of Maluku province, and Poso, a small town in Central Sulawesi, soon after the political reform occurred in May 1998. The violence began slightly earlier in Poso in the christmas season of 1998 and was followed with a quite similar incident in Ambon on 19 January 1999 in coincidence with the Eid Al-Fitr festival for local Muslims. Both conflicts ended through

a peace agreement named the Malino I Peace Accord for Poso signed by the warring parties in November 2001 and the Malino II Peace Accord for Maluku in February 2002.

Ambon has long been applauded as a 'plural society' due to its heterogeneous and plural society as reflected in its demographic composition. In 1998 before the communal war erupted, the population in Ambon was 314,417, consisting of 53.6% Protestants, 5.25% Catholics, and 40.99% Muslims, while the ethnic composition in Ambon was 39.04% Ambonese, 12.99% Saparuanese, 7.08% Butonese, 4.03% Seramnese, and 3.06% Javanese (Panggabean, 2018, p. 126). The different ethnic and religious communities lived relatively harmoniously in Ambon in the past. (Tanamal & Trijono, 2004, pp. 232–233).

The relatively peaceful condition was suddenly broken by the eruption of a violent communal conflict during 1999-2004, initially sparked by youth brawls between Muslims and Christians in the border area of Batumerah and Mardika villages. The conflict then escalated into a bigger communal war between Muslim and Christian communities after the burning of mosques and churches (Tanamal & Trijono, 2004, p. 239). Thousands of Ambonese were killed while hundreds of thousands of them were displaced, not to mention material costs such as burned houses and the damage to public facilities. Klinken (2007) notes that Ambon's communal conflict is the most shocking violence seen in Indonesia since the anti-communist pogroms of 1965/66.

There are several underpinning factors of Ambon's communal war. Scholars have identified a number of underlying factors for the outbreak of violence in Ambon, which will be summarized below. Some argue that the underlying factor for the communal conflict is a political and economic struggle between the Muslim and Christian communities (see Klinken,

2007; Sidel, 2006; Trijono, 2004). The struggle was related to the contestation over the bureaucratic positions of the local state in Ambon. Historically, such positions were occupied by the Christian Ambonese since they were the most educated citizens thanks to the colonial education that they enjoyed. However, the situation has changed since the demographic shift as Muslim migrated to this region during 1970s-1990s. (Tanamal & Trijono, 2004, p. 235). This demographic change was exacerbated by the contestation over the state-related job market between the Christian and the Muslim communities (Klinken, 2007, p. 90).

These inter-community tensions were the product of the policies of Suharto's New Order regime. Bertrand (2004) argues that Suharto's regime adopted a narrow conception of the state and implemented it, which contributed to the marginalization and exclusion of particular groups and the deepening tensions among the religious communities. These two structural factors combined with the partisan role of security forces, especially military during the communal war, exacerbated the conflict. Several studies reveal that the involvement of military forces is one of the key factors that led to the prolonged conflict in Ambon (Aditjondro, 2001; Azca, 2006; Suaedy, 2000). This involvement includes various forms of the partisan role played by the security forces during the communal war, such as deliberate neglect, direct involvement, support, and instigation (Azca, 2006).

Meanwhile, the fourth factor contributing to the communal conflict in Ambon is the religious tension deeply rooted in the Muslim-Christian rivalry in Maluku as argued by Al-Qurtuby (2015). He argues that the combination between unfair politics during the colonialism and 'regionalization', both Christianization and Islamization of

local cultures and societies, fundamentally changed Maluku's religious communities from what he calls 'common adherents of religion' to 'zealous followers' of Islam and Christianity. Other scholars have also delineated the important roles played by religious-based movements involved in the communal conflict, such as *Laskar Jihad* and other non-local paramilitary groups (Azca, 2011; Hassan, 2006). The coming of these groups into Ambon exacerbated religious tensions, which in turn contributed to the radicalization of Muslim communities. The last factor that contributed to the prolonged communal conflict is the failure of the local state to prevent the widespread use of violence by non-state actors as argued by Panggabean (2018).

In Poso, the communal conflict peaked in 2000 when the death toll was estimated at more than 1,000, with thousands more being injured (Trihartono & Viartasiwi, 2015, p. 118). Like what happened in Ambon, the bloody conflict in Poso was rooted in a long history dating back to the colonial era. The issues of interreligious communities, migrant and indigenous people, and local elite competition had contributed to the vulnerability of Poso and the subsequent communal conflict.

David McRae (2013), based on his extensive study in Poso, argues that two main factors caused the outbreak of the large-scale communal conflict in Poso, namely the overall national context and the particularities of the local. McRae (2013) refers the former factor to the uncertain national transition after the collapse of the Suharto's New Order regime in 1998. Meanwhile, the latter points out the 'localities' of Poso that contributed to the conflict, such as the rivalry between interreligious (Muslim and Christian) communities, the contentious issues of migration, and the communal competition on the political and economic field.

Like what happened in Ambon, the combination of colonial legacy and migration became a critical factor leading to the eruption of conflict in Poso. Traditionally, the Christian community dominated local bureaucracy in Poso dating back to the colonial discrimination policy of the Dutch. During the colonial era, the Christian communities in the highland were provided with education, health facilities, agricultural knowledge, and positions in the local bureaucracy, whereas the Muslim communities inhabiting the coastal areas were marginalized. This segregated population, along with unequal access legacy of the Dutch, persisted until after the independence of Indonesia. The condition began to change after the New Order regime introduced a development project in the 1980s. The trans-Sulawesi highway was built and completed in 1990. This road and other development projects made Poso an interesting place for new migrants, mainly those from South Sulawesi (Trihartono & Viartasiwi, 2015, p. 117).

Migration has changed Poso's population significantly since the 1970s and 1980s. During these times, new arrivals of migrants shifted Poso's demographic structure from 'Protestant majority' into 'Muslim majority.' From 1975 to 1990, Central Sulawesi experienced an influx of 181,696 transmigrants. This transmigration was perceived as unfair by the local people because the government appropriated the local land and gave some of it to the migrants along with financial assistance (Schulze, 2017, pp. 4–5). After their arrival, the migrant communities began to penetrate economic activities, especially those in extractive industries, such as ebony, cash crops, clove, cacao, coffee, cocoa, and copra trades (Schulze, 2017, p. 4). By 1990s, activities in key economic sectors were dominated by migrants, and local Christians were inclined to fill civil servant positions within the local bureaucracy. This demographic change followed by the shift in the balance of local power and

economic activities conjoined with the political turbulence at the national level during the transition contributed to Poso's communal conflict.

## POST–CONFLICT SITUATIONS
## IN AMBON AND POSO

After the Malino II Accord in 2002, Ambon and other areas in Maluku province still experienced forms of violence. The Malino II Accord ended the large-scale communal fighting. However, the violence transformed into a kind of sporadic violence that threatened the fragile peace in Ambon. Several targeted bomb attacks, a series of sniper killings, and a number of localized fights between neighboring villages still happened in the post-conflict period of Ambon (Tomsa, 2009, p. 4). Based on the data provided by National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) and the World Bank-led Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (VICIS), on a per capita basis, Maluku province had a higher level of violence in its post-conflict period than any other province in Indonesia that experienced large-scale and extended violence. This is especially the case with Ambon, which still became an area with the highest accumulated violent conflict rate from February 2002 to December 2002 (Ansori et al., 2014; Barron, Azca, & Susinarjanti, 2012).

One of the key factors behind the persistently high level of violence in Ambon is the unintended consequences of post-conflict reconstruction policies made by the government. Such a post-conflict reconstruction led to a new socio-spatial segregation. This post-conflict segregation primarily resulting from community displacement and refugee relocation after the outbreak of violence in 1999-2002 caused thousands of Christians and Muslims to take refuge in areas with an ethnoreligious identity similar to theirs.

The refugees faced trauma and fear of returning to their homes and encountering neighbors of a different religion (Ernas, 2016, p. 221). Results of a research conducted by a team of the Habibie Institute (Ansori et al., 2014) show that increased post-conflict segregation contributed to and played a particular role in the emerging cases of violence. The team found that many post-conflict violent incidents occurred in border areas between Christian and Muslim communities. Furthermore, the post-conflict situation was also signified by what Jeroen Adam (2010) calls as 'ethnic territorialization' in which customary land tenure is used used as a tool to exclude non-indigenous migrants who sometimes become displaced people as a consequence of protracted conflict.

Meanwhile, although having a relatively low-level large-scale violence, post-conflict Poso has witnessed a transformation of violent conflict in recent years. Violence and conflict have not ended since the Malino agreement in 2001. Post-conflict Poso has been signified by the transformation of violence, the persistence of social distrust, and the struggle for power and economic resources among various parties involved in the communal conflict. One of the most striking indicators of post-conflict Poso is the transformation of violence from communal conflict to terrorism. Several studies have been conducted to understand this phenomenon. For instance, Viartasiwi's study (2012) divides post-conflict governance in Poso into two main periods, namely terror period (2001-2007) and stabilization period (2007-2010). The former period was signified by the persistence of violence, especially in the form of terrorism conducted by radical groups including Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah, and local Jihadi groups in the Muslim side. There were at least three crucial terrorist attacks that claimed high fatalities during the period, such the bombing of the Central Market of Poso, which occurred a day before

the Eid Al-Fitr in 2004, the bombing of the Tentena Market in 2005, and the bombing of Maesa pig market in Palu City in December 2005.

According to Viartasiwi (2012, p. 116), the source of the perpetual terrorist attack was the lack of legitimacy among security forces and the internal rivalry between the police and army. Meanwhile, Nasrum (2016) argues that a militarized and security-based approach conducted by the security forces (police and army) sparked a cycle of violence in Poso, for examples, the two operations by the police in 2007 that resulted in the loss of lives in Gebang Rejo village, Poso City, including the death of dozens of the residents who were not specifically targeted by the operations. The operations triggered a cycle of violence and revenge. Nasrum said that after the operations, the conflict was transformed from one in which certain civilians were targeted for revenge into another one in which the police were the main targets. Behind the backdrop of such an event, such groups as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) led by Santoso were born into existence. They waged jihad and took revenge by challenging and targeting the police, especially Densus 88.

## THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN THE COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN AMBON AND POSO

We have discussed the root causes of the communal wars in Ambon and Poso and the post-conflict dynamics, including the recent trends of violence. Where were the youth in such bloody conflicts? Were they just victims of the communal conflicts or just instruments of the elites during the conflict? Or were they the active perpetrators of violence as well?

This section attempts to provide an understanding on the roles of the youth in the communal conflicts and the consequences of their roles in the contemporary post-conflict situations.

Before moving forward, it is important to clarify the concept of youth we use in this paper. Instead of using a policy-oriented approach, which is commonly influenced by the psychobiological perspective in defining the concept of youth mainly based on a strict categorization of age, the paper refers to the view of Wyn and White (1997) that sees youth as a 'relational concept'. According to them, youth is a relational concept because it exists and has meanings largely in relation to the concept of adulthood, which is understood as a state of 'being' while youth is understood as a state of 'becoming'. Thus, understanding youth as a relational concept brings power relations to the forefront, by viewing youth as the 'non-established' group in relation to adults as the 'established' one in society.

While many accounts have placed youth as the victims of violence especially during wars and armed conflicts, the paper will argue that youth were both the victims and perpetrators of violence in Ambon and Poso communal wars. However, in arguing that youth play an important role during a communal war, it should not be necessarily viewed that they are inherently violent actors. Rather, youth may become violent actors in a certain moment and certain period, especially during a transitional moment both on personal and generational levels (Azca, 2013). Youth can also turn into violent activists and groups, being triggered by other structural factors, such as unemployment, exclusion from political participation, long-term economic decline, and poor education prospects (Cursi & Marzo, 2017, pp. 2–3). For instance, the engagement of youth in violent groups like Jihadist groups during the communal war

in Ambon was triggered by the high unemployment rate among young people at the time (Hassan, 2010, p. 49). Interestingly, the participation of young people in the conflict enabled them to become brave peacebuilders in the post-conflict period. This unique position of youth will be elaborated further in the next section.

There is no doubt that youth played an important role during the communal wars in Ambon and Poso. They were actively involved from the very beginning of the communal conflicts.

In Ambon, even before the communal conflict erupted on 19 January 1999, some youths had been involved in a violent incident that later became a precipitant of the violence in Maluku. Azca (2006, p. 437) highlights two crucial moments before the first eruption of the religious communal conflict, namely the coming of hundreds of Ambonese *preman* (criminal thugs) from Jakarta in December 1998 after 'the Ketapang incident' and the clash in Dobo after the brawl between Muslim gang members. In the first moment, 'Ketapang incident' was a significant factor that forced the return of Christian Ambonese thugs. It was triggered by a fight between local Muslim youth and a Christian Ambonese gang called 'Coker', who worked at an entertainment center in Jakarta. It turned into an inter-religious conflict after the rumors of the burning of mosques and churches were circulated (Azca, 2006, p. 437). Goss (2000, p. 11) also notes that following the clash in Dobo and the return of Ambonese thugs, the atmosphere in Ambon was tense as rival gangs were supported by co-religionist youth. He argues that youth played an important role in the violence in Ambon.

Another example of how the youth were involved in the communal violence from the very beginning is the case of Batu Gajah Incident. It refers to a series of

anti-military demonstrations that ended with violent riots. It resulted in dozens of students, local people, and several army personnel being hospitalized. The incident was led by some Pattimura University students. They demanded that the government abolish 'Dwifungsi ABRI' and remove the commander of KOREM in Ambon. The incident reflects the polarization among young people in Ambon at the time. The initiators and victims of the incident were predominantly Christians, while Muslim student organizations like HMI did not participate in that event. They felt that the demonstration was an attempt by Christian students to overthrow the Muslim commander of KOREM (Panggabean, 2018, p. 159). In addition, the involvement of youth in the communal is also reflected in the phenomenon of 'Children's Army' in both Muslim and Christian communities. According to Jacky Manuputty (Jack Manuputty, 2017, p. 17), it is estimated that there are two hundreds of Christian children who joined 'Children's Army' during the communal conflict.

Youth's involvement in communal conflict also happened in Poso. From the very beginning, youth were involved in instigating the violence. The first event that is widely cited as the beginning of the communal war in Poso obviously involved young people. The event refers to the incident on the Christmas Eve and in the Ramadhan month in 1998 when a Christian youth stabbed the son of the imam of a local mosque. The Christian youth was drunk while the Muslim was celebrating the holy month of Ramadan. The stabbing sparked outrage from Muslim youth. Then, some Muslim youths attacked Chinese Christian shops for selling alcohol. In the following weeks, there was a massive mobilization of Muslim youth from the coastal town of Ampana and Christian youth from the heartland of Tentena (Klinken, 2007:80). After that, rumors of the burning of churches were circulated among Christian communities.

On December 27, 1998, a group of youth from *Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah/GPST* (Central Sulawesi Youth Movement) armed with machetes and led by a local Member of Parliament was carried by a truck from Pamona to reinforce GKST (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah) Lombogja (Aragon, 2001, p. 61). This GKST group was a resurrected version of the Protestant militia organization from Pamona dating back to the Permesta period.

Youth were also involved in the second major riot in Poso in April 2000. Clashes occurred between crowds of Muslims and Christians triggered by a brawl between two drunken youths, a Christian and a Muslim, who began fighting at Poso's central bus terminal. The incident sparked anger among the nearby crowds, and more people were injured. Then, Muslims burned down some of the Christians' houses that night (Aragon, 2001, p. 65). The unrest reached its peak in the form of widespread arson and tit for tat murders that led to the death of seven people, including three Muslim youths shot dead by the police (Rae, 2013, p. 36).

Another example of how young people were engaged in violent activities during the conflict is the emergence of Islamic radical groups in Ambon and Poso during the communal wars. Many young people from outside conflict zones and those from local groups joining with international and national Jihadi groups, like Laskar Jihad, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and Jemaah Islamiyah, fought in Ambon and Poso to help their fellow Muslims in their battles against the Christian groups. These Islamic Jihadi groups even used the conflict zones of Ambon and Poso to mobilize mass and expand their movement; they tried to make the conflict zones their headquarters (Azca, 2013). In Poso, both national and international Jihadi groups actively recruited young people and

gave them religious and military trainings (Fauzi, 2017, p. 62). Noorhaidi Hassan (2006, p. 162) conducted an extensive study on Laskar Jihad fighters involved in Maluku's communal war. He interviewed 125 fighters from across Indonesia and found that they were largely young militants whose ages ranged between 20 and 35 years old and almost half of them were university students.

Youth's involvement in the communal wars in both cities does not necessarily mean that they were inherently violent actors, nor does it mean that they were the single important actor in such bloody religious wars. Regarding youth's engagement in violent activities in the communal wars in Ambon and Poso, we argue that young people played a significant role in the violence during the pre-conflict and conflict periods. To a certain degree, youth's involvement in the conflict enabled them to actively participate in the post-conflict period as peacebuilders or peace brokers. This will be elaborated in the following section.

## THE EMERGENCE OF GRASSROOTS PEACEBUILDING IN AMBON AND POSO

The previous section has demonstrated that youth played an important role in the outbreak of communal violence in Ambon and Poso. However, this is only a half story. Youth have also been playing a key role in the peacebuilding process in the post-conflict period in both cities. Young people in Ambon and Poso have been actively engaged in various forms of grassroots peacebuilding at the locales. Their active engagement in peace initiatives resonates with the wider phenomenon of peacebuilding initiatives that have emerged across former communal war zones in Indonesia. Sumanto Al-Qurthuby (2012, p. 142) suggests that grassroots peacebuilding has

taken place throughout Indonesia, even in former communal conflict areas, such as Ambon, North Maluku, Sambas and Sampit (Kalimantan), and Poso (Central Sulawesi). In these areas, we can find abundant examples of civil coexistence, religious harmony, and grassroots peacebuilding, which demonstrate the capacity of local actors in managing diversity and differences in fruitful ways.

In Ambon, grassroots peacebuilding emerged after the bloody communal war. There are two main streams of grassroots peacebuilding in Ambon, namely religious-based and tradition or *Adat*-based peacebuilding initiatives. Some of them are Gerakan Baku Bae (Baku Bae movement), Tim 20 Wayane (20 Wayane Team), Peace Provocateur, and Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku/LAIM (The Moluccan Interfaith Council). LAIM was established in 2003 and consists of representatives of main religious bodies in Ambon, such as Moluccan Protestant Church (GPM), the Indonesian Council of Muslim Clerics (MUI), and the Catholic 0f Amboina. It has organized a wide range of activities that aim to raise awareness about the commonalities and positive values within each religion that can guarantee peaceful coexistence. LAIM has various programs, such as grassroots interfaith dialogues, exchanges of lecturers between Christian and Islamic universities, and joint religious classes in primary and high schools in Ambon (Brauchler, 2014, pp. 164–165). LAIM has also attempted to develop dynamic encounters within the framework of Orang Basudara as a strategy to restore kinship values based on Maluku local wisdom (Jacky Manuputty, 2017, p. 117).

One of the *Adat*-based peace initiatives is Baku Bae Movement (Gerakan *Baku Bae*) whose principles and methods are based on *Baku bae*, which is a key element in Maluku culture and means 'the peaceful spirit to signify

reconciliation or restore friendship after a quarrel between children' (Malik, 2017). Baku Bae movement was established to bring together the conflicting parties into a dialogue. People behind the movement believe that peace can only be reached with peacebuilding with 'grassroots approach', which involves the violence-affected people (Qurtuby, 2016, p. 132). The use of *Adat* as a medium for reconciliation and peacebuilding is also obvious in the revival of *Pela Gandong* by local actors. *Pela* is a traditional alliance system between two or more villages in central Maluku which together sign pacts irrespective of their religions to help each other in times of political or economic crisis in building religious buildings and organizing big rituals or meetings (Qurtuby, 2012, p. 144). While *Gandong* can be simply translated as 'treating others like our siblings'. Birgit Brauchler (2009, 2014, 2015), through her extensive ethnographic research on peacebuilding in Maluku, concludes that culture and grassroots peacebuilding initiatives have played an influential and important role in Maluku's search for peace and reconciliation. Meanwhile, religion has also been a crucial factor in the processes of peacemaking and reconciliation. Al-Qurthuby (2013) shows that Ambonese Christian and Muslim leaders have collaborated in fruitful ways in the process of interreligious peacebuilding in post-conflict Ambon.

## THE NARRATIVES OF PEACE PROVOCATEUR

While the roles of religion, *Adat* or culture, and women in peacemaking and peacebuilding have been widely acknowledged by scholars, the role of youth in peacebuilding has been rarely seen as important as those three actors. The narratives presented here will show that youth have played an important and crucial role in the post-conflict period as peacekeepers and peacebuilders. Two distinct and

creative youth-based movements, namely Peace Provocateur and Rumah Katu, are taken as the examples to show how young people have been actively engaged in peace initiatives.

Peace provocateur was born on 11 September 2011 when a clash between Christians and Muslims and its subsequent sporadic violence took place. This violent clash was sparked by the death of Dafri Saimin, a Muslim motorcyclist (*tukang ojek*) in the Waihaong region of Ambon City. The local police said that the death of Darfin was an accident, but the family and local Muslims believed that Dafri was murdered by a Christian. They were convinced of it because of the evidence of wounds on Dafri's body and the location of the incident in Gunung Nona, a Christian neighborhood. After that, rumors were circulated among Muslim communities through text messages referring to Dafri's torture and murder before the riot occurred. In Dafrin's funeral, hundreds of mourners gathered. After they left the cemetery, the violence erupted leading to the death of three and dozens wounded. More than 100 houses were burned to the ground. On the following day, a clash took place in the town, and about 50 Christian houses were burned (ICG, 2011).

International Crisis Group (2011) narrates the initial work of Peace Provocateur after the violence erupted on 11 September 2011. ICG (2011, p. 4) writes that "in the midst of the first days of chaos, dozens of brave activists of both faiths who called themselves 'peace provocateurs' rushed around dispelling rumors and urging calm". Peace Provocateur is a voluntary organization established by a small group of Christians and Muslims. The organization was formed by fewer than ten people, who were mostly close friends (Jacky Manuputty, 2012). The founders of the group define Peace Provocateur as "a community-based movement whose main objectives are to provoke peace, reinforce amity, and reduce tensions and

the escalations of violence in Ambon city" (Qurtuby, 2013, p. 358). Since the very beginning, Peace Provocateur has been a youth-led movement. They met and discussed how to counter rumors while at the same time spreading peace messages. Their encounters started from simple things, like having a coffee together, having small talk, and exchanging jokes. Then, they uploaded these encounters through social media or SMS platforms with "peaceful captions" (Manuputty, 2019).

Peace Provocateur gained its prominence through its extraordinary work to defuse provocative messages and rumors, especially during the outbreak of violence in 2011. After the violence outbreak started on 11 September 2011, the core members of the group were on the phone with each other constantly, checking stories and sending information through Twitter, Facebook, and text messages. For instance, when a member of the network heard rumors about Silo Church being destroyed, he called another member of the network at the church to take a picture of it with his phone and circulate the picture to prove that the church was undamaged (ICG, 2011, pp. 4–5). Another example of how Peace Provocateur worked is reflected in the case of rumors over the *Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an* (MTQ) event in June 2012. Approaching the event, there were text messages circulated among Christian communities that urged Christians to take revenge following a grenade attack. Peace Provocateur responded to these messages by circulating a message that reads: "Don't you ever think that you can provoke anger among the Christian community, so that the MTQ will fail! We (the Christians) will fight to the end to make this event successful' (Qurtuby, 2013, p. 359). According to Embong (Interview, 28/3/2019), an activist of Peace Provocateur, the impact of this rumor diffusion was evident when people started to re-check the information they got, and they were not easily provoked by divisive and violent messages.

Peace Provocateur creatively utilizes various media platforms in its activities. It uses multiple media instruments, including print and electronic media (newspapers, TVs, mobile phones), internet devices (Twitter, Facebook, email), and personal relationships or friendship. According to Manuputty (2012), the main instrument to provoke peace in Ambon is media. Media here is understood not only as conventional media, such as print and electronic media, but also interreligious friendship. Interreligious friendship is the basic modality in the movement of Peace Provocateur. Interreligious friendship should be promoted in the public sphere as a way to spread the message of peace and curb provocations. For instance, interreligious friendship should be exposed to public spheres when provocation of violence gets escalated.

What is also distinct from Peace Provocateur is the massive utilization of social media in their movement. According to Jack Manuputty (2019), the four functions of social media are used as the methods of Peace Provocateur. First, social media are used to clarify biased news circulating in conventional media. Second, social media are utilized to counter information that spreads hatred and violent narratives. Third, social media are used to cover memes about peace and tolerance messages and spread them to a wider audience, especially the younger generation. Fourth, social media function as bridges between different ethnic and religious communities during the conflict and tensions.

Today Peace Provocateur is well aware that media are being used to spread disinformation and fake news. Therefore, they have started to change the negative contents of social media with positive ones. One of these efforts has been made by Embong (Interview, 28/3/2019). He initiated Maluku Photography Club and has uploaded "the beauty of Ambon's beach"

as much as possible in his Facebook account. According to him, the effort was designed to shift the youth's attention from negative contents on social media.

Peace Provocateur certainly not only sends tex messages to defuse violent provocations, but also carries out a wide range of activities that attempt to bridge differences among people, such as theatre, photography, storytelling, and sports. These activities are aimed at bringing people together, bridging gaps, and building trust (Qurtuby, 2013, p. 360). In addition, Peace Provocateur is focused on cultivating peace at the community and family levels. For instance, it has attempted to intervene in religious sermons in both churches and mosques in Ambon by providing sermons on peace (Tuwanakotta, 2017, p. 59). In churches, sermons on peace are integrated into yearly curricula while in mosques they are integrated into Friday prayers. Peace Provocateur has also attempted to intervene in the domestic sphere (family) to break the cycle of violence by sending their agents of peace to families and communities. It challenges stereotypes and prejudices among different communities, including the perception among Muslims that Christians are separatists and the perception among Christians that Muslims are terrorists.

Although Peace Provocateur consists of people with different backgrounds ranging from religious leaders, journalists, academics, activists to students, this community-based movement has heavily relied on young people to run their activities. Jacky Manupputty, along with Abidin Wakano, as two of the founders of Peace Provocateur, said that young people are actively engaging in peace initiatives through various hobby communities (Mulyartono, 2014). Peace Provocateur also collaborated with a group of

young Christians and Muslims named 'Ambon Bergerak' (Ambon on the Move). The core members of the group were ten individuals spread across the city flashpoints. They coordinated with each other and frequently verified and sometimes defused provocation messages in order to provide factual information amidst the escalating tension (Manuputty, 2012).

Another new development is the use of photography as a medium to facilitate cross-cutting interaction among young people. As narrated by Embong (Interview, 28/3/2019), a peace activist in Ambon, Peace Provocateur has broadened their movement to include various communities, such as photography clubs, art clubs, literature clubs, and blogger communities. These communities are run by young people who have high awareness about the importance of nurturing and sustaining peace in Ambon. For instance, they have an active and vibrant photography club named "Maluku Photography Club". Its members include young people, journalists, civil servants, and even police and military personnel. One of their activities is hunting sunrise photos in a region where the population has a background different from that of the club members. For instance, when Christian members of the club organize a photo hunt, they will visit a predominantly Muslim village, such as Tulehu village. This will enable them to make contact and interaction with the locals, who have a different background, while at the same time doing their hobby.

At the individual level, numerous young peacebuilders have emerged in post-conflict Ambon. Ronald Regang and Iskandar Slameth are among them. The stories of Ronald Regang and Iskandar Slameth reflect how former child ex-combatants turned into peacemakers. Ronald Regang was a leader of 'Children's Army' formed by Christian communities, while Iskandar Slameth was a member of a Jihadist troop during

the communal war. Ronald Regang was ten years old when he was involved in what he considered as a 'holy war' at the time while Iskandar Slameth was 14 years old when he joined the Jihadi troop. Both of them met for the first time in the Young Ambassadors for Peace (YAP). At first, they were involved in a heated debate and defended their respective opinions about the past conflict. Fortunately, mentors from YAP successfully bridged them, and then they became close friends. Ronald and Iskandar have developed a close friendship that bridges their fellow young Muslims and Christians in various activities, such as writing poetry, singing songs, and painting (Manuputty, 2017, pp. 40–41). They now become the icons of Ambonese young peace ambassadors widely covered by the media.

Ali Madi Salay and Rifky Husain are other exemplars of Ambonese youth peacebuilders. Both of them are university students who are actively recruiting students of Ambon to join peace communities. Ali Madi Salay and his fellow students have established an Ambonese blogger community aimed at spreading peace values and countering violent provocation on social media (Mulyartono, 2014). Ali Madi Salay and his friend, Rifky Husain, collaborated to make a film titled *Provokator Damai* (Peace Provocateur). The film narrates a story of peacemakers in Ambon. The film has been widely appraised as a success story of peace in Ambon, and it was selected as a finalist of 2013 Eagle Award.

Besides Peace Provocateur, there are a wide range of youth-based peace initiatives in post-conflict Ambon. Some of them are Badati, Moluccas Hip Hop Community, Bengkel Sastra, Kanfas Alifuru, and Non-Violence, to name a few. They have been actively engaged in peacemaking initiatives with various and different methods. Badati is concerned with the psycho-social dimension of peacebuilding. Moluccas Hip Hop,

Bengkel Sastra, and Kanvas Alifuru utilize music and arts for sustaining peace and solidarity. Meanwhile, Non-Violence uses the scientific community to foster unity in Ambonese society. They have been influential and become an important factor as well in the future of Ambon, especially in anticipating the unintended consequences of social segregation (Tuwanakotta, 2017, p. 87).

## THE NARRATIVES OF RUMAH KATU IN POSO

Ambon has Peace Provocateur as a medium of young people to contribute to the peacebuilding, while Poso has Rumah Katu as a youth-based peace initiative in the post-conflict period. Rumah Katu was founded in 2016 with the aim of voicing peace to the public. The spreading of peace messages is deemed important since there is persistent stigmatization that Poso has been a conflict area since the communal violence occurred in 1998-2000. Arifuddin Lako, one of the founders and the chairman of Rumah Katu, said, "In Poso, 'katu' is the name for sago leaves. *Katu* has many benefits, including its use as a roofing material. 'Katu' is also the abbreviation for 'Kita Satu' (We are One) (Fikrie, 2018).

The story of the establishment of Rumah Katu is the story of peace and reconciliation of post-conflict Poso. Arifuddin Lako started narrating the story by saying that in 2015 he was released after six years in prison. Arifuddin Lako was a Jihadist combatant during the communal war in Poso. He was imprisoned for his involvement in the killing of a prosecutor of Central Sulawesi on 24 May 2004. He turned to a Jihadist organization, a local type of Jamaah Islamiyah, after he witnessed his house being burned by Christian militants during the communal war. He was jailed for six years after surrendering himself to police in 2009. After he was released in 2015, he started a business in

screen printing and reunited with his former Jihadist fellows. Arifuddin also intensively communicated and discussed with Adriani Badrah about the possibility to start a community to campaign peace and empower former combatants in Poso. Adriani Badrah is a peace activist and director of Celebes Institute. He helped hide Arifuddin when he was a fugitive.

Rumah Katu was initially based in Rumah Katu Marine Park, a tourist site in Poso that was managed by Arifuddin and his fellows. Arifuddin Lako's access to the site for Rumah Katu Marine Park was offered by a Marine Colonel who led the Tinombala Operation in 2016. The marine tourist site provided various outbound games, such as banana boat, flying fox, and snorkeling. It also provided rest areas for families. Unfortunately, the marine park operated just for a while, because it was closed in 2017 due to the lack of access to the site. Then, Arifuddin and his fellows decided to focus on developing Rumah Katu as a community. The community consists of Christian and Muslim victims of the communal war. With the assistance of local civil society organizations like Celebes Institute and Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (LPMS) (Civil Society Empowerment Institute), Rumah Katu was developed to be a community. Arifuddin Lako served as the chairman, and Fery Djamorante, a Christian activist from Tentena, served as the secretary (Fauzi, 2017, pp. 79–80).

On 19-20 August 2016, Rumah Katu organized the first Rumah Katu Festival, which presented dance performance, photography events, and film screenings. In organizing the festival, Rumah Katu collaborated with several other communities, such as music, traditional dance, and photography communities. The event aimed to campaign peaceful coexistence in Poso. It was declared during the event that

Poso was no longer a conflict zone and, therefore, safe for tourists. According to Arifuddin (Interview, 2018), the event also aimed to empower and reintegrate former combatants and terrorist prisoners into wider society. The event was widely appreciated by mass media and the local government. The Regent of Poso, who opened the event, also appreciated it, saying that what had been done by young people in Rumah Katu was a positive act that would increase tourism in Poso (Fauzi, 2017, p. 79).

Rumah Katu is not just focused on organizing cultural festivals. It has a wide range of other creative activities that attempt to convey the peaceful condition of post-conflict Poso. Like Peace Provocateur in Ambon, Rumah Katu, which is run by mostly young people of Poso, has creatively utilized various media platforms to spread peace and reconciliation messages. They have vibrant and active social media accounts, like Instagram, YouTube, and Facebook. These online platforms have been used by Rumah Katu to disseminate information on their events. Their activities aim to spread peace messages. For instance, in November 2017, Rumah Katu joined with the local government and other local communities to organize 'Konser Perdamaian' (Peace Concert). The event was part of Festival Danau Tektonik Poso (FPDTP) (Lake Tentena) (the Festival of Tectonic Lake POSO (Lake Tentena) and the launching of Tour De Celebes. The event was attended by popular musicians, such as Slank, Ungu, and some local musicians. On 21-22 September 2018, Rumah Katu successfully organized its second Rumah Katu Festival with the theme of 'From Tentena to Poso' at Taman Kota Tentena (Tentena City Park). The activities for this event include film screenings and workshops, mural and graffiti making, a culture carnival, photography exhibitions and workshops, music performances, culinary bazaars, and

traditional dance performances. Numerous local artists and musicians performed at the event. The event was widely supported by the local government and the private sector.

One of the distinct activities of Rumah Katu is film production. Rumah Katu has its own film production house. Until recently, Rumah Katu has produced at least four short and documentary films. These films are *Senjata Rakitan* (Artificial Weapon), *2/3 Malam* (2/3 Night), *Salamnya Salim* (Salim's greeting), and *Jalan Pulang* (The Way Home). The first two films are short movies, and *2/3 Malam* is the winner of Tempo Institute Film Competition. *Salamnya Salim*, the second movie produced by Rumah Katu, is the first winner of the film competition with the theme of 'deradicalization' held by the Regional Police of Central Sulawesi to commemorate the 72nd anniversary of Bhayangkara (Setiawan, 2018).

Meanwhile, *2/3 Malam*, a three-minute film, was selected as the first winner of Tempo Institute Film Competition in 2017. Due to the winning, Arifuddin as the representative of Rumah Katu went to Jakarta to join a filmmaking workshop organized by Tempo Institute. The film itself narrates the story of an ex-terrorist prisoner's life, including such issues as stigmatization, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society.

The latest film, *Jalan Pulang*, was produced in 2017. The story behind the production of *Jalan Pulang* dates back to 2017. At the time, Arifuddin Lako was challenged by Adriani Badrah to make a documentary movie that promotes reintegration in ex-combatants in Poso. Arifuddin accepted that challenge. He became the producer, story writer, and director of *Jalan Pulang* (the Way Home). He said that before he produced the film, he circulated the film script to his fellow former combatants and ustads to get feedback.

After getting feedback from them, he produced the film (Interview with Arifuddin Lako, 2018). It was screened for the first time in Poso on 30 October to commemorate 'Sumpah Pemuda' (Youth Pledge). On 30 October 2017, the film was screened at Universitas Kristen Tentena (Tentena Christian University), a stronghold of the Christian community that became a hotspot of communal conflict in the past. During the discussion session, Arifuddin Lako said:

'I am one of the victims of the conflict, which destroyed our life in Poso. I am also a former terrorist prisoner. This film is a form of my responsibility after what I have done to others during the conflict. And I will continue to spread peace messages through various forms of media' (Fauzi, 2017, p. 55)

The stories of Rumah Katu and Arifuddin Lako reflect how young people involved in violence in the past can turn into peace activists. They can significantly contribute to the peacebuilding process in post-conflict Poso.

## LESSONS FROM RUMAH KATU AND PEACE PROVOCATEUR, AND LIMITATIONS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES

The narratives of Rumah Katu in Poso and Peace Provocateur in Ambon have demonstrated the emergence of youth-led peace education initiatives in post-conflict eastern Indonesia. What Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur have done in some ways could be seen as the practice of peace education at the grassroots level. As Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace (2008, p. 21) define, peace education is a transformative education that aims to cultivate people's knowledge base, skills, attitudes, and values to transform their mindset, attitudes or behavior that created or exacerbated violent conflict. In this regard,

through various creative and artistic activities and events, both Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur have attempted to cultivate the youth's knowledge and skills to transform their mindset to be conducive for nurturing peace culture and countering violent narratives. This is extremely important and crucial, particularly in the contexts of post-conflict Ambon and Poso.

From the description above, we can draw several lessons and limitations from the comparison between Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur. First, both youth-led organizations have creatively used various methods in spreading their peace messages and countering violent narratives. Both Rumah Katu and Peace Provocateur have utilized multiple ways in their movements, ranging from music, media, photography, dance, journalism, film to sports. However, they have different accentuations and strengths in organizing their activities. Rumah Katu looks very skillful in using films and cultural festivals to boost their peace initiatives. Its films, which spread peace and reintegration messages among ex-terrorist prisoners, have received several awards and appreciations.

Meanwhile, Peace Provocateur, since the very beginning, has creatively utilized media and journalism to defuse rumors and hate speech while campaigning for interreligious friendship. In order to defuse rumors, those involved in Peace Provocateur need to be seen as credible and reliable, and they have demonstrated that they are exactly so since they are local young people who precisely know the real condition on the ground. The credibility of Peace Provocateur is strengthened by the fact that many of its founders and supporters are respected religious and informal leaders who have a strong social position

in their communities. Later developments show that Peace Provocateur has broadened their movement, ranging from an environmental movement to a photography club.

Second, both organizations have skilfully used various social media platforms to spread their peace messages. Rumah Katu has Instagram and YouTube accounts with fascinating contents. They upload their activities through these platforms. They have even uploaded their film trailers on their YouTube account. However, this should not be overemphasized since the followers of their account remain limited. Like Rumah Katu, Peace Provocateur is well-known for its creative methods for defusing rumors by using SMS, Twitter, and other social media platforms. Using these platforms, their movement can reach a wider population, especially the younger generation who are very familiar with social media.

Third, both organizations have created a social platform that accommodates former youth combatants/terrorists involved in the communal wars who turned into peace activists. Interestingly, both movements have successfully facilitated former young combatants to turn into peace builders and campaigners. The main founder of Rumah Katu is a former terrorist prisoner, Arifuddin Lako. He turned into a peace activist after engaging with peace and civil society networks. Together with his fellow activists, he established Rumah Katu. Likewise, the story of former 'Child Troops' who turned into peace activists can be easily found in Peace Provocateur. The story of Ronald Regan and Iskandar Slamet is one of them.

Fourth, another interesting point to draw from these two youth peace initiatives is their relationship with government-led peace initiatives at the local levels of Poso and Ambon. Since they are non-state and grassroots peace initiatives, they do not depend on the state's resources in mobilizing and

organizing their movements. However, both organizations seem to take different routes to develop their relationship with the state. It seems that Rumah Katu has a more intimate relationship with local state agencies. Since the very beginning, the community has received abundant support from the local government and elites. The cultural festivals organized by Rumah Katu were generously supported by the local government of Poso. The Regent of Poso even attended the opening of the events.

Meanwhile, Peace Provocateur seems to be relatively self-reliant in comparison with Rumah Katu. Although Peace Provocateur has a quite close and good relationship with the local government, it has been mostly relying on its own resources and relatively independent. Peace Provocateur also applies a sort of principle for not receiving any international funding to support its campaigns. Such a principle is likely a part of its intentional strategy to prevent potential division and fragmentation among its activists. Nevertheless, the strategy of Peace Provocateur to keep its distance from the government and funding agencies does not prevent its ideas from being accommodated by the government. A senior activist of Peace Provocateur told us that the Government of Maluku Province accepted its idea to build 'a multicultural village' (*kampong multikultur*) as an exemplar of the harmony and heterogeneity of Moluccan society (Interview with Embong, 28/3/2019).

Despite the lessons that can be learned from Peace Provocateur and Rumah Katu, both organizations have some limitations related to their focus on artistic and creative methods. Such methods have largely excluded other young people who are not interested in creative and artistic activities to campaign peace. Indeed, to engage with creative arts in peacebuilding activities, such as movie making and photography,

certainly needs certain skills and tools. This is true especially in the case of Rumah Katu, which has intensively used movie making and art festivals in their activities. Meanwhile, Peace Provocateur has more fluid membership and diverse activities, causing it to be much more inclusive in term of the variety of its activities. Another limitation is a dependency on the influential figures within the movements. Even to a certain degree, their movements have become personified with certain influential figures. For instance, Rumah Katu somehow is personified with the figure of Arifuddin Lako as the founder, while Peace Provocateur cannot be separated from its senior and influential figures, such as Jack Manuputty and Abidin Wakano.

## CONCLUSION

Through narratives, this article attempts to demonstrate youth agency in both communal conflict and peacebuilding in the post-conflict periods of Ambon and Poso. While the role of youth in provoking violence during the communal wars in both cities has been widely acknowledged, our research found that young people have also contributed to peacebuilding and reconciliation at the local level in the post-conflict period.

The research found that young people have also been actively engaging in peacebuilding initiatives in the post-conflict periods of Ambon and Poso. Youth-based peace initiatives have taken various forms of creative activities in spreading the messages of peace, reconciliation, and reintegration into wider society. The most salient feature of these youth peace initiatives is the ability to cleverly utilize various media platforms to defuse violent narratives and spread peace culture values. Youth in both cities have also actively organized a wide range of creative and artistic activities in their peacebuilding movements by carrying out such activities as film screenings, photography events,

cultural festivals, and music performance to bring together different communities in order to reduce prejudice and tensions while at the same time nurturing a culture of peace.

Peace Provocateur has been widely recognized for its extraordinary contribution to defusing rumors and preventing the escalation of conflict in Ambon in 2011 and beyond. Although established only about two years ago, Rumah Katu has conducted a series of creative activities to disseminate the messages of peace and reintegration of former combatants into the post-conflict society of Poso. Moreover, both movements have demonstrated that young people may become peacebuilders in the post-conflict setting. Their peacebuilding initiatives can be carried out in tandem with other grassroots peacebuilding initiatives, such as the ones of government agencies, women's groups, religious figures, and *Adat* elites.

The article has examined the two youth-led peacebuilding initiatives in Poso and Ambon that have contributed to the creation of cooperations and cross-cutting interactions among the local young people. By mainly utilizing artistic and creative works, they have provided social platforms in which young people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, including those who are former combatants in the communal wars, can meet and interact with each other. Rumah Katu has its eminence in helping the reintegration of Muslim and Christian ex-combatants from various groups in Poso through art platforms and activities, such as movie making, festivals, and music performance. Meanwhile, Peace Provocateur has transformed itself from an organization that 'defused rumors' after the eruption of violence in 2011 to a much broader alliance of civil society to make Ambon better. Peace Provocateur is

an umbrella organization for such activities as photography events and environmental movements and committed to nurturing peace and harmony in post-conflict Ambon.

The fact that the two organizations have been largely focused on artistic and creative methods has also brought some limitations. The first limitation is the exclusion of young people who do not have interest in art or those who do not possess skills in creative works. Another limitation is a dependency on the influential figures within the movements.

All in all, despite their limitations, youth in post-conflict Ambon and Poso can be seen as peacebuilders who have contributed to spreading the messages of reconciliation and reintegration, and sustaining peace in both cities.

# REFERENCES

Adam, J. (2010). Post-Conflict Ambon: Forced Migration and the Ethno-Territorial Effects of Customary Tenure. *Development and Change*, *41*(3), 401–419.

Aditjondro, G. J., (2001). Orang-Orang Jakarta di Balik Tragedi Maluku. Retrieved December 23, 2018, from http://www.michr.net/orang-orang-jakarta-di-balik-tragedi-maluku.html.

Ansori, M. H., Sukandar, R., Peranto, S., Karib, F., Cholid, S., & Imron Rasyid. (2014). *Post-Conflict Segregation, Violence, and Reconstruction Policy in Ambon*. Jakarta.

Aragon, L. V. (2001). Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People. *INDONESIA*, *72*, 45–79.

Azca, M. N. (2006). In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the Communal Conflict in Ambon. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *34*(3), 431–455.

Azca, M. N. (2011). *After Jihad: A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia*. Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Azca, M. N. (2013). Yang Muda, Yang Radikal: Refleksi Sosiologis Terhadap Fenomena Radikalisme Kaum Muda Muslim di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru. *Jurnal Maarif Institute*, *8*(1).

Barron, P., Azca, M. N., & Susinarjanti, T. (2012). *After the communal war : understanding and addressing post-conflict violence in eastern Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Centre for Security and Peace Studies Books.

Bertrand, J. (2004). *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bracuhler, B. (2015). *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia*. London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Brauchler, B. (2009). Mobilizing Culture and Tradition for Peace: Reconciliation in the Moluccas. In *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots agency for peace*. London and New Jersey: Routledge.

Brauchler, B. (2014). Christian-Muslim Relations in Post-Conflict Ambon, Moluccas: Adat, Religion, and Beyond. In B. Platzdasch & J. Saravanamuttu (Eds.), *Religious Diversity in Muslim-majoirity States in Southeast Asia: Areas of Toleration and Conflict*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

Brauchler, B. (2015). *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Cursi, D. R., & Marzo. (2017). *The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding*. Rome.

Ernas, S. (2016). Architecture of Peace in Ambon: Reading Dynamics of Peace Afer Ten Years of Conflict. *Al-Albab*, *5*(2).

Fauzi, I. A. (2017). "Jalan Pulang" menurut Mantan Teroris Jihadis: Kekerasan dan Binadami di Poso, Sulawesi Tengah. In I. A. Fauzi & D. A. Kartika (Eds.), *Keluar dari Ekstremisme: Delapan Kisah "Hijrah" Dari Kekerasan Menuju Binadamai*. Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina.

Felice, D., & Wisler, A. (2007). The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders. *Journal of Peace Conflict and Development Issue*, (11), 1–29. Retrieved from http://creducation.net/resources/Power_and_Potential_of_Youth_as_Peace-Builders.pdf.

Fikrie, M. (2018). Ikhtiar kreatif mantan teroris Cerita seorang mantan teroris menyusuri "jalan pulang". Arifudin Lako menanggalkan gagasan radikal, menggantinya dengan ide-ide kreatif demi perdamaian Poso. Retrieved December 23, 2018, from https://beritagar.id/artikel/laporan-khas/ikhtiar-kreatif-mantan-teroris.

Galtung, J. (2006). Theoretical Challenges of Peace Building with and for Youth. In S. McEvoy-Levy (Ed.), *Troublemakers or Peacemakers: Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Goss, J. (2000). Understanding the "Maluku Wars": Overview of Sources of Communal Conflict and Prospects for Peace. *Cakalele*, *11*, 7–39.

Hasan, N. (2006). *Laskar Jihad: Islam, militancy, and the quest for identity in post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

Hassan, N. (2006). *Laskar Jihad* (ISIM Disse). Singapore: SEAP Publications.

Hassan, N. (2010). The Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia. In *Being Young and Muslim: Nex Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hwang, J. C. (2018). *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Cornell and Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

ICG. (2011). *Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon*. Jakarta and Brussel.

Klinken, G. Van. (2007). *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small town*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Malik, I. (2017). *Resolusi Konflik: Jembatan Perdamaian*. Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia.

Manuputty, J. (2012). Provokator Damai. Retrieved December 23, 2018, from http://www.acehkita.com/opini-provokator-damai/.

Manuputty, J. (2017). Dari Tarian Perang ke Tarian Damai: Transformasi Ronald Regang, Mantan Tentara Anak Maluku. In I. A. Fauzi & D. A. Kartika (Eds.), *Keluar dari Ekstremisme: Delapan Kisah "Hijrah" Dari Kekerasan Menuju Binadamai*. Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina.

Manuputty, J. (2017). The Turning Point on the Road of Basudara Relationship. In *Basudara Stories of Peace from Maluku Working Together for Reconciliation*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Meinema, E. H. (2012). *Provoking Peace Grassroots Peacebuilding by Ambonese Youth*. University of Groningen.

Muluk, H., & Malik, I. (2009). Peace Psychology of Grassroots Reconciliation: Lessons Learned from the "Baku Bae" Peace Movement. In *Peace Psychology in Asia*. London and New York: Springer.

Mulyartono, S. (2014). Para Provokator Damai. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from https://siswomulyartono.wordpress.com/2014/07/15/para-provokator-damai/.

Nasrum, M. (2016). From Communal Conflicts to Terrorism in Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia: A Shifting Terrain. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, *11*(2), 83–88.

Navarro-Castro, L., & Nario-Galace, J. (2008). *Peace Education: A Pathway to A Culture of Peace*. Quezon: Center for Peace Education, Mirriam College.

Panggabean, S. R. (2018). *Konflik dan Perdamaian Etnis di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet dan PUSAD Paramadina.

Qurtuby, S. Al. (2012). Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia's Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace. *Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, *44*(2), 135–162.

Qurtuby, S. Al. (2013). Peacebuilding in Indonesia: Christian–Muslim Alliances in Ambon Island. *Slam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, *24*(3), 349–367.

Qurtuby, S. Al. (2015). Ambonese Muslim JIhadists, Islamic Identity, and The History of CHristian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia. *International Journal of Asian Studies*, *1–29*(12). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479591414000199.

Qurtuby, S. Al. (2016). *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rae, D. M. (2013). *A few poorly organized men: interreligious violence in Poso, Indonesia*. Leiden and Boston: BRILL.

Sarapung, E., & Ven, C. van der. (2016). From Religion as Part of the Problem to Religion as Part of the Solution Case Study on Multi-religious Engagement for Peace and Conflict Solution in Indonesia. *The Ecumenical Review*, *68*(4), 433–443.

Schulze, K. E. (2017). The "ethnic" in Indonesia's communal conflicts: violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1–19.

Setiawan, E. (2018). Rumah Katu Juara 1 Lomba Film Pendek Deradikalisasi. Retrieved October 25, 2018, from https://www.ruangobrol.id/obrolan-kita/rumah-katu-juara-1-lomba-film-pendek-deradikalisasi/.

Sidel, J. (2006). *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Suaedy, A. (2000). *Luka Maluku: Militer Terlibat*. (A. Sueady, Ed.). Yogyakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi.

Tanamal, P., & Trijono, L. (2004). Religious Conflict in Maluku: In Search of Religious Community Peace. In L. Trijono (Ed.), *The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolustions*. Yogyakarta: CSPS Books.

Tomsa, D. (2009). *Local Elections and Party Politics in a Post-Conflict Area: the Pilkada in Maluku* (Indonesian Studies Working Paper No. 8). Sidney.

Trihartono, & Viartasiwi, N. (2015). Engaging the quiet mission: Civil society in breaking the cycle of violence in the post-conflict Poso, Indonesia. *Procedia Environmental Sciences*, *28*, 115–123.

Trijono, L. (2004). *The Making of Ethnic & Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions*. (L. Trijono, Ed.). Yogyakarta: CSPS Books.

Tuwanakotta, F. (2017). *Media Sosial sebagai Ruang Publik Komunitas Muda-Mudi dalam Mengantisipasi Ancaman Konflik Ambon Akibat Segregasi*. Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana.

Viartasiwi, N. (2012). *Calming Down the Ghost of Conflict: PostConflict Governance at Poso, Central Sulawesi-Indonesia 2001- 2011*. Ritsumeikan University.

Wyn, J & White, R. 1997. Rethinking Youth. 1997, 2014. NSW: Allen & Unwin.

# SUPPORTING TEACHERS TO TEACH PEACE: A CASE STUDY OF A SCHOOL

*Dody Wibowo*

## INTRODUCTION

A school is a small-scale society that represents the situation of an actual society. A school is small, but it has a vast potential to transform a society. Due to its role as a place to educate society members, particularly children (who will be future leaders of a society), a school should provide education that is useful not only for an individual, but also for a society.

Transforming schools into a setting that is supportive for nurturing a culture of peace is a fundamental requirement to overcome violence in society (Salmi, 1993). Such a supportive setting contributes to the creation of a peaceful society. It is not only the curriculum, pedagogy and other learning activities designed to support the culture and the organisation and decision-making structure in the school should also act in the same way (UNESCO, 2002).

Along with schools, there are teachers, who are seen to have various roles, including the role as agents of peace socialisation who help students to acquire knowledge, skills, and values related to peace. Teachers have a developmental influence

on their students (Reardon, 1999). Therefore, they are demanded to be the role model. However, teachers need guidance to identify knowledge, values, and skills that are needed to create a peaceful society, internalise them and know how to transmit them. These actions should be done intentionally, explicitly, and systematically to achieve the goal of creating a peaceful society (Reardon, 1999). Teachers may already know some knowledge on peace, subscribe to specific peace values, and practice peace skills. However, there are other knowledge, values, and skills that they may not know yet and need to learn. Therefore, support for teachers, particularly the support from their school, in developing their professionalism regarding peace is needed.

This study was intended to raise awareness of the importance of teachers in teaching peace and schools in supporting teachers to have the capacity to teach peace. The literature on the teacher-related topic in peace education is still limited (Horner et al., 2015). Meanwhile, it is universally agreed that teachers are an essential factor in schools. Therefore, studies on the role of teachers in peace education need to be mainstreamed.

Using the case of a school in Pidie, Indonesia, this study analysed the culture of the school and its efforts to socialise peace-related concepts to the teachers. Two questions guided this study:

- What do the school and its teachers understand about peace-related concepts and values?
- What are the efforts that the school taking to socialise peace-related concepts and values to its teachers?

The study employed the organisational culture adopted by the school and the activities of teacher professional development carried out by the school as the framework to analyse the data. The organisational culture was analysed to explain

the culture of the school. The analysis was focused on the peace-related values adopted by the school. Meanwhile, the activities of teacher professional development were investigated to find out and explain the different activities that the school does to socialise peace-related concepts and values in the school culture to the teachers.

## THE CONTEXT

Different areas in Indonesia have experienced different kinds of peace-conflict dynamics. There are areas that have been relatively peaceful, experienced a horizontal conflict (conflict between different groups in society), and experienced a vertical conflict (conflict between the government and local actor). Aceh is an area that has experienced a vertical conflict, which involved the Government of Indonesia and a separatist group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka / GAM (Free Aceh Movement).

### CONFLICT IN ACEH

Aceh is a province of Indonesia located on the northernmost tip of the island of Sumatra. Aceh suffered from a vertical conflict involving the Government of Indonesia and GAM. The almost 30 year conflict ended with the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM in August 2005.

A working unit, Badan Reintegrasi Aceh / BRA (Aceh Reintegration Agency), was created to conduct works mandated in the peace agreement related to the peaceful reintegration of GAM ex-combatants, the economic empowerment, and the provision of aid for the conflict victims. However, the work on the peacemaking in Aceh has not been finished yet. Thirteen years after the peace agreement was signed, BRA is still working on completing its tasks.

Education is one of the sectors handled by BRA. The Aceh Government Law issued in 2015 states that BRA has an office that works on the issues of peace education. However, there is minimal information available that explains the task of this office and what it has done. Information on the work of BRA related to peace education has been obtained from a series of seminars held by BRA to socialise the importance of peace education. BRA held the first seminar in Banda Aceh in December 2012. This one day seminar emphasised peace education models that are conflict sensitive and may prevent violent conflicts (Serambinews.com, 2012). In January 2013, BRA held the second seminar in Pidie Jaya. In this one day seminar, the topic delivered was the integration of peace education into the school curriculum (Portalsatu, 2013).

## EDUCATION IN ACEH

The Aceh provincial government recognises that the conflict has affected the education sector; however, education in Aceh has not been designed to respond to it. The government prefers to focus on education focused on the cultivation of Islamic values, as emphasised in the Aceh Government Law on Education (Direktorat Jenderal Peraturan Perundang-undangan, 2008). The Aceh Development Planning Agency in 2015 stated that the quality of the teachers in Aceh was still low (BAPPEDA Aceh, 2015). However, it did not explain the indicator used to measure the quality.

UNICEF implemented a peace education program in 13 districts in Aceh from 2000 to 2002 (Ashton, 2007). Since then, there has been no sustainable peace education program conducted in Aceh.

During the 2017 governor election campaign, one gubernatorial candidate promised to integrate peace education in the school curriculum. Once he was elected, he fulfilled his promise and since then the program of peace education integration has been one of the programs of the Aceh provincial government. However, its realisation is still unclear. The only realisation of the program is the allocation of 1.4 billion Indonesian rupiahs for the commemoration of Peace Day as part of the peace education program (AJNN, 2017).

## THE SCHOOLS

There are several areas in Aceh that have been largely affected by the conflict. One of those areas is Pidie (World Bank, n.d.). Pidie is also known as one of the camps for GAM (Gatra, 2003).

Pidie is located 150 kilometres east of Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh province. It has a population of 425,974 people (BPS Kabupaten Pidie, 2017). 99.95% of its population is Muslim (Sekretariat Daerah Kabupaten Pidie, 2018). Data from the Regional Secretariat of Pidie show that there are no other prayer buildings other than Mosques and other Islamic religious buildings in Pidie (Sekretariat Daerah Kabupaten Pidie, 2018). Although the largest ethnic group in Pidie is Acehnese, there are also other ethnic groups, such as Javanese, Bataknese, Sundanese, Minangnese and Chinese.

The number of cases of violence in Pidie during the time of conflict is excessive and dominated by GAM related cases (SNPK, 2019). Meanwhile, the cases of violence that occurred from 2005 to 2015 in Pidie have different motives (SNPK, 2019). Most of them are connected to the legislative election. There are 16 cases involving schools. They are cases in

which students of one school were in conflict with those of other schools and cases in which teachers were in conflict with students (SNPK, 2019).

There are 387 public and private schools (elementary to high school levels) registered in Pidie (Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah, 2018). Internet research has been conducted to find schools whose visions and missions are related to peace. There is only one such school. The other schools are focused on Islamic teaching.

The school is a private school established as a response to the earthquake and tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, which affected many areas in Aceh. The school commenced its operation in 2006. At the beginning of the operation, the school foundation, which runs the school, selected potential students who came from families affected by the earthquake, tsunami, and conflict. All the students lived in the school's boarding house and received scholarships from the school foundation. However, the school started accepting students from its neighbourhood in the second year of its operation. Now, the school does not provide scholarships anymore, and its students are mostly from the middle to upper-class families.

## THE CONCEPTS

### SCHOOL CULTURE

According to Edward Schein (1984), organisational culture is a set of underlying assumptions that consists of values, beliefs, attitudes, and experiences owned by a group as a result of dealing with problems of "external adaptation and internal integration" (p. 3). By applying the definition above, school culture can be seen as a set of values, beliefs, and attitudes,

as well as written and unwritten rules, created by the school management to construct the way the school members think and act.

In a school culture, there are conscious and unconscious perspectives, values, interactions, and practices that shape the culture, especially the one related to the history of the school. A school culture is influenced by the members of the school, such as the students, teachers, parents, administrators, and other members, but it is also influenced by external factors, such as the community, the location, and the government' policies.

A school has values that its members want to nurture. Values are "strategies, goals, principles, or qualities that are considered ideal, worthwhile, or desirable" (Keyton, 2011, p. 24) and that become the basis for the operation of an organisation and give direction to the organisation and its members in making decisions (Posner, 2010).

Schools have values that they believe. The values may be overt or hidden. To create a maximum impact of the values, O'Neil and Horne, who researched the internalisation of core values in an organisation, stated that an organisation has to state the values that it upholds clearly and integrate them into its culture (2012). An organisation can place its values in its statements, strategic documents, and communication media (O'Neil & Horne, 2012).

It is imperative for the members of a school to internalise the values of the school, as stated by O'Neil and Horne that "value-driven transformation in an organisation can only occur if the individuals in the organisation begin to internalise the organisation's chosen values" (2012, p.2). The members of a school should not only know what the school's values are but also show the values through their actions and behaviour.

## PEACE VALUES

An individual who practises peace has specific knowledge and skills and upholds values which are essential to create a peaceful society. Castro and Galace (2008) proposed that in a peaceful society, there is not only an absence of direct violence but also the existence of conditions supporting peace of mind. Borrowing the term developed by Johan Galtung (1969), a peaceful society is not only in negative peace, but also in positive peace, in which direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence are eliminated.

UNESCO (2001) considered 'values' as part of the positive qualities which are inherent within an individual. Meanwhile, Schwartz (1992) stated that values are "concepts or beliefs, pertain to desirable end-states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance" (p. 4). In short, a value is something that is good and indicates an ideal situation.

Peace values consist of any values which are positive, useful, and conducive to the creation of a holistic peace (Wulandari and Murdiono, 2018). Peace values may have various meanings, depending on the context. However, UNESCO, in its framework for peace education, stated that although peace values seem different in different contexts, they are still universally recognised (1995).

Here are some examples of peace values proposed by UNESCO (1995), Castro and Galace (2008) and Carter (2008), which can be categorised into two different categories:

Values related to self:

- Self-respect: having pride in one's identity, and realising that they have the strength and kindness that can contribute to positive change.
- Positive vision: having an imagination and hope for the creation of a peaceful society in the future, and trying to make that imagination into a reality.
- Optimism: having a trust that peace can be attained through peaceful means and processes.
- Patience: being capable of following steps that need to be fulfilled in a peace process.
- Courage: being eager to interrupt or stop violence.
- Responsible: being accountable for actions taken to create peace in the society.
- Commitment: aspiring to take action for a peaceful future.

Values related to the relationship with others and the planet:

- Cooperation: emphasising the importance of working cooperatively with others to achieve common goals.
- Acceptance: being ready to accept diversity among people.
- Nonviolence: respecting human life and rejecting the use of violence to respond to an enemy.
- Tolerance: respecting different customs, cultures, and forms of expression.
- Compassion: understanding the difficult situations and pain of others.
- Ecological concern: showing ethics that care about the sustainability of an environment.
- Respect for others: demonstrating a positive attitude towards others despite their differences from oneself.

- Gender equality: respecting the rights of every individual, particularly women, aspiring to equal opportunities between men and women, and fighting against abuse, exploitation, and violence.

- Global concern: being concerned more about other people in the world than about one's own group.

- Openness: being ready to learn and accept other people's ideas, beliefs, and experiences with a critical but open mind.

- Justice: being fair toward others, maintaining equality, and refusing all forms of exploitation and oppression.

- Mutuality: demonstrating recognition of others as part of the human family, while at the same time recognising the different needs of different groups.

- Empathy: demonstrating compassion for others who suffer and have difficulties in fulfilling their basic needs.

- Involvement (including personal and social responsibility): recognising personal and collective responsibility to create change by peaceful means in society.

- Service: showing awareness in supporting others.

## TEACHER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Teachers nowadays are no longer understood as a profession that transmits knowledge to passive students (Girardet, 2018). Teachers have transformed themselves to be agents of change, who 'facilitate the co-construction of knowledge between teachers and students, and among students themselves' (Girardet, 2018, p. 3).

As agents of change, teachers need to regularly and continuously update their capacity. The situation that surrounds teachers is always changing, and

they need to respond to the changes. It is mandatory for teachers to provide education that equips students with the necessary knowledge to respond to the rapid changes in society. The role of teacher professional development, then, is essential to support teachers to act as agents of change.

Teacher professional development can be defined as teacher's learning process to obtain knowledge, beliefs, motivation, and skills which then can be used to improve their work in supporting students' learning (Avalos, 2011; Richter, Kunter, Klusmann, Lüdtke, & Baumert, 2014). This learning process is a complex one that requires both emotional and cognitive abilities of teachers, as well as their capacity and willingness to study various beliefs and principles (Avalos, 2011).

A school or other institutions, as well as teachers themselves, can organise teacher professional development. Teacher professional development may take place in school or outside of school. It can take place individually and collectively and in the form of formal or informal learning, depending on the teachers' objectives and needs (Avalos, 2011). Formal learning is delivered through courses, workshops, trainings, and other structured activities. Meanwhile, informal learning happens through activities such as reading books, classroom observations, the production of curricula, discussion about data assessment, and sharing strategies (Avalos, 2011; Richter, Kunter, Klusmann, Lüdtke, & Baumert, 2014).

## METHODS

This study was conducted by applying a qualitative method since it was intended to explain actions done by the researched school on a specific topic. The study followed the steps proposed by Uwe Flick (2014) in conducting qualitative research, namely analysing the teachers' experiences in the school,

analysing the interactions and communications between the teachers and the school, and analysing some relevant documents.

Data for the study were collected from semi-structured interviews with the teachers and the school director and from informal conversations with other school members, including a member of the school foundation. Other sources of data were some of the school documents and school publications. Observation in the school environment was also conducted to collect some data.

Four teachers participated voluntarily in an individual interview. A set of criteria was decided to choose participants. The criteria are that the selected participants are teachers who are Acehnese and non-Acehnese (more specifically: who moved to Aceh after the earthquake and tsunami disaster), teachers who have participated in a training on school-based conflict management, teachers who have not participated in such a training yet, and teachers who have joined the school for at least one year. All of them appeared anonymously in the study to protect their identity.

The collected data were processed by reading the interview transcripts one by one to find data related to the research questions. Then the data related to the research questions were sorted so that the themes, patterns, and contradictions within them could be seen (Huberman and Miles, 1994; Yin, 2003). Data from the transcripts, school documents, and field notes were compared to triangulate the findings.

This study was conducted in a private school, which has its specific characteristics. Public schools have different characteristic. Therefore, the results of the study cannot be applied to them. Another issue potentially faced by the study is related to social desirability. However, the concern was

minimised by making the interviewed teachers anonymous, which was also aimed at making them feel less afraid to speak out.

## FINDINGS

The results of the interviews, conversations, observations, and document reviews are presented here in two parts, both of which respond to the research questions. The first part is the school's perspective regarding the school culture related to peace and the socialisation of the peace culture to the teachers. The second part is looking at the same question but from the teachers' perspective.

### THE SCHOOL'S PERSPECTIVE

To understand the school culture, two school documents, i.e. the school's statute and blueprint, are reviewed. The school statute is the highest regulation for the school, written by the school foundation. Meanwhile, the blueprint is a document that contains concepts and values which underlie the establishment and the development of the school. In addition to those two documents, a book written by the school foundation is also read to give more information about the school.

### THE SCHOOL CULTURE

In both the statute and the blueprint, the statement regarding the school culture is absent, but both documents contain the school's vision and missions. The vision and missions serve as the foundation for the development of necessary knowledge, values, and skills in the school. They also serve as the guidance for the development of different activities in the school, including the writing of school regulations.

The vision of the school is to create a positive and sustainable educational environment for the learners. Therefore, they will become qualified individuals who have academic capacity, strong skills, and noble character. The vision then is broken down into four missions:

1. Creating a learning space that can develop the learners' potential.
2. Developing a research culture, scientific publication, and other scientific activities that contribute to the world's civilisation.
3. Developing networks and cooperation with other institutions to improve the school's capacity.
4. Conducting education advocacy and community empowerment activities to contribute to the establishment of a culture of peace.

Mission four above is evidence that the school gives attention to peace. However, the statute does not provide further explanation about the culture of peace.

The school director, through an interview, explained that the school does not have a document specifically explaining the school culture. He said that the school culture had already existed when he joined the school as a teacher. He added that the school management and the school foundation never explained to him the reason behind the development of the school culture. He remembered that he learned about the school culture through various conversations with the school management members and fellow teachers, not in a specific meeting or activities that discuss the school culture.

An explanation of the school culture is found in a book written by the school foundation. It is explained that the school culture is a way to achieve the school's vision and missions. The culture of the school covers two groups of types of behaviour,

namely the group of five types of behaviour which the school members are encouraged to do (called as 5S in Indonesian) and the group of four types of behaviour that the school members are not allowed to do (called as 4No). The 5S consists of *senyum*, *salam*, *sapa*, *sopan*, and *santun*, which in English are, more or less, smile, greet, friendly, polite and well behaved. Meanwhile, the 4No consists of no cheating, no bullying, no smoking, and no littering. However, the book does not explain the reason why the school chose those behaviours as the foundation of its school culture. Among the 5S and 4No behaviours, 'no bullying' becomes the only noticeable behaviour that is connected directly to the culture of peace. 'No bullying' is closely related to the non-violence value in the list of peace values.

It is stated in the school statute that bullying and other violent actions are prohibited in the school. In the chapter on the termination of employment, it is stated that a teacher will be terminated if they are proven to have done physical or verbal violence to other school members. Meanwhile, in the chapter on students' rights, it is stated that the school protects the students from any violent actions and discrimination.

The school also creates a system to manage conflict in the school. The system is called the system of school-based conflict management. The school statute contains a chapter on this topic. It is a system designed to prevent, manage, and solve conflict within the school environment. The school statute explains different activities that the school can conduct to manage conflict, namely curriculum development, peer-mediation, peaceable classroom, and peaceable school. However, it is hard to see those activities in practice since there is no document telling about them. The only available document is a mechanism on how a school member should report if they see a violent action or become a victim of a violent action.

Meanwhile, the school blueprint explains peace education. The school wants to promote peace education in society. According to the school, peace education is an education to fulfil every individual's basic needs and improve their social relations with other society members, characterised by cooperation, communication, emotional expression, appreciation for diversity, inclusivity, and conflict resolution.

The peace education in the school is focused on non-violence education and inclusive education. Non-violence education is education that prevents the occurrence of bullying, quarrel among students, and teachers' violence against students. Meanwhile, inclusive education provides educational access to the marginalised group. However, the blueprint does not explain which community group can be categorised as marginalised.

## SOCIALISATION STRATEGY

For the socialisation of the school culture, particularly the non-violence value to the teachers, the school uses three different activities, namely the enforcement of the school regulations, trainings for the teachers, the promotion of values and behaviour through posters, and informal conversations with the teachers.

The school management enforces the school regulations, in particular the ones related to non-violence education, consistently. The school applies the system of school-based conflict management whenever a conflict happens in the school. This is confirmed by the school counselor, who has the task of recording and managing every conflict in the school. The system to manage conflict is also applied when there is a case of violence conducted by a teacher or another school staff member. The system is seriously applied by

the school management, as can be seen from the termination of a teacher who was proven to have committed violence against a student.

The school foundation provides trainings on school-based conflict management for the teachers. However, the trainings is not scheduled regularly and do not have a follow-up activity or a system to evaluate their impacts on the teachers. There is no available information that explains why the training is not conducted regularly and the considerations for the conduct of the training. Since the establishment of the school in 2006, the school foundation has conducted such a training three times, and only several teachers participated in the trainings. A school foundation member, who is an expert in peace studies, delivered the two-day training. The training covered topics such as conflict mapping, conflict style, bullying, peer mediation, peaceable classroom, peaceable school, and effective communication.

Another strategy done by the school to promote the value of non-violence is placing posters in different spots within the school compound. The posters contain non-violence and no bullying messages. This socialisation effort targets not only the teachers, but also other school staff members.

The school director informed that the decision to place the posters was the result of a meeting of the school management. However, the placing of the posters was not decided with a clear strategy. The school director could not explain the criteria for choosing such messages and the spots for the posters. Furthermore, the school did not have a strategy to evaluate the effectiveness of the posters in influencing the school members.

The last socialisation effort mentioned by the school director is informal conversations with the teachers. He said that the school promotes the value of non-violence through the routine morning meetings and other school meetings,

as well as personal conversations. However, this effort needs to be improved. The school has not yet had a system to measure and evaluate the impact of the effort.

## TEACHERS' PERSPECTIVES

This section presents the perspectives of four teachers from the school regarding their understanding of peace and the school's efforts to socialise the concept of peace and peace values to the teachers.

### *Teacher 1*

Teacher 1 joined the school in October 2017. She was a student of this school. She was a victim of the conflict in Aceh and was offered to be a student of the school in 2006. She studied at the school from grade 7 to grade 12. After finishing her university study, she decided to be a teacher and worked at her alma mater.

As a person who was born and grew up in East Aceh, one of the heavily conflict-affected areas in Aceh, she experienced living in a conflict time. She remembered that she could not sleep well in the evening since armed contacts between GAM and the Indonesian military sometimes happened in the evening. She added that during the conflict time, people could not show their assets since the conflict parties could take the assets from them. Further, she said that after the signing of the peace agreement, Aceh has gradually become peaceful and people have been able to claim the right of their assets. She said that at the moment, Aceh is in a peaceful situation, which means that there is no armed conflict anymore.

When asked about her understanding of a peaceful society, she explained that a peaceful society is a society in which there is no conflict among its members. According to her, members of a peaceful society solve their problems through excellent communication. She also added that members of a peaceful society could fulfil their economic and cultural rights without any disturbances. "When food prices are high and people are unable to buy foods, they will be restless. This will create an unpeaceful situation," she said.

The definition of a peaceful society provided by Teacher 1 above is based on her life experience. She said that she had never learned peace education during her school and university studies. She also said that she had not participated in any training on peace education that the school had conducted.

When asked whether the school had provided any socialisation about peace and non-violence to her, she said that since she had not participated in any of the training on peace-related topics provided by the school, she learned them only from her daily interactions with other school members. In her first day of work, she did not receive any orientation explaining the school's vision and missions. The school management gave her a copy of the school's statute and blueprint, but she has not finished reading it yet.

Regarding peace values, she said that she believes that patience is a peace value. She explained, "If there is a conflict, we should not be hasty, we should be patient, search the cause of the conflict, then solve it non-violently." According to her, patience is not taught explicitly by the school, but she learned it during her time as a student at the school. When she was a student, she had to live in the school's boarding house. Her family rarely visited her due to the long distance between

her house and the school. That is why she learned to be patient. Lastly, she added that patience is also a value promoted by her religion, Islam.

*Teacher 2*

Teacher 2 is a senior teacher at the school. She joined the school from the commencement of the school in 2006. She is from Aceh and experienced living in the conflict time.

She said that Aceh now is more peaceful compared to that in the conflict time. During the conflict time, it was dangerous to go out after 10 pm. Other than that, she could not express her opinion freely since there was a restriction on the freedom of speech. Today the situation in Aceh is different, as she said, "we can express our opinions freely now, and now we can go anytime we want."

She did not say that Aceh is peaceful now, but she said that Aceh is more peaceful compared to it in the past. She thought that there are still some threats, which come from criminal activities. According to her, separatism is not an issue anymore since the economy of Aceh is getting better.

She defined a peaceful society as a society in which there is no conflict, everyone can do their activities without fear, everyone supports and respects each other, and everyone has the freedom to express their opinions. She said that she did not get the definition from a training on a peace-related topic which she had participated in, but the training, and her life experience, did influence her in developing such a definition.

Teacher 2 said that, besides providing trainings for the teachers, the school management socialises peace values by giving messages in various meetings and providing a space for the teachers to implement the values.

She explained that the school management emphasises the importance of a process and lets the teachers experience the process of understanding the meanings of peace values.

Teacher 2 stated that respect is an essential peace value. She said that through respect, one can accept diversity and build empathy. "Respect makes us able to listen to different opinions and understand others' positions. Through such an understanding, we can find a solution to a conflict," she added. Further, she said that her parents taught her to nurture respect and the school strengthens it.

*Teacher 3*

Teacher 3 is a senior teacher who has been teaching at the school since its commencement. He is from Java and has never had any experience living in a conflict time. He came to Aceh as a volunteer for the program of education in emergencies in Aceh after the earthquake and tsunami disaster hit Aceh in December 2004.

When he joined the school, the school foundation told him that one of the school's purposes of having some teachers who are not from Aceh is to provide Acehnese children with an opportunity to learn about diversity, particularly the one related to the experience of interacting with people from outside Aceh. He also shared his understanding of the goal of the school, which is:

> *"We hope that if the students learn in a peaceful environment, they can achieve their dreams based on their potential, and once they graduate from the school, they will also be able to contribute to the creation of peace in their society."*

He then shared his understanding of a peaceful society, which is a society where its members can actualise their self freely, but still in a corridor that does not disturb the rights of others. He learned the definition from his education before joining the school.

He also explained that the definition of a peaceful society introduced by the school is more on the absence of verbal and physical violence in the society. However, this definition was not explained clearly to him by the school management. His understanding of the definition introduced by the school management was based on his observation on what the school management expects the school members to do in connection with the creation of a peaceful society. Nonetheless, he thought that his definition and the school's are still on the same track.

He said that some teachers have participated in the trainings on peace-related topics conducted by the school, while others have not. This has contributed to the teachers' different understandings of peace. He has participated in three trainings. The first training was conducted by the school foundation for all the teachers who would teach in the school in 2006. However, he did not know the school management's rationale for his selection to participate in the second and third trainings.

He suggested that, if the school wants to support the teachers to understand peace better, it should provide the training for all the teachers. He felt that the training that he had joined gave him a basic understanding of peace only. He wanted to have a deeper understanding of peace. Therefore, he recommended that the school foundation and the school management conduct follow-up trainings and make the training as a regular agenda.

He also suggested that the school management should create an environment conducive to the school members where they can practice and discuss their peace-related knowledge, values, and skills. He stated, "Teachers will function well when the school environment is supportive. Teachers can practice their understanding of peace, which will contribute to the achievement of the school's goal."

## *Teacher 4*

Teacher 4 joined the school in 2015. He is from Aceh and comes from the village where the school is located. He joined the school because his parents and people in his village told him that there should be someone from the village who worked as a teacher in the school.

Explaining his understanding of peace, he said that having experience of living during the conflict time in Aceh has made him have negative stereotypes towards people from outside Aceh. He revealed that during the conflict time, people in his village supported GAM. There was a divide between GAM as the good guy and the Indonesian military as the bad guy. He admitted that he subscribed to that stereotype since he witnessed the bad behaviour of the Indonesian military. However, his stereotype gradually changed after joining the school. Having interaction with teachers and some members of the school foundation who come from outside Aceh has made him learn about people from different regions other than Aceh. He said that he does not see people from outside Aceh as enemies anymore. That is why his definition of a peaceful society is a society where its members respect each other - where they respect diversity and the different opinions of each other. He emphasised that his interaction with other school members influenced his definition.

Teacher 4 mentioned that, besides the interaction that he has in the school, the training on school-based conflict management that he participated in 2017 also taught him to respect diversity. He remembered that the trainer, who is a non-Acehnese, asserted, "Everyone is different, but we are part of a big picture; we have a common goal in this school that unites us."

Reflecting on the impact of the training, he hoped that the school management will carry out more activities of teacher professional development related to peace, such as providing trainings on peace, inviting peace activists to share their experiences, and conducting programs in which the teachers can practise their peace-related skills and knowledge in real situations.

## UNDERSTANDING ON THE
## PEACE CONCEPT AND VALUES

The theory of organisational culture mentions that it is imperative that an organisation state clearly the concepts, values, and other aspects of the culture that it upholds. The lack or absence of such a clear statement will create confusion among its members on the organisational culture.

The lack of information on the peace concept and values in the school's statute and blueprint, coupled with the lack of communication between the school foundation and the school management on peace-related matters, has resulted in the different understandings among the school members on the peace concept and values that the school aspires to. The peace concept and values upheld by the school are not clearly stated in its statute and blueprint. The documents contain some keywords commonly used in peace studies, such as non-violence, diversity, respect, communication, appreciation,

inclusive, cooperation, and conflict resolution. However, the school foundation does not transform those keywords into a definition of peace which will guide the school management to develop a strategy to establish a culture of peace, as mentioned in the school's missions.

The school foundation has made 5S and 4No behaviours as the school culture. However, it is difficult to justify those behaviours as a translation of the school's culture of peace. There is only one among those behaviours connected directly to peace, i.e. the no bullying behaviour. The other behaviours can be considered as contributing to peace only if there is a justification for their contribution to the creation of a peaceful society.

The consistency of the school in enforcing the use of non-violence through the adoption of the system of school-based conflict management to manage conflict in the school and the harsh consequences for any use of violence in the school explains that the school implements only a part of a culture of peace. A culture of peace, according to UNESCO, not only rejects violence but also promotes freedom, justice, democracy, protection of human rights, tolerance, and solidarity (United Nations, 1998). The importance of moving beyond non-violence is also emphasised by Susan L. Caulfield (2000), who stated:

> *"The concept of peaceable school goes beyond the notion of violence reduction. A peaceable school is a school where violence is minimised, yes, but it is also a school where everyone is made to feel important and where youths are given meaningful opportunities to explore learning (p. 173)."*

The teachers' definitions on the concept of peace are not uniform. Each of the teachers has a different emphasis based on their life experience. In creating a peaceful society,

Teacher 1 emphasises the importance of fulfilling human needs, while Teacher 2 emphasises freedom from fear as the element of a peaceful society. Teacher 3 emphasises self-actualisation as an essential factor, and Teacher 4 emphasises respect for diversity. The teachers created those definitions based on their life experience. They did not learn the definitions from the school.

The different emphases that the teachers gave show that, according to them, peace is beyond the absence of violence. Compared to the school's understanding of peace, the teachers' understandings are more comprehensive. The teachers mentioned different elements, besides non-violence, that are required for the creation of a culture of peace.

Unfortunately, the teachers' understandings are still personal in nature. They have not yet communicated their understandings to other school members nor discussed their understandings with them, particularly the school management and their fellow teachers. Meanwhile, it is imperative for the school to have one common understanding of the comprehensive peace since it will be the guideline for all the teachers to develop learning activities for the students that can contribute to the creation of a culture of peace.

## THE SOCIALISATION OF PEACE-RELATED TOPICS

Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy (1998) asserted that the creation of a school that supports a culture of peace should be carried out by teachers who understand and consider the social situation around the school and bring in the social issues in the society to their classrooms. Therefore, a program of teacher professional development is crucial as a way to remind teachers to update their understanding

The school has conducted four activities to socialise the school culture, particularly its aspect of non-violence. However, the school did not design the activities well; they were not accompanied with an evaluation system, which actually could have measured the effectiveness of the efforts made by the school.

The school regulation related to non-violence is enforced well. The consistent efforts made by the school to create a non-violence environment seems to have made the teachers uphold the value of non-violence. However, this situation leaves the question of whether the teachers have already embraced non-violence as their value or just follow the school regulation. This situation has connection with the effectiveness of the trainings on school-based conflict management for the teachers conducted by the school foundation.

The trainings on peace-related topics created as a program of teacher professional development have two problems. The trainings did not have a regular schedule and were not accompanied with follow-up activities. Only three trainings have been conducted in the school since 2006. This is not sufficient to capacitate the teachers. Moreover, only several teachers participated in the trainings. Those participating in the trainings remember only a few parts of the training materials, and without follow-up activities, they will most likely forget what they have learned.

The impacts of the other two activities, poster making and informal conversations, are not clear. All the interviewed teachers did not mention poster making as their learning medium. Meanwhile, Teacher 1 and Teacher 2 mentioned informal conversations as a forum for them to learn peace-related topics. However, it is difficult to measure their effectiveness in influencing the teachers.

Lastly, the teachers asserted that they need more activities of teacher professional development to learn peace-related matters. The forms of the activities proposed by them vary. Teacher 3 emphasised the importance of a scheduled-training with different levels of depth of the topic and follow-up activities, which enable the teachers to conduct continuous learning. Meanwhile, Teacher 4 stated that it is important for the teachers to put the peace-related knowledge and skills that they have learned into practice. This idea is in line with John Dewey's idea that experiential learning is important for teachers, because it enables them to address problems in society (1916). Further, Dewey added that teachers often become more productive in learning when they practice their skills and knowledge (1916).

## CONCLUSION

A school represents the situation of society. A school can contribute to the transformation of society through different learning activities that it provides to its students. To be able to do that, a school needs to provide an environment that is conducive to the learning of the knowledge, values, and skills needed to transform society into a peaceful one.

Two essential elements that create such an environment are school culture and teachers. A school culture that is aligned with the culture of peace provides a ground for the school members to practice their knowledge, values, and skills related to peace. In addition to school culture, well-prepared teachers who have capacity for conducting peace-related activities will help their students to learn how to act as society members who are capable of contributing to the creation of a peaceful society.

The case of the school in Pidie shows that a school culture should be developed based on a clear foundation. The lack of detail on what the school defines as a culture of peace and

the peace values that it wants to promote has made it lose its direction in developing a school culture that is aligned with the concept of a culture of peace agreed globally.

The teachers' different understandings of the concept of peace may lead to confusion, mainly if there is no communication to discuss their various definitions of peace. The teachers are the extension of the school management and their responsibility is to conduct learning activities in the classroom, which in the end, will fulfil the vision and missions of the school. Therefore, the teachers need to have a common understanding of the concept of peace.

Preparing and supporting teachers to teach peace is a necessity. Schools should have a clear strategy for developing their teachers' professionalism in teaching peace. Different activities can be conducted to capacitate teachers. However, a balance between learning in a formal setting (such as joining a training) and learning in an informal setting (such as practising the skills and knowledge of peace in society) will provide more insights to teachers, which will help them in designing pro-peace learning activities for their students.

# REFERENCES

AJNN. (2017). *Anggaran BRA 2017 capai Rp 61 miliar, ini rinciannya*. Accessed on June 4, 2019, from http://www.ajnn.net/news/anggaran-bra-2017-capai-rp-61-miliar-ini-rinciannya/index.html.

Avalos, B. (2011). Teacher professional development in Teaching and Teacher Education over ten years. *Teaching and Teacher Education, 27*(1), 10–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2010.08.007.

BAPPEDA Aceh. (2015). *Kajian analisis mutu pendidikan Aceh*. Accessed on June 4, 2019, from https://bappeda.acehprov.go.id/download/download/56.

BPS Kabupaten Pidie. (2017). *Jumlah penduduk pertengahan tahun dirinci menurut jenis kelamin dan seks rasio di Kabupaten Pidie, 2016*. Accessed on June 5, 2009, from https://pidiekab.bps.go.id/dynamictable/2017/10/26/47/jumlah-penduduk-pertengahan-tahun-dirinci-menurut-jenis-kelamin-dan-seks-rasio-di-kabupaten-pidie-2016.html.

Brush, P. S., Caulfield, S. L., & Snyder-Joy, Z. (1998). Seeking a Social Justice-Oriented Classroom: The Role of Curriculum Transformation and the Importance of Difference. *Contemporary Justice Review*, *1*, 297-321.

Carter, C. C. (2008). Voluntary standards for peace education. *Journal of peace education*, *5*(2), 141-155.

Castro, L.N. and Galace, J. N. (2008). *Peace education: A pathway to a culture of peace*. Quezon City: Miriam College.

Caulfield, S. L. (200,0). Creating peaceable schools. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *567*(1), 170-185.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education.* New York: Macmillan.

Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah. (2018). *Data Sekolah Kabupaten Bireuen Semester 2018/2019 Genap*. Accessed on April 30, 2019, from http://dapo.dikdasmen.kemdikbud.go.id/sp/2/061200.

Direktorat Jenderal Peraturan Perundang-undangan. (2008). *Qanun Aceh nomor 5 tahun 2008 tentang penyelenggaraan pendidikan*. Accessed on June 4, 2019, from http://ditjenpp.kemenkumham.go.id/files/ld/2008/nanggroacehdarussalam5-2008.pdf.

Flick, U. (2014). *An introduction to qualitative research*. London: Sage Publication Ltd.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of peace research*, *6*(3), 167-191.

Gatra. (2003). *Aceh Bergolak*. Accessed on June 5, 2019, from http://arsip.gatra.com/2003-05-26/majalah/artikel.php?pil=23&id=28888.

Girardet, C. (2018). Why do some teachers change and others don't? A review of studies about factors influencing in-service and pre-service teachers' change in classroom management. *Review of Education, 6*(1), 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1002/rev3.3104.

Horner, L. K., Kadiwal, L., Sayed, Y., Barrett, A., Durrani, N., & Novelli, M. (2015). *Literature review: The role of teachers in peacebuilding*. Amsterdam: The Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding.

Huberman, A. M., and Miles, M. B. (1994). Data management and analysis methods. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (p. 428-444). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.

Keyton, J. (2011). *Communication and organizational culture: A key to understanding work experiences*. Los Angeles: Sage.

O'Neil, S. M., & Horne, A. L. (2012). Evaluating the internalisation of core values at a South African public service organisation. *SA Journal of Human Resource Management*, *10*(1), 1-14.

Posner, B. Z. (2010). Another look at the impact of personal and organizational values congruency. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *97*(4), p. 535-541.

Portalsatu.com. (2013). Badan Reintegrasi Aceh sosialisasikan pendidikan damai di Aceh Jaya. Accessed on May 6, 2019, from http://archives.portalsatu.com/uncategorized/badan-reintegrasi-aceh-sosialisasikan-pendidikan-damai-di-aceh-jaya/.

Reardon, B. A. (1999). *Educating the educators: The preparation of teachers for a culture of peace*. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1464-9055(00)00214-1.

Richter, D., Kunter, M., Klusmann, U. T. A., Lüdtke, O., & Baumert, J. (2014). Professional Development Across the Teaching Career: Teachers' Uptake of Formal and Informal Learning. In S. Krolak-Schwerdt, S. Glock, & M. Böhmer (Eds.), *Teachers' Professional Development: Assessment, Training, and Learning* (pp. 97–121). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Salmi, J. (2004). Violence, democracy and education: an analytic framework. In C. C. Yeakey, J. Richardson, and J. B. Buck (Eds.), *Advances in Education in Diverse Communities: Research, Policy and Praxis*, 4, p.207 – 230.

Schein, E. H. (1984). Coming to a new awareness of organizational culture. *Sloan management review*, *25*(2), p. 3-16.

Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, p. 1-65.

Sekretariat Daerah Kabupaten Pidie. (2018). *Profil & data Kabupaten Pidie*. Accessed on June 5, 2019, from https://www.scribd.com/document/387990987/ABUSYIK-docx.

Serambinews.com. (2012). BRA gelar seminar pendidikan damai. Accessed on May 6, 2019, from http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2012/12/13/bra-gelar-seminar-pendidikan-damai.

SNPK. (2019). *Sistem nasional pemantauan kekerasan Indonesia*. Accessed on May 6, 2019, from https:// http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/.

UNESCO. (1995). *Declaration and integrated framework of action on education for peace, human rights and democracy.* Accessed on April 30, 2019, from http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/REV_74_E.PDF.

UNESCO. (2001). *Learning the way of peace teachers' guide to peace education*. New Delhi: UNESCO.

UNESCO. (2002). *Good practices in support of educating for peace and non-violence.* Paris: UNESCO.

United Nations. (1998, January 15). *Culture of peace (A/RES/52/13).* Accessed on December 4, 2018, from http://www2.unesco.org/iycp/uk/uk_sum_cp.htm.

World Bank. (n.d.). *Program tinjauan pasca konflik oleh para pemangku kepentingan di Aceh.* Accessed on April 30, 2019, from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/857501468049458698/pdf/556030WP0v10BA1BLIC100MSR0Exsum0Ina.pdf.

Wulandari, D. and Murdiono, M. (2018). Peace values on Pancasila and civic education textbooks in senior high school. *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 251*. Annual Civic Education Conference (ACEC 2018).

Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Los Angeles: SAGE.

# INDEX

214, 221, 225, 227, 237, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, 288, 307, 317, 319, 324, 328

# H

harmonious, 3, 239, 249, 251, 254, 256, 258, 259

harmony, 8, 31, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 70, 71, 91, 175, 239, 240, 253, 254, 255, 259, 260, 264, 290, 305, 308

hijab, 26, 41, 64, 65, 66, 67, 80, 81

history, 15, 5, 16, 18, 22, 36, 61, 89, 148, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 241, 255, 274, 280, 321

horizontal, 4, 1, 25, 124, 317

human rights, 2, 42, 141, 159, 164, 165, 173, 241, 249, 259, 339, 347

# I

identities, 8, 9, 14, 16, 24, 25, 74, 90, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 163, 174, 176, 201, 234, 250, 268

ideology, 52, 53, 57, 91, 128, 141, 167, 179, 180, 181, 197, 211, 213

implementation, 4, 3, 10, 11, 20, 25, 27, 30, 39, 51, 52, 55, 56, 65, 75, 125, 126, 132, 138, 140, 141, 144, 156, 235

inclusion, 6, 153, 155, 234

influence, 4, 8, 20, 21, 22, 27, 41, 76, 77, 128, 138, 142, 143, 173, 174, 224, 226, 236, 237, 238, 315, 334

informal, 1, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 25, 95, 236, 247, 303, 325, 326, 330, 331, 341, 343

infrastructure, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 103, 147, 151, 153

inheritance, 4, 2, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 95

initiatives, 28, 107, 116, 253, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 297, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307

institutions, 8, 9, 10, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 21, 25, 37, 43, 46, 84, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 107,

## S

**T**

## U

## V

# W

# Y

# CONTRIBUTORS

**Alifian Ramadhany** is a graduate student in the Study Program of Islamic Education Management, Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teaching Sciences, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Azka Abdi Amrurobbi** is a researcher with Polgov, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Dian Nuri Ningtyas** is a researcher with Polgov, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Dody Wibowo** is a lecturer in the Masters Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Jusuf Nikolas Anamofa** is a lecturer in Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (STKIP) Gotong Royong Masohi, Central Maluku, Indonesia.

**Katarzyna Głąb** is PhD researcher in SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland.

**Mada Sukmajati** is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**M. Najib Azca** is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Moh Zaki Arrobi** is a Ph.D. student in Utrecht University and a lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Nancy Novitra Souisa** is a lecturer in the Study Program of Christian Religious Education, Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, Ambon, Indonesia.

**Nur Fatah Abidin** is a lecturer in the Department of History Education, Faculty of Teacher Training and Educational Sciences, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta, Indonesia.

**Siti Nur Hidayah** is a lecturer in the Study Program of Islamic Education Management, Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teaching Sciences, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

**Steve Gerardo Christoffel Gaspersz** is a lecturer in the Graduate Program of Theology, Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, Ambon, Indonesia.

**Yogi Setya Permana** is a Ph.D. researcher in the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) - Universiteit Leiden and a researcher of the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Indonesia.

This book has at least three aims. The first aim is exploring the dynamics in the implementation of peace education in various regions in Indonesia in the democratization era. The second aim is explaining how far the inheritance of conflict memory has been incorporated into the learning process in the education system in Indonesia, be it in regions with the background of vertical conflict (between the state and the communities), in regions with the background of horizontal conflict (among community groups), or in regions that seem to be capable of maintaining peace, although they actually have quite high (horizontal) conflict potentials. The third aim is expanding interests in the study of the roles and contributions of education in and to conflict management and democratic deepening in Indonesia, especially the ones with interdisciplinary approaches. Therefore, it is hoped that the book will contribute to the development of studies in peace education and be followed up with further studies on the topic of the relationship among education, democratic deepening, and conflict management.