RECLAIMING THE STATE

OVERCOMING PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY IN POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA

EDITORS
AMALINDA SAVIRANI & OLLE TÖRNQUIST

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PREFACE

DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA: AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT

Purwo Santoso

This is a report on the state of democracy and democratisation in Indonesia. It provides recently assembled, critical accounts on the achievements toward, as well as challenges to democratisation in the country. In doing so, it offers a point of reference for individuals who are positioned to secure Indonesia's transformation to a truly democratic political system. The assessment weaves together perspectives from two groups contributing to this transformation: theoretically oriented democracy researchers and action-oriented pro-democracy activists. Thus, this report aims to ensure that democratisation is not only moving forward, but that it also is headed steadily in the right direction. While research for this report has been carried out in compliance with the highest standards for a scientific

assessment, the resulting report is intended to equip activists and political practitioners with the tools to more effectively contribute to democratisation.

The content of this report has been previously made available to the public as an executive summary. This publication makes available to the public a more elaborate presentation of findings and arguments. Early findings were also previously presented during seminars that took place in Jakarta on February 25, 2014, with the assistance of the former Secretary General of the House of Representatives, Eddie Siregar, and on April 29, 2014 at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Yogyakarta.

This publication also contains a revised periodical assessment on the increasing liberalisation of Indonesian politics. This does not, in any way, imply that Indonesia is becoming more democratic, however. Confusion over the current state of affairs and a misunderstanding of the distinction between democracy and liberalism warrant further exploration. While Indonesians have rejected authoritarianism, they have also expected the state to retain its strategic role in managing public affairs, and particularly welfare provisions. Thus, the fact that the existing mode of governance is more liberalised does not necessarily reflect democratic governance. As the title of this book suggests, Democratisation is a matter of reclaiming the state.

An initial assessment on the state of democracy in Indonesia took place between 2003 and 2004, and the written report was published in 2005 as the Indonesian-language book, *Menjadikan Demokrasi Bermakna: Masalah dan Pilihan di Indonesia*, edited by A. E. Priyono, Willy Purna Samadhi, and Olle Törnquist. It was made available in English in 2007 under the title, *Making Democracy Meaningful: Problems and Options in Indonesia*. The second update

was presented in an English-language report released in May 2009, edited by Willy Purna Samadhi and Nicolaas Warouw and entitled, *Building–Democracy on the Sand: Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia*. Later that same year an Indonesian-language version was released under the title, *Demokrasi di Atas Pasir*: *Kemajuan dan Kemunduran Demokrasi di Indonesia*. These two previous reports were combined for a publication in *PCD Journal* titled, "A Decade of *Reformasi*: Unsteady Democratisation." While earlier reports have been refined with more detailed parameters, the basic aim remains to understand the dynamics of democratisation in Indonesia.

In addition to noting the precedence for these previous reports, it is also important to note that the management of the project has shifted. While previous reports were technically managed by Demos Jakarta, the current report is technically managed by the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UGM, as part of a larger, ongoing project titled "Power, Welfare and Democracy." The research was made possible by the generous support of The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Indonesia. Bearing this in mind, I can assure the reader that this support precludes any governmental influences — either Norwegian or Indonesian. The managing team strictly maintained the integrity of the assessment content while carrying out its managerial responsibilities. The assessment has involved a wide array of contributors with diverse backgrounds, who work professionally under the banner of academic collaboration between UGM and the University of Oslo (UiO). In this regard, the report maintains the central role of UiO's Professor Olle Törnquist.

The main features of the assessment scheme are as follows:

First, while the assessment is concerned with the achievement of democratisation, its main interest is not to reach a particular index position. An index on democracy allows a comparison of various approaches, but in and of itself, it is not prescriptive. The assessment presented in this book concerns the future trajectory of democratisation, and employs a qualitative approach to pinpoint specific achievements, barriers, and challenges for setting agendas within pro-democracy. In other words, this report is meant to support the broad framework of the democracy movement.

Second, given the style of previous reports, the production of this report maintains the collective ownership of the pro-democracy movement. It relies on the hard work of pro-democracy activists from all over the country, and especially where pro-democracy activism is widely prevalent. Data were collected by enumerators under the supervision of local and prominent chief researchers who served as key informants in their respective areas. Extensive surveys were carried out between February and August 2013 in 30 cities and regencies (*kabupaten*), including the Greater Area of Jakarta and Special Region of Yogyakarta. Data collection was possible through the hard work of the following key informants: Aryos Nivada (South Aceh), T. Muhammad Jafar (Banda Aceh), Benget Silitonga (Medan), Priyono Prawito (Bengkulu), Kasmadi Kasyim (Kerinci), Muhammad Irfan (Batam), Syafarudin and Tabah Maryanah (Lampung Selatan), Didik Hadiyatno (Balikpapan), Noorhalis Majid (Banjarmasin), Lutfi Wahyudi (Kutai Kartanegara), Viza Julianzah (Pontianak), Widiyanto (Jakarta), A. H. Maftuchan (Bekasi and Tangerang), Caroline Paskarina (Bandung), Hasrul

Hanif (Yogyakarta), Alfi Satiti (Pekalongan), Wachyu Ardiyanto (Batang), Akhmad Ramdhon (Surakarta), Aan Anshori (Surabaya and Sidoarjo), I Putu Wirata (Badung), M. Imran (Makassar), M. Nur Alamsyah (Poso), Welly Waworuntu (Manado), Jusuf Madubun (Ambon), M. Ridha Ajam (Ternate), Otto Gusti Madung (Belu), Rudi Rohi (Kupang), and Aprila R. A. Wayar (Jayapura). Research teams included a total of 120 persistent and tenacious regional researchers. They formed the real frontline for this survey. Without their dedication, this survey would not possibly have been accomplished. Our appreciation goes out to them all.

Third, this report is informed heavily by the assessments provided by pro-democracy activists who are engaged in democracy movements. Their locally based assessments were useful in conveying how advocacy can accelerate the democratisation process at the regional level. The authors of this book, as well as other key contributors, have analyzed the feedback provided by pro-democracy advocates to present a trans-local picture. In addition to the report's authors and informants, other individuals who contributed to this report include Wening Hapsari M. and Rita Kartika Sari who, under the coordination of Debbie Prabawati, ensured that all needs of the field research team were met. They also convoyed the early dissemination of surveys in Jakarta and Yogyakarta and ensured that surveying ran smoothly. Additionally, Loly N. Fitri supported the team of writers by providing a positive and fully supported environment to fulfil their tasks. I am deeply appreciative of their dedicated work.

Fourth, this report's validity is contingent upon the sharing of observations and analyses — following data gathering and analysis — with research participants. In order to ensure the

accuracy of the analysis, a series of workshops involving activists in the field were conducted. On other occasions, focus groups of experts met with the core research team to discuss data findings. In writing this report, we acknowledge the important contribution of prominent experts on democratisation in Indonesia, including Mohtar Mas'oed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Daniel Dhakidae, A. E. Priyono, Wardah Hafidz, Wiladi Budiharga, Usman Hamid, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Danang Widoyoko, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Handoko Wibowo, Philip J. Vermonte, and Kuskridho Ambardi. Their insights and various perspectives, as democracy practitioners and academicians, enriched this book's analysis. Professor Kristian Stokke from UiO was particularly instrumental in providing valuable input throughout the research process. I extend my deep gratitude to all expert consultants for taking part in this study.

Fifth, the report links topical assessments from particular resource people to form a broader argument on democratisation. This report is produced under the conviction that Democratisation is a bottom-up process, rather than a scheme imposed at the national level down to the local level. Moreover, democracy requires the engagement of the public, or *demos*, in public affairs. In line with this contention, the findings of this study are subject to ongoing revision following follow-up studies, and it is hoped that the participants in this research will continue to engage in our deepening analysis of the progression of democracy.

Finally, this book would not have come about without the dedication of its authors: Amalinda Savirani, who served as research coordinator and editor, together with Hasrul Hanif, Eric Hiariej, Willy Purna Samadhi, and Olle Törnquist engaged in lengthy, heated, and informative debates to ensure that this

book is ready to be presented to the public. They have translated complex qualitative data into an easy-to-comprehend analysis and reflection on the democratic movement in Indonesia. Their spirited persistence for this book's completion deserves the highest appreciation.

I hope that the publication of this report contributes solutions to the remaining challenges to achieving a democratic Indonesia. Enjoy your reading, and prepare for action accordingly.

Prof. Purwo Santoso
Head of Department of Politics and Government
Director of Power, Welfare and Democracy Program

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Amalinda Savirani and Olle Törnquist

In mid-August 1998, three months after the Soeharto regime crumbled in the face of the Asian economic crisis and student protests, the Indonesian Academy of Sciences and the Ford Foundation bought together leading international and Indonesian scholars and experts to discuss what the country could learn from worldwide efforts at crafting liberal democracy, efforts which began in Spain in 1975 (Liddle et al. 2001). However, there were some problems. The universal recommendation was to foster a pact of moderate reformers who could contain both reactionary forces and radical popular movements by combining economic liberties, civil society, free and fair elections and the establishment of institutions (usually defined as rules of the game) with which moderates could live. Several participants asked for

more contextual points of departure in the visions and problems in Indonesia. But as the response was an unbending 'we just give you the framework; you fill it in'[1], a number of concerned intellectuals began to consider a broader approach.

The first step was to survey the post-Soeharto democracy movement, followed by critical case studies in cooperation with the actors themselves (Prasetyo et al. 2003). A major conclusion was that much of the movement had almost become 'floating', lacking a strong social and organisational base in the ordinary people that were prevented from independently organising under Soeharto. The next step was therefore to assess the challenges of the broader dynamics of democratisation.[2] This was the origin of the alternative framework for assessing democratisation, which has now been applied in three countrywide surveys — in 2003-2004 and 2006-2007 by the Demos research organisation in cooperation with the University of Oslo, and 2013-2014 in cooperation with Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo.

In this book, the major conclusions from the most recent survey are reported in the context of previous survey results as well as major arguments present in the scholarly and public discourses. The summary report is followed by three more detailed analyses. The first involves making all data from the surveys publicly available. The second consists of in-depth studies of some of the most important data (such as on actors' capacity for change). The

1 Professor Alfred Stefan.

2 The decision was agreed upon by a task force (including the late Asmara Nababan, Th. Sumartana and Munir Said Thalib in addition to Stanley Adi Prasetyo and Olle Törnquist) that was appointed in early 2002 at a conference with scholars and activists discussing early conclusions from studies of the democracy movement.

third consists of a number of case studies of issues crucial for further democratisation, including the struggle for active citizens, political and social rights, the politics and policies of welfare state systems, and the efforts of local democratic regimes. The results of this survey, as well as related publications, are available via the project's web site http://pwd.polgov.id/.

Points of Departure in Assessing Democratisation

Our alternative framework for assessing democratisation differs from the mainstream methodologies in five respects.[3] First, we do not take for granted that a number of institutions that have often been related to paradigmatic cases of democracy in western Europe and North America in particular, necessarily promote democracy (defined in the generally accepted terms of 'public control of public affairs on the basis of political equality'[4]) in other times and contexts. The issue of whether or not rules and regulations, such as those on citizenship, freedoms, civil society organisations, or elections, actually foster democracy should therefore be an empirical question rather than a normative one. Hence, we have opted for a substantive definition of democracy, rather than a procedural one. Moreover, in contrast to most mainstream assessments, it is also important to consider the extent to which a democracy is not only substantive but also substantial by investigating which matters are subject to democratic decisions or are depoliticised and decided by, for example, technocrats, courts, the market, Rotary meetings, or heads of religious communities, clans, or families.

3 For more extensive discussion, see Törnquist 2013.
4 Beetham 1999

Second, while we do not take a stand against liberal democracy, we recognise that the standards of this dominant model may not always be viable or generate the intended effects in all contexts. Hence, we also consider other views and possibilities, such as supplementary democratic representation through issue- and interest-organisations (in addition to liberal elections) as well as various forms of deliberation, which have proven crucial in such efforts as participatory budgeting in Latin America.

Third, we attempt to go beyond existing assessments of the 'state of democracy', as they tend to measure against a normatively preferred model of democracy and do not examine the causes of stagnation and progress. We focus instead on the setbacks, advances, and options of democratisation.

Fourth, we therefore complement studies of more or less formalised and organised institutions by likewise focusing on (i) both dominant and alternative actors of change and (ii) their capacities to foster and use democratic values and institutions. In other words, we combine theories of institutions, agency, and power.[5]

Finally, we give prime importance to new knowledge about actual dynamics — beyond air-conditioned think tank offices in the big cities — and to support pioneering actors of change. This is both because of the shortage of databanks on democratisation in Indonesia, and because mainstream assessments assume that liberal democratic institutions are superior so that it is therefore sufficient to focus on people's feelings about them. Unlike

5 In the first case we stand primarily on the shoulders of David Beetham and his colleagues (2002); in the latter cases we draw particularly on Pierre Bourdieu's theories of power, Sydney Tarrow's (1994) and others' theories of social movements, and our own previous studies of political organisations in Southeast Asia (e.g. Törnquist 2002)

opinion surveys, which use random sampling and statistical explanations, we have instead identified the best experts on the challenges of democratisation in various political fields around Indonesia and asked them questions, which have enabled us to evaluate the strength of different theories and arguments about democratisation. These experts are critically reflective scholars and activists that have been engaged in democratisation for long periods of time. Many are also important actors of change, and therefore most capable of using the survey results to discuss policy recommendations. We shall later return to the details of our survey parameters and the identification of the informants.

Three Views on Indonesian Democratisation

Observers of Indonesian democratisation broadly agree on both its successes and its problems. The country permits relative freedom for private enterprise, freedom of association, and free elections. Destabilising identity politics have been successfully contained, and dominant political actors have been largely reconciled to the democratic 'rules of the game'. Critics add, however, that corruption and cronyism persist, and that the pace of reform has stagnated.

The early years of President Yudhoyono's government, which came to power in 2004, saw political stability and economic growth; pledges to fight corruption; a democracy-oriented truce in Aceh; increasing involvement of civil society activists in politics, and the emergence of several promising leaders — Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo among them — as holders of directly elected offices in local politics. Recent years have seen a regression on most fronts: persistent corruption, including within the president's own party; Aceh's backsliding into ineffective and corrupt rule and

harsh sharia laws under conservative former rebels; ever greater domination of parliamentary politics by monied interests; and difficulties in extending growth beyond favourably priced export commodities, cheap labour, and middle class consumption.

There are three major ways of thinking about problems and options of Indonesian democratisation: (1) a liberal perspective, (2) a structuralist view with a radical or conservative twist, and (3) a transformative social democratic reading.

The roots of the liberal view are in the combined analyses of the agencies and institutions that proved able to explain why, despite poor structural conditions, democratisation was possible in the Global South from the late 1970s. As indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, this perspective has been dominant in Indonesia since 1998. The basic explanation is that economic liberalisation and the wider political space since the fall of Soeharto have paved the way for moderate reformers to form pacts. Thus they have contained reactionary forces and radical popular movements, and combined, on the one hand, privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation (so that powerful actors can hold on to the benefits they gained through previous authoritarian rule) and, on the other, carefully designed liberal-democratic institutions promoting the rule of law, human rights, elections and civil society and less corruption (to which moderate actors themselves can adjust). The current liberal argument is that Indonesia is a showcase among new democracies, one that has proven the possibility of rapid democratisation under harsh conditions, and that its problems, while real, are no worse than those faced anywhere else in the Global South or during the early phases of democratisation in North America and Europe. In this view, reforms, such as greater public funding of parties

and efforts by civil society activists and union leaders to enter mainstream politics, will eventually take the country towards full liberal democracy. (e.g. Mietzner 2013, Aspinall 2010 and 2013, and partly Caraway and Ford 2014).

A contrary — and increasingly influential — structuralist position is held by conservatives, on the one hand, and radical political economists on the other. The conservatives agree with Samuel Huntington's (1965) original and Fukuyama's (2014) revised position, that democratisation increases corruption and conflict and must therefore be preceded by 'politics of order' which permit efficient state-building, as once occurred in the ideal case of Singapore and is now being attempted in more militarist ways in Burma; the political corollary in Indonesia is a desire for 'stronger leadership'. These conservatives often argue that corruption has spread since 1998, and that democratic reform has been unable to combat it. They call for more power to technocratic and politically independent agencies such as Central Bank (Soesastro and Atje 2005:28). Meanwhile, the radicals (e.g. Winters 2011, 2014, Robison and Hadiz 2004, 2014) survey contemporary Indonesian politics and conclude that little has changed since Soeharto, except that the oligarchs are no longer ruled by Soeharto and his inner circle but by themselves or, with Slater (2013), by political cartels. In addition, decentralisation has enabled a wider circle of business actors to gain access to favourable contracts and concessions through politics. Hence, they argue, Indonesia has become an oligarchic democracy whose reform requires structural change on the level of political economy. Marxists like Max Lane (2014) see potential for accomplishing this in progressive unions and social movements, but most political economists deem these, as well as progressive middle-class and business organisations, far too weak. The upshot

of structuralist analyses is therefore that a more substantive democracy in Indonesia must wait. According to the conservatives it must wait for further augmentation of state capacity; according to the radicals it must wait for the development of capitalism beyond simple accumulation based on plunder and cheap labour, and the consequent emergence of a business constituency with an interest in predictable and transparent regulation through the rule of law and stronger and more forceful trade unions.

A third position, oriented towards transformative social democracy, has (at least partly) emerged out of studies of and with critically reflective democracy activists that combine studies of agency, institutions and structural conditions. We shall soon return to somewhat more detailed results of our previous surveys, but these (Prasetyo et al. 2003, Priyono et al. 2007, Samadi et al. 2009, Törnquist 2013) and a number of other studies (e.g. Nordholt 2004, Klinken 2009 and partly Caraway and Ford 2014) have concluded that democratisation has been uneven and restrained. In effect, Indonesia's transition is a shift from dictatorial to opportunist rule. The dismantling of the old regime was not the result of negotiated pacts, but rather of the loss in trust of Soeharto's ability to foster economic development favourable to big business and the middle class and then a student revolt. Subsequently, however, the transition proceeded in accordance with the liberal recommendations of a pact between 'moderate reformists'. Beyond the rhetoric, the elitist model of democratisation rested on two pillars: (i) the *marginalisation* of popular organisations and the referring of dissidents to activities in civil society where they have generally remained fragmented and disorganised, and (ii) *depoliticisation*, in the form of privatisation and the transfer of jurisdictions to technocrats,

the courts, and local elites. This initially served the purpose of involving the dominant actors in developing (and thus, it was hoped, adhering to) the new rules of the game, thereby offering greater stability and growth and even invalidating Huntington and Fukuyama's thesis that democratisation must be proceeded by 'politics of order' and strong state-building. However, the effect of both pillars has, over the years, been to restrict the ability of popular constituencies and progressive interests among businessmen and the middle class to combat corruption, promote the rule of law, and support inclusive development. As a result, most 'moderates' with their fingers in the pie have abstained from seriously fighting corruption, improving legal consistency, or broadening political representation. As such, liberal hopes for further democratisation by simply tweaking top-level institutions are misplaced; the social balance of power must be altered. But, whereas radical structuralists argue that democratisation can only proceed once capitalism has become sufficiently progressive, and conservatives claim that democracy must be deferred until the requisite state capacity has been built by 'strong enlightened leaders', leftist social democratic-oriented observers suggest that the best path to altered power relations is though transformative, democratic politics. These should, this position argues, take the form of championing reforms to improve the political capacity and representation of those actors with a real interest in fighting corruption, promoting the rule of law, and deepening democracy.

Who is right? What are the pros and cons of the three positions? Are there new developments, which have yet to be fully considered in previous arguments and recommendations? These were the major question that motivated the third alternative democracy survey.

Design and Method

This survey uses the expert survey method, meaning that informants, all of whom were all experienced activists, were asked to assess the condition of democracy in their own area or sector. We asked them to reflect on their long experiences as activists, covering six sections in our assessment: questions related to what constitutes public affairs, institutions of democracy, actors within the democratic set up, relations between actors and institutions, strategies that the actors employ, and informants' reflections on strategies they have employed over the past decade.

In the first section of the assessment, the key questions are 1) what issues our informants deem to be public affairs, 2) what they deem that people in general think of public affairs, 3) whom they say have handled public affairs (public governance, private sector, people's organisation), 4) whom they think are involved in discussions of public affairs, and 5) how the deem that people understand the roles of active citizens (cf. Törnquist 2013: 36).

The second section in our assessment covers democratic institutions, by which we mean 'democratic rules and regulations'. We list thirteen rules and regulations, which are predominantly formal rules of the games. These rules are sourced from universal principles on democracy, based on the work of David Beetham and his associates (1999, 2002). We asked our informants to assess the quality of these thirteen formal rules and regulations at the general level; their quality since the last local election (cf. Törnquist 2013: 42); and to what extent the formal institutions contradict or conform to informal/local institutions.

The third section covers actors that compete about the control of the public affairs that were explored in the first section of the assessment and develop and employ the institutions that

were studied in the second section. Our aim in the third section is to have our informants to map the democracy actors in their area or sector, in accordance with what we call 'dominant' and 'alternative' actors. These actors are at both the local and national levels, and play roles in the arenas of political society, business communities, the State, and civil society in general (cf. Törnquist 2013: 52). Our informants were asked to list sixteen names, four in each polity (state, political society, civil society, and business sector). This shortlist of sixteen names we asked them then to compress further, into a list of four names to be explored in the fourth section of this assessment. Additionally, we study to what extent these actors do or do not relate to the New Order regime.

In the fourth section, we explore how actors relate to democratic institutions, particularly how they promote, avoid, or abuse democratic rules and regulations.

The last section, thereafter, is the lengthiest, which is about the capacity of dominant and alternative actors to alter the opportunity structure of the four actors (two dominant and two alternative) they listed in the third section. This capacity covers at least five aspects: to include or to exclude other political actors; to transform types of capital (social, economic, cultural, and coercive) into authority; to transform communal/private concern into public concern; to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies; and to use, reform and develop means of participation and representation (Törnquist 2013: 67).

All of the sections in our assessment have gone through series of discussions that involved committed members of reference groups, as well as our partners, the local researchers. These groups are those with whom we have discussed the instruments, the results, and the implications of said results.

The selection of informants too has gone through an inclusive process. This has been necessary as the survey concludes with a recommendation (policy alternatives) and as its implications would affect our informants. The way we conduct the work is that, after Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo discussed and finalised the survey instruments together, they were also improved upon by a 'reference group' (consisting of leaders, intellectuals, and activists at the national level). We proceeded by selecting regions, frontlines, and so-called 'key informants', who were essentially the coordinators of the surveyed area. These key informants comprise NGOs, activists, students, former students, or alumni of Universitas Gadjah Mada throughout the archipelago. We proceeded by training the enumerators who conducted the interviews. Since the survey covered thirty areas in the archipelago, we conducted training in three regions in Indonesia: West, Central, and East Indonesia.

The survey consists of two sets of questionnaires[6]: one for respondents at the local level and one for respondents at the central level. The difference between these questionnaires is that the first focuses predominantly on the dynamics of democracy at the local level, whereas the second focuses on the institutions and actors at the central level. In both cases we direct our questions to experts along the most crucial 'frontlines' of democratisation such as the environment, labour, gender, corruption eradication, pluralism, budget transparency.

6 See Appendix.

Results from Previous Surveys

The 2013 democracy survey is the third one, following a first survey conducted in 2003/2004 and a second in 2006. We need to take into account the results of these two surveys to understand the pattern of answers concerning the state of democratisation in Indonesia, as they will allow us to reflect how Indonesian democracy has evolved. With regard to democratic institutions (rules and regulations), the surveys showed at least four main points. First, that there have been impressive but deteriorating freedom; second, that there have been efforts to improve governance; third, a countrywide political community have taken root at (at least) the formal institutional level, meaning a unitary political community (rather than an ethno nationalist one), and fourth, that representation have been monopolised. This means that, though there is a minimal infrastructure of democratic institutions, the main problems of Indonesian democracy remain that the representation system is not sufficiently open to allow the inclusion of people's main interests. Civic and popular organisations are being prevented from taking part in organised politics, including because of the difficulties to gain democratic representation of issue- and interest organisations and of establishing new parties, as current law prohibits it. Consequently, representation is monopolised by elites. (Cf. Törnquist 2013: 43-46).

With regards to democracy actors, the previous two surveys show the following results. First, there are politically strong dominant actors and weak alternative actors. Dominant actors generally act in the arena of the State, whereas the alternative actors (pro-democrats) act within civil society. This dichotomy became less pronounced in the 2013 survey. Second, the elites

have practiced adaptation and evasion of democratic institutions. More than 50% of dominant actors only consume or abuse democratic institutions. Furthermore, politics — beyond freedom and rights in election — is monopolised by dominant actor and oligarchy groups. The third result conforms with the second, but to a twist: the elitist domination of Indonesian democracy (beyond elections) has led to a relatively stable democracy. Without the support of the elite, Indonesia's 'actually existing' fledgling democracy is unlikely to have survived (Cf. Törnquist 2013: 54). This is not to say that democratisation could not have been more consistent, but that wold have required organised backing of alternative actors. And the survey results are very clear: the alternative actors are on the sidelines (Cf. Törnquist 2013: 68-70).

Actors of change in Indonesia have gone from the interest-based politics in the 1950s and early 1960, followed by the catastrophe in 1965-1966 and the three decades of dictatorship, to the acknowledgement of the central position of democratisation since the late 1980s onwards. This period has a different context — polycentrism, individual freedom and privatisation — and neglects the important role of socio-economic reforms in strengthening ordinary people's democratic capacity. It means it has disconnected democracy and mass politics (Cf. Törnquist 2013: 79-87).

Recommendation from previous surveys

The recommendation from the first survey to 'go politics' was to tackle the problems of weak representation and oligarchy-dominated democracy in Indonesia, as shown in the survey results. 'Go Politics' meant that activists should try to enter organised politics, including elections, by engaging in politics

themselves. By doing so, problems faced by civil society activists, such as weak social and political bases among society — and thus their tendency to 'float' in society — would be mitigated or resolved. The weak linkages between political and civil society would slowly be reformed (Priyono, Samadhi and Törnquist, et. al. 2007), and popular representation of meaningful quality could be created. As such, there are several prerequisites to 'go politics'. First, activists should be part of a larger popular movements, rather than focus on individual initiatives. Second, after being elected, activists cannot simply abandon their supports; popular movements should take part in their representation roles, get involved, guide, and control representative functions through their elected representatives.

Democratic Political Blocs

The second survey recommended 'democratic political blocs' after showing a consistent pattern of weak representation, elite-dominated democracy (mixed with some populist sentiments), and deteriorating democracy institutions. Democratic political blocs are social political spaces created by civil society aimed at strengthening people's representative capacities, to widen networks, and to transform sectarian-based conflicts into more strategic issues involving productive political collaboration. They are non-party, broad alliances and alternative channels of popular representation with permanent features, which can be established from the village to the national level (Mundayat and Priyono 2009). These democratic blocs allow civil society, together with political and people's organisations, to jointly engage and best use democratic institutions to create a more meaningful democracy. Democratic political blocs can also function as alternatives to exercise popular

control over the State's institutions, including parliament, as people can have access to wide-reaching public issues and mobilise broad extra-parliamentary alliances behind crucial demands.

New Results and Recommendations

The current survey clearly demonstrates that the democratisation in Indonesia, which has widely been argued to be a success story, is stagnating. This is in-spite of the fact that the country has been successful in adopting many relevant rules and regulations, that the pro-democracy actors have become more politicised in recent years, and that clientelism is no longer 'the only game in town'. There have been a number of advances with regard to liberties and elitist elections that, remarkably, have not hampered stability or economic growth. Meanwhile, successful crafting of pacts between moderate conservatives and reformists has been favouring structural and institutional changes towards economic and political liberties.

Nevertheless, these advances have come with problems that inhibit further improvements of Indonesian democracy. Most institutions remain significantly weak. Apart from some freedom and vibrant civil association, there are hardly any major improvements in political equality, governance, and representation. Both dominant and alternative actors support democratic institutions, but only so long as those rules and regulations are relevant to their respective positions. The era of post-clientelism is continuously marked by a mix of distribution of patronage, populist political style, and preoccupation with individual political career. While welfare has been the primary public issue for some time, the services which the state is supposed to deliver are largely non-existent or inefficient. Instead, those

who can afford turn to market-based solutions, while the majority of people have to turn to fixers to be able to claim their rights to public services or go to self-help communities to fulfil their welfare-related needs. The alternative actors who are supposed to be the forerunner of democracy remain relatively weak. They are fragmented, lack long-term strategy, and tend to rely on the politics of penetrating political and public institutions as well as organisations more broadly. This signifies the tendency of both dominant and alternative actors to bypass democracy. Both use current openings to affect public governance through the 'politics of penetration' rather than resolving problems related to democratisation. Needless to say, from their own point of view, the dominant actors are most successful.

However, because of the politicisation of civil society, many alternative actors have thus managed to penetrate the spheres of state and mainstream politics. Owing to limited independent organisations, their engagement in state and politics is mainly realised through connections to open-minded dominant actors. In the process, alternative actors tend to be co-opted by the oligarchy. In short, the major problems are weak political representation and weak collective action.

We argue that democratisation in Indonesia must enter a second phase. The first phase was characterised by the engagement of powerful actors in modest reform agendas and the building of democratically oriented liberal institutions that they could accept. The second phase, that we advocate, must also engage the wide concerns and interests that have hitherto been marginalised but are needed (also by enlightened supporters of the first phase) in order to tackle the remaining problems of stagnant freedoms, limited governance reforms, and poor representation. Ω

CHAPTER 2

DEMANDS FOR WELFARE RIGHTS BUT FRAGMENTED *DEMOS*

Amalinda Savirani

Introduction

Although the notion of 'public' occupies a central role in the concept of democracy, its exact meaning is often unclear, as is its centrality in the practice of democracy — particularly in the Global South. Generally, the meaning of democracy has also been taken for granted. David Beetham's definition of democracy provides a noteworthy exception: He defines democracy as 'popular control over public affairs based on political equality', thus rendering the notion of public as inseparable from the practice of democracy. In a Beetham-ian democracy, matters of public portent — public affairs, in other words — are a democracy's primary concern. Beetham also points to a secondary term that is central to democracy: the 'people', or '*demos*', in ancient Greek — the populace of a democracy, in

modern-day lexicon. In this survey, *demos* refer to active citizens who impact government decision-making. A successful *demos* can exert popular control by steering public discourse. In Indonesia, this often takes place via social media. Therefore, the people control public affairs within a democracy, and public affairs and popular control are the two halves of Beetham-ian democracy. Public here is defined in Hannah Arendt's term that is 'Man act together in concerts' (Benhabib 1996).

This chapter will set out to identify, investigate, and measure the awareness and understanding of public affairs among our informants in order to determine to what extent the *demos* determines public affairs. The notions of public and *demos* will be discussed and framed under the umbrella concepts of citizenship and welfare. Although the notion of citizenship has become a preoccupation in recent literature, clarification on its definition is also needed. Citizenship, in our utilisation, refers to political participation in a particular country, rather than one's legal status within that country. As a notion of engagement, citizenship refers to involvement in the public governance of affairs that are publicly shared (Stokke 2014: 10). Public affairs are dependent upon citizenship because citizens recognise their shared rights through a deliberate process of public debate and decision-making. Welfare is defined according to its relation to governance and the state's central role in managing the economy for public wellbeing (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2).

This chapter will posit three arguments: First, current awareness is strong among Indonesian citizens on their entitlement to welfare guaranteed by the state. Public awareness relates to institutional changes that impact the policies framework on welfare, and welfare issues have been prioritised within local

elections and presidential campaigns. Second, despite an increase in citizen awareness on the state's responsibility to uphold their welfare rights, the state's capacity remains limited. As a result, welfare provisions have been handled by non-governmental agencies such as social institutions. Thus, society, rather than the government, has endeavoured to meet citizens' welfare needs. Third, *demos* are a primary site for discourse about public affairs, including public welfare.

Demands for Welfare Rights

In a 2007 survey, the notion of citizenship was understood in a slightly different manner than it is today: It was defined as a notion of belonging. Respondents suggested that they belong to a nation, as well as a local political infrastructure. This indicates that regional identity is as important as national citizenship. The survey's findings also suggested that communalism appears to cast a long shadow over the ethos of national identity in Indonesia, manifested similarly to Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' (1982).

Through our 2013 survey, we sought to understand more specifically citizenship's relationship to public affairs. We asked informants four questions:

1. What public affairs do you believe to be the most important?
2. Who talks about these public affairs most frequently?
3. Who is ideally responsible for managing these public affairs?
4. To what extent do *demos* determine public affairs?

A primary focus of public on welfare-related issues

A primary public affairs concern was determined to be welfare provisions, including both healthcare and education.

In the Indonesian context, these provisions are considered to be 'public services.' Welfare issues have taken greater precedence over the last decade in Indonesia as a consequence of Indonesia's adoption of a direct election system at the governance levels of the nation (presidential elections), province (governor elections), and district or city (district head/*bupati* and mayoral elections) to the government's decentralisation and corresponding institutionalisation of direct local elections in 2004. Successful candidates mostly garner votes by prioritising public welfare in their campaigns and throughout their terms in office. During regional elections, for example, candidates running for local office have promised popular programs such as free education and healthcare. In fact, no successful public official in the last decade has failed to take up these popular issues in his or her political campaign. Thus, in Indonesia the popularity of public issues has become inseparable from electoral democracies resulting from direct local elections.

Current survey findings differ from the previous 2007 survey, in which the majority of respondents did not identify welfare issues, nor did activists indicate concerns over public service provisions by the state. Rather, the priority issue was determined to be the development of civil society organisations.

Based on the current survey responses, we outlined fifteen major challenges that citizens face in their daily lives, subdivided into four categories:

1. Challenges to public services, including education, health, physical security, housing, social welfare, and security.
2. Economic regulations on industries, fisheries, agriculture, and informal sectors; wages; and labour rules.
3. Infrastructural challenges, including public transportation and traffic congestion.

4. Challenges to citizenship, including civil rights mandated by religion-based regulations, children's and child custody rights, and minority rights.

Other challenges include environmental conservation, political dynamics at the regional and national levels, government performance, moral issues, diversity issues, and leadership (See graphic 2.1).

A total of 55% of respondents indicated that public affairs related to welfare provisions — including healthcare, education, security, public transportation, traffic, and public housing — were a primary concern. Nearly 30% of respondents considered economic governance to be a secondary public issue. Citizenship, including civil rights such as religion-based regulations, child's rights, and minority rights came in third at less than 14%.

Graphic 2.1. Priority public issues



Due to the non-identical questionnaires employed in the 2007 and 2013 surveys, a direct comparison over time is difficult. Some indicators, however, allow for an inclusive analysis utilising data collected from both surveys: During 2006-2007, when the first

democracy survey was conducted, the popularity of welfare-related issues in political campaigning was much lower than it is today. Instead, issues related to civil society tended to take precedence. The institutionalisation of welfare rights, however, predates this survey: Bill Number 40 of 2004 on social security was introduced during the Megawati presidency (2001-2004). A transition period of ten years prior to full implementation would follow, and during that time, political hopefuls began to introduce welfare-related issues during their campaigning. This tactic increased in the years after direct local elections were introduced.

A pioneer in welfare-based campaigning was the Head of the Buleleng district in North Bali, I Gede Winasa. The practicing dentist was the first to propose public welfare programs to attract voters. Winasa implemented a regional healthcare program called Jembrana Healthcare Security (*Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana*, JKJ), as well as free education at the elementary school level over the course of his first and second terms (2000-2005; 2005-2010). Winasa's welfare programs increased his popularity throughout the region and earned him nearly 90% of the votes during the 1995 local elections. Donor agency TIFA Foundation dubbed him a model of innovative local leadership and praised Winasa and the district of Buleleng for 'best practices' in welfare promotion (TIFA Foundation 2005). Following TIFA's endorsement, many other local leaders followed in Winasa's footsteps to gain popular support by proposing free healthcare for the poor.

By 2014, welfare issues were a primary focus in both regional and national elections. During Joko Widodo's campaign for presidency in 2014, populist policies such as the Indonesian Smart Card (*Kartu Indonesia Pintar, KIP*) within the education

sector and the Indonesian Health Card (*Kartu Indonesia Sehat, KIS*) were used as successful campaign platforms. KIP and KIS guarantee Indonesian citizens up to twelve years of free education and healthcare. According to the World Bank, these programs constituted 'the largest social security reform effort in the world today' (2014). Additionally, Jokowi introduced the Prosperous Family Card (*Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera*) to assist a total of 15.5 million homeless and poor families endure oil price increases through the assistance of monthly energy subsidies. If successful, Indonesia's new social security model will resemble Bolsa Familia, a public security scheme introduced in Brazil in 2003 to assist twelve million poor families (Janvry et al 2005).

Demanding State Welfare

In addition to asking informants which public issues they deemed to be important, we asked if they believed that the majority of the people they know and with whom they interact daily understand who should *ideally* manage public welfare. Responses are outlined in Table 2.1. Almost 36% of our informants responded that the majority of the people they know understand who should be in charge. 50% responded that their acquaintances are not sure. One third responded that people they know have no knowledge whatsoever about who should be in charge.

We followed up by asking informants who in their view should manage public affairs: individuals, families, the state, private sector, or civil organisations or other community-based organisations. More than 65% responded that public affairs are a state matter, while less than 9% responded that public affairs should be managed by civil organisations.

Table 2. 1. Institutions that should manage public issues

NO	INSTITUTION	PERCENTAGE
1	Individual	3.2%
2	Family, kin	0.5%
3	Market	5.9%
4	Civil society organisations	8.1%
5	State/ government and/or local government	65.9%
6	State and public institutions	6.4%
7	No responses	10.0%
	TOTAL	**100.0%**

The majority opinion that the state should manage public affairs such as welfare reflects citizens' understanding of both the importance of welfare and capacity of the state to provide for citizens' collective needs. The Indonesian state is regarded as having the financial and political capability to guarantee public service provisions such as healthcare, education, public housing, pension, public transportation, and physical security.

Informants further suggested, however, that this ideal has not yet become a reality. Responses to the question, 'Who is really managing public affairs?' suggested that welfare needs are met as a result of civil engagement (almost 40%) rather than state provisions. Only 13.6% of respondents suggested that welfare is managed through state-citizen partnership governance, while a very small number (5.9%) suggested private sector management. The previous survey conducted in 2007 yielded similar results. Survey results suggest that when citizens have a public affairs concern, they have to turn to community-based organisations or informal leaders (45%) to solve their problems. They apply pressure via lobbying or media campaigning (34%), and they go to

elected officials at the regional and national levels (23%). Similar results across these two surveys indicate an ongoing concern for state welfare provisions, while in reality the state has tossed responsibility to individual citizens, community organisations, and the private sector.

One explanation for the statements that non-state institutions in reality address public affairs in better ways is public awareness about the poor state capacity. In the case of healthcare, as elaborated by Aspinall (2014), the state's capacity to uphold citizen's welfare rights is limited firstly with regards to its political capacity to curb corruption and extortion carried out by politico-bureaucrats and secondly by its financial circumstance: In 2014, the Indonesian GDP fell below Taiwan and South Korea when universal healthcare coverage was first implemented. If Indonesia wants to increase the quality of its healthcare system, then it must increase expenditure via taxation. This might result in an erosion of support from the middle class, however, and 'potentially bring into play more intense social struggle' (Aspinall 2014: 817).

Despite the state's lack of preparedness for implementing public welfare programs such as universal healthcare, survey results reflect the public expectation that welfare is a matter of state control and, therefore, a basic citizen right.

United in Discourse, Fragmented in Movement: Demos in Indonesia

Public Affairs Discourse Predominant in Civil Society

Based on survey results, discourses about public affairs take place predominantly among civil society organisations (56%).

Civil society, therefore, plays an important role in defining welfare rights. State and government take second place at 25%; political society, i.e. political parties and members of parliament, come in at 11%, and the economic sector contributes to 8%. Civil society actively guides public affairs as a primary focus of the public agenda and, subsequently, public policies. In fact, the so-called 'balcony faction', which refers to the second floor of the plenary room in the national parliament building in Jakarta, where members of civil society organisations convene and learn about policy-building and implementation, is designated specifically for members of the general public who wish to take part in the parliamentary process. During the development of the BPJS law in 2011, the 65 members of the Social Security Action Committee (*Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial, KAJS*) regularly attended 'marathon' meetings in the parliament building to support the policy process. They are the 'balcony faction'. In addition to forming the faction, this alliance conducted demonstrations throughout the bill's debate in the parliament.

Graphic 2.2. Actors involved in dialogues on public issues



From the graphic above we can observe how civil society actors are important in the process of 'discourse making'. The graphic also shows how active civil society is an important pillar for democracy, in least at the level of discourse. To function effectively, democratic institutions require independent, pluralistic arenas for interaction and debate, whereby citizens are directly involved in decision-making on welfare policies managed by the state. A vibrant civil society will thereby endorse government policies and ensure acceptance of welfare terms and compliance with regulations (Beetham, Carvalho, Landman & Weir, 2002:28). Civil society also limits state authority for a democratic ideal of a balance of power.

As this chapter has demonstrated, public affairs will only become meaningful to the public if the public has a stake in defining those affairs and the government's role in managing them. Furthermore, debates are not sufficient for guaranteeing welfare provisions. Rather, they must be included on political party, representative body, and government agendas in order that public affairs are translated into public policies developed and enforced by the state. Without this activation process, disparities will between public affairs and public policies will result.

Civil Society's Transformation of Public Affairs

Political representatives of the people ideally undertake the development of public policies based on public affairs. Civil society organisations, however, play crucial roles in garnering attention for such issues and encouraging political parties and members of the parliament to develop policies that are relevant to the people. They also ensure that there is no discrepancy between the concerns of the public sphere and those of the parliament. Where

a division between civil society and political society exists, public policies may not reflect the actual needs of a country's citizens, and democracy may stagnate. Mietzner (2012) has argued that in Indonesia, such democratic inertia is a symptom of policies that only benefit elites, rather than the nation's entire population.

The surveys outlined here suggest that ongoing stagnation is the result of a failure to translate the welfare concerns of the people into policies that benefit them. Public affairs remain stalled at the level of debate, rather than forming the basis for planned governmental action. Over the past decade, representatives of civil society organisations[7] have expanded their direct political involvement as members of state auxiliary agencies, consultancy teams, special ministry staff, commissioners for state-owned companies, or members of parliament. While they have had some impact on Indonesian politics and developed channels for policy advocacy, their capacity for impacting policy development has remained limited. This may reflect political biases against the social backgrounds of such actors, the people they wish to represent, and the way in which they have been appointed and elected.

7 Civil society is a realm outside state, political society and market. It usually refers as a 'watchdog' towards government or state. It consists of many society-based organisations, called Non Government Organization (NGO), or in a civil community. In liberal tradition, civil society do not take part in politics. However, in the social democratic tradition in the Global North and in many developing countries, like Indonesia, member of civil society organisations do take part in politics, such as running for an election. It is labelled as 'politicised civil society' (c.f. Foley and Edwards 1996; Cohen and Arato 1996; Törnquist 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the two notions of 'public' and '*demos*' as vital components of democracy outlined by Beethams. We have argued that public welfare is a current preoccupation among Indonesians. While elsewhere, such as in European countries, grassroots movements to demand the state's fulfilment of welfare provisions may have been and continue to be effective, in Indonesia, welfare rights are at this point of time part of a top-down initiative whereby political candidates highlight public affairs issues in their campaigns for office and engender awareness on welfare rights among the general public. Furthermore, this is a trend that has only truly emerged in just over a decade. It began in 2004 with early welfare debates and became a popular topic of public debate when universal healthcare coverage was implemented in 2014. During the years in between, politicians gained momentum on the campaign trail by highlighting welfare in the lead-up to regional elections.

In the previous survey we did not ask specific questions about these matters to our informants. It is safe to say, however, that while in other countries (such as in Scandinavia) the combination of citizen and government engagement in welfare demands have also strengthened social movements and finally generated the welfare state, in Indonesia, social movements have largely provided welfare services on their own, and demands for a welfare state have only very recently become a major topic in the public discourse.

Demos in the specific terms of publicly active citizens who engage in debates about public affairs and ultimately push the state to meet citizens' welfare rights. Survey results indicate the importance of their role within public discourse — particularly

with regards to nation-wide policies such as social security. In some cases — such as the KAJS campaign — a popular movement may develop, while in others, *demos* activities may be limited. In all cases, citizenship is a matter of participation in the country. Further investigation is warranted, however, to determine the extent to which discursive assessment of public affairs will have lasting impact on policy-making in Indonesia. Ω

CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FROM GOOD GOVERNANCE TO VIBRANT CSOs

Hasrul Hanif and Eric Hiariej

Introduction

Institution is a fundamental component of the democratisation process. A functioning institution is regarded to be an essential precondition for democracy. Institutions and existing political practices are means to uphold and guarantee ideal democratic principles. This chapter positions democracy as a governmental ideal that is manifested through institutions and practice, or procedures and mechanisms. Realisation of popular control and political equality can be measured against the presence and the performance of democratic institutions in a given country (see Beetham, 2007). This is further in line with Olle Törnquist's assertion on measuring the achievement of democratic goals (2013: 31):

> *First, a number of crucial principles or norms are defined, namely participation, authorisation of representatives and executives, representation of opinions and social groups, government's responsiveness to voters and public opinion, accountability, transparency and human, national and international solidarity. Secondly, what institutions (in term of rules and regulations) are necessary in order to make these principles real?*

However, the presence of a functioning institution alone is not sufficient for the realisation of democracy. Actors who take part in the political process must also promote, adopt and internalise those rules and regulations upheld by institutions in order for democracy to become 'the only game in town'. Alternatively, if political actors disavow existing rules and regulations and/or operate those institutions based on non-democratic principles, democratisation process will be negatively impacted and the creation of a democratic order will be difficult (O'Donnell, 2004: 9-92).

In addition, an institution is not an isolated organism and hardly operates within a political vacuum. The existing power relations between different organisation, groups and classes significantly shape the way institutions performed. Assessing the quality of institution without taking the power relations into account is doomed to fail as it hardly uncovers the actual practices as well as the political nature of given institutions. In formal terms an institution is good in itself since it promotes ideal democratic rules and regulations. However in practical and political terms, by allowing the intervention of power relations' analysis, an institution is always open to be abused by those of dominant groups and/or classes.

A number of scholars observing contemporary Indonesian democracy have published their assessments with various judgments and conclusions related to institutions. For the optimist (se, for example, Diamond 2009), as a new democracy in East and Southeast Asia, Indonesia has performed better than most experts anticipated. The development of institutions has resulted in a more open, free and liberal politics. Democracy in Indonesia will be secured for a very long time and will be further improved with more progress toward better governance. On the other hand, for the pessimist, despite of the increasing number of key institutions that were adopted and established, the process of democratic consolidation in the country has been held back. While civil society organisations emerge as the most important defender of democracy, the anti-reformist elites want to roll back the process (Mietzner 2012). Even worst is the highjacking of institutions by either political cartels (see, for example, Slater 2004; Ambardi 2005) or oligarchs (see, for example, Hadiz 2004; Winters 2011). In short Indonesian democracy has stagnated. Somewhere in between are scholars who celebrate the process of democratisation across the Archipelago but at the same time express their concern on the continuation of ancient political practices that hampers the full realisation of democracy. They are concerned with the practice of clientelism in the place of democratic accountability (see, for example, Nordholt 2004; Klinken 2009).

Drawing on the importance of institution and agreeing on general assessment on the performance of rules and regulation argued by the majority of scholars mentioned above, the following chapter argues that democracy in Indonesia since the first local election has significantly improved with regard to almost all types of rules and regulation. The continuing presence of informal

practices accompanying formal institutions is hardly a hindrance. They instead have potential to support the performance of democratic rules and regulations.

However, in contrast to the optimistic views celebrating the achievement of democratisation process in Indonesia, the survey reveals a more nuanced picture on the performance of the institutions. The improvement is most impressive in institutions related to civil society, while this is much less so with regard to institutions related to representation and governance. Such development leads the findings to conclude that Indonesian politics is becoming more liberal but not more democratic.

More importantly is the relations between actors and institutions. In contrast to the pessimistic views, the main actors support and promote most institutions. Nevertheless, their support is hardly substantive and tends to be discriminating as both dominant and alternative actors promotes mostly rules and regulations in their own sector of operation. Furthermore, as compared with the alternative actors, the dominant actors are more prone to abuse democratic rules and regulations.

In this survey institution does not only refer to "organisation" and/or state and non-state agency. More importantly, included in the term are norms, values, procedures, conventions, social roles, regulations, believes, codes, cultures and knowledge that constitute or structure social or individual behaviours and orientations (see Lauth 2000: 23; Olsen & March 1989: 22). By adapting David Beetham's ideas on democratic institution (Beetham 1999: 154-155; Landman 2008: 11-12), the survey tries to identify the progress of the current Indonesian democracy by assessing the performance of rules and regulations classified into the following categories. The first category is rules and

regulations related to the idea of citizenship, which includes 'equal citizenship', 'rule of law', 'equal justice' and 'universal human rights'. The second can be put under the rubric of **representation** consisting of 'democratic political representation', 'citizen participation', 'institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation', 'local democracy', and 'democratic control of instruments of coercion'. The third group of rules and regulations are those associated with **democratic governance**, comprising 'transparent, impartial and accountable governance', and 'independence to make decisions and implement them'. The final category is vibrant **civil society** consisting of 'freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses', and 'democratic citizens self-organising'. By categorising these democratic rules and regulations in detail, this survey aims to assess the quality of democracy without falling into generalisation.

The survey was then structured to assess those institutions by posing the following questions:

- What is your general assessment of the quality of city/district regulations on democratic institutions (good, fair, or bad)?
- What is your assessment of the quality of the development of city/district regulations regarding democratic institutions (improved, not changed, or worsened)?
- What informal practices (*adat* or customs, traditions, cultural values, etc.) support, limit, or contradict regulations on democratic institutions?
- Do primary actors (both dominant and alternative) promote, abuse, or abandon regulations on democratic institutions, based on their respective interests?

Improved Democratic Institution

In general, the standards of Indonesian democracy (with regard to its institutions) that have been argued by scholars such as Larry Diamond is confirmed. The survey asked informants to provide a general assessment on the performance of formal institutions. It is revealed that the majority of answer believes that democratic rules and regulation are either in fair or good shape (see Table 3.1). Compared to the previous surveys the trend is increasing (see Table 3.2). This is in line with the assessment on the quality of institution. The informants were asked to evaluate the quality of rules and regulations since the last local election. Apart from 'democratic political representation' and a couple of rules and regulations associated with governance those who answer 'improved' double the number of those who believe that the institutions are getting worse (See Table 3.3).

Contrary to the existing studies, the 2013 survey also paid attention to informal institution such as local customs (*adat*), values such as respecting the elders, local customary forums, neighbourhood gatherings, formal village (*kampung*) meetings, and traditional ceremonies. In a country like Indonesia such informal values, organisation and mechanism have significantly shaped the process of democratisation. While it might seem that informal institution such as *adat* (local customs) contradicts values and norms of democracy, the findings showed a much more intricate feature. By and large informal institution can be both supportive and a hindrance to democratic institutions (see Table 3.4 and 3.5). It seems that the idiom of 'man behind the gun' is strongly applied in this case, as actors who use the informal rules and regulations significantly affect the nature of how they

Table 3.1. General assessment on formal democratic laws and regulations

NO	LAWS AND REGULATIONS	GOOD	FAIR	BAD	NO ANSWER
		(% of informants)			
A	CITIZENSHIP	29.0	42.0	25.8	3.2
1	Equal citizenship	34.3	45.3	17.9	2.5
2	Rules of law	27.7	42.9	25.2	4.2
3	Equal right to justice	22.3	36.0	38.5	3.2
4	Universal human rights	31.8	43.8	21.6	2.9
B	REPRESENTATION	25.5	41.7	28.8	4.0
5	Democratic political representation	27.4	35.5	33.3	3.9
6	Citizen participation	20.8	43.8	32.3	3.2
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation	24.0	47.0	24.8	4.2
8	Local democracy	28.9	43.2	23.8	4.1
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	26.7	39.0	29.9	4.4
C	GOVERNANCE	19.4	41.7	35.1	3.7
10	Transparent, impartial, and accountable governance	19.8	39.9	37.5	2.9
11	Government's independence to make decisions and implement regulations	19.1	43.6	32.8	4.6
D	CIVIL LIBERTY	52.0	33.4	10.6	3.9
12	Freedom of and equal opportunity to engage in public discourse	49.0	34.5	12.2	4.4
13	Freedom to self-organise	55.1	32.4	9.1	3.4
	AVERAGE	**29.7**	**40.5**	**26.1**	**3.7**

Source: primary data

Table 3.2. Comparison of a general assessment on democratic laws and regulations 2003, 2007, and 2013

NO	CLUSTER OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS	Years					
		2003		2007		2013	
		Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad
1	Citizenship, law, and rights	36	63	55	44	71	26
2	Democratic representation	36	62	57	42	67	29
3	Government accountability	23	76	53	45	61	35
4	Vibrant civil society	45	55	62	38	85	11
	AVERAGE	**35**	**64**	**57**	**42**	**70**	**26**

impacts on formal democratic rules and regulation. However, another interesting finding relates to the dimension of informal institution. As showed in Table 3.4 and 3.5 'mechanisms' such as those of local customary forums and traditional ceremonies are the key factor. They occupy a central position in both the positive and negative relations of informal institutions to democracy. Apparently, informal mechanisms are the defining factor in the relations between informal institutions and formal democratic rules and regulations. Consequently, should an intervention to improve the contribution of informal institution toward democracy be arranged the best would be to go through the informal 'mechanisms'.

Table 3.3. Quality of the democratic process (laws and regulations)

NO	LAWS AND REGULATIONS	IMPROVED	WORSENED	NOT CHANGED	NO ANSWER
		(% of informants)			
A	CITIZENSHIP	33.4	14.6	48.0	4.0
1	Equal citizenship	38.5	12.7	44.9	3.9
2	Rules of law	33.4	14.2	47.1	5.2
3	Equal justice	27.2	16.7	52.4	3.7
4	Universal human rights	34.6	14.7	47.5	3.2
B	REPRESENTATION	32.5	15.1	47.5	4.9
5	Democratic political representation	28.9	21.3	45.3	4.6
6	Citizen participation	31.8	14.4	50.2	3.7
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation	35.8	11.5	47.3	5.4
8	Local democracy	34.0	14.0	46.8	5.2
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	32.3	14.2	48.0	5.6
C	GOVERNANCE	27.8	17.1	50.4	4.6
10	Transparent, impartial, and accountable governance	29.7	16.9	49.7	3.7
11	Government's capacity for decision-making and policy implementation	25.8	17.4	51.2	5.6
D	CIVIL LIBERTIES	54.1	7.5	34.3	4.1
12	Freedom of and equal opportunity to engage in public discourses	51.9	6.6	37.2	4.4
13	Freedom to self-organise	56.3	8.4	31.4	3.9
	AVERAGE	35.4	14.1	46.1	4.5

Table 3.4 How informal rules and regulations support formalised democratic institutions

NO	RULES AND REGULATIONS	INFORMAL SUPPORT FOR FORMALISED DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS			
		Values	Organisation	Mechanism	Uncategorised
A	CITIZENSHIP	29.4%	12.4%	39.9%	18.4%
1	Equal citizenship	33.9%	11.2%	36.2%	18.8%
2	Rules of law	24.9%	11.0%	39.1%	24.9%
3	Equal justice	25.0%	16.0%	43.5%	15.4%
4	Universal human rights	33.7%	11.2%	40.6%	14.4%
B	REPRESENTATION	12.9%	20.2%	44.4%	22.5%
5	Democratic political representation	12.2%	10.0%	32.8%	45.0%
6	Rights-based citizen participation in public governance	10.9%	18.3%	51.3%	19.5%
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance	7.6%	40.2%	33.5%	18.7%
8	Local democracy	14.3%	11.9%	55.2%	18.6%
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	19.3%	20.5%	49.2%	11.0%
C	GOVERNANCE	18.6%	18.6%	50.4%	12.4%
10	Transparent, impartial, and accountable governance	14.6%	18.0%	55.7%	11.8%
11	Government independence for decision-making and policy implementation	22.7%	19.3%	45.0%	13.0%
D	CIVIL LIBERTIES	16.9%	22.5%	51.8%	8.9%
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse	20.2%	11.3%	60.2%	8.3%
13	Freedom to self-organise	13.5%	33.7%	43.4%	9.4%

Table 3.5 How informal rules and regulations limit or oppose formalised democratic institutions

NO	RULES AND REGULATIONS	INFORMAL OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRACY			
		Values	Organi-sation	Mecha-nism	Uncate-gorised
A	CITIZENSHIP	32.2%	9.8%	46.7%	11.4%
1	Equal citizenship	41.0%	9.2%	40.7%	9.2%
2	Rules of law	28.8%	9.0%	50.5%	11.8%
3	Equal justice	25.6%	13.2%	48.3%	12.8%
4	Universal human rights	33.3%	7.7%	47.3%	11.7%
B	REPRESENTATION	29.4%	12.7%	42.9%	16.1%
5	Democratic political representation	38.2%	4.1%	30.7%	27.0%
6	Rights-based citizen participation in public governance	32.7%	10.2%	36.2%	20.9%
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance	28.0%	18.0%	42.9%	11.2%
8	Local democracy	29.7%	10.4%	50.5%	9.4%
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	18.4%	20.9%	54.4%	11.9%
C	GOVERNANCE	21.8%	14.6%	53.1%	10.4%
10	Transparent, impartial, and accountable governance	20.4%	11.4%	59.2%	9.0%
11	Government's independence for decision-making and policy implementation	23.2%	17.8%	47.0%	11.9%
D	CIVIL LIBERTIES	31.3%	15.2%	44.1%	9.4%
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse	28.8%	12.4%	48.0%	10.7%
13	Freedom to self-organise	33.7%	18.0%	40.1%	8.1%

More Liberal, Less Democratic

Findings outlined above potentially lead to a positive general assessment of the performance of rules and regulation in the current process of democratisation in Indonesia. Despite these seemingly bright developments, rules and regulations guaranteeing civil liberties remain a concern. Religious minority rights for groups such as the Ahmadiyah and Syiah communities, including the freedom to establish houses of worship for example are still frequently violated. The Wahid Institute for Islamic research and peace advocacy reported 245 violations on freedom of religion and faith in 2013 alone. Ordinary citizens, rather than political leaders, were responsible for most of these violations. Regional leaders were also culpable as in many cases they failed to prosecute perpetrators. They instead accused the minority groups of disrupting community cohesion.

More importantly, such general assessment conceals the variety in the performance of rules and regulations. The assessments are different from one set of institution to the other. The most impressive achievement is on institutions associated with a vibrant civil society. The least one are those of governance related institutions. The assessments on rules and regulations related to citizenship and representation are somewhere between these two extremes with the latter much closer to least impressive pole (see Table 3.1).

The pattern is replicated in the quality of institutions. Since the first local election institutions related to the formation of vibrant civil society have been improved the most. In contrast there is no significant change in governance. A quite significant number of informants even believe that rules and regulations associated with governance are getting worse. Institutions related

to citizenship and representation occupy the middle ground. The first records a better percentage than the latter.

By taking into account such variety, this chapter argues that the process of democratisation seems to be biased towards institutions associated with civil society and citizenship. These two categories of rules and regulations are closely related to liberal values and norms. On the other hand, the other two categories, governance and representation which are close to the idea of the inclusion of people into political process are left behind. Therefore, it seems that the process of democratisation in Indonesia is increasingly witnessing the rise of more liberal and less democratic politics.

This trend may be referred to as a success story of political liberalisation in the country. Since the fall of Soeharto basic rights such as freedom of expressions, rights to organise and rights to participate in public debate (aside from some significant violations) have been improved. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the state gradually becomes more open to non-state actors penetration, and the number of civil society organisations is significantly increased.

However, such openings have rarely been followed by improved governance and representation; hence, the trend toward less democratic politics. It is commonly understood that corruptions, lack of accountability and pork barrel legislations remain the unbreakable obstacles in Indonesian democracy (see, for example, Aspinall and Klinken 2011). As shall be discussed further in Chapter 5, those openings are accompanied by elitism, fragmentation within pro-democracy movements and the lack of policy alternatives. These factors are responsible for the weak political representation in the country.

In short the positive development of institutions in the current process of democratisation in Indonesia should be taken cautiously. Behind those impressive improvements are promising openings that could potentially lead to a better democracy in the very near future. However, the country's democracy is in danger of getting stagnated should the problems of governance and representation not be addressed.

Actors and Institution

This chapter basically argues that assessment of institutions must be followed by assessments of how actors approach and operate rules and regulations. The presence of actors is extremely important as it shapes the performance of formal institution and uncovers power relations. Put differently, by allowing assessment on actors this survey prevents the discussion from being preoccupied with impressive record of formal rules and regulations which tend to be always good in itself and opens up debate on the political aspect of institution which should be at the centre of concern.

In general, and in contrast to the findings of several scholars of Indonesian politics (see, for example, Hadiz 2004; Winters 2011), the survey demonstrates that all main actors tend to support democratic rules and regulations, instead of abusing them (see Table 3.6 and Table 3.7). Even though the dominant actors are more prone to abusing democratic rules and regulations, nowadays one could hardly imagine a politician, a mayor or an activist that speaks against democracy. The common practice is that they will instead proclaim themselves as celebrating, promoting and defending democratic institutions.

Table 3.6. How the main actors promote the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy

NO	DOMINANT ACTORS	DOMINANT ACTORS			ALTERNATIVE ACTORS		
		Frequently promote	Rarely promote	No answer	Frequently promote	Rarely promote	No answer
1	Equal citizenship	60.80%	36.80%	2.40%	72.20%	23.40%	4.40%
2	Rule of law	46.80%	49.30%	3.90%	63.00%	31.60%	5.40%
3	Equal to justice	47.90%	46.60%	5.40%	68.90%	25.70%	5.50%
4	Universal human rights	45.80%	48.60%	5.60%	65.30%	29.40%	5.30%
5	Democratic political representation	51.10%	43.20%	5.70%	56.80%	36.10%	7.00%
6	Citizen participation in public governance	51.60%	43.50%	4.90%	64.90%	28.80%	6.30%
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance	46.40%	48.10%	5.50%	58.00%	34.80%	7.20%
8	Local democracy	46.60%	47.10%	6.30%	55.00%	37.80%	7.20%
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	43.90%	50.20%	5.90%	54.20%	38.60%	7.20%
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	48.10%	46.70%	5.20%	62.10%	30.90%	7.00%
11	Government's independence to make decisions and implement them	39.80%	55.40%	4.80%	49.50%	42.50%	8.00%
12	Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses	39.80%	55.40%	4.80%	59.10%	33.40%	7.50%
13	Democratic citizens' self-organising	51.70%	42.90%	5.40%	61.90%	31.20%	6.90%
	AVERAGE	**47.72%**	**47.22%**	**5.06%**	**60.84%**	**32.63%**	**6.53%**

Table 3.7. How the main actors abuse the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy

NO	DOMINANT ACTORS	DOMINANT ACTORS			ALTERNATIVE ACTORS		
		Frequently abuse	Rarely abuse	No answer	Frequently abuse	Rarely abuse	No answer
1	Equal citizenship	36.50%	58.10%	5.40%	9.70%	85.50%	4.70%
2	Rule of law	28.90%	64.00%	7.10%	6.10%	88.30%	5.60%
3	Equal to justice	33.20%	59.80%	6.90%	7.00%	87.30%	5.70%
4	Universal human rights	28.50%	64.50%	7.00%	5.40%	89.30%	5.30%
5	Democratic political representation	33.30%	59.50%	7.20%	10.00%	84.40%	5.60%
6	Citizen participation in public governance	31.70%	61.50%	6.80%	7.10%	87.50%	5.40%
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance	26.90%	66.10%	7.10%	7.40%	87.20%	5.40%
8	Local democracy	24.00%	67.70%	8.30%	5.60%	88.70%	5.70%
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion	29.80%	63.40%	6.70%	5.90%	89.20%	4.90%
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	36.00%	57.70%	6.30%	7.70%	87.20%	5.10%
11	Government's independence to make decisions and implement them	33.50%	60.30%	6.20%	8.20%	86.70%	5.10%
12	Freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses	20.80%	72.50%	6.60%	4.90%	89.90%	5.20%
13	Democratic citizens' self-organising	20.00%	73.50%	6.50%	-	-	-
	AVERAGE	**29.47%**	**63.74%**	**6.78%**	**7.10%**	**87.60%**	**5.30%**

The main actors might express their support of democracy for the sake of increasing their own popularity as a leader with democratic credentials. They might also plan to abandon those democratic rules and regulations once they occupy public offices. Nevertheless, it seems that even if the main actors want to abandon the institutions they have to do it by following the rules of the game. Although this may sound contradictory, the fact is that the main actors could only abuse democracy through ironically the very widely accepted existing rules and regulation that in theory are supposed to promote democracy. As shall be explored in the following pages, regardless their own understanding and attitude toward democracy, the main actors at the very least have to formally and officially announce their belief in, and support of, institutions of democracy. Hence it could be argued that in Indonesia democracy has become 'the only *dominant* game in town'.

Moreover, there are also interesting findings about the ways in which the main actors support democratic rules and regulations. First, the survey reveals how dominant and alternative actors take different approaches in promoting and supporting institution. Above all, both actors tend to express their support by disseminating the ideas of democratic rules and regulation to a wider audience. The dominant actors prefer to rely on *sosialisasi* (literally socialisation) strategy, while the alternative actors apply more diverse and interactive dissemination process such as seminar, workshop and social media engagement in order to influence public discourse and promote democratic institutions.

Sosialisasi is an Indonesian adopted word to express public dissemination involving speaker and audience with a very limited interaction. Political leaders are often involved in this type of

giving speech without critical engagement with the audience as a proof of their support to democracy.[8] The problem is that *sosialisasi* is nothing less than empty propaganda. *Sosialisasi* has never been able to provide the public with a credible guarantee that those in power who preach and defend democracy will implement democratic institutions properly. Adding with media coverage such strategy is apparently only to increase the popularity of political leaders at the expense of substantive application of democratic rules and regulations.

The type of public dissemination adopted by the alternative actors is more promising in terms of inviting more dialogue and allowing debate. Nevertheless, such strategy is hardly sufficient. To ensure the substantive implementation of democratic institution the alternative actors need to work on problems outlined in Chapter 5 such as elitism and fragmentation within pro-democracy activists. Without significant improvement in this area, their public dissemination could also turn into a vehicle for the alternative actors to increase their own popularity.

Second, the survey shows that the main actors promote different categories of institutions. The dominant actors tend to be preoccupied with rules and regulations associated with citizenship and representation. The alternative actors prefer institutions related to governance and vibrant civil society. The survey only possesses very limited information on why such different preferences occur. Nevertheless, combining with findings on other parts of questionnaire, it is safe to argue that the main actors might only be concerned with rules and regulation related to what they take as their area of operation. Rather than promoting

8 See Chapter 6.

democracy in a broader sense the main actors seems to pay more attention to institutions that can potentially increase their leverage as individual, group and/or organistion. In other words, the main actors might simply promote rules and regulations that serve their interests in the best possible way.

Such differences might also be viewed as accentuating the specific type of relations between the dominant actors and the alternative actors. Clearly both type of actors are preoccupied with their own concerns. Informal linkages are certainly there, but more strategic and structured communication involving substantive attempt to connect different categories of institutions and to transform such connection into a logical frame of action to improve democratisation process in the country is absent. The result could be a process of democratisation marked by two groups of actors fight for different types of democratic institutions. Informal contacts to foster penetration in order to serve their own interests come in addition. In Chapter 4 it is reported that most of dominant actors are from the arena of the state, while the alternative actors mainly represent those of pro-democracy movements. Taking into account these backgrounds of the main actors, the tendency outlined above confirms the 'politics of penetration' discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

* * *

To sum up, in terms of general assessment on the performance of the institutions of democracy in Indonesia is significantly improved. The presence of informal institutions potentially supports democratic rules and regulations; but attention on how to intervene informal mechanism needs to be emphasised

in order to prevent informal institution such as *adat* to become a hindrance for democracy. More importantly, there is a variety in the performance of institutions. The most impressive performance is in those rules and regulations related to the formation of vibrant civil society. The least impressive one is in governance related institutions. Interestingly variety in the current condition of institution leads to an argument that the current process of democratisation brings the country into more liberal than democratic politics.

The relations between actors and institution are extremely important as it reveals how the actual practice and operation of institution takes place. The survey concludes that democracy has become the only dominant game in town. All actors promote democracy and have to play by the accepted existing democratic rules and regulation even though they plan to abuse the institutions. However, the way the main actors promote democratic institution is hardly supportive toward proper implementation of rules and regulations. It seems that the main actors especially those of dominant one merely use such promotion to increase their own interests and popularity. The dominant and the alternative actors also take different strategy and approach to promote democratic institutions. Such different relates to their own preoccupation with their respective concerns. More importantly it is a confirmation of 'politics of penetration' as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Ω

CHAPTER 4

CONSOLIDATED STATE, CONSOLIDATED BUSINESS ACTORS, AND NEW POPULIST LEADERS

Amalinda Savirani

Introduction

According to David Beetham's definition of democracy as 'popular control of public affairs based on political equality', actors are an inherent part of the political process. 'Actors' refer not only to 'elites' or political insiders, the way pluralist tradition argues, but they are the ones with capacity to get involved in political movements. Therefore, 'actors' cannot be isolated from what they are doing and an understanding their central role within democracy requires an examination of their social and ideological backgrounds, as well as their business backgrounds and economic status.

Predominantly, New Order-era publications on the history of Indonesian democracy have focused on political elites' maintenance of central authority. This is an elite oriented perspective. It has led to an assumption that elites control all aspects of governance, including state bureaucracy

(Jackson, 1976, King 1979), and the military (Crouch 1975), as well as marginalised social movements (Kartodirjo 1984). Few scholars have focused on structural conditions like capitalism, which directly contributed to Indonesia's democratisation (Mortimer 1986, Robison 1986, Törnquist 1984, Winters 1996).

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, studies on Indonesian politics have been more diverse, focusing on institutions, oligarchies, and social movements.[9] Robison and Hadiz (2004) posit an 'oligarchy thesis' to describe 'any system of government in which virtually all political power is held by a very small number of wealthy [elites]'. An oligarchy, in their terms, is 'a collective term to denote all the individual members of the small corrupt ruling group in such a system' (2004:16). The authors suggest that Indonesia post Soeharto is an oligarchic regime. In a related study, Mietzner (2012) describes the 'stagnation of democracy' in Indonesian politics following the fall of Soeharto's regime, due to anti-reformist elites who disputed democratisation. Such elites claimed 'transition fatigue' to argue against swift democratisation and openly attacked civil society organisations that defended democracy. Mietzner does not concur that Indonesian politics were oligarchic, however.

Other challenges to the oligarchy thesis (see Ford and Caraway 2014, Ford and Pepinsky 2014, and Aspinall 2015) suggest that Indonesia's post-New Order politics have opened up opportunities for diverse actors to push various political agendas, including public affairs priorities. Aspinall cites, for example,

9 See Chapter 1.

the newly introduced healthcare system, and Ford and Caraway highlight the labour movement and unionisation.

This chapter will identify the actors within Indonesian democracy, including their positions, personal backgrounds, political affiliations, and strategies to gain legitimacy. It will question reigning theoretical assumptions that political capital is gained through financial capital controlled by a small group of affluent actors by citing survey results that indicate that, while access to capital may interweave business and politics, it may not necessarily result in the full-blown oligarchy that some theorists fear. Finally it will examine strategies for populist leaders to gain public support by pushing populist agendas and scrutinise whether such agendas have historically translated into beneficial public policies.

Consolidated State and Consolidated Business

Survey questions addressing actors asked informants to identify both dominant actors and alternative actors working within their respective sectors which we relate to 'frontlines' of democratisation such as land rights sector, gender, anti corruption, environmental, informal economy), as well as within the national government, political society, business sector, and civil society.[10] Each informant was asked to identify up to sixteen actors, resulting in a total of 5,801 identified actors. They were then asked to identify actors as either dominant or alternative.

10 Political society is defined here as 'the arena where citizens are represented and their views, therefore, are aggregated and packaged into specific policy demands and proposals'. It is functionally different from civil society — which may be defined as a realm outside state, political society and market — where citizens themselves articulate their interests. In the liberal tradition, civil society actors do not take part in politics. However, in many countries in the Global North, including in Scandinavia, as well as in developing countries like Indonesia, member of civil society organisations do take part in politics, such as running for an election. It is labelled as 'politicised civil society' (c.f. Foley and Edwards, 1996).

Then we asked our informants to reduce those sixteen names into the four most important: two for dominant actors, and two for alternative ones. Total number of actors is 2,222, and they are analysed in this chapter. Some of the actors that were labelled as 'alternative' — including some actors from the NGO sector — during the New Order have then turned 'dominant' in the post-Soeharto era because they are now are taking up formal power and have entered the arena of state governance. As a result, some informants identified dominant actors who were previously known as alternative actors. We will refer to these actors as 'new elites'. Finally, informants were also asked to identify the positions held by each actor at the time that the survey was conducted. The thirteen identified positions are outlined in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Dominant and alternative actors managing public issues

NO	ACTORS' PRESENT POSITION	PERCENTAGE	
		DOMI-NANT	ALTER-NATIVE
1	Member of House of Representatives/ Regional Representative	14.0%	7.3%
2	Member of Political party	7.3%	6.1%
3	Elected public official (in general election)	49.2%	1.9%
4	Bureaucrat	5.2%	1.7%
5	Commissioner member	0.4%	3.2%
6	Businessperson	6.4%	4.0%
7	Civil Society Organisations activist/ committee/leader	3.6%	36.5%
8	*Adat*/clan/ethnic/mass organisation/ community leader	4.2%	8.5%
9	Religious leader	1.8%	7.2%
10	Member of military	1.3%	0.2%
11	Member of militia	0.1%	0.1%
12	Professional/Academic	2.4%	11.7%
	Total	**100.00**	**100.00**

A comparison with the previous 2007 study indicates that the number of dominant actors in the state arena (including commissions and representative institutions) increased from 70% to almost 75%. Dominant actors with experience working for civil society (including Civil Society Organizations activists, *adat* or customary leaders, religious leaders, professionals, or academics) comprised 12%, with a total of 6.5% sharing a business background — up slightly from 6% in 2007, but down by 50% since the 2004 survey. Actors from the military or militia contribute a very small minority of 1.4%, suggesting that civilian presence is growing in formal Indonesian politics. Data also reveals that dominant actors are increasingly prominent in state positions.

CSO activists comprise the majority of alternative actors and join community and religious leaders, professionals, and academics to constitute a total of 73.9% of political actors. This figure reveals a dramatic increase in the number of alternative actors contributing to public issues. Since alternative actors have strong backgrounds working within civil society, this increase likely reflects an increasing focus on public affairs. Alternative actors with expertise in business total 4%, illustrating an increase in alternative actors with a business background.

The majority of dominant actors who acquire roles within state politics, share a business background. In fact, the percentage of business professionals contributing to politics has significantly increased. Almost 60% of the elected public officials own or operate large-scale business enterprises and 9% oversee medium-scale companies. Nearly

Table 4.2 Background of dominant actors in 30 surveyed areas

NO	REGENCY/ CITY	THREE TOP ANSWER		
		1	2	3
1.	Banda Aceh	Businessperson	CSO Activist	Party leader
2.	South Aceh	Party leader	CSO Activist	Member of parliament
3.	Medan	Businessperson	CSO Activist	Party leader
4.	Batam	Member of parliament	Businessperson	Elected public official
5.	Kerinci	Businessperson	CSO Activists	Elected public official
6.	Bengkulu	Professional/ Academic	Businessperson	Party leader
7.	South Lampung	Businessperson	Community/*adat* leader	Member of parliament
8.	Tangerang	Community/*adat* leader	Member of parliament	Businessperson
9.	DKI Jakarta	Businessperson	Elected public official	Community/*adat* leader
10.	Bekasi	Community/*adat* leader	Member of parliament	CSO Activist
11.	Bandung	Businessperson	Party leader	CSO Activist
12.	Pekalongan	Elected public official	Religious leader	Member of parliament
13.	Batang	CSO Activist	Community/*adat* leader	Party leader
14.	Surakarta	CSO Activist	Businessperson	Member of parliament
15.	DI Yogyakarta	Businessperson	Elected public official	Community/*adat* leader
16.	Surabaya	CSO Activist	Businessperson	Elected public official
17.	Sidoarjo	Businesspeople	Elected public official	CSO Activist
18.	Badung	Businessperson	Community/*adat* leader	Member of parliament
19.	Banjarmasin	Party leader	CSO Activist	Member of parliament
20.	Balikpapan	CSO Activist	Community/*adat* leader	Member of parliament

NO	REGENCY/ CITY	THREE TOP ANSWER		
		1	2	3
21.	Kutai Kertanegara	Party leader	CSO Activist	Businessperson
22.	Pontianak	Member of parliament	Businessperson	Elected public official
23.	Manado	Businessperson	Community/*adat* leader	Elected public official
24.	Poso	Businessperson	CSO Activist	Elected public official
25.	Makassar	Businessperson	Elected public official	CSO Activist
26.	Kupang	CSO Activist	Businessperson	Party leader
27.	Belu	Party leader	Businessperson	Elected public official
28.	Ambon	Businessperson	Professional/ academic	Elected public official
29.	Ternate	Businessperson	Elected public official	CSO Activist
30.	Jayapura	Community/*adat* leader	Businessperson	CSO Activist

half of the country's party leaders run large-scale businesses, while 5% manage medium-scale businesses.[11]

The 2013 study surveyed a total of thirty regions, and of these, a total of fourteen regional governments were mainly composed of dominant actors with business backgrounds. These former business professionals held positions as party leaders (in four regions), CSO activists (four regions), members of parliament (two regions), community leaders (three regions), elected public officials (one region), and professionals or academics (one region).

These findings reveal that business professionals are playing increasingly important roles in Indonesian politics. One possible explanation for this trend is that the significant cost of running

11 Business acquisition patterns and sector types are beyond the scope of this study.

for elections limits participation to individuals with the capital to fund their campaigns, as argued by Aspinall and Sukmajati on the 2014 elections (2015) The increased quality and quantity of vote buying have been explored in 30 areas in Indonesia during the 2014 legislative election (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015). The two authors conclude that the compared to 2009 election, the cost to run for party candidate is getting more expensive. The open list system adapted in 2009[12] may have also increased the possibility for business professionals to become political candidates.

The 'New' Elites

As part of the 2013 survey, informants were asked to identify actors as either dominant or alternative. They were also asked to indicate whether or not the dominant actors they identified were affiliated with the New Order either as (a) administrators or bureaucrats, (b) GOLKAR party members[13], (c) members in state corporatist institutions such as the Civil Servants Association (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, *KORPRI*), youth organisations (such as *Karang Taruna*), Women's Organization (*Dharma Wanita*), Journalists Association (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI*), or Teachers Association (*Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, PGRI*), or (d) businessmen with formal or informal ties

12 Open list election system or also known as 'party-list proportional system' is a voting system which is part of proportional representation (PR). In this system, multiple candidates are elected through allocation to an electoral list. Voters elect both the party and the candidates within the party. With this system, there is a high degree of competition among candidates coming from the same party, which tends to produce vote buying, commonly known in Indonesia as 'money politics'. This eventually creates a high-cost democracy.

13 *Partai Golongan Karya*, the Party of the Functional Groups, was the ruling political party under Soeharto's New Order.

to the New Order. The aim was to uncover arguments made by elites within the current political climate about power relations and politics during the New Order (Hadiz & Robison 2004).

Survey responses suggest that, of more than 2,000 actors identified as dominant, only 26% were involved with the New Order. The remaining 74%, which are referred to here as new elites, were not affiliated with the New Order, as outlined in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Dominant actor positions and affiliations with the New Order

NO	CURRENT POSITIONS	NEW ORDER AFFILIATIONS	
		OLD ELITES	NEW ELITES
1	Member of House of Representatives/ Regional Representative	21%	79%
2	Member of political party	34%	66%
3	Elected public official (in general election)	38%	62%
4	Bureaucrat	17%	83%
5	Commissioner member	3%	97%
6	Businessperson	49%	51%
7	CSO activist/committee member/ leader	3%	97%
8	Adat/family/ethnic/mass organisation/community leader	16%	84%
9	Religious leader	1%	99%
10	Member of military	7%	93%
11	Member of militia	100%	0%
12	Professional/academic	4%	96%
	TOTAL	**26%**	**74%**

With regards to the sectors in which new elites maintain positions, the study reveals that almost 40% contribute to state politics. Of the remaining 60%, 40% work within political society, 30% in economic society, and 40%, in civil society. The study also reveals that new elites dominate all political sectors, thus suggesting that dominant actors during the New Order no longer dominate governance (See Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Dominant actor types of polity

		STATE		POLITICAL SOCIETY		ECONOMIC SOCIETY		CIVIL SOCIETY	
NO	ACTOR TYPE	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
1	Old elites (affiliated with the New Order)	325	35.3%	191	24.3%	196	35.4%	29	4.28%
2	New elites (no affiliation with the New Order)	595	64.7%	559	75.7%	358	64.6%	647	96.7%
	TOTAL	**920**	**100.0%**	**786**	**100.0%**	**554**	**100.0%**	**676**	**100.0%**

The focus of this chapter has been on individuals and their positions within politics. Individuals are only able to win elections, however, with the help of their political associates. Political power is acquired through collective efforts, but such power is no longer dependent upon ties to the New Order. This is illustrated by the character of several current leaders such as Surabaya Mayor Tri Risma Harini, Bandung Mayor Ridwan Kamil, Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama, District Head of Bantaeng, South Sulawesi, Nurdin Abdullah, and District Head of Bojonegoro, East Java, Suyoto. These leaders have all risen to power without connections to Soeharto's corporatist government. Rather, they

have diverse backgrounds as bureaucrats (Tri Risma Harini), architects (Ridwan Kamil), party activists (Basuki Tjahja Purnama for the Great Indonesian Movement Party or the *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra*), and Suyoto for the National Mandate Party or *Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN*), and academics (Nurdin Abdullah). Despite their diverse backgrounds, they represent a similar orientation toward leadership as an obligation to work for the public good. They also cultivate public images as hard workers who are dedicated to public service and disconnected from New Order-era oligarchies — sentiments that reflects their disassociation from old elites, as well as their successful deployment of 'image-based politics' (*politik pencitraan*) to build their credibility (Subono and Samadhi 2009: 107).

The New Elites and Populism

While new elites have cultivated an image that aligns with leadership in democracy, they exhibit some shortcomings that they share with old elites — particularly in the case of direct regional elections . Survey results suggest, for example, that new elites come into power due to their individual capacities, rather that due to their connections to grassroots or social movements. They are also believed to support 'figure-based' or individualist politics that tend to emphasise individual achievement rather than public will and, therefore, may be seen as another form of elite politics. Individualist politicians ultimately lack solid support from popular movements. Their leadership techniques differ from those of the New Order, however, in that they mobilise supporters directly through their charisma and popular policies, rather than through religious groups or civic organisations.[14]

14 Popular policies such as those impacting public welfare are addressed in Chapter 2.

The rise of individualist politics, as reflected in survey results on actor capacity, is also exhibited in strategies that dominant and alternative actors deploy to secure political allies. Such strategies, including patronage, fundraising, media, and public relations, and lobbying account for 48.2% of dominant actors' campaigning and 37.9% among alternative actors. Strategies to solicit popular support, such as cooperation with democratic institutions, engaging the public in political decision-making, supporting mass action, networking, and advocacy work contribute only 15.83% of dominant actor strategies and 29.19% for alternative actors. These figures suggest that dominant and alternative actors tend to avoid strategies that require mass organising and popular movements.

Questions on how actors acquire authority and legitimacy yielded similar results:[15] 20% of informants indicated that money and individual authority are primary determining factors, followed by political affiliations and active participation in democratic organisations (See Table 4.5). Informants indicated that among both dominant (87.2%) and alternative (73.9%) actors, achieving legitimacy depended most crucially upon individual capacity developed through active participation in an organisation or institution, experience and expertise, a favourable personality, personal wealth, political authority, strong networks, and a positive image according to the media and general public.

Among dominant actors, informants argued that the most important factor to achieve legitimacy and authority is access to capital (20%). This assessment corresponds to the fact that (a) most dominant actors in all thirty regions surveyed share a business background and that (b) material wealth in post-Soeharto Indonesia is increasingly important.

15 For a detailed description of actor capacity, see Chapter 3.

Table 4.5 How Actors become legitimate and authorised leaders

No	Means	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Being active in organisation/institution where s/he is member	7.2%	6.5%
2	Possessing supportive background experience	3.6%	2.2%
3	Possessing capacity, knowledge and expertise	5.8%	10.0%
4	Possessing knowledge on social, political, economy context in constituent region	4.0%	9.0%
5	Possessing a good character and personality	1.6%	1.5%
6	Shared similar ideology between actor and constituent	0.2%	1.5%
7	Achieved support from people movement	6.7%	14.5%
8	Having political authority (actor involved in regulation and policy making)	14.4%	6.7%
9	Having good network/contacts within the government	5.1%	7.2%
10	Becoming part of patronage, oligarchy and dynasty politics.	3.5%	0.5%
11	Winning political competition (internal and external institution)	3.9%	1.0%
12	Possessing positive image, track, and popularity.	4.3%	10.2%
13	Incumbent	5.3%	4.7%
14	Access to (economic) capital	20.0%	4.0%
15	Gained trust from the people	3.7%	4.5%
16	Having relation with clan, ethnic, race and religion leaders	1.6%	1.0%
17	Using violence (coercive)	0.8%	0.7%
18	Being popular in media	0.8%	3.2%
19	Leadership capacity	2.4%	1.7%
20	Others	1.8%	1.2%
21	Do not know	3.2%	8.0%
		100	**100**

The use of popular organisations to gain legitimacy by both dominant and alternative actors has historically been limited primarily to the mobilising of voters during elections. Following a successful campaign, mobilisation concludes. Thus, gaining popular support has tended to be pragmatic and short-lived. Thus, cooperation is not institutionalised but informal and loose. Some informal cooperation may continue after a victory, such as between Jokowi and the NGO in Solo that facilitated various people's organisations. But since this cooperation was informal, not even the activists were especially focused on trying to institutionalise the linkages between politics and society and to organise.[16]

According to the 2007 survey, limited engagement of grassroots organisations in mobilising voters reduced the opportunity to build strong alliances between organisations and dominant actors. Alliances were limited to small, closed groups of dominant actors such as members of parliament or other actors in government sectors (Subono and Samadhi 2009: 111). The 2013 survey revealed a modest change, however, with the establishment of more diverse and enduring alliances. The Social Security Alliance Committee (*Koalisi Jaminan Sosial Nasional*, *KJSN*) provides a case in point.

According to the 2007 survey, dominant actors, like their alternative counterparts, also engaged populist strategies to 'connect' with the people, including policy development for public welfare. While this strategy may have been effective, it was mainly about image-building politics (Subono and Samadhi 2009), rather than reflecting leaders' commitment to public welfare policies. The 2013 survey results once again reflect, however, a shift toward more intense and substantive populist leadership.

16 See chapter 6 for a more elaborated case.

Conclusion

This chapter has compared surveys of actors in Indonesian governance which reveal the following major trends in Indonesia's democratisation: Firstly, the most influential actors (especially dominant actors) are increasingly consolidated within state governance. Secondly, influential dominant and alternative actors have more often than earlier a business background, thus strengthening the connection between business and politics. This is likely due to institutional changes of the elections, particularly with regard to the regional elections, and well as the rising cost of campaigning over the two last elections. Thirdly, actors referred to here as the new elites have few connections to the New Order and its corporatist system. Thus, new elites exhibit different leadership styles, as compared to the old elites. They tend to seek popular support by promising populist policies. This strategy does not require organising a popular movement or strong political party support as an instrument of democracy, but rather but mainly rests with the efforts of individual leaders and their so-called success teams. Thus, there are few attempts to establish legitimacy and authority through citizen grassroots organisations.

Survey results also reveal the growing tendency of dominant actors to employ populist approaches, both during campaigning and after they have assumed office. For example, they tend to promote public welfare policies such as healthcare and free education. Their emphasis on welfare is, however, rarely due to the pressure of grassroot organisations — as is often the case in other countries — but to direct pressure from voters, or leaders own attempts to garner political supports. Ω

CHAPTER 5

THE RISE OF POST-CLIENTELISM IN INDONESIA

Eric Hiariej

Introduction

The role and capacity of the political actor in democracy was largely unexplored in early democracy studies emphasising structural factors (c.f. Moore, Jr. 1966; Lipset 1959). The next generation of scholars, however, applied a 'transitional' approach to examine the impact of prominent figures and elite groups — both inside and outside the government — in shaping democracy. The current survey is based upon a third approach: while an analysis of actor contributions remains essential, a model of transition no longer serves to explicate democratisation in Indonesia. A political actor, in the current usage, thus refers to an individual or collective that possesses the capacity to transform socio-political structures to foster democratisation.

Scholarship employing this latter approach posits two arguments on actor capacity: The first argument focuses on the

balance of class power and the empowerment of subordinate classes. Key actors safeguard this class from dominant class hegemony and seek to balance the state and civil society (Rueschemeyer et.al 1992). The second argument, exemplified by Olle Törnquist (2013), suggests that actors transform socio-political structures to foster democratisation. This approach emphasises power structures that shape what actors can accomplish and how institutions are developed. Based upon this latter argument, the survey identifies five areas in which to assess the capacities necessary for promoting and preserving democratic institutions: the promotion of inclusive politics, accumulation of resources to develop authoritative power, conversion of private issues into foci for political agendas, organisation and mobilisation of supporters, and utilisation and advancement of existing means of participation and representation (Törnquist 2013: 56-60). These five areas of studies compose the main topics in Part Five of the questionnaire.

Based on an assumption that political actor capacity is essential for the development of democracy, this chapter posits that, although Indonesia's democracy has become more inclusive, the pro-democracy actors have been increasingly more involved in formal politics, and although there is a trend toward the formation of a public discussion around welfare issues, substantive political representation remains weak and, which we shall discuss in the next chapter, democracy is in danger of being 'bypassed'. A number of factors contribute to the stagnation of Indonesian democracy: First, due to the high cost of political participation, economic resources remain the most important source of power for both dominant and alternative actors. This leads to the perpetuation of oligarchies within governance. Second, despite

the emerging politicisation among alternative actors, they remain too weak to foster meaningful reform or popular representation. They are deeply fragmented, lack long-term alternative strategies and substantive policy alternatives, and tend toward the elitism that defines dominant actor politics. Third, democratisation has yet to overcome clientelistic practices. At best, democracy is entering a new era, in which the rise of populism accompanies the ongoing and rampant allocation of power based on patronage.

Populism, in this study, is understood as a 'political style' rather than an ideology (see Raadt, Holladers, Krouwel 2004). This 'populist style' is characterised by a definition of a relatively unified "people' for whom political candidates and leaders claim to act. It alludes to an unmediated relationship between the populist leader and the people. Populist leaders rely heavily on anti-establishment and anti-elitist discourse, as well as their own charisma to mobilise support. An exemplary term associated with Indonesian populism is the Javanese-language *blusukan,* a term that roughly translates to 'impromptu style', which was often used to describe President, Joko Widodo's political style during his run for office.

Based on the current survey, this chapter will explore five major trends that characterise the rise of post-clientelism in Indonesian politics.[17] Political clientelism is defined as the practice of offering personal benefits such as money, jobs, or access to public services in exchange for electoral support. Other forms of patronage that are also prevalent include promising voters beneficial policy changes during a bid for office. This chapter will examine the role of current dominant actors as a continuation of oligarchic power structures, despite the trend toward more

17 For the concept of post-clientelism, see Manor (2013)

inclusive politics. It will argue that the politicisation of alternative actors — many of whom are believed to be pro-democracy and activist-oriented — has not significantly increased their capacity to address challenges to democracy. This is due to significant internal fragmentation and the lack of clear strategies and policy alternatives that would propel democratisation. Instead, alternative actors tend to be absorbed into elite power hierarchies and fail to represent the people. The final section explores the rise of populism that has supported the rise if post-clientelism in the context of democratisation across the archipelago.

Oligarchic Democracy in a More Inclusive Politics: Dominant Actor

Survey results reflect a tendency towards increasing inclusion in Indonesian democracy: informants indicated that approximately 77% of the dominant actors and 80% of the alternative actors are politically inclusive, both within political society and in interactions with political actors in civil society and business. This is despite the fact that the majority of the dominant actors maintain positions within state governance or political society — an that their primary experience is within business.

To be more specific about the rise of political inclusiveness, dominant actors overcome exclusion through persuasive action (24.3%), media engagement (7.61%), and public accessibility (6.65%). Alternative actors, on the other hand, tend to prioritise media engagement (17.89%), mass action (15.66%), and persuasive action (15.48%). Just over five percent of the dominant and alternative actors respectively turn to democratic organisations or institutions as means to overcome exclusion. An aggregate percentage of them use instead patronage (5.3%), persuasive action

(24.3%), and authority (6.6%); and as many as 36.2% of the actors use strategies that resemble clientelism to overcome exclusion.

Table 5.1 Actor strategies to overcome exclusion

STRATEGIES TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION	DOMINANT ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
Patronage	7%	2%
Cash incentives	3%	1%
Media engagement (for information-sharing and dialogue)	9%	18%
Democratic organisations and institutions	6%	5%
Coercion/intimidation	2%	0%
Propaganda/campaigning	7%	4%
Persuasive action	30%	15%
Authority	8%	1%
Public accessibility	8%	5%
Political image	2%	0%
Mass action/networking	3%	16%
Advocacy, civil programs	2%	4%
Others	3%	2%
No Answers	8%	2%
TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

Political, economic, and social methods are major means to take part in political society. Political methods include safeguarding voter rights and the right to assume a political office. Economic methods include conducive business regulations and licensing procedures. Finally, social methods can include such diverse topics as the right to community action and housing ownership. Political methods are the most popular option among

both dominant and alternative actors (39.4%). In short, according to the latest survey results, dominant and alternative actors have become more inclusive since the 2007 survey was conducted.

Despite a growing trend toward inclusiveness, there is also a tendency for actors to limit such interactions to their respective polities or domains — be they the state, political society, civil society, or the business sector. This is especially true among dominant actors, and it impacts civil representation and requires greater persuasive action, such as mobilising patronage among dominant actors and media engagement among alternative actors. In other words, an increase in political inclusion has failed to significantly deter elitist and oligarchic practices in Indonesian democracy, which are used by actors with sufficient political or economic capital in order to strengthen and maintain their internal networks.

In fact, economic capital is central to dominant actors' strategies to gain legitimacy, accounting for 45.5% of such strategies. Trailing strategies include strong allies (31.8%), coercion (8.9%), and political knowledge (8.3%). Once they have assumed public offices, they often increase their economic capital — thus cementing their dominant position.

According to previous surveys, economic capital has not consistently constituted the most important strategy to win an election. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, the importance of access to economic resources declined (Subono and Samadi 2009: 105): Among dominant and alternative actors respectively, it accounted for 25% and 23% in the 2003/2004 survey and 13% and 17% in the 2007 survey. By 2007, other forms of capital predominated. Social capital, for example, such as having a strong network of allies, accounted for 28%, while knowledge

and capacity accounted for 13% and social, political, or military coercion accounted for a staggering 33%. The latest survey notably reveals a significant decline in the importance of coercion.

Alternative actor strategies have differed significantly. Historically, alternative actor strategies have differed significantly from their dominant counterparts. As individuals who tend to advocate for democracy, they have relied less on money and more on knowledge (25%) and social capital (52%) as key factors in gaining the right to participation in politics in 2013 survey. Notwithstanding this trend, 15.2% of respondents to the 2013 survey claimed that economic capital is a significant source of power. In 2007 survey, knowledge is cited as the most important form of capital (37%), followed closely by social capital (32%), mass power (21%), and access to economic resources (10%). This data suggests that alternative actors increasingly aspire to acquire economic resources as they become more established and transition into the role of new elites.

In line with the argument developed in chapter 2 on Actor, the consistently high value placed on access to financial resources by both dominant and alternative actors corresponds to the financial requirements for running for office, mobilising supporters, promoting policies and, ultimately, winning an election. Thus, politics continues to be controlled by only a small number of actors who possess enough money to run for election. Consequently, the oligarchy continues unhindered — though New Order elites no longer maintain it.

Fragmented Politicisation Among Alternative Actors

Based on previous surveys, alternative actors have since long suffered from fragmentation. The fragmentation is strongly

visible when it comes to different strategies to organise grass root movements (which tend to bypass democratic representative channels), how to establish an alliance with other actors (which tend to be the major party and the minor one), and how to select issues (which tend to be single issues rather than strategic one) (Kariadi 2009: 126-133). While many are now playing a larger role in formal politics — including assuming parliamentary seats — the continuing fragmentation has significantly weakened their capacity to improve quality of democratic representation. Rather than forming a solid political block (between members of parliament and CSOs activists), which calls for common issues across sectors (strategic issues) and strong organisations and strategies, they tend to prioritise muddled methods of collective action to address popular issues. The current survey identified three types of strategies among alternative actors that lead to political fragmentation (Samadhi 2015). First, actors involved in political parties and special interest groups tend to rely on their populism and social capital, but exhibit insufficient connections to grassroots organisations. Second, civil society actors involved in social movements, with close relationships with grassroots movement, including trade unions, and possessing significant social capital, are often unable to build their own political organisations and must thus relate to 'the least worst' among the already established ones. Three, alternative actors who focus on advocacy and lobbying politicians and the administration with regard to special and separate issues such as human rights.

Fragmentation is not the only result of these disparate strategies but also rooted in political agendas without long-term strategies. Nevertheless, since the majority of alternative actors

fall into the first or second categories, they may pioneer less elitist political methods by developing connections with grass root based organisations and networks.

The fragmentation within the main actors is quite clear from in the current survey. With regard to the use of existing means of participation and representation, the survey revealed the following: 29.5% of dominant actors opt for joint state and stakeholder agencies, 18.8% prefer institutions for community and civil self-governance, and 17.2% prioritise political executives to hear their issues and promote their interests. Among the alternative actors, on the other hand, 38.7% rely on institutions for community and civil self-governance, 24.2% turn to joint state and stakeholder agencies, and 11.5% on institutions for private governance.

Fragmentation among alternative actors is also related to the particular interests and types of issues that they advocate. The top three clusters of such issues are welfare (32.9%); problems if democracy, including human rights, and pluralism (21.9%); and governmental transparency (14.3%). This differs from the 2007 survey results, in which welfare-related issues only constituted a concern among 6% of alternative actors, whereas 38% were concerned with democracy, human rights, and pluralism and 27% with issues of governance. Different areas of concern result in different strategies, and communication across the three platforms has been limited. For example, during the saga involving the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), while NGOs working on governance issues took the central stage, the role of those NGOs working on human rights issues was rather limited.

Table 5. 2 Primary concerns of dominant and alternative actors

NO	DESCRIPTION	DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
		RES-PONSE	PERCENT OF RES-PONSE	RES-PONSE	PERCENT OF RES-PONSE
1	Moral issues and ethics	37	3.2%	49	4.5%
2	Welfare issues	459	40.3%	357	32.9%
3	Governance issues	125	11.0%	155	14.3%
4	Democracy, human rights, and pluralism issues	114	10.0%	237	21.9%
5	Development, infrastructural issues	72	6.3%	19	1.8%
6	Various issues (combined)	148	13.0%	134	12.4%
7	Others	108	9.5%	80	7.4%
8	Unknown	77	6.8%	53	4.9%
TOTAL RESPONSES		**1140**	**100,0%**	**1084**	**100,0%**

Both dominant and alternative actors display disparate ways of promoting their interests. While both prioritise media engagement (21.5% and 25.8%, respectively), dominant actors rely in the second instance on political society (19.2%) followed by informal leaders (16.9%). Alternative actors, on the other hand, prioritise civil society organisations (23%), interest-based organisations (9%), informal leaders (13%), and political society (15%). All political actors tend to select the means of engagement in which they are most proficient. For example, alternative actors, many of whom formerly contributed to Civil Society

Organizations (CSOs), also depend on CSO support during their campaigns and terms in office.

While Indonesian politics presents similar challenges to both dominant and alternative actors, lacking or unclear communication between sectors often leads to competition for resources, rather than collaboration for problem solving and policy-making. For example, alternative actors and their associated CSOs must identify sources to finance their operations, such as international agencies like USAID or AUSAID. Funds are limited however, and competition is high among actors who share the similar platforms. Since they are often preoccupied on their own sectors, they often miss opportunities to combine forces with other sectors to strategically address similar issues and share resources. This short-sighted strategising renders such platforms as mere selling points to leverage public support for accessing funding rather than as critical public issues that may be worked into the political agenda.

Fragmentation is a widespread problem. and the politicisation of alternative actors' roles through their integration into state apparatuses and formal organising has not improved the fragmented nature of pro-democracy movements. Thus, Indonesia's current alternative actors are strongly politicised, but also critically fragmented. Such fragmentation has a direct impact on policymaking for public welfare issues, such as education and healthcare.[18] Such issues are insufficiently aggregated and often fail to facilitate communication between political actors within the same sector in order to coalesce public matters for policy considerations. In short, the actors only tend to communicate with their 'friends' rather than those who share similar concerns.

18 These are outlined in Chapter 2.

High profile examples of collective action, such as the pro-KPK movements in October 2009 and October 2012, may appear to suggest that political fragmentation is diminishing. Concerted action across various sectors to combat corruption and safeguard the nation's corruption watchdog inspired a strong public defence of KPK. A range of actors — from regional government budget watches agencies (ICW) to trade union (FSPMI) took on corruption as a strategic issue and seised the opportunity to integrate their aims and develop a collective action plan. Actions were largely spontaneous, however, and failed to advance into formal policy changes on the issues of corruption.

Mass collective campaigns such as "Coin for Prita" (*Koin untuk Prita*) in 2008 and 2009 suffered similar fates. "Coin for Prita," which was also known as "Coin for Justice" (*Koin untuk Keadilan*), was a mass action campaign to raise awareness about medical malpractice and funds for a woman named Prita Mulyasari. Prita was misdiagnosed at Omni International Hospital and ordered to pay IDR 204,000,000 in damages after being convicted of criminal defamation for complaining about the hospital via email. Citizens throughout Indonesia donated coins for Prita's cause and successfully raised well over the amount of her fine. Eventually, the court rejected the hospital's demand for retribution. This means a short target was immediately achieved. While this campaign successfully mobilised a large number of citizens around a singular cause, it was an isolated and spontaneous movement that did not result in further legislation to address medical malpractice. The lack of long-term strategies for collective action compounds efforts to transform issues into policies. KPK support waned, for example, when direct attacks on the Commission and media and public interest declined.

Shortage of Strategy and Policy Alternatives Among Alternative Actors

This study has posited that both ordinary citizens and democratic actors share similar public concerns and aspirations for a welfare state. It has also argued that long-term strategies for directing these concerns toward collective action involving both political actors and citizens from diverse backgrounds remain underdeveloped. The Coalition for Social Security (*Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial, KAJS*) presents one notable exception: KAJS successfully lobbied for and won national healthcare provisions for all Indonesian citizens (Aspinall 2012). Yet, even in this case it has proved difficult to contuinue the joint actions towards more advanced social rights. Without such intellectual and ideological exercises, substantive welfare policy alternatives will fall short.

In lieu of long-term strategising, political actors have turned to the media to communicate on and promote welfare issues. They compete for public office or positions in state auxiliary institutions. They lobby for political allies, via their engagement. Welfare issues at times become platforms to gain popularity and power. Thus, policy changes to improve education and healthcare are not always the primary goals; rather, demonstrating support for improvements is a means to become politically influential and get access to economic resources.

Survey responses on what indicates success among dominant and alternative actors to prioritise public issues within political agendas reveal similarities between the two when it comes to political support, assuming roles as state officials or parliament members, and contributing to public discourse. These 'classic' indicators remain oriented toward short-term goals, however, such as gaining allies or winning an election. Once again, the

Table 5.2 Indicators of success in prioritising public issues

NO	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	DOMINANT ACTORS (%)	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (%)
1	Media presence	4%	5%
2	Public discourse presence	8%	12%
3	Presence in government, parliamentary, party and/or social movement agendas	2%	3%
4	Infrastructural development	1%	1%
5	Election as state official or parliamentary member	14%	14%
6	Establishment of welfare policies and/or policy implementation, including education, healthcare, physical security, income, working conditions, etc.)	7%	5%
7	Political and popular support, coalition formation	17%	16%
8	Good governance	4%	3%
9	Material/financial benefits and/or socio-political advantages	4%	1%
10	Public activities and events	2%	1%
11	Establishment of development and economic programs	4%	1%
12	Policy change	2%	2%
13	New regulations	6%	3%
14	Peace-building, political equity, human rights protection, improved political awareness, pluralism, and/or democratisation	2%	7%
15	Successful programs, strategies, or policies	5%	3%
16	Political process influence	3%	10%
17	Others	10%	9%
18	Combined	5%	5%
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

development of long-term strategies is not prioritised and substantive policy alternatives are lacking. Despite this fact, both dominant and alternative actors share the opinion that a lack of support and trust is a fundamental factor in their failure to turn issues into public matters.

Dominant and alternative actors also share the view that mobilising support is essential for success, and successful mobilisation results in an enlarged support base (29% for dominant actors and 30.5% for alternative actors). Whereas 25.6% of dominant actors assume that gaining power is the second most important indicator of successful mobilisation, followed by media coverage (14.3%), alternative actors believe that media coverage (23.7%) is a more important indicator than assuming an office (12.4%). These survey findings are particularly illuminating in the case of dominant actors: In the Soeharto era, Indonesian politics was often characterised as a 'bureaucratic polity' in which policymakers experts/technocrats, and administrators isolated themselves from the people. The general public did not participate in political processes. Survey results reveal that this has shifted, and the former 'bureaucratic polity' has turned into what may be called a 'bureaucratic populist' government.

Dominant and alternative actors differ with regard to identifying causes of a failure to mobilise. Among dominant actors, factors that impede mobilisation include lack of public support (15.1%), strong and influential opposition (14.7%) or lack of political networks (12.3%). Among alternative actors, factors include disorganised networks (19.2%), lack of personal/institutional capacity (17.5%) and lack of public support (11.3%). These findings illustrate that dominant actors prioritise public

support, while alternative actors tend to be more concerned with the capacity of their networks and institutions.

Table 5.3 Indicators of success in mobilising and organising support

NO	INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL	DOMINANT ACTORS (%)	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (%)
1	Frequent demonstrations, rallies	0%	2%
2	Strong networks within political parties	3%	2%
3	Strong personal networks and alliances	3%	8%
4	Collective engagement for policymaking	3%	2%
5	Platforms to gain public, media interest	15%	26%
6	Gaining power by assuming public/political positions	28%	14%
7	Enabling mass organisation	3%	2%
8	Large public support base	31%	34%
9	Others	13%	11%
Total Responses		**100%**	**100%**

The major indication is, thus, that dominant actors remain primarily concerned with gaining power and increasing their popularity. Policies on welfare provisions are only a consideration if they increase their popularity and ensure their successful candidacy. As a result, substantive measures or long-term strategies that affect governance on public issues are not prioritised. Rather, popular support and winning elections take precedence. In short, the way in which both dominant and alternative actors mobilise support point to pragmatic, short-term

objectives and policies. This populist model of gaining support is also carried into leadership style, as will be addressed in the next section.

Elitism and Weak Representation

The alternative actors are increasingly well established and politicised. A significant number of them have succeeded in entering public office as governors, district heads (*bupati*), or city mayors. However, their networks remain fragmented and their strategies and ideologies lack longevity. Historically, the alternative actors have tended to be elitist in such roles. Eventhough they claim to represent the voice of the people, they primary network with fellow insiders and fail to form substantive grassroots connections. Their attempts at fostering change tend to rely less on the methods and processes associated with democratic representation and more on their own political authority and the media. Thus, they may become popular public figures by voicing demands to foster policy changes, but they disregard popular support for efforts at democratic governance.

Such elitism is reflected in the current survey by the dominant and alternative actors' methods to mobilise and organise support (Table 5.4). A commitment to democratic, bottom-up mobilisation is limited. A large percentage of the dominant actors (45.4%) rely on populism and charismatic leadership (11.8%), as do alternative actors (30.2% and 10%, respectively). Responses pointing to clientelistic mobilisation indicate that dominant actors offer client patronage (12%) maintain relationships with influential people (4.2%) and utilise family connections (5.7%) to a much greater degree than alternative actors.

Table 5.4 Methods to mobilise and organise support

NO	METHODS OF MOBILISATION	DOMINANT ACTORS (%)	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (%)
1	Develop populist profile	47%	31%
2	Charismatic leadership	12%	10%
3	Clientelism and patronage	12%	4%
4	Alternative economic and political protection and support	5%	20%
5	Relationships with influential people	4%	6%
6	Family connections	6%	2%
7	Counterpart networks	6%	10%
8	Groups and movement coordination	4%	9%
9	Bottom-up organising	3%	8%
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

In addition to the elitist methods of mobilisation and organisation displayed in Table 5.4, both dominant and alternative actors also tend to deploy capacities that reflect the importance of leadership, such as networking (14.7%), organisational support (12.4%), and developing a populist political profile (9.7%). Similarly, the informants responses to our question on how actors incorporate public issues into the political agenda reflect these strategies too. Dominant actors rely on active participation in a political party (56.9%) or interest-based organisation (18.6%). Alternative actors priorities vary slightly. They tend to at first hand rely on active participation in interest-based organisations (38.6%), followed by party participation (19.8%) and media engagement (16%).

As previously demonstrated the alternative actors are very much part of politics based on popular individual 'figures'. The fragmented nature of alternative actors discussed above implies that the activists often work in isolation. The tendency to rely on methods such as populism and alternative patronage in mobilising and organising support means that the alternative actors hardly operate in-group, let alone in well-managed and organised networks of activists. In addition to this comes the importance of securing media attention when the activists engage in political struggles on certain issues that tends to focus on developing their own roles as crucial 'figures' with an image of fostering political ideals, policy orientation and public interests.

The degree to which such elitism is easy to observe differs, however. Generally, the alternative actors surveyed in this study tend to represent much of the elitist leanings. However, those of the alternative actors that are active in grassroots social movements and peasant movement rather tend to support open governance, and prioritise less isolated leadership. Such individuals generally operate within sectors requiring wide popular support. Moreover, there are signs of a trend toward political party and interest group networking, combined with social movement engagement. This suggests that Indonesia may experience a decline in elitism among pro-democracy actors in the near future.

Elitism combined with fragmentation and the lack of long-term strategies and ideologies is however detrimental to popular representation and inhibits Indonesia's disassociation with oligarchic governance. Unfortunately, instead of improving representation, many pro-democracy actors still adjust their efforts to the existing system. One crucial example is the establishment of independent commissions and entities for state-stakeholder

collaboration. These institutions do little to propel internal change as they often consist of actors that are, firstly, appointed by dominating actors on their own discretion, and, secondly, are inclined toward 'figure-based politics' by remaining outside political parties and parliamentary engagement. Instead, they depend on civil society support — but are rarely elected and accountable to any particular organisations — and also network with colleagues inside their own auxiliary institutions. In short, being well established and politicised does not necessarily translate into improved democratic representation.

The Era of Post-Clientelism

Despite the argument that Indonesia's political evolution will support democratisation, several studies (such as Klinken 2009, Aspinall and Sukmajati 2014) argue that clientelism remains a hindrance to democratic accountability. Clientelism in this survey is understood as a practice of offering personal benefits such as money, jobs or access to public services in return for electoral support.

The 2013 survey reveals, however, that the relative importance of clientelistic politics is being reduced. Furthermore, despite the ongoing challenge of elitism and tendency toward oligarchy, Indonesia's democracy is increasingly open and inclusive, as illustrated by the presence of former pro-democracy activists in public offices, as well as the increasing popularity of populist governance. It is certainly true that clientelism remains important, as illustrated in particular by dominant actors' ways of gaining support. Furthermore, methods associated with democratic accountability, such as bottom-up organising and interest group coordination are not yet prioritised by either type

of actor. The survey also indicates that a candidate's status as an authoritative and effective political leader is paved with economic resources and contingent upon strong networks. While such strategies may not necessarily imply the presence of political clientelism, in general, money and connections are often won through mutually beneficial patron-client relations. However, in addition to applying clientelism, both dominant and alternative actors must now also project themselves as modern public personalities with populist and charismatic characteristics in order to mobilise and organise sufficient support. In fact the main actors seem to combine clientelism and populism.

Both populism and clientelism are elitist top-down methods of incorporating people into politics in contrast to their integration from below oin the basis of their own organisations (Mouzelis 1998). Populism clearly differs from clientelism, however. Rather than exchanging material benefits for political support, a populist leader relies on voter support developed in large part by cultivating his or her public image as a leader who communicates directly with the people and least promises to prioritise their needs. Thus, populist methods emphasise either the leader's personal background — his or her class, ethnic, or religious background, for example — or public welfare. In fact, populist measures like prioritising welfare issues, is at this point of time the prime strategy within Indonesia's political elite as it has provided them with the widest possible popular support.

With regard to targeting the issues that will become matters of public concern, both dominant and alternative actors require broad support. As indicated in Table 5.5, failure to gain such support can result in an inability to control the public discourse.

Table 5.5 Causes of failure to control public discourse

NO	CAUSES OF FAILURE TO CONTROL PUBLIC DISCOURSE	DOMINANT ACTOR (%)	ALTERNATIVE ACTOR (%)
1	Commercialisation and fragmentation of media	0%	2%
2	Elite maintenance of power	1%	11%
3	Poor education	4%	4%
4	Public fear and avoidance	0%	0%
5	Lack of public, party, collegial, or institutional support	28%	19%
6	Unreliable or under-performing institutions or weak or malfunctioning institutional frameworks	8%	5%
7	Political apathy	1%	2%
8	Lack of public awareness due to poor communication or lack of reliable social and political networks	3%	4%
9	Prejudices based on personal background (e.g., ethnic, religious background)	2%	1%
10	Conflict of interest	3%	2%
11	Lack of economic, social, and/or political resources	4%	13%
12	Rise of democracy, political awareness, and political inclusiveness	5%	1%
13	Political conflict	9%	5%
14	Poor capacity	5%	4%
15	Political scandal due to corruption, abuse of power, etc.	3%	2%
16	Strategy and public communication challenges	2%	4%
17	Others	13%	8%
18	Combined	10%	10%
	TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

The existing gulf between populism and democratic accountability is cause for concern. The populist candidate's promises in return for voters' support do not necessarily lead to corresponding policies addressing public concerns. With the rise of populism, pro-democracy actors too have been preoccupied with acquiring political power and assuming office. In order to expand their popularity, populist actors in general promise to make public issues part of the political agenda. But the prime aim seems to be to acquire political power and authority as a state official rather than to give priority to public welfare (see again Table 5.2 and 5.3 above). This is especially apparent among dominant actors, who tend to network with mediating agencies that also possess power and authority, rather than directly with the voting public.

While the survey reveals some notable exceptions, wherein new regulations, policies, and development programs reflect commitment to public issues, welfare improvement has not generally been a top priority. Rather, candidates display a tendency toward 'figure-based politics' — particularly by the dominant actor whose reputation as a legitimate and authoritative leader depends more on his or her economic capital and perceived leadership capacity than on a commitment to democratic organisation. Populism as a political style, therefore, correlates with 'figure-based politics' because it depends on the public perception of an individual leader claiming to act in the public interest. In fact, 'figure-based politics' is so prevalent that the Indonesian-language term *politik pencitraan*, which translates to 'branding politics', is pervasive in media and public discourse. It implies the prioritisation of public relations in order to develop and promote one's public image via the media and thus garner public support.

Those supposed to play pivotal roles in improving the problem of democratisation are the alternative actors. They mainly comprise activists from various types of CSOs at both national and local level. Although they are the key figure in promoting major public issues, including welfare related issues, CSO's activists are short of several capacities. The lack of capacity prevents them from being able to successfully foster the democratisation process in the country.

Above all the activists hardly rely on empowered citizens and popular organisations in overcoming the problem of exclusion and mobilising resources and support. Instead of building pressure from below through a network of democratic associations, CSO's activists are highly preoccupied with using (mass) media in voicing public matters; and persuasive methods and some sort of populism in bringing broader sections of the population into the political process. In addition, contacts and communication with figures and organisations outside one own sector of activism are limited. The activists tend to speak to themselves regarding issues that seem to be important by the society in general. They lack well-developed strategies and ideologies for alternative policies.

In the place of improving popular representation the country is, as already indicated, witnessing the continuing presence of clientelism. However, clientelism is no longer 'the only game in town' as the dominant actors in particular have to also employ various forms of populism in mobilising and organising support. Therefore, the introduction of liberal institutions in Indonesia is yet to be followed by stable and substantive democracy with strong popular representation. The country seems to enter a new phase of politics with 'post-clientelistic' characteristics. Ω

CHAPTER 6

BYPASSING THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATISATION

Willy Purna Samadhi and Olle Törnquist

Introduction

This chapter will examine the dynamics of Indonesian democratisation. Most assessments of democracy present a static picture of the state of affairs at a given point in history. In the preceding chapters there have already been some important comparisons over time based on results from our previous surveys. This chapter moves ahead by also examining the *processes* of democratisation. We investigate the potential for further democratisation and what interests, issues, and actors that impact this process. Such questions call for additional information. In our view, the best indicator for this is the character of the actors' strategies and weather and how they affect the key problems of democratisation. Before proceeding to the strategies

and their effects, let us therefore recall the main problems of democratisation that have been identified in the survey and which require redress, in order to commence a much-needed second phase of democratisation in Indonesia.

In brief summary, the previous chapters have shown that, ironically, the major problems with Indonesian democratisation lay with the very characteristics that made Indonesia a showcase among the world's new democracies. These characteristics may be summarised as the successful crafting of pacts between moderate conservatives and reformists in favour of structural and institutional changes towards the kind of economic and political liberties and supposedly democratic institutions that the moderate actors would be able to live with.

This has required, firstly, the introduction of a number of comparatively radical liberties and decentralisation of governance to break up previously consolidated economic and political monopolies under the New Order's authoritarian regime. It has also required the introduction of new freedoms for the media and other parts of civil society, as well as the prioritisation of civil and political rights and relatively free and fair elections. Secondly, however, these advances have also come with a number of problematic effects. One crucial effect is the depoliticisation of several issues that, under the New Order, were controlled by the autocratic president and his politically appointed assistants and politicians. Instead of than more democratic decision-making about these matters, they have been privatised and deregulated and judicial and technocratic authority has been increased.

Another consequence has been the holding back of principled administrative and judicial reforms and other measures to foster the rule of law and to fight corruption. This containment has

allowed moderate actors to manipulate moderately revised standards. Finally and most momentously, the development of substantive political representation has been obstructed by way of electoral and party laws that benefit moderate elites and prioritise networking and 'good contacts'. Attempts at the introduction of democratic linkages between state and issue/interest organisations have been held back. This has resulted not only in reduced representation for the old authoritarian rulers such as the military. It has also restricted the prioritisation of popular interests and concerns that were once expressed by radical activists and union leaders and which reflected the emergence of various social movements to provide land to the tillers, rights for the urban poor, and rights to means of production and livelihood. Hence it has been quite difficult and at times not even rational for such activists and movements to focus instead on broad collective action and organisation. More recently, the remarkable involvement of both activists and ordinary citizens in criticising regional governments and the state and, demanding welfare reform are also short of strong organisations among people themselves. In addition, the state and local governments that are supposed to implement such reforms in a reasonably impartial way are still short of economic and administrative capacity

In other words, it is true that there have been a number of advances with regard to liberties and elitist elections. Remarkably, moreover, these freedoms have not challenged stability or hindered economic growth. Indonesia is a liberal and democratic showcase. However, with the exception of citizens own organising and self-help activities, further improvements of liberties and human rights have stagnated. Even worse, few advancements, if any, have addressed defective governance and limited organising

or representation of public concerns and interests beyond those of the moderate elites. Improvements call, thus, for a second phase of democratisation that benefits more than dominant elites. This calls for the inclusion and representation of public interests and improvements of the democratic capacity of the state to implement welfare and government reforms.

How have important actors' strategies addressed these challenges? What, if any, are the opportunities for further democratisation? The main indicators present a bleak forecast, but there are also some signs of openings. In short, the major problems of democratisation as outlined above have not been addressed. At present, rather than overcoming the challenges to democratisation, both dominant and alternative actors capitalise on their freedoms to find ways to affect public governance that are not always very democratic. Essentially, they practice what may be labelled 'politics of penetration' in order to access 'good contacts' and public resources, rather than working to improve democratic representation and governance and developing strategies aiming at transformative reforms combining welfare and economic growth.

Combining Case Studies and Surveys

The analytical logic that has facilitated these conclusions is, as previously mentioned, to understand actors' aims and strategies and examine how these strategies have addressed challenges to democracy. There are multiple sources for these studies. Firstly, a number of questions in the surveys generate knowledge of the dominant actors' strategies and how they impact on democratisation. Secondly, however, there is also a need for thematic case studies. This is because of the need to prioritise studies of potentials for change and, therefore, to focus

on the alternative actors. Some of these case studies preceded the democratisation surveys (Budiman and Törnquist 2001, Prasetyo, Priyono, Törnquist 2003). Other studies were carried out to supplement the surveys (Priyono and Nur 2009, Törnquist 2009 and 2013-2014, Samadhi 2015). Together, they not only provide an understanding of the most impressive and pioneering experiments. In addition, they point to challenges that less prominent actors would face too. Bearing these case studies in mind, and with the additional insights revealed through the new surveys, we have reached a number of conclusions that will be outlined in this chapter.

Dominant Actors' Strategies

Data from all three surveys indicate clearly that dominant actors exhibit more comprehensive strategies and greater sources of power than alternative actors. As demonstrated in Chapter Five, dominant actors are more capable of accumulating economic, social, and cultural sources of power in addition to means of coercion, and of transforming them into authority and legitimacy in order to dominate politics and governance. Dominant actors also possess valuable individual contacts and significant influence within civil society — especially with regard to community activities. In addition, they often recruit popular alternative actors within their political parties and deploy creative methods to situate their issues on the public agenda. Finally, they are more successful than alternative actors at mobilising and organising public support.

Such strategies, however — as Chapter Five illustrated — rarely result in specific policies, aims, and ideologies that may contribute to economic and social development and 'good governance'. Dominant actor strategies also fail to foster collective

action through issue-based and special interest organisations. Rather, these actors prioritise getting access to public positions and resources by 'socialising' (i.e. make known and impose) programmes through media, nourish political populism and to network with other actors within the elite in win public office. The relevant data from the recent survey illustrates this point:

Table 6.1. Dominant actor strategies to achieve their goals

NO	DOMINANT ACTORS' MAIN STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS	PERCENT OF RESPONSES
1	Socialising programs and engaging in media action	16%
2	Developing populist and charismatic actions	16%
3	Developing inter-elite networks and alliances	12%
4	Getting support from parties and parliaments	12%
5	Using power to gain bureaucratic support	11%
8	Others	33%
	TOTAL	**100%**

Interestingly, dominant actor strategies are not impeded by the current level of Indonesian democratisation. Beyond problems of elitist competition and insufficient public support, they are quite able to navigate politics and governance without being 'disturbed' by democratic processes. Rather, the following table 6.2. outlines the key challenges to in implementing their strategies.

The effect of dominant actor strategies on democracy is, therefore, ambiguous. While they face few challenges in adjusting to the existing democratic rules of the game, they continue to focus primarily on strategies to penetrate the administration and to gain access to public resources and power. This is in contrast to developing policies and programs that would gain public

Table 6.2. Challenges to democratisation faced by dominant actors for strategy implementation

NO	MAJOR CHALLENGES	PERCENT
1	Opposition from parliament; burdensome legislation	3%
2	Insufficient public support	15%
3	Pressures and influence from the business sector	4%
4	Intra-elite competition and conflicts	15%
5	Insufficient bureaucratic support; poor/weak bureaucracy	5%
6	Opposition from NGOs/civil society	2%
7	Lack of economic resources	3%
8	Poor/weak law enforcement	2%
9	Media hostility, cynicism; inability to control the media	2%
10	Geographic challenges	1%
11	Insufficient leader capacity to monopolise politics	11%
12	Money politics, corruption	2%
13	Feudalism and patronage, including royalty (kesultanan), patriarchy, ethnic politics	5%
14	Unclear, unstable, discontinued, or inconsistent policies	3%
15	Regeneration and recruitment (of cadres), difficulties identifying committed people	2%
16	Challenges formulating appropriate programs and strategies	7%
17	Lack of engagement of educated citizens and middle classes	7%
18	No serious challenge	4%
19	Unknown	7%
TOTAL		**100.0%**

support, and foster collective action through issue- and interest organisations of both allies and adversaries.

In short, dominant actor strategies rarely address the challenges to democracy that were identified in the survey. Furthermore, more than half of survey informants indicated that dominant actor strategies impact democracy negatively. Less than a third of the answers assessed their strategies positively, and of these, very few outlined efforts that directly addressed the main problems of democracy. Similarly, few informants pointed to a positive link between dominant actor strategies policy improvements to protect citizen rights and to provide public services; and none drew connections to inclusive development.

Alternative Actor Strategies: Case Studies and Related Survey Results

Much of the democratically oriented opposition to the Soeharto regime came from self-help groups (sometimes combined with efforts to foster alternative development) as well as scattered issue and action groups among students and intellectuals in particular, occasionally supported from outside by disfavoured sections of the upper classes. As Törnquist and Budiman (2001) illustrated, however, more organised pro-democracy actors also played important roles: they not only promoted specific interests, but they also demanded political change, coalesced disparate concerns and interests and expanded the social base for democracy. Examples of such organising included the labour movement in Medan; protests against the Kedung Ombo dam in Central Java; peasants' and farmers' movements in Nipah, East Java; journalists' protests against the forced cancellation of a number of magazines; and dissidents' attempts to work within

the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P*).

Such groups, activists, and movements lost momentum, however, because they were marginalised in the process of transition from the Soeharto regime to democratic elections. In this process, negotiated pacts among moderate elites led to the crafting of institutions and an electoral system that benefited them. Many post-Soeharto pro-democracy actors thus lost interest in trying to make a difference within 'dirty politics' and retreated instead to civil society to focus on specific aims and campaigns with limited social bases. This was documented and analysed in an early survey and several case studies of and with the post-Soeharto democracy movement (Prasetyo, Priyono, Törnquist 2003). A major conclusion was that the actors were best characterised as 'floating democrats'.

These results were confirmed through further analysis in a report on the first democracy survey, carried out in 2003-2004 (Piryano, Samadhi, and Törnquist 2007). This resulted in an expert recommendation for pro-democracy groups to 'go politics'. Priyono and Nur's subsequent publication (2009) documented attempts by pioneer civil society groups and related movements to do just that. By discussing issues, interests and location, the authors could identify two major ways in which such groups attempted to expand their field of influence. Firstly, they embraced more broad issues and interests than they had previously by building local level coalitions and alliances. Secondly, they connected groups in different localities that shared similar foci and support bases. Typical strategies included: (i) to continue work as a pressure group, (ii) to support candidates for parliamentary seats, (iii) to work within an established political party; (iv) to try

to build an alternative party, (v) and to navigate the web of public and private governance (Ibid: 83-95).

Based on more extensive interviews around the country in 2006-07, and international comparative experiences, Törnquist (2009) arrived at similar conclusions in the form of nine strategies among pro-democracy actors: (i) spearheading of interests among oppressed and exploited people; (ii) developing dissident politics based on communal solidarities and concerns among marginalised populations; (iii) attempting at direct political participation among concerned citizens as an alternative to 'rotten politics'; (iv) influencing the public discourse, including via media, by exposing protests and demands (but not so much engaging in alternative policy proposals); (v) negotiating issue-based contracts between politicians and activists that also served the purpose of coordinating various movements and their concerns; (vi) attempting at building radical political fronts within mainstream political parties; (vii) trying to build new parties based on trade-unions or multi-sector groups and movements; (viii) attempting at local political parties; (ix) and struggling to build new ideologically driven parties.

Typically the results of all strategies were meagre. On the one hand civil society activists got more engaged in politics, but mainly on the basis of their cooperation with specific movements and engagements in special issues. On the other hand a number of the activists who considered party building failed because of poor organisation and insufficient resources — typically thereafter linking up with mainstream parties or behind potentially alternative politicians in local direct elections (of heads of districts, mayors and governors). In almost all cases without forceful organised bases of their own.

Results from the 2007 survey (Samadhi and Warouw 2009) confirmed the case study results above and underlined the need to overcome fragmentation and short-term strategising by building political blocks based on common goals and the most fundamental demands of civil society groups, social movement and committed politicians. This should be done by developing a new sphere of action that did merge civil society and party political activism but established an independent field *in-between* the specialised and fragmented issue-oriented groups, on the one hand, and mainstream parties dominated by bosses and seemingly alternative politicians banking on populism and charisma, on the other. Through such political blocks, it was anticipated that 'real' alternative actors would gain enough bargaining power to successfully conduct negotiations with political parties and populist leaders, and to later on build genuinely rooted parties of their own.

This recommendation was rarely realised in practice, however. Rather, specialised activists rationalised their focus on specific issues and interests and opted for methods that they believed had the best chance to generate positive results, including lobbying, networking, and influencing the public opinion. Hence, they only engaged in temporary coalitions and they were afraid of being abused by political coordinators and operators. By implication, these activists also faced problems in mobilising sufficient resources, which in turn caused additional conflicts among them (such as in East Nusa Tenggara; Samadhi 2015.). For those who anyway wanted to focus on politics it was actually more difficult to organise political blocks than to rally behind and strike deals with local populist leaders (such as Jokowi in Solo; Pratikno and Lay 2013), or (as many individual civil society

campaigners and a few trade union leaders) to run as invited 'diaspora candidates' for any of the 'least worst' parties.

This pattern was detailed in Törnquist's field studies (2013-2014), as well as in Samadhi's in-depth analyses of the new data from 2013 survey (2015). Samadhi identifies three clusters of actors with similar political capacities and strategies: The first cluster consists of individuals working with political parties or alongside populist-oriented politicians. At present, this group dominates within the democracy movement. Associated activists tend to be inclusive and to welcome the involvement of various parties and their political figures. Through this strategy, activists are able to influence important actors and the public discourse as well as to broaden their social bases. But their relationships to these bases are often unorganised and mainly rely on personal connections. Furthermore, they are short of financial resources.

A second group of activists consists of those who are also influenced by populism but who tend to associate directly with organised groups such as trade unions or farmers' associations. Thus they are at best able to foster well-organised interest representation and actions but are rarely able to act independently within politics, only via mainstream parties on sympathetic political leaders. A third cluster — the smallest and least populist oriented — include a number of action groups on various issues such as human rights, corruption, the environment or the subordination of women. They focus on networking with likeminded actors and movements and on influencing government institutions and the bureaucracy.

In contrast to these mixed experiences, however, Törnquist's field studies (2013-2014) also identified three new structural processes that might pave the way for broader alliances behind

common minimum demands within crucial political fields and policy areas. One of these processes is rooted in the uneven neo-liberal development and the fact that as the number of contract workers and informal labourers increase, trade union activists must seek allies outside their own organisations. This is because they need to measure up against employers, demand better employment and wage regulations from the state, at best along with more inclusive economic policies generating more jobs. Another process is based on the common interests among wide segments of the urban populations (from poor to well off and even some businessmen) to handle chaotic cities by participatory governance enabling fair relocations, better public services and struggle against the kind of corruption that affects all citizens — not just middle classes impacted by the abuse of tax monies or lack of a meritocracy. In Solo and Jakarta, for example, this process was the foundation for Jokowi's rise to prominence along with populist policies in cooperation with loose networks of supportive actors. The third process is rooted in the increasingly widespread demands for public welfare. So far this has been related primarily to health and education, but the expectations are clearly of a comprehensive welfare state which provides social security, free or subsidised childcare, public housing, unemployment, and a combination of welfare and inclusive economic growth that generates more jobs and, hence, tax revenues.

These three processes have generated mixed results. The first process of social movement trade unionism proved particularly dynamic in the industrial areas around Jakarta However, organised workers experienced limited benefits from broader alliances. Instead, they received favourable short-term offers from authoritarian politicians like former presidential candidate

Prabowo Subianto and the oligarchs behind him. This points to the importance of coordinating instead specific labour interests with demands for (i) long-term policies to improve welfare measures that foster inclusive economic development too and (ii) democratic interest based representation in addition to the already existing political elections The second process of negotiating social pacts to transform chaotic big cities risks prioritising the interests of affluent middle classes and businessmen as well as *their* way of incorporating lower middle classes, labourers and urban poor. Hence, institutionalised channels for democratic representation for all citizens to build more impartial and efficient public programmes must be added. Finally, the third process of developing a welfare state suffers from a lack of transformative policy proposals and a strategic perspective. As suggested above, however, it is the only process that shows potential for combining common concerns for better labour and employment regulations, inclusive growth with more jobs and tax revenues, and improvements to public service and good governance — all preconditions for a viable welfare state.

Alternative Actor Strategies and Effects on Democratisation: Indices from the Third Survey

The third survey suggests that alternatives actors lack clear aims and policies, especially with regard to welfare reforms, inclusive growth, and the institutionalisation of democratic, interest-based representation. Their aims tend to be less about reforms to improve democracy and universal welfare systems and more about gaining influential positions, resources, and contacts. Informants' indicators for a successful strategy include strengthened positions and social base, improved governance,

and increased public awareness. Such achievements are certainly important, but they are more about improving the capacity of the movements themselves and of politics of penetrating state and local government than of politics of social democracy. They also resemble dominant actors' primary aims to gain power and access to public resources. Yet, of course, dominant actors continue to be more successful and make more use of corruption.

A crucial question in this regard is where alternative actors take their concerns. While activists and ordinary people obviously expect more public welfare, their trust in the capacity of public institutions to deliver remains low. Paradoxically, the main focus of the alternative actors themselves is therefore not on trying to solve issues via improved public institutions of governance and service but — at least in the short run — on civil society and community organisation and even private institutions (See Table 6.3). They are also pragmatic in their engagement with public governance institutions: they turn to individuals or institutions with the most power and influence rather than demanding improvements to democratic standards in order to achieve desirable results.

Table 6.3. Institutions of governance targeted by alternative actors to address problems and promote visions and interests

NO	CHANNELS	PERCENT OF RESPONSES
1	Institutions for private governance	12%
2	Institutions for civil self-governance	39%
3	Joint state-stakeholder agencies	24%
4	Civil and military administration	5%
5	Judiciary authorities and the police	10%
6	The political executive	10%
TOTAL		**100%**

The same pattern is revealed in mediation and related representation. Among ordinary citizen and activists, the trust in politicians, political parties, and even collective interest organisations remains low. As a result, these actors often bypass such institutions to seek direct representation and alternative mediation via, for example, the media, NGOs , and informal leaders They are also increasingly interested in invitations from politicians to join well-funded state society commissions and reference groups, through which they can expand their professional networks and get 'good contacts' and access to resources. (See Table 6.4.)

Table 6.4. Mediators approached by alternative actors to address their concerns and promote their visions and interests

NO	MEDIATOR	PERCENT OF RESPONSE
1	Civil society organisations	23
2	Media	26
3	Issue-based and special interest organisations	13
4	Individual, direct participation	10
5	Political society	12
6	Informal leaders	13
7	Individual or collective bypassing of democratic representation	4
TOTAL RESPONSES		**100.0**

It is true that there is a tendency among alternative actors to reengage in politics. There are also attempts to broaden the social base and to build broad membership based organisations. Yet, the main methods remain advocacy, campaigning, lobbying,

and attending or orchestrating seminars. And there is far from an exodus into political parties. Fortunately, however, identity politics has not become a major shortcut to acquiring influence and power — demands for jobs and public welfare stand in the forefront.

Table 6.5. Alternative actor strategies to achieve their goals

NO	ALTERNATIVE ACTOR STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS	PERCENT
1	Widen social base and improve organisations and networks	24%
2	Accumulating and activating economic resources	3%
3	Advocating various popular interests	13%
4	Campaigning and media activities	20%
5	Developing intellectual capacity, researching, data collection	4%
6	Gaining support from parties and parliament	6%
7	Attending public seminars, discussions	3%
8	Lobbying and communicating with executives and influential figures	11%
9	Entering political parties, elections	1%
10	Citizen mobilisation	4%
11	Acquiring support through cultural, religious, and community groups	6%
12	No answer/Not relevant	6%
TOTAL		**100.0**

Finally, the informants' answers about what institutional constraints and problems that the alternative actors' face when trying to implement their strategies (see Table 6.6!) are also supporting the previous conclusions that these actors are less concerned with aims (in terms of for example welfare policies and governance and

Table 6.6. Challenges to democratisation faced by alternative actors for strategy implementation

NO	MAJOR CHALLENGES	%
1	Opposition from parliament, burdensome legislation	2%
2	Insufficient public support	14%
3	Pressures and influence from the business sector	2%
4	Inter-elite competition, elite rivalries	4%
5	Insufficient bureaucratic support or poor public administration	6%
7	Lack of economic resources	6%
8	Poor/weak law enforcement	1%
9	Media attacks, cynicism, inability to control the media	2%
10	Geographic challenges	1%
11	Politics monopoly by elites/alienated leaders	4%
12	Money politics, corruption	4%
13	Feudalism and patronage, including royalty, , patriarchy, ethnic politics	2%
14	Unclear, unstable, discontinued, or inconsistent policies	1%
15	Regeneration and recruitment (cadres), difficulties identifying committed people	4%
16	Unsuccessful or inefficient programs or strategies	13%
17	Disconnection between critical actors, the middle class, and educated citizens on political decision-making	3%
18	Insufficient government support	4%
19	Lack of public awareness on the importance of democracy	3%
20	Discrimination	1%
21	Criminal acts, coercive mass action, anti-democratic mass pressure	3%
22	Fragmented movements	6%
23	Pressures from the government	3%
24	Insufficient party, political support	1%
25	No serious challenges	3%
26	Unknown	10%
	TOTAL	**100.0%**

popular representation) than with penetrating state and government in order to 'gain access' and resources. The problems faced are not really related to the major challenges to democratisation such as unfavourable systems of representation or weak political capacity. Rather, the informants point to lack of popular support (14%) or problems with programs or strategies (13%).

Despite these shortcomings, informants are more positive about alternative actors and the extent to which their strategies contribute to democratization than of their dominant counterparts. Only one fourth of the informants stated that alternative actor strategies have a negative impact on democratisation. Yet, positive impacts are less due to their efforts to address the main challenges to democratisation than with their capacity to address problems of public freedoms, human rights, and direct participation.

Conclusion: Poor Dynamics of Democratisation

The same factors and actors that made Indonesia's democratisation into an early success case are now holding back further advances. Indonesia requires a second round of crafting of democracy — this time with the involvement of the interests and public concerns that really would be in favour of better governance and improved representation and political capacity of vital actors of change. The question that remains is whether or not this is possible. Dominant actors often follow the rules of a rudimentary democratic game, but primarily for their own advantage, not in order to develop policies that address the main challenges of democratisation.

Alternative actors, on the other hand tend to foster democracy, but primarily with regard to freedoms such as civil and political rights. They still fail to address the main challenges

of democratisation. Even in such cases that alternative actors have supported ordinary citizens' political capacity they have not given priority to long-term organisation and development of transformative policies. The challenges of democratisation are often bypassed and the main tendency seems to be 'politics of penetration' of state and government to gain access and to gain 'good contacts'.

Nonetheless, there are three positive openings. One is the interest among organised labour to seek additional allies. Another is the wide coalition to address the crisis of urban governance (including poor services, monopolisation of resources and corruption). A third is the wide interests in welfare policies that would also foster inclusive economic development. These three tendencies are certainly insufficient on their own but may provide a basis for broader alliances behind joint platforms in a number of policy areas. The final problem, then, is that their preferred method has been to ally with populist leaders, rather than to seize the opportunity to develop transformative policy agendas and institutionalise the channels of interest representation that would strengthen movement organising and collective action among civil society organisations. Ω

CHAPTER 7

RECOMMENDATION

Amalinda Savirani, Eric Hiariej, Hasrul Hanif, Olle Törnquist, Willy Purna Samadhi

The current survey clearly demonstrates that the democratisation of Indonesia, which has been commonly argued to be a success story, is stagnating. It is true that the country has been successful in adopting relevant rules and regulations; pro-democracy actors have become more politicised in recent years; and clientelism is no longer 'the only game in town'. There have also been a number of advances with regard to liberties and elitist elections that, remarkably, have not hampered stability and economic growth. Finally, the successful crafting of pacts between moderate conservatives and reformists has favoured structural and institutional changes towards such economic and political liberties.

However, these advances have come with problems that inhibit further improvements of Indonesian democracy.

Institutions remain significantly weak. Apart from some freedom and vibrant civil association, there are hardly any major improvements in political equality, governance, and representation. Both dominant and alternative actors support democratic institutions, but only so long as those rules and regulations are relevant to their respective positions. The era of post-clientelism is continuously marked by a mix of patronage populism and preoccupation with individual political careers. While welfare has been the primary public issue for some time, the state service — services which the state is supposed to deliver — are largely non-existent or inefficient. Instead, those with sufficient financial resources turn to market-based solutions, while the majority of people tend to go to self-help communities to fulfil their welfare-related needs. The alternative actors supposed to be the forerunner of democracy remain relatively weak. They are fragmented, lack long-term strategy, and tend to rely on the politics of penetrating state and organised politics. This signifies the tendency of both dominant and alternative actors to bypass democracy. Both use current openings to affect public governance through the 'politics of penetration' rather than resolving problems related to democratisation. Needless to say, from their own point of view, the dominant actors are most successful.

However, because of the politicisation of civil society, many alternative actors have also managed to enter into the spheres of state and mainstream politics. Owing to limited independent organisations, their engagement in state and politics is mainly realised through connections to open-minded dominant actors. In the process, alternative actors tend to be co-opted by the oligarchy. In short, the major problems are weak political representation and weak collective action.

The 2003/2004 survey revealed the following initial tendencies:

1. There was a significant increase in political freedom, but with less improved democracy. Instead, two-thirds of democratic institutions were essentially defunct.
2. The democratisation process resulted in a rise in pseudo-representation. Despite a free and fair process, elections merely produced unrepresentative and unresponsive candidates from political parties and their cadres.
3. The oligarchy continued to hold a strong grip on politics. Unsurprisingly, although institutions presumed to foster liberal democracy had become the only game in town, they were largely manipulated and abused by the elites.
4. The country was witnessing the rise of floating and marginalised democrats. They were pro-democrats with no strong social base or independent popular organisations, and thus a) marginalised from the state, business and workplace, b) relied on populist and clientelistic methods in mobilising support, c) used public discourse as their main strategy to gain legitimacy and authority.
5. This less-impressive feature was also shown in civil society organisations. They were largely fragmented and scattered, with hardly any substantive or strategic coalitions of interests.

Some significant changes were revealed in the 2006 survey:

1. It was reported that freedom for democratic institutions had deteriorated somewhat; however, there were efforts to improve governance, at least in the form of measures against corruption.
2. Democracy had become relatively stabilised with the consolidation of the elite.

3. There was no significant improvement of representation. Rather, elections had resulted in an elitist monopolisation of organised politics. This facilitated stability, but did not improve governance. As such, there were also growing demands for the return to authoritarian and technocratic governance, i.e. a return to 'politics of order' in the search for 'good governance'.
4. There were signs of the emergence of a national political community, one which facilitated democracy-oriented agreements for peace and reconstruction (in Aceh in particular) but also limited the development of alternative democratic politics from below.
5. A number of activists in civil society attempted to build democratic political blocs in spheres between fragmented civil society organisations and elite-dominated parties in order to foster a social political space in which people's organisations and progressive political activists could engage and utilise democratic institutions to make democracy more meaningful. This was visualised as a non-party broad alliance and as an alternative channel with permanent features and with roots from the village to the national level with an aim to strengthen people's representative capacity.

Based on the current survey, it is safe to note that institutions of democracy in Indonesia have been relatively successful in terms of stability and economic development. Major rules and regulations regarding the advancement of democracy have been established and improved, and support for these institutions has been clearly demonstrated by the main dominant and alternative actors. However, with regard to institutions that are

supposed to foster democratic representation and governance, the improvements are less impressive. Support for these institutions has mainly come in the form of *sosialisasi*, without any concrete action to ensure their implementation toward the fulfilment of public interests; the main actors, meanwhile, only support rules and regulations which are beneficial to their own positions.

At the same time, among Indonesian citizens there has been an increasingly strong awareness of the importance of the welfare to which they are entitled — the provision of which is the state's responsibility. This 'longing for a welfare state' is mainly related to the institutional change in policy framework on welfare, but also to the electoral democracy. Since the introduction of direct elections for national and local executive-branch political leaders, promising programs such as free education and healthcare have been commonly adopted by candidates as strategies to gain popular support. Nevertheless, despite this rising awareness, the state's capacity to provide services related to welfare issues remains weak. Welfare provisions such as education, healthcare and housing are largely provided through the market and community organisations.

More importantly, rather than improving popular representation, practices of clientelism continue to be witnessed in the country. However, personal bonds between patrons and clients that are difficult to sustain in the context of economic development and urbanisation are no longer 'the only game in town'. Dominant actors in particular, but alternative actors too, also rely on less personalised patronage and various forms of populism (i.e. charismatic and direct links between supporters and leaders who claim to be attuned to the thinking of ordinary people) in mobilising and organising support. Therefore, the

introduction of liberal institutions in Indonesia has yet to be followed by a politicised democracy with strong popular representation. The country seems to have entered a new phase of politics with 'post-clientelistic' characteristics.

Unsurprisingly, Indonesian democracy remains in the relatively strong grip of oligarchs. The tendency towards the high-cost politics of electoral democracy has consolidated their power, as the oligarchs are the ones with sufficient economic capital to compete for public offices and policy preferences. However, most of them are not remnants of the old elite of New Order. Many are newcomers, with slightly different political methods and tactics. They do not forge long-term and substantive attachments to popular-based movements and organisations, but focus on their own political careers and related benefits. Their main method is developing and consolidating themselves as public figures through media, most often by promising populist welfare-related programs and practicing populist political styles. Though such 'figure-based politics' barely affect the problem of elitism in Indonesian democracy, the importance of populist programs and political styles is now forcing these new elite to be more open to the interests of the general populace.

The alternative actors, who are supposed to be the most potent force of democratisation, have become more established and politicised. However, they remain fragmented and without long-term strategy and ideology. They tend to be elitist and be co-opted into the existing system. Other activists, those remaining outside the system, tend to avoid political parties and parliament when settling and governing public matters, instead relying on community- or civil society-based governance or on colleagues inside such auxiliary institutions for solutions and favours. In

short, activist may have become more established and politicised, but it is inadequate to promote improved representation. Isolation from the people and fellow activists, together with limited contact with political society in dealing with public issues, could potentially integrate them into the oligarchy.

Civil society organisations are probably the most important element of alternative actors. They are the key figures in raising and discussing public issues, promoting active citizenship to increase pressure on the government to pay greater attention and to work more seriously on public issues. However, it seems that the mobilisation of issues in the media is the most potent power at civil society actors' disposal. Even though civil society organisations have expanded their reach into the state and political arenas over the past decade — such as by becoming members of state auxiliary agencies and consultancy teams, special staff at government ministries, commissioners at state-owned companies, or members of parliament (and thus becoming alternative mediators for policy advocacy) — such power hardly equips them with sufficient and meaningful capacity to bring about substantive changes. Similarly, sections of the trade union movement have also attempted to engage in politics, launching their own political candidates through various parties and forming alliances with other groups to promote better minimum wages and social security. However, thus far their alliances have remained temporary and subordinated, as with the political candidates, to the priorities of union leaders.

Rather than addressing the problems of democratisation, the main actors have used current freedoms to find alternative — but not always very democratic — ways to affect public governance. Essentially, they practice the politics of penetration to get access to 'good contacts' within state and organised politics and public

resources too, instead of struggling to improve democratic representation and governance. The effect of the dominant actors' strategies on democracy is therefore dubious. They focus on developing strategies to penetrate the administration and get access to public resources and powers rather than developing policies and programmes to gather public support and foster collective actions from friends and foes through issue and interest organisations. The strategies of the alternatives actors are almost equally problematic. Their aims seem to be less about reforms to improve democracy and universal welfare systems than getting access to good contacts as well as influential positions and resources.

Several questions remain. How can the above-outlined findings answer Indonesia's stagnating democracy? How does the current survey reveal the answer? How does it relate to the previous recommendations? Should it focus on improving and enhancing pro-democracy activists' strategy of entering politics and broadening democratic political blocs?

What´ Should be Done?

To begin with, it is important to note that the problem of weak representation and weak collective action in Indonesia is not a recent phenomenon. As strongly indicated in previous surveys, the significant increase in political freedom and civil liberties in the country has been associated with the formation of a less-representative democracy. Similarly, pro-democracy activists, associated mainly with various civil society organisations, are fragmented and short of significant social bases. Nevertheless, there is a different nuance in the problem of representation and collective action found in the current survey as democracy in the country enters an era of post-clientelism.

Following the findings in the 2003/2004 survey, researchers recommended that pro-democracy actors, who had largely been referred to civil society in the process of elitist democratisation, should re-engage in politics — 'Go Politics!'. The assumption was that focusing on 'Go Politics' would generate several political benefits by: (a) allowing activists to develop their leadership skills outside the power of oligarchy; (b) paving the way for the 'floating democrats' to build popular bases and thus become socially anchored; and (c) persuading civil society organisations to operate on multiple rather than single platforms, as broader support must be mobilised during elections.

The 2006 survey generated the recommendation to build 'Democratic Political Blocs' in various public spheres between civil society organisations and elitist political parties. Such 'Political Blocs' were considered to be socio-political alliances forged by civil society actors and likeminded political activists which would foster joint engagement by popular-based associations in politics. Such alliances might be in a position to make use of democratic openings in order to resolve or mitigate the problem of representation. As non-party broad alliances, such 'Democratic Political Blocs' were meant to be semi-institutionalised public spheres in which progressive groups could get together and engage in politics. There would be strong roots, from the village to the national level, in order to strengthen people's capacity to foster representation of their interests and visions. This recommendation was intended to tackle the existing problem of weak representation by consolidating the 'Go Politics' pro-democracy activists into concerted collective actions to propel the process of democratisation

Clearly both strategies have yet to resolve or mitigate the problem of weak representation and collective action. Although the recommendations of 'Go Politics' and 'Democratic Political Blocs' remain relevant and, in fact, require further enhancements, a discussion on additional strategy should be pursued. This discussion should best be carried out in the context of the findings of current survey and as the logical continuation of previous recommendations.

First of all, the current survey strongly demonstrates that the hegemonic power of elitist pacts and the establishment of institutions with which the dominant actors can play have significantly prevented any individuals and groups lacking huge resources, particularly economic capital, from establishing alternative parties and/or even launching independent candidacies. Hence, there is a great need to build supplementary channels of representation for concerns and interests that have thus far been marginalised. The additional channels of representation are necessary to address the neglected problems of poor governance and representation. Finally, the channels of influence for hitherto marginalised concerns and interests may also help generate broader collective action that could, in turn, open the way for the formation of alternative parties — which certainly remain crucial.

The need to institutionalise supplementary channels of representation is supported by other findings. The survey specifically reveals the predominance of networking, lobbying and media-use by the main actors to mobilise support. These general strategies only favour individuals and groups from both the dominant actors and the alternative actors who have access to money and good contacts. As this enhances the 'politics of penetration', institutionalised supplementary channels of

democratic representation will instead offer a chance for a greater range of actors and popular organisations to affect public governance.

The continued emergence of populism further supports this idea. As shown in the case of Solo and Jakarta, populist leaders such as Joko Widodo might have significantly facilitated popular participation, but this has hardly been institutionalised democratically and remains subject to discretion of populist leaders and their loyal followers. Populism is only used by populist leaders for their political benefit, for gaining popularity and cultivating support without substantive policy alternatives or strategies to reform existing public governance.

The question is now on what basis such supplementary channels of representation could be established. The two previous recommendations focused on politicising the efforts of pro-democracy activists. In practice, this politicising did occur, but it appears to have been mainly based on existing civil society organisations and some trade unions, as well as the rallying behind a number of popular figures rather than broad alliances behind joint policy agendas. The politicising appears to have resulted in the penetration by a significant number of activists into state and mainstream politics. Former activists have turned into government officials, parliament members and even walikota/bupati. This trend begs for a different approach, one which can no longer solely emphasise civil society, unions and popular figures only.

The penetration by activists into the state arena potentially allows actors within both state and mainstream politics as well as civil society, trade unions and similar interest organisations, to at times develop constructive dialogues and avoid hostile relations. There are certainly risks of co-optation and favourism, but some

forms of collaboration between state and civil society may well be possible without giving up differing views and relatively independent positions. In addition, activists' penetration of state and mainstream politics enables in itself the state to be more open to society. The trend towards populism enhances such openings. Equally important, such forms of cooperation are against the liberal notion of inevitable conflicts between state and civil society and that cooperation implies co-optation. Experiments from northwest Europe, Latin America, and parts of India point instead to *democratic* forms of participation and cooperation.

In short, we argue that democratisation in Indonesia must enter a second phase. The first phase was characterised by the engagement of powerful actors in modest reform agendas and the building of democratically oriented liberal institutions that they could accept. The second phase, that we advocate, must also engage the wide concerns and interests that have hitherto been marginalised but are needed (also by enlightened supporters of the first phase) in order to tackle the remaining problems of stagnant freedoms, limited governance reforms, and poor representation.

In contrast to our previous recommendations, our current focus is on the state. It is crucial to not only focus on pro-democracy activists and, more broadly, civil society groups and interest organisations such as trade unions; rather, the state should also be a prime concern in attempts to address the problem of democratisation in the country. The key issue is how to generate specific mechanisms to manage public — and, very often, conflicting — interests and to direct actions of popular-based organisations and movements into more democratic and representative channels. This has proven to be impossible to achieve through electoral processes and lobbying and watchdog

groups alone. Politically elected leaders must indeed engage in proposing and deciding the main priorities in governing the country, but specific knowledge-based policies and their implementation must also be discussed, developed, and kept accountable through close cooperation between the executive branch and administration and the various affected and concerned parties in economic life, workplaces, residential communities, and among concerned citizens. This should now be the primary focus when it comes to proposing state-civil society collaborations.

To this end, the survey team proposes the formation of supplementary democratic channels of representation for democratic issue and interest organisations. These channels would primarily take the form of joint state–society commissions and involve government officials, intellectuals, civil society organisations, activists, and representatives from crucial interest organisations. In accordance with the previously indicated liberal–democratic rules and regulations, the elected politicians must certainly have the right to decide policy areas and issues for cooperation through supplementary democratic representation, such as the proposed joint commissions. Hence they will also decide (and be publicly accountable for) what kind of issue and interest groups that should be consulted — i.e. the crucial organisations necessary for the development and implementation of policies within the respective policy areas

*Needless to say, these decisions (about crucial policy areas and what kinds of issue and interest organisations are crucial within these fields) should follow open and intensive political discussions in which ordinary people, media, and various organisations have the opportunity to put forward their views. Thereafter elected and publicly accountable politicians must make the final decisions --**but** subsequently, said politicians shall not decide what individual organisations should be*

invited and what representatives they shall appoint. If such decisions were permitted, there would be a risk of a return to statist corporatism or various forms of favourism. Representatives of joint commissions must instead be selected by the democratic issue and interest groups themselves. How can this be ensured?

The joint commissions should be open to all everybody concerned, but not everybody should participate. There must be a system of representation. The various issue and interest organisations that have been identified within various policy areas need time to come together and elect joint representatives. In the final instance, this (along with public facilitation) has to be recognised as a non-negotiable basic principle for such organisations. In the case of many crucial interests, moreover, there are at this point no or very few independent democratic organisations. As such, there must be vacant chairs for their joint representatives. There must also be public funds and other measures to facilitate the building of democratic organisations and the arrangements among them, with the assistance of trustworthy activists from existing democratic civil society and interest groups.

One of two initial priorities of these joint commissions will be to study and propose possible methods to foster further democratisation. Issues to be investigated by these commissions should, firstly, be to consider improved representation in the liberal democratic system, for example, experiments to allow for the electoral participation of parties with less basis in business and dynasty; public financing of campaigning and elections; and the right for civil servants to participate as candidates in politics to counter the domination of the business sector.

The second but no less important priority of these commissions would be to study and propose possible methods

to democratise the representation of primary interests and issue groups in public governance. This is intended to counter (a) inequalities and the tendency to bypass the principles of democracy by way of privileged access, influence and networks, (b) politicians' appointment of their allies in social offices, which lead to fragmentation and poor collective action among democratically oriented interests, issue groups, and movements. Crucial policy areas most certainly include the public demand for welfare state measures and the insufficient state capacity to deliver them, as well as employment and wage regulations as a part of inclusive economic development.

The idea of such joint commissions is not entirely new in Indonesia. This survey and related studies have pointed to increasingly common participation of various civil society groups and popularly reputed experts in various commissions, expert groups, participatory organs, investigations, consultations, etc. These types of initiatives can be found in a range of multi-stakeholder forums and groups, including National Forest Board (DKN), Multi-Stakeholders Group of Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI), CSR Forum, Forum For Disaster Risk Reduction (PRB), and Regional Poverty for Alleviation Coordination (TKPKD).

However, the existing pattern of selecting people and/or committees of experts is problematic. Politicians and parliament members conduct the selection at their own discretion, and consequently tend to allocated positions to their supporters and allied NGOs, movements and researchers. Furthermore, those who occupy the positions of existing joint commissions are largely (new) elite and/or 'floating democrats' without a popular base. They have yet to escape pseudo representation. Clearly, such

problem must be addressed by democratising the process of appointing people to such committees as proposed above.

The idea of supplementary democratic representation through commissions of the kind outlined above is a joint state–society approach to complement the existing recommendation to develop democratic 'political blocs'. Blocs are necessary to fight for the commissions and appoint joint representatives. In turn, commissions will stimulate the initiation and working of blocs. Finally, the chance to develop commissions will strengthen the capacity of the blocs of interest and issue organisations to have a real effect on public governance and put pressure on politicians and parties and, perhaps, form new parties with moire genuine popular bases.

Furthermore, the development of political blocs and public commissions should not be focused merely on the forms of politics. It is equally important to inject substantive content into these collective actions. *The fostering of democracy must most definitely include the development of policies and reform proposals with a clear ideological orientation and long-term strategies for their implementation in areas of inequalities and other socio-economic problems identified, both by this survey and other studies.* Significant advances have been achieved by the election of some progressive politicians. However, thus far there have been very few ideas and specific policies to focus on. Ω

Baseline Survey on Development of Democracy

QUESTIONNAIRE

3rd round assessment on problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia - 2013

version:
[√] LOCAL CONTEXT
[ ] CENTRAL-SECTORAL CONTEXT

UNIVERSITAS GAJAH MADA

UiO : University of Oslo

A	B	C

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF REGION

TOWN		DISTRICT	
01	Banda Aceh	18	Aceh Selatan
02	Medan	19	Kerinci
03	Batam	20	Bengkulu
04	Bekasi	21	Lampung Selatan
05	Bandung	22	Tangerang
06	Pekalongan	23	Batang
07	Surakarta	24	Sidoarjo
08	Surabaya	25	Kutai Kartanegara
09	Pontianak	26	Poso
10	Banjarmasin	27	Belu
11	Balikpapan	28	Jayapura
12	Makassar	29	Manokwari
13	Manado		
14	Ternate		
15	Denpasar	SPECIAL REGION	
16	Kupang	30	DI Yogyakarta
17	Ambon	31	DKI Jakarta

B. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

01	Issues of Education, including both services and content	08	Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations
02	Issues of Health Services	09	Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media
03	Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.)	10	Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform
04	Issues of Labour Movement and related policies	11	Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government
05	Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues)	12	Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights)
06	Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing	13	Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations
07	Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children	14	Issues of Industry and Business

C. NUMBER OF INFORMANT IN TOWN/DISTRICT (01-30)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

NO	DATE	PART (NUMBER)	TIME	
			START	END
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

VALIDATION

Interviewed by:		
(name)	Local assistant	(sign)
Checked and validated by:		
(name)	Key informant	(sign)

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation, Demos, and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009)[1]. The transfer of the responsibility to UGM is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and

1 Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). *Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia*. Jakarta and Singapore; Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). *Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia*. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

public education and information as well as is academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).[2]

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013

Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

2 Törnquist, O. (2013). *Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave.



BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM-UiO
research cooperation 2013

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ABOUT THE INFORMANT

NAME	
SEX	[ ] FEMALE [ ] MALE
AGE	
ADDRESS	
CITY	
PROVINCE	
PROFESSION	
ORGANISATION	
LOCATION OF ACTIVITY	
CONTACT	
PHONE/MOBLE	
EMAIL	

In this part we focus on the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs. Both topics are related to definition of democracy, e.g. "popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality" (Beetham 1999). More specifically, we want to explore what constitutes public issues, who shall control them, and how.

PART 1

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q1.1. In your assessment, which of the issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do people in your town/district think are public issues, irrespective of whether the current local government addresses them or not?

Q1.2. In your assessment, which of these issue areas that are listed in the Table A below do **people in your town/district** deem to be the most important in your town/district? *(Pick one from the list)*

TABLE A

NO	PUBLIC ISSUE ACCORDING TO PEOPLE	Q1.1. Accepted As Public Issues		Q1.2. The Most Important Public Issue
		Yes	No	
A	Education	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
B	Health services	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
C	Physical security	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
D	Fishery	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
E	Agriculture	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
F	The informal sector, such as street vendoors,	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
G	Industry	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
H	Wages and labour regulatios	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
I	Welfare and social security	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
J	Public transportations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
K	Traffic	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
L	Public housing	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
M	Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
N	Regulations of the rights of children	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
O	Religion-based regulations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
P	Others	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

Q1.3. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below do **people in your town/district** think are left outside local government attention in your district/town and left to the market, self-help among communities and private solutions?

Q1.4. In your assessment, what of the major issue areas listed in the Table B below that **people** say have been left out of public governance do they think should instead be subject to public governance?

TABLE B

NO	ISSUES	Q1.3. MARKET	Q1.3. SELF-HELP	Q1.3. FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL	Q1.4. SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
A	Education	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
B	Health	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
C	Physical security	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
D	Fishery	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
E	Agriculture	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
F	The informal sector, such as street vendoors	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
G	Industry	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
H	Wages & labour regulations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
I	Welfare and social security	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
J	Public transportations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
K	Traffic	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
L	Public housing	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
M	Discrimination against minority groups (gender, ethnic, religion)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
N	Regulations of the rights of children	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
O	Religion-based regulations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
P	Others	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

Q1.5. We return now to the issues that people deem to be most important (Q 1.2). In your asssessment, do **people in your town/district** know who and what institutions are supposed to control and manage the problem that they deem to be most important?

a. [ ] Yes, they know very well
b. [ ] Yes, but they know only partially
c. [ ] No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.6. In your assessment, who and what institution (as listed in Table C) do **people in your town/district** think should handle the problem you just said that they deem to be most important (Q1.2)?

Q1.7. And how should this be done?

TABLE C

Q1.6.	Q1.7.
WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM	HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED
a. [ ] The individual	a. [ ] Proceed directly to Q1.9.
b. [ ] The family	a. [ ] Proceed directly to Q1.9.
c. [ ] On the market	a. [ ] By paying for help/services b. [ ] In other ways related to the market: .....
d. [ ] Citizens' and people's own organisations	a. [ ] Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. [ ] Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. [ ] In other ways related to groups in civil society ....
e. [ ] State and/ or local government	a. [ ] Getting it done by town/district government (including local politicians) b. [ ] Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. [ ] In other ways related to state/local government: ....
f. [ ] State and stakeholders' organisations	a. [ ] By the town/district government and local stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discression of the politicians and bureaucrats. b. [ ] By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (a). c. [ ] By town/district government and local stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint their representatives. d. [ ] By the provincial/ national government according to the same method of selection as in (c). e. [ ] In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations: .....

Q1.8. In **your own** asssessment, who in this town/district discuss actively the issue that you just said people deem to be most important (Q1.2)? .....

Q1.9. What additional issues do **you yourself** think are also necessary for people at the local level to engage in, in order to control their 'local' problems? .....

Q1.10. In **your assesment**, what (if any) are the problems of identifying the 'demos' (those who shall decide about public affairs) among all the people who think that certain problems are of public concern (as specified in question Q 1.2) and are involved in discussing public issues (as specified in Q1.8)? .....

This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.

PART 2

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

Q2.1. What is **your** general assessment about the situation in your town/district with regard to the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad? Please give priority to the institutions that you are most well informed about and then continue to the rest on the list! *(If you absolutely do not know, you can of course abstain from answering)*

Q2.2. In **your** assessment, has the quality of the means of democracy (rules and regulations) improved or worsened or remained the same since the first Pemilukada (direct elections of local executives) during 2008/2009 in your town/district?

In answering those questions (Q2.1 and Q2.2), please consider and combine these three aspects:

1. How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy mentioned in Table D below?
2. How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?
3. How comprehensive are these rules and regulations applied to the entire town/district?

TABLE D

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESS-MENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
1	EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indegenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/imigrant/internally displaced persons and refugees, The legar framework includes (1) Law and implementing regulations, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) Implementing agencies, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider other practices	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
2	RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS) This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as international covenants and conventions through (1) the Law and implementing regulations, such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No. 39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) implementing agencies such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
3	EQUAL JUSTICE This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the Law and implementing regulations such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as implementing agencies, such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESS-MENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
4	THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS) This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the laws and implementing regulations, implementing state agencies (courts, police) and societal agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
5	DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offerpeople the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
6	RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals, the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order?	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
7	INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local market places, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESS-MENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
8	LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECCESSARY This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please coinsider the laws and implementing regulations as well as other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
9	DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC) This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion. To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
10	TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
11	GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESS-MENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
12	FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
13	CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders.	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

Q2.3. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

Q2.4. In **your** assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table E)?

TABLE E

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.3 INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q2.4 INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	....	....
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	....	....
3	Equal justice	....	....
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	....	....
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	....	....
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	....	....

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	Q2.3	Q2.4
		INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT SUPPORT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT LIMIT OR CONTRADICT THE FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue-based representation in public governance	....	....
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	....	....
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	....	....
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	....	....
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	....	....
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	....	....
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	....	....

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.

PART 3

MAIN ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors — individual or collective — in the discussion about public issues in your town/district? *(Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table F)*

TABLE F

Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....
B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups)	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....

Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
C. BUSINESS LIFE	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....
D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities)	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS	
DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1)	....
DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2)	....

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important sub-ordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your town/district? *(Please mention two actors)*

Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1)	....
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2)	....

In this part, we want to explore how the main actors that you have identified relate to the means of democracy. It is basic to a democracy that the major actors are willing to apply the rules of the game. More specifically, we want to explore how they use the various rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy. Do the actors promote or abuse or avoid them?

PART 4

MAIN ACTORS' RELATION TO THE MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

Q4.1. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.2. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the alternative actors** (Q3.3) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.3. In your assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

Q4.4. In your assesment, how (if at all) do the alternative actors (Q3.3) abuse or avoid the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote democracy to reach their aims?

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.4. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak. This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART 5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION)—Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

Q5.1. In your assesment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your town/district? *(You may select more than one option)*

- a. [ ] Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)
- b. [ ] Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)
- c. [ ] Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

Q5.2. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 include other main actors or other people?

Q5.2. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS INCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)
DOM-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)

Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

	Q5.3.	Q5.4	
MAIN ACTOR	WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED	SECTORS OF INCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 2 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 1 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)	ALT-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)
DOM-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)	ALT-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people? *(Please provide examples!)*

	Q5.6.	Q5.7,	
MAIN ACTOR	WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED	SECTORS OF EXCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 2 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 1 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION?			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	....	ALT-1	....
DOM-2	....	ALT-2	....

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your town/district? *(You may indicate more than one option)*

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the they (Q5.9) exclude people? *(Please provide examples!)*

Q5.9.		Q5.10.
OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE		SECTORS OF EXCLUSION
a. [ ] POLITICAL ACTORS	....	....
b. [ ] BUSINESS ACTORS	....	....
c. [ ] SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS	....	....

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your town/district need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

a. [ ] Special favours and preferential treatments Explain: .....
.....

b. [ ] Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY — *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force. What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?*

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? *(Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them)*

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES			
	ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL)	GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL)	KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL)	MEANS OF COMPULISON (COERCIVE CAPITAL)
DOM-1	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
DOM-2	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
ALT-1	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
ALT-2	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.13.	
	EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER	WHY?
DOM-1	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....

Q5.14. How sucessful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.14.
	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING — *In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change give priority to. Now we want to know how the actors try to put 'their issues' on the top of the political agenda.*

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the 'political agenda'?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alterntive actors give priority to?

Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' GIVE PRIORITY TO	
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? *(Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)*

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.17. METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
DOM-2	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
ALT-1	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
ALT-2	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? *(Pick only one option per actor)*

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.18. METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
DOM-2	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-1	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-2	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans

Q5.19. How sucessful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.19. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.20. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION — *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation — i.e. to politicise the people.*
What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? *(Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)*

TABLE L

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21. METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
DOM-1	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
DOM-2	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21. METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
ALT-1	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-2	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.23 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22. HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.23. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.24. CAUSESOF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION — *People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.*
What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?
Q5.25. To what institution of governance?
Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

DOMINANT ACTORS	Q5.25. WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	Q5.26. MEDIATORS
DOM-1	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
DOM-2	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, Including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?

Q5.28. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

ALTER-NATIVE ACTORS	Q5.27. WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	Q5.28. MEDIATORS
ALT-1	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
ALT-2	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question ?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.30. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.31. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.

Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

Q5.32. CHANNELS	Q5.33. MEDIATORS
[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.34. In your judgment, *why* do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? *(Open question)* ....

Finally, it is crucial to understand the dynamic dimensions of democratisation. This can best be done by identifying actors' strategies to reach their aims and to thereafter study how their strategies influence the major challenges of democratisation.

PART 6

ACTORS' CAPACITY

Q6.1. What are dominant and alternative actors' main strategies to reach their own aims?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.1. ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

Q6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.2. MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION	Q6.3. EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION
DOM-1	....	....
DOM-2	....	....
ALT-1	....	....
ALT-2	....	....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

Baseline Survey on Development of Democracy

QUESTIONNAIRE

3rd round assessment on problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia - 2013

version:
[ ] LOCAL CONTEXT
[√] CENTRAL-SECTORAL CONTEXT

UNIVERSITAS GAJAH MADA

UiO : University of Oslo

		A	B
9	9		

NO QUESTIONNAIRE

A. CODES OF FRONTLINE OF DEMOCRATIC WORK ALONG WHICH THE INFORMANT IS ACTIVE

01	Issues of Education, including both services and content	08	Issues of Clan, Ethnic, and Religious Relations
02	Issues of Health Services	09	Issues of Media, Culture and Social Media
03	Issues of Ecology, Environment and Natural Resources (incl. mining, forestry, fishery, etc.)	10	Issues of Security Sector and Welfare Reform
04	Issues of Labour Movement and related policies	11	Issues of Anti-corruption, Transparent and Accountable Government
05	Issues of Informal Sectors (incl. urban poor issues)	12	Issues of Human Rights and Law (incl. minority rights)
06	Issues of Agrarian Movements, Land Reform and Land Grabbing	13	Issues of Party and Electoral rules and regulations
07	Issues of Women, Gender Equality and Children	14	Issues of Industry and Business

B. NUMBER OF INFORMANT IN TOWN/DISTRICT (01-30)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

NO	DATE	PART (NUMBER)	TIME	
			START	END
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

VALIDATION

Interviewed by:		
(name)	Local assistant	(sign)
Checked and validated by:		
(name)	Key informant	(sign)

STATEMENT OF AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENT

This survey is based on the combined efforts of concerned scholars, students and experienced and reflective practitioners of democracy. The study would not be possible without the dedicated involvement of the informants in particular. We know that it will take a lot of your important time to answer all the questions, but we hope that you like to contribute thus to the production of an independent baseline of knowledge for further efforts at democratisation, and we like to express our sincere thanks for your commitment and patience. We shall certainly keep you updated on the results and we are looking forward to further cooperation on various follow up activities.

Please note that the research team based at the UGM, supervised by us, Professors (Dr.) Purwo Santoso (UGM) and Olle Törnquist (UiO), is committed to keep all information about the informants in strict confidence, only use it to secure the validity and reliability of the survey, as well as to keep the information separated from the answers to all the substantive questions and only use the thus anonymised information for the purpose of non-commercial and independent academic research in accordance with strict academic principles. All members of the team, including local key-informants and research assistants, have signed a statement of commitment to this effect.

The survey is supported by the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the University of Oslo and by additional financial support from the Royal Embassy of Norway to Indonesia. The financial support is given to the universities without any other formal or informal conditions than to conduct the best possible independent academic study for the benefit of democracy and thus based welfare and development, and, of course, to account for all funds used and make the results available for the public.

The survey is to follow up and broaden two previous surveys which were carried out in partnership between the civil society organisation, Demos, and the University of Oslo, in cooperation with the Indonesian Democracy Movement, between 2004 and 2008 about the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. The comprehensive previous results were reported on in Priyono et al. (2007) and Samadhi et al. (2009)[1]. The transfer of the responsibility to UGM is to (a) sustain the academic basis and quality of the surveys while continuing the cooperation with democratic practitioners and (b) to foster the utilisation of the results in the wide academic and

1 Priyono, A.E, Samadhi, W.P. and Törnquist, O. with Birks, T. (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful. Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS; Samadhi, W. P. and Warouw, N. (Eds.) (2009). Building Democracy on the Sand. Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. Jakarta and Yogyakarta; Demos and PCD Press. (1st edition: December 2008; 2nd edition 2009).

public education and information as well as is academic follow-up studies. A reference group of leading democracy activists and intellectuals serves to support this cooperation and contribution to the public discourse. The founding members of the group include Danang Widoyoko, Daniel Dhakidae, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Handoko Wibowo, Luky Djani, Mian Manurung, Mohtar Mas'oed, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Wardah Hafidz, and Wiladi Budiharga. The ultimate aim of the survey is to generate the best possible knowledge as a basis for attempts at democratic transformative politics through the combination of democratisation and reforms towards welfare based and sustainable social and economic development.

The survey is not built on the number of answers and of statistical analysis but on the quality of the assessments by the informants of the problems and options of democratisation and the interpretation of this information with the help of a number of relevant theories. For further information about the rationale and academic foundations of the survey, see Törnquist (2013).[2]

The survey is carried out both in a number of local contexts around the country and with regard to crucial national level institutions of public governance. The focus is on six pillars of democracy: (1) the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs; (2) the institutions (rules and regulations) of democracy; (3) the actors; (4) how the actors relate to these institutions; (5) the political capacity of the actors and (6) how their strategies affect democratisation.

Once again, on behalf of the full team, thank you very much for engaging in this effort.

Yogyakarta and Oslo, March 2013

Purwo Santoso and Olle Törnquist

2 Törnquist, O. (2013). Assessing the Dynamics of Democratisation: Transformative Politics. New Institutions and the Case of Indonesia. New York: Palgrave.

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UiO : University of Oslo

BASELINE SURVEY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

PWD Project
UGM-UiO
research cooperation 2013

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ABOUT THE INFORMANT

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AGE

ADDRESS

CITY

PROVINCE

PROFESSION

ORGANISATION

LOCATION OF ACTIVITY

CONTACT

PHONE/MOBLE

EMAIL

In this part we focus on the constitution of the demos (people) and public affairs. Both topics are related to definition of democracy, e.g. "popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality" (Beetham 1999). More specifically, we want to explore what constitutes public issues, who shall control them, and how.

PART 1

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A. Informant's Assessment on Public Issues

Q1.1. In your assessment, what are the major public issues in your political field/sector?

Q1.2. Give real illustrations/examples for each issue.

Q1.1. MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE	Q1.2. ILLUSTRATION/EXAMPLE
1.	1. .....
2.	2. .....
3.	3. .....
4.	4. .....
5.	5. .....
6.	6. .....

B. People's Assessment of Public Issues

Q1.3. In your assessment, do **people in general** think that the issues that you listed in the above (Q1.1) should be matters of major public concern in your political field/sector?

Q1.4. Please give concrete examples for each type of issue.

Q1.3. MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN ACCORDING TO PEOPLE IN GENERAL	Q1.4. CONCRETE EXAMPLE
1.	1. .....
2.	2. .....
3.	3. .....
4.	4. .....
5.	5. .....
6.	6. .....

Q1.5. According to **people in general**, which issue is the most important within your political field/sector?
.....

Q1.6. With regard to the issue that people in general think is most important in your politiucal field/sector (Q 1.5), in your asssessment, **do people** know who and what institution that are supposed to control and manage that issue?
a. [ ] Yes, they know very well
b. [ ] Yes, but they know only partially
c. [ ] No, they don't really know much about this

Q1.7. Again with regart to the issue that people in general think is most important in your political field/sector (Q 1.5), in your assessment, who and what institution **do people** think should handle that issue?? Do people think the problem should be handled primarily on the market, by organisations in society, by the state/government, or state and stakeholders' organisations together?

Q1.8. And how should this be done?

Q1.8. WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM	Q1.9. HOW THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED
A. [ ] On the market	a. [ ] By paying for help/services b. [ ] In other ways related to the market: .....
B. [ ] By citizens' and people's own organisations	a. [ ] Getting it done through community organisations (for example, self-management groups and cooperatives but also religious and cultural (adat) groups) b. [ ] Getting it done by joint interest/issue organisations c. [ ] In other ways related to groups in civil society ....
C. [ ] By state and/or local government	a. [ ] Getting it done by government (including politicians) b. [ ] Getting it done by provincial/ national government (including politicians) c. [ ] In other ways related to state/government ....
D. [ ] By state and stakeholder's organisations	a. [ ] By the government and stakeholder organisations that have been selected at the discression of the politicians and bureaucrats. b. [ ] By the provincial/local government according to the same method of selection as in (a). c. [ ] By government and stakeholder organisations in accordance with politically decided but impartial rules and regulations and with the right of the organisations to appoint its representatives. d. [ ] By the provincial/ local government according to the same method of selection as in (c). e. [ ] In other ways related to state and stakeholders' organisations: .....

C. Constitution of the demos (the people who shall have control of public issues)

Q1.9. In your assessment, who within your political field/sector discuss actively the issue that you just said people have deemed to be most important (Q1.5)? .....
.....

Q1.10. What additional issues and tasks within your political field/sector do you yourself think are also necessary for people to engage in order to control their problems? .....
.....

Q1.11. In your assesment, are there any problems within your political field/sector with regard to who have the right to decide and control public affairs (and to thus be part of the political demos)? .....
.....

This part focuses on the institutional means that are supposed to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A substantial democracy that is comprehensive by not being too narrowly defined requires thus also that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high.

PART 2

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

Q2.1. What rules and regulations related to these 13 means (listed in Table A) of democracy are applicable or not applicable in your political field/sector?

Q2.2. What is your general assessment about the situation in your political field/sector regarding the following means of democracy? Is it good or fair or bad?

Q2.3. In your assessment, has the thus combined performance of the rules and regulations improved or worsened or remained the same since 2007 in your political field/sector?

To answer the questions, ask the informant to consider and combine these three aspects:

1. How effective are the existing rules and regulations in fostering the 13 means of democracy listed in Table A below?
2. How comprehensive are the existing rules and regulations in terms of covering all or only a few aspects of these means of democracy, for instance only a few of the many human rights?
3. How comprehensively are these rules and regulations applied in the country as a whole?

TABLE A

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESS-MENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
1	EQUAL AND INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP This is with regard to consensus on equality without discrimination. For example: No discrimination of indegenous people, or Chinese and ex-tapol (tahanan politik/political prisoner) as well as of minority/ imigrant/internally displaced persons and refugees, The legar framework includes (1) Law and implementing regulations, such as Antidiscrimination Law (UU No 40/2008), and (2) Implementing agencies, such as National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider other practices	a. [ ] applica-ble b. [ ] Not ap-plicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Im-proved b. [ ] Wors-ened c. [ ] Not change
2	RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN CONVENTIONS) This is with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the laws, and the implementation of the ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For example: Does the government implement all ratified universal declarations, as well as international covenants and conventions through (1) the Law and implementing regulations, such as Constitutional Law, Law No.7/1984, the law No. 39/1999, the Law No. 11/2005, the Law No. 12/2005 and other related laws, and (2) implementing agencies such as National and Regional Ombudsman and the National Commission on Human Rights; but do also consider other practices.	a. [ ] applica-ble b. [ ] Not ap-plicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Im-proved b. [ ] Wors-ened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESSMENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
3	EQUAL JUSTICE This is with regard to secure equal access for all people to justice, including poor people. Please consider the Law and implementing regulations such as the Constitutional Law and the Antidiscrimination Law as well as implementing agencies, such as courts, legal aid agencies, and also consider other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
4	THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING BASIC NEEDS) This is with regard to the respect for and promotion of civil and political rights as well as the protection and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Please consider the laws and implementing regulations, implementing state agencies (courts, police) and societal agencies such as legal aid organisations and also consider other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
5	DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REPRESENTATION THROUGH PARTIES AND ELECTIONS This is with regard to the extent to which elections and parties offerpeople the chance to choose the persons and parties they want to represent them, articulate their interest and control the government and its policies. One may also consider the chances to form parties and participate in elections, the chances for independent candidates to participate and the quality of democratic decisions inside parties.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESSMENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
6	RIGHTS-BASED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE This is with regard to public participation in the process of policy making and implementation. To what extent is it possible in principle (according to law) and in practice for citizens to take part in and be consulted in various public matters such as, for example, the planning of residential and industrial areas, the deciding of budget priorities, the running of schools and hospitals, the regulation of market places and public transportation, the regulation of local economic activities and the upholding of law and order?	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
7	INSTITUTIONALISED CHANNELS FOR INTEREST- AND ISSUE BASED REPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE To what extent are there institutionalised channels of influence for the organisations of immediately concerned stakeholders with regard to various public matters such as, for example, for traders to have a say on local market places, for trade unions to have a say on labour regulations, for employers and labourers to have a say on support for local production and for parents to influence the schools? Please consider both the legal framework and actual practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESSMENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
8	LOCAL DEMOCRACY MADE REAL IN COMBINATION WITH INFLUENCE ON OTHER LEVELS WHEN NECCESSARY This is with regard to what extent the local democracy and regional autonomy work. Has it become more possible for ordinary people to control and influence local politics or is it controlled by powerful actors and by various actors from outside the town/ district? Has decentralisation made a difference? Please coinsider the laws and implementing regulations as well as other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
9	DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION (INCLUDING PRIVATE MILITIAS, ETC) This is with regard to the capacity of democratic political institutions to control various instruments of coercion. To what extent are police and military as well as private security organisations and various gangs subordinated to democratic control and regulations? Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
10	TRANSPARENT, IMPARTIAL AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE This is about the institutionalisation and implementation of transparent, impartial and accountable governance. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

NO	13 MEANS OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO WELL DEFINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS	HOW APPLICABLE THIS R/R IN YOUR SECTOR	Q2.1 GENERAL ASSESSMENT	Q2.2 IMPROVED, WORSENED, NOT CHANGE
11	GOVERNMENT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENT THEM This is with regard to whether governments are subject to backseat driving by powerful actors and conditions beyond the control of government and, most importantly, the extent to which the government and its bureaucrats are capable of really implementing its laws and decisions. Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
12	FREEDOM OF AND EQUAL CHANCES TO ACCESS TO PUBLIC DISCOURSE, CULTURE AND ACADEMIA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS Please consider both laws and implementation regarding, for example, National Education System Law, regulations on art festival, public polling, and other practices, such as writing opinion article in mass media.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change
13	CITIZENS' DEMOCRATIC SELF-ORGANISING Please consider both laws and implementation as well as other practices regarding both rights to organise and the independence of organisations to elect accountable leaders.	a. [ ] applicable b. [ ] Not applicable	a. [ ] Good b. [ ] Fair c. [ ] Bad	a. [ ] Improved b. [ ] Worsened c. [ ] Not change

Q2.4. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations support the formal means of democracy (listed in Table B) apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

TABLE B

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/ SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.4. INFORMAL PRACTICES ALLOW FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	[ ]	....
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	[ ]	....
3	Equal justice	[ ]	....
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	[ ]	....
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	[ ]	....
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	[ ]	....
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	[ ]	....
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	[ ]	....
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	[ ]	....
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	[ ]	....
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	[ ]	....
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	[ ]	....
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	[ ]	....

Q2.5. In your assessment, what informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formal means of democracy (listed in Table C) that apply to your political field/sector according to your answer to Q2.1?

TABLE C

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	APPLIED IN POLITICAL FIELD/SECTOR (Q2.1) [√]	Q2.5. INFORMAL PRACTICES LIMIT FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	[ ]	....
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	[ ]	....
3	Equal justice	[ ]	.....
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	[ ]	....
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	[ ]	....
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	[ ]	....
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	[ ]	....
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	[ ]	....
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	[ ]	....
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	[ ]	....
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	[ ]	....
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	[ ]	....
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	[ ]	....

Democracy is not just about the intrinsic institutional means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. From this part and onwards, we will focus on the actors and their issues. First, we identify who are the main actors in public affairs.

PART 3

MAIN ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Q3.1. Who are the main influential actors — individual or collective — in controlling and disputing public issues in your political field/sector? (*Please mention 2-4 actors in each arena mentioned in Table D*)

TABLE D

Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
A. STATE AND GOVERNMENT	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....
B. POLITICAL SOCIETY (including parties and political movements, pressure groups and interest groups)	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....

Q3.1. MAIN INFLUENTIAL ACTORS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
NAME AND PROFESSION	WHY AND HOW DO THESE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE?
C. BUSINESS LIFE	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....
D. CIVIL SOCIETY (for instance NGOs, trade unions, peasant organisations, neighborhood groups, civic communities)	
(1)	....
(2)	....
(3)	....
(4)	....

Q3.2. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most dominant actors (irrespective of whether they foster democracy or not) when it comes to public affairs in your political field/sector? (*Please mention two actors*)

Q3.2. DOMINANT ACTORS	
DOMINANT ACTOR 1 (DOM-1)	....
DOMINANT ACTOR 2 (DOM-2)	....

Q3.3. Who among the influential actors (Q3.1) are the most important sub-ordinated (alternative actors) in favour of change and more popular control of public affairs in your political field/sector? (*Please mention two actors*)

Q3.3. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 1 (ALT-1)	....
ALTERNATIVE ACTOR 2 (ALT-2)	....

In this part, we want to explore how the main actors that you have identified relate to the means of democracy. It is basic to a democracy that the major actors are willing to apply the rules of the game. More specifically, we want to explore how they use the various rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy. Do the actors promote or abuse or avoid them?

PART 4

MAIN ACTORS' RELATION TO THE MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

Q4.1. In your assesment, how (if at all) do the dominant actors (Q3.2) promote the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy (listed in Table E) below to reach their aims?

TABLE E

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.1. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.2. In **your** assesment, how (if at all) do **the alternative actors** (Q3.3) **promote** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy (listed in Table F) to reach their aims?

TABLE F

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

Q4.3. In your assesment, how (if at all) do **the dominant actors** (Q3.2) in your political field/sector **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy (listed in Table G) to reach their aims?

TABLE G

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.3. HOW DO THE DOMINANT ACTORS ABUSE OR AVOID THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		DOM-1	DOM-2
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely abuse or avoid this R/R

Q4.4. In your assesment, how (if at all) do **the alternative actors** (Q3.3) in your political field/sector **abuse or avoid** the rules and regulations that are supposed to promote means of democracy (listed in Table H) to reach their aims?

TABLE H

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
1	Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
2	Rule of law (including international law and UN conventions)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
3	Equal justice	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
4	The universal human rights (incl. basic needs)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
5	Democratic political representation through parties and elections	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
6	Rights based citizen participation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
7	Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation in public governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
8	Local democracy made real in combination with influence on other levels when necessary	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
9	Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private militias etc)	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

NO	MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	Q4.2. HOW DO THE ALTERNATIVE ACTORS PROMOTE THE RULES AND REGULATIONSTHAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?	
		ALT-1	ALT-2
10	Transparent, impartial and accountable governance	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
11	Government's independence and capacity to make decisions and implement them	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
12	Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the framework of human rights	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R
13	Citizens' democratic self-organising	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R	a. [ ] Please explain ..... b. [ ] Rarely promote this R/R

In politics as in sports: even if all players follow the rules of the game, it also matters if some are strong while others are weak. This part focuses on the political capacity of the actors. There are five aspects of capacity to be explored: a) whether people are politically included or excluded from vital parts of public life, b) whether actors possess authority and legitimacy, c) whether they can put their issues on the public agenda, d) whether they can mobilise and organise followers, and e) whether they can participate and build representation. We want to ask you to assess the capacity of the four dominant and alternative actors that were identified in the previous part (Part 3 Q3.2 and Q3.3).

PART 5

ACTORS' CAPACITY

A. POLITICAL INCLUSION (VERSUS EXCLUSION) — Democratisation presupposes that people are not excluded from politics and the crucial parts of society that effect politics. They must at least be powerful enough to fight exclusion and claim presence.

What is the capacity of the main actors to exclude others or overcome political exclusion and marginalisation?

Q5.1. In your assesment, what methods are used to involve people in the political process in your political field/sector? (*You may select more than one option*)

a. [ ] Politics (examples: registered as voters, eligible to run for public positions)

b. [ ] Economy (examples: property rights, access to business permit)

c. [ ] Social and culture (examples: eligible for community gathering, freedom of expressing cultural identity)

Q5.2. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 include other main actors or other people?

Q5.2. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS INCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)
DOM-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)	ALT-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.7)

Q5.3. Whom are being included by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.4. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors include other main actors or other people? (*Please provide examples!*)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.3.	Q5.4	
	WHOM ARE BEING INCLUDED	SECTORS OF INCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 2 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 1 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....

Q5.5. Do any of the dominant and alternative actors whom you mentioned in Part 3 exclude other main actors or other people?

Q5.5. ARE THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS EXCLUDE OTHER MAIN ACTORS OR PEOPLE			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)	ALT-1	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)
DOM-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)	ALT-2	a. [ ] Yes b. [ ] No (proceed to Q5.8)

Q5.6. Whom are being excluded by the dominant and alternative actors in the political process?

Q5.7. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the dominant and alternative actors exclude other main actors or other people? (*Please provide examples!*)

	Q5.6.	Q5.7,	
MAIN ACTOR	WHOM ARE BEING EXCLUDED	SECTORS OF EXCLUSION	EXAMPLES
DOM-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 2 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Alternative actor 1 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 2 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Dominant actor 1 b. [ ] Dominant actor 2 c. [ ] Alternative actor 1 d. [ ] Other people (please explain)	....	....

Q5.8. What do the dominant and alternative actors do to overcome exclusion?

Q5.8. WHAT DO THE DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION?			
DOMINANT ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
DOM-1	....	ALT-1	....
DOM-2	....	ALT-2	....

Q5.9. In your assesment, who else (in addition to the major dominant and alternative actors) are involved in excluding/marginalising people in your political field/sector? (*You may indicate more than one option*)

Q5.10. In what political, economic, social and cultural sectors of public life do the they (Q5.9) exclude people? (*Please provide examples!*)

Q5.9.		Q5.10.
OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN EXCLUDING/ MARGINALISING PEOPLE		SECTORS OF EXCLUSION
a. [ ] POLITICAL ACTORS	....	....
b. [ ] BUSINESS ACTORS	....	....
c. [ ] SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTORS	....	....

Q5.11. What kind of favours, rights and policies, do you think that those who are excluded or marginalised in your town/district need to claim and develop in order to be included in public and political life?

a. [ ] Special favours and preferential treatments Explain: .....
.....

b. [ ] Equal rights for all

B. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY — *Knowledge of the predominant ways in which various resources (capital) are transformed into legitimate authority is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy. Economic resources are about money and other assets; social resources are about good contacts and networks; cultural resources are about knowledge; coercive resources are about armed, physical or other forms of force.*

What is the capacity of the actors to transform their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources (capital) into legitimate and political authority as a leader or leading organisation, to thus become politically powerful?

Q5.12. What are the prime bases for the capacity of the dominant and alternative actors that you have identified in Part 3? (*Pick the most two important prime bases for each actor, then rank them*)

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.12. ACTOR'S PRIME BASES			
	ECONOMIC RESOURCES (ECONOMIC CAPITAL)	GOOD CONTACTS (SOCIAL CAPITAL)	KNOWLEDGE/ INFORMATION (CULTURAL CAPITAL)	MEANS OF COMPULISON (COERCIVE CAPITAL)
DOM-1	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
DOM-2	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
ALT-1	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
ALT-2	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

Q5.13. Is it easy or difficult to become a *legitimate and authoritative* political leader?

MAIN ACTOR	Q5.13.	
	EASY OR DIFFICULT TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL LEADER	WHY?
DOM-1	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
DOM-2	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
ALT-1	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....
ALT-2	a. [ ] Easy b. [ ] Difficult	....

Q5.14. How sucessful are the dominant actors and sub-ordinated/alternative actors in using their economic, social, cultural and coercive resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, i.e. to gain political power?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.14. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.15. In their attempts to use their resources to gain political legitimacy and authority, when do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.15. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

C. POLITICISATION AND AGENDA SETTING — In Part 3 you have already identified the priorities of the dominant and the sub-ordinated actors of change. Now we want to know how the actors try to put 'their issues' on the top of the political agenda.

What is the capacity of the actors to turn problems that they deem to be of common concern into public matters, i.e. to put them on the 'political agenda'?

Q5.16. What are the issues that the dominant and alterntive actors give priority to?

Q5.16. ISSUES THAT DOMINANT AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' GIVE PRIORITY TO	
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.17. What are these dominant actors' and alternative actors' methods to put those issues on the political agenda? (*Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them*)

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.17. METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
DOM-2	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
ALT-1	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....
ALT-2	[ ] Be active in a party and thus put the issue on the agenda [ ] Be active in an interest organisation and bring the issue to the agenda via that organisation [ ] Build TV/radio stations [ ] Writing articles in media [ ] Offering support [ ] Petition [ ] Demonstration, Mass action [ ] Others: .....

Q5.18. When promoting their issues, do the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors typically frame them as single issues/specific interests or as issues and interests that are part of strategic reforms? (*Pick only one option per actor*)

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.18. METHODS TO PUT MATTERS ON POLITICAL AGENDA
DOM-1	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
DOM-2	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-1	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans
ALT-2	a. [ ] Single issues/Specific interests b. [ ] Parts of strategic reforms and plans

Q5.19. How sucessful do you think that the dominant actors and sub-ordinated actors are in turning their issues into public matters, i.e. to put them on the political agenda?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.19. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

Q5.20. In their attempts to turn issues into public matters, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.20. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

D. MOBILISATION AND ORGANISATION — *Democracy presupposes that all actors are able to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation — i.e. to politicise the people.*
What is the capacity of the actors to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies?

Q5.21. How do the actors try to increase their capacity to mobilise and organise support for their demands and policies? *(Pick three methods that are most important for each actor, and rank them)*

TABLE L

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21. METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
DOM-1	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
DOM-2	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.21. METHODS TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE SUPPORT
ALT-1	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups
ALT-2	[ ] Develop populism (i.e. to pick up issues that ar popular and establish direct links between leaders and people), such as Soekarno, Jokowi [ ] Charismatic leadership, such as Megawati, Abubakar Ba'asyir [ ] Offer patronage to clients, such as Soeharto [ ] Offer alternative protection and support, such as advocacy works by Kontras [ ] Provide contacts with influential people, such as Andi Arif, Dita Indahsari, Eggy Sudjana [ ] Utilise family or clan connections, such as Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut [ ] Build networks between equal actors such as Mega-Amien-Gus Dur-Sultan to declare "Ciganjur pact" days before reformasi [ ] Coordinate groups and movements for example, such as anti-rotten politician campaign [ ] Facilitate the building of organisations from below that may unite many groups

Q5.22. How do the actors use their specific capacity and methods to mobilise people that you have indicated in Q5.23 (e.g. to use populism or networks)?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.22. HOW THE ACTOR DEVELOP AND USE THEIR METHODS OF MOBILISING SUPPORT
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.23. How successful do you think that the actors are in mobilising and organising support for demands and policies?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.23. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.24. In their attempts to mobilise and organise support for demands and policies, in what situation do the actors fail?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.24. CAUSESOF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

E. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION — *People must be able to use existing means of participation and representation, reform them or develop new ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. These may be institutions for public governance of various kinds but also associational or private governance. The main focus needs be, then, on different types of representation in relation to these institutions and how these are legitimised and mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, corporatist arrangements and/or institutions for direct participation.*

What is the pattern and capacity of the actors to use and improve existing means of participation and representation?

Where do the **dominant actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.25. To what institution of governance?

Q5.26. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

DOMINANT ACTORS	Q5.25. WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	Q5.26. MEDIATORS
DOM-1	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
DOM-2	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, Including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Where do the **sub-ordinated/alternative actors** go to solve/address their problems and promote their visions and interests?

Q5.27. To what institution of governance?

Q5.28. Via what mediators?

With reference to each of the dominant actors, please indicate the two most important institutions of governance and the three most important mediators.

ALTER-NATIVE ACTORS	Q5.27. WHAT INSTITUTION OF GOVERNANCE DO THE ACTORS TRY TO AFFECT	Q5.28. MEDIATORS
ALT-1	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation
ALT-2	[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.29. Why do the different dominant and alternative actors go to to the specific institutions and mediators in the ways that you have indicated in your answer to the previous question ?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.29.
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

Q5.30. How successful do you think that these are in seeking participation and developing representation in the way that you have indicated in your previous answer?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.30. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Q5.31. When do the actors fail in their attempts to solve/address problems and promote their vision and interests through channels and mediators as you mentioned before?

MAIN ACTORS	Q5.31. CAUSES OF FAILURE
DOM-1	....
DOM-2	....
ALT-1	....
ALT-2	....

Now we turn to how ordinary people seek representation. Please indicate the most two important channels and the three important mediators.

Where in your judgement do **ordinary people** go to solve/address their problem and promote their vision and interests?

Q5.32. To what institutions of governance?

Q5.33. Via what mediator?

Q5.32. CHANNELS	Q5.33. MEDIATORS
[ ] Institutions for private governance [ ] Institutions for community and civil self-governance [ ] Joint state- and stakeholder agencies for public governance [ ] Civil and military administration [ ] The judiciary and police [ ] The political executive	[ ] Civil society organisations [ ] Media [ ] Issue and interest organisations [ ] Individual direct participation as stakeholder [ ] Political society, including parties and individual candidates and legislatives at all levels [ ] Informal leaders [ ] Ways of bypassing democratic representation

Q5.34. In your judgment, why do **ordinary people** go to the specific institutions and mediators etc? (Open question) ....

Finally, it is crucial to understand the dynamic dimensions of democratisation. This can best be done by identifying actors' strategies to reach their aims and to thereafter study how their strategies influence the major challenges of democratisation.

PART 6

STRATEGIES (DYNAMICS) OF DEMOCRATISATION

Q6.1. What are dominant and alternative actors' main strategies to reach their own aims?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.1. ACTOR'S STRATEGY TO REACH AIMS
DOM-1	.....
DOM-2	.....
ALT-1	.....
ALT-2	.....

Q6.2. What are major challenges related to democratisation that the actors face when implementing their strategies?

Q6.3. What effects do actors' strategies have on the problems and options of democratisation that you have pointed to in the previous questions?

MAIN ACTORS	Q6.2. MAJOR CHALLENGES RELATED TO DEMOCRATISATION	Q6.3. EFFECT OF THE ACTOR'S STRATEGY ON DEMOCRATISATION
DOM-1	.....	.....
DOM-2	.....	.....
ALT-1	.....	.....
ALT-2	.....	.....

Finally, we want to ask informant's own reflections of the efforts of pro-democrats since the previous surveys to engage in organised politics.

PART 7

REFLECTION

Q7.1. In your experiences, what are the major problems and options that have appeared since 2007 within your political field/sector with regard to the efforts of many civil society organisations and social movements to engage in politics? .....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

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Indeks

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This is a report on the state of democracy and democratisation in Indonesia. It provides recently assembled, critical accounts on the achievements toward, as well as challenges to democratisation in the country. In doing so, it offers a point of reference for individuals who are positioned to secure Indonesia's transformation to a truly democratic political system. The assessment weaves together perspectives from two groups contributing to this transformation: theoretically oriented democracy researchers and action-oriented pro-democracy activists. Thus, this report aims to ensure that democratisation is not only moving forward, but that it also is headed steadily in the right direction. While research for this report has been carried out in compliance with the highest standards for a scientific assessment, the resulting report is intended to equip activists and political practitioners with the tools to more effectively contribute to democratisation.

Power Welfare & Democracy

Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD) Project [pwd.polgov.id], is a research-based collaboration project between UGM and UiO dedicated to support and fine-tune the direction of democratization in Indonesia. PWD Project attempts to support democratization in Indonesia by enhancing academic-base engagement. It aims at transforming and reshaping Indonesian political movements that promote and enhance the democratization process. In short, PWD Project's goals are to assess the progress and to discover the underlying problems of democratization, and to feed or redirect the required reorientation and measures based on the assessment. PWD is currently managed by PolGov Research Centre Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada under the coordination of PACER program and supported by the Royal Norwegian Embassy Universitas Gadjah Mada, and Universiteit i Oslo.

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