



**SECURING THE PACE AND THE
DIRECTION OF INDONESIAN
DEMOCRATIZATION**



Purwo Santoso, Hasrul Hanif, AE Priyono
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Editors: Eric Hiariej, Nicolaas Warouw

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Power, Welfare, and Democracy Studies in Indonesia (PWD Project)

The Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Universitas Gadjah Mada consolidate a trans-national collaboration for studying three interrelated issues: Power, Wealth and Democracy. One of key agendas in the study is to design a country-specific model of democracy assessment. The models will emphasis on power relations regarding welfare production and distribution. An international workshop will be held to discuss the framework of the study. The same workshop is also aimed at developing a network of scholars across countries. The program is supported by The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Indonesia.

As an emerging democracy, Indonesia has succeeded in conducting three general elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. While this has been widely taken as an achievement in itself, especially from liberal-cum-procedural democracy point of view, welfare as another substantial element remains in query. This is due to the fact that democratic regime has not brought positive effects in providing the citizens with sufficient public goods. As shown by several studies conducted by Demos (2006), Priyono et.al. (2008), and Hadiz and Robison (2004), the main beneficiaries of democracy are the new oligarchy, comprising

groups such as the upper middle class, prominent political clans, traditional aristocracy, and educated elite groups. As a result, while civil and political rights are well distributed, a large number of people still suffer from poverty, misery and exploitation.

In Indonesia, studies on democracy are dominated by liberal point of view. On the contrary, this study aims to propose an alternative model which seriously takes the issue of welfare into consideration. In doing so, a country-specific model of power assessment needs to be developed to measure the level of feasibility in preparing and promoting a new direction of democratization. This does not necessarily means that comparison with other countries is irrelevant. Instead, Indonesia can learn a good deal experiences from countries across five continents.

In fact, there exists a large number of democracy assessments conducted in other countries. However, most of the assessments hardly depart from the experiences of democratic developed countries. As a consequence, problems as urgent as how democratic practices could produce welfare faced by the new emerging democratic countries are not properly addressed. This implies a lack of concern on the issues of welfare production and distribution.

In this respect the main goal of Power, Welfare, and Democracy assessment is to assess and to explore any relations that might exist between democracy and welfare in Indonesia. The focus will be on how resources are produced and distributed among political actors. To this end, the study invites scholars and scientists from around the globe to share their knowledge and experience. It is our expectation that the study will improve the existing model of democratic assessment. In terms of advocating welfare development in democratic Indonesia, this study will be highly significant.

The scope of the project is quite extensive. There has been a strong agreement that the project would have: (1) an umbrella research; namely Power, Welfare and Democracy, (2) to produce a quantitative measurement of the progress or downturn of democracy through surveys; (3) to have an in-depth understanding of strategic issue through a number of case studies; (4) to strengthen the existing network among researchers and activists through several workshops and seminars, and (5) to improve academic competence of the participants.

In bringing about these agreements, a good combination of a strong competence academic research, strong dedication to democracy as well as a high managerial competence, especially to consolidated the resource are badly needed. The challenge is not only (1) to conduct a good research, but also (2) to establish and enhance a mutually benefitting network among Indonesian and international scholars and democracy activists, (3) to sustain a process of mutual learning among them, and eventually (4) to follow up the finding through new academic activity as well as practical advocacy.

Objectives

1. Providing substantive and methodological inputs for democratic assessment in Indonesia, under the framework of power, welfare, and democracy.
2. Developing international network for knowledge production as well as publications on the issues of power, welfare, and democracy.

Activities

1. Collaborative research, survey, case studies.
2. International academic networks.
3. Development, empowerment, and utilization of networks among academicians and CSOs.
4. Academic capacity enhancement.
5. Publishing publications.



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Overview

This concise book lays down a framework to seek alternative models of democracy, which seemingly satisfies two contradicting requirements. They are internationally justifiable but can easily be implemented in particular context, that is Indonesia. Ensuring ease in implementing the model is important for Indonesia, given the difficulty of the country to sustain in the country's democratization. This book has no intention to obstruct the possibility to adopt a particular idea of democracy, but it believes that more proper consideration on the contextual aspect is just as crucial as the values of democracy themselves, no matter how we define them. We believe that democratization is basically a cultural transformation process from a less democratic culture, towards a more democratic one as the public defines it.

The framework rests on two pillars. It takes power-relation and welfare production and welfare distribution seriously. In the mainstream political studies, democracy and welfare are widely acknowledged as separate logic. Welfare has been regarded as an economic mechanism to achieve prosperity, while democracy was merely a political project to provide "infrastructures" for welfare operations. The modernist proponents, foremost, tend to vividly propose that the economic

prosperity is the prerequisite for stable democracy. Yet the experiences of the so-called newly industrializing countries in Asia have apparently proven different, and even contradictory, results. We argue, therefore, that democracy and welfare shall be comprehended no longer in the causality manners, but as mutually enforcing relations. In principle, whatever the models look like, democratization is marked by the capability to control the power of the rulers and at the same tie control the accumulation and the distribution of public welfare.

In ensuring that the model is practicable in different contexts of the county, the search will be carried out through the consolidation of practical and discursive engagement of epistemic communities. Such consolidation should counterweight the existing dominant logics, which are insensitive to power relations and the issue of welfare. Consolidation of actively engaged epistemic community, at some points raise the previously incomprehensible problems and at some other points offer appropriate solution. Various problems emerge, however, when practices and behavior of other nations, in interpreting democracy, is to be adopted instead of the basic principal of democracy.

Indonesia has a strong tendency to adopt democracy as a cultural package and mimic the original nations' interpretation and behavior in interpreting democracy. In this sense, Indonesia is only an area for expansion of an ideology called democracy. Consequently, international learning through conducting comparative analysis with other nations is inevitably required.

The model shall bring to the fore the practice of democracy, which has locally-bound meanings and processes. Moreover, it traces various responses dictated by particular ecosystems in the country. The physical conditions, patterns

of adaptation, social organization and systems of human ideology have proven to be a dynamic object of the play of power. By employing a political ecology perspective, we will be able to understand the processes in the development of power and how it works in environmental management, public interests and power relations toward the realization of welfare as well as democracy in society.

This book is organized into four chapters. The first chapter discusses the necessity of involvement from among the epistemic communities in democratization. It is interesting that their involvement is crucial not only to optimize the democratization but, more than that, to formulate the proper model of democracy, compatible to Indonesia, in regards to the uniqueness of its society. The deep exploration on the efforts in constructing a newly welfare-based democracy model appears in chapter two. We examine the three types of power relations operated in the logics of welfare and democracy. There are various—and somehow overlapping—combinations of power relations in practice, which support the practice of welfare and democracy. The following chapter seeks to provide initial identifications to set up new democracy assessment models that are aware of welfare and environmental dimensions. The fourth chapter would be a conclusive statement and reflection of the overall studies on power, welfare and democracy.

Chapter I



In Search for Alternative Model of Democracy for Indonesia

It is now widely recognised that development is about much more than growth of GDP. Equally, everyone appreciates that democracy is more than simply a matter of universal suffrage and the holding of regular multiparty elections, essential though these are. So we need to understand exactly what is meant by development and democracy ... Furthermore, while development and democracy are goals in their own right, they must also be mutually reinforcing. A key challenge is to understand how best to make this a reality.

(Don McKinnon; Commonwealth Secretary-General).

In Search for Alternative Model of Democracy for Indonesia

During the New Order era, Indonesian government treated democracy as something expendable for the sake of economic development (welfare). It obsessed with democracy and they treat welfare as something cumbersome. Since its collapse, it has been turning the perspective over. Both democracy and welfare are simultaneously embedded in the public life. Yet, courage and laborious efforts are badly needed in order to formulate and realize a kind of democracy which enhances welfare creation and distribution. This book is prepared for that purpose, especially for communities of scholars which have commitment toward the development of democracy and welfare in Indonesia.

It is obvious that democracy comes at a price. People must struggle for democracy, including the segment of educated ones through their knowledge and scientific capacity. When these educated people intensively interact with their colleagues and are generated by a particular concern, with their specific capacity, this may emerge as what is commonly known as an *epistemic community*.¹ Through the thinking capacity of its members, such community has the ability to go beyond the government sectoral gaps, even beyond the state's jurisdiction.

This book discusses the necessity to of epistemic communities in democratization. Their involvement is crucial,

¹ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Winter, 1992), pp. 1-35.

not only to optimize the democratization, but more than that, to formulate a proper model of democracy which compatible with Indonesia, in regards to uniqueness of its society. In the Indonesian context, the question of ‘what kind of democracy’ is crucial, given the existence of hidden effort to reduce the meanings of democracy. The real problem is not merely the existence of this hidden effort, but, more than that, there are particular parties trying to gain something from this uniformity of the meaning of democracy. Democratization is not a value-free process.

The efforts to mobilize political activism from among the epistemic communities, which have been carried through the inherent strength of these communities, are crucial for accomplishing the agenda of democratization in Indonesia. It is a necessity since the meaning of democracy has relatively been uniformed and its implementation sweeps every corner of the world like a giant tidal wave.² Scepticism toward the idea and practice of democracy has been obvious since a long time,³ and generates its own political movement. Though their cause gains sympathy from some of the Indonesian populace,⁴ democratization has still been undeniably the top priority of the Indonesian political agenda in the last ten years.

²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

³Gerry Mackie, *Democracy Defended*, Cambridge University press, 2003. See also Russel J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenge, Democratic Choice: The Erosion of Political Support in Advance Industrial Democracies*, Oxford University Press, 2004; Michle Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuku, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracy to the Trilateral Comission*, New York University Press, 1975.

⁴*Hizbut Tabrir*, literally means Freedom Party, for instance, makes any efforts to advocate the ideas of *ummah*-based government on the earth. For the details see // www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/tentang-kami. Accessed on 22 March 2010.

There is a necessity to compose a new genre of democracy movement in order to fill the gaps, which make Indonesia swing wildly in controversies and yet trapped under the hegemonic ideas of democracy. There are, at least, two points which are attainable through the formation of this new genre. Those are: (1) acceleration of democratization and (2) the generation of consent on the intended direction and model of democracy.

In order to assure the urgency of those aforementioned points, firstly, we need to scrutinize the hidden challenges behind the idea and the institutionalization of democracy. Then, we may continue to involve this movement to guide itself in unraveling the controversies over the meaning of democracy to find the intended direction. The next part of this paper will discuss various details necessary to achieve the aforementioned goals.

Global Diffusion of Democracy: A Challenge for the *Epistemic Community*

The popularity of democracy as a concept could cloak a deadly challenge, specifically at the level of idea. Democracy as a notion is not merely popular, but also hegemonic. Ignorance in critically scrutinizing the notion of democracy may lead the public trapped in the mid of controversies and unable to make a clear decision.⁵ No matter how popular the notion of democracy has been, democracy is a model of government that contains many inherent practical problems. This point is clear as Crouch and Streeck state that: “Struggles for democracy

⁵ Allen Chun, “Democracy as Hegemony, Globalization as Indigenization, or the “Culture” in Taiwanese National Politics,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2000; 35; 7.

mostly take place in difficult, even dangerous, contexts, and involve very weak institutions.”⁶ It is commonly known that, regardless of its many virtues, democracy is the best model of government among the worst ones.

Inside the notion of democracy, there is a big paradox.⁷ The most obvious paradox is attached to the liberal-capitalist economic order where the public’s sake is put in the invisible hands of the market as democracy holds the right of every men and women to further its own ideas and interests. This widely known paradox of invisible hands manifest itself not only as an idea but also as economic practices. Nonetheless, failure in understanding the idea is very likely to lead to failure to put it into practice. Jay Ulfelder mentions, “democracy is inherently fragile because it entails strategic uncertainty that subjects key organizations— leading political parties and the military— to fear as well as temptation.”⁸

According to scholars in countries whose public’s sake is determined by market mechanism, such a Crozier; Huntington; and Watanaku, there is nothing wrong with democracy, as long as the public still true with the essence of the democratic system. This means, at least for them, that the public must understand the linkage between liberty and responsibility.⁹ The liberals, who have been staunchly struggling for liberty, solve the paradox of

⁶ Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), *The Diversity of Democracy Corporatism, Social Order and Political Conflict*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006.

⁷ Arthur Seldon, *The Dilemma of Democracy: The Political Economics of Over-Government*, The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998.

⁸ Jay Ulfelder, “Why Is Democracy So Fragile?,” paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28–31, 2008.

⁹ Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanaku, *op. cit.*, halaman 1.

democracy by absorbing public responsibility for individual liberty.

The people in Scandinavian countries have their own way to manage the paradox of democracy. They entrust the well-being of the people to an institution named “the state,” and they manage the state as a cross-point for people movement. The state, which usually works with the top-down approach, eventually supported by a strong sense of citizenship and controlled by the public from below.

Unfortunately, the efforts to bring the idea of democracy into reality have been overlapping with the historical ideological contest. We have, on the one hand, a group that upholds the idea of democracy based on the philosophy of liberalism. On the other hand, we have its rival that sees democracy by referring to the idea of socialism. Each party approaches democracy from the opposing poles. The Cold War, which emerged right after the WW II, was a long battle over claim on the model of democratic government. We have, on the one side, the liberal Western Democracy and, on the other hand, the non-Western Democracy.

The complication in building democracy has not been obstructed only by ideological struggle of West and East blocks, but also by the never-ending debate on the scope of the idea of democratization. The design of democracy, basically, refers to the idea of nation-state. It means democracy is carried by a sovereign nation. In other words, the political order called democracy is built on the idea of nation-state. In the era of globalization, there is a developing idea of global scale democracy. In such context, the problem is more than the mere difference in scope of national versus global, but further, “which one should be our reference?.” Should democracy at global level

dictate the one at the local level? Or should the democracy at global level serve as the downstream of various models of democracy at national level?

Every democratization in every nation-state, however, has international support either directly or indirectly. Some developed countries even declare democracy as their “missions,” and as it is sanctified as a mission, their support for democratization in other countries is not considered as violation of sovereignty of the object countries.¹⁰ In short, democratization is no longer a nationalistic project since this process is related, and easily drawn, to be part of the institutionalization of global democratic governance.¹¹ Thus, when a country intends to formalize its political format, it will be very unlikely that the leaders of this particular country to see any other options but democracy, specifically, democracy as defined by countries which self-claimantly call themselves democratic countries.

In the current global context, there is not much room left for a particular country to design its own model of democracy for its own use. The discreet intensification of the global political economic order in the contemporary global context has been successful in building a strong regime of democracy standardization. Even worse, there has been no democratic procedure to formulate and enact those standards so far. The currently daily discursive process has led Indonesia into the trap

¹⁰James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “The Democracy Mission? Democratic Sponsor States and the Extension of the Third Wave, 1988-2003,” paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA March 22-25, 2006.

¹¹Barry K. Gills, “Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2002; 581; 158.

of liberal democracy. For them, democracy is all about guarantee of individual political right. Once it is done, the welfare will eventually come in consequence, through the work of the market mechanism. The liberals believe that a good government is one that uses the least state's authority, and the least state involvement is considered as production process of wealth, based on self-actualisation and inter-individual competition.¹²

When people utter the word of “democracy,” they have the liberal ideology and model of governance in their mind. Raffaele Marchetti says that democracy is alluring the obsession for global democracy, but the emerged form of governance still, in fact, leaves some deficit of democracy.¹³ The expanding adoption of democracy goes beyond the domain of nation-state and has left a trail of failure in enforcing the basic principal of the democratic government.

Either democracy is global or it is not democracy. Any political system that applies allegedly democratic principles within a limited scope is either hypocrisy or an illusion. ... the ideal of democracy requires the creation of a system in which all citizens have a voice in the formulation of norms and decisions that have a public scope. In particular, such an ideal requires a system to be framed on different layers, each of them allowing for the maximum participation of all citizens. By contrast, a system that

¹²Lihat Frank Cunningham, *Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, 2002, pp. 27-51.

¹³ Raffaele Marchetti, *Global Democracy: For and Against Ethical Theory, Institutional Design, And Social Struggles*, Routledge, 2008.

allows for public actions that do not undergo citizens' political scrutiny and yet have a public impact does not qualify as democratic. And this is the current situation at the international and transnational level. Vast sections of the world's population have, in fact, no say in transborder decisions that (often profoundly) affect their lives. From a democratic perspective this lack of voice is not acceptable, and it is just this kind of institutional discrimination that this book challenges.¹⁴

The judgement on whether a form of government is democratic or not cannot be unilaterally determined by its own people, who are supposed to hold the ultimate sovereignty. It has been them, the governments of the self-proclaimed democratic countries, who have made the judgements.

It is noteworthy that the transnational political resistences have been waged by those who oppose the idea of democracy. They also have the agenda to form a single transnational government entity, such as the idea of *ummah* promoted by the *Hisbut Tabrir*. In parallel with the idea of global governance, the *Hisbut Tabrir* has developed its own global scale model of governance.¹⁵

The aforementioned tensions lead to several simple conclusions, *first*, the importance of indigenouisation of democracy; and *second*, in doing so, it requires laborious effort

¹⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 1.

¹⁵ Jan Grugel (ed.), *Democracy Without Borders: Transnationalisation And Conditionality In New Democracies*, Routledge, 1999. Wendy Larner and William Walter (eds.), *Global Governmentality: Governing International States*, Routledge, 2004.

for discursive engagement. Both will be explained in the following part of this paper.

Localising Democracy

Democracy is just one among many concepts developed and to be implemented in Indonesia. The success of other countries to adopt democracy does provide valuable lessons for Indonesia. A problem emerges, however, when the practice and behavior of other nations in interpreting democracy will be adopted instead of the basic principle of democracy. Indonesia has a strong tendency to adopt democracy as a cultural package and mimic the original nations' interpretation and behavior in interpreting democracy. In this sense, Indonesia is only an area for expansion of an ideology called democracy.

As a bundle of ideas, democracy has many inherent problems. The acceptance of democracy as an ideology does not necessarily lead to a consensus on its operation. We have to recognize, however, that democracy has become a hegemonic idea in the world and spread as a total cultural package. Further, it has become a political mission for a particular country. We have failed to examine the political load of democracy, upon its arrival in Indonesia, as a cultural package. We had only noticed it after this idea was normatively reproduced.


Normative perspective treats democracy as a set of norms. It was in such a context the idea of human rights, participation, public control, etc. were born. At the next level, we may ask to ourselves if we agree to the norms derived from democracy. As the education process in Indonesia has succeeded to reproduce those norms as virtues, at the next level we must demand ourselves to put them into action. As we lack the experience to put these normative ideas into practice, we

think that it is good to draw some lessons from other countries. What could be wrong with this way of normative thought?

First, in carrying democratization we think that we don't have pre-dominant culture, particular ways to list the hierarchy of social values, particular ways to interpret reality, etc. This particularity could either be better or worse, but our cultures have undeniably been functionally operated through them. The normative perspective does not merely deny their existence, but more than that, it renders them irrelevant. In short, insensitivity toward particular ways to interpret reality and particular concepts, such as democracy, has screwed the principal meanings of the concept. No matter how good this normative perspective performs, it will surely lead us to disappointment since the reproduced concepts are inconsistent to the actual behavior of the mimicked countries. The strong grip of normative thinking in Indonesia has obstructed us to contextualize the practice of democracy in Indonesia.

Second, this book does not have the intention to promote or campaign chauvinism that Indonesian culture is established and better than other cultures. The point of this paper is that in a particular cultural context there is always a cyclical process to connect reality with norms. In every culture, there continuously operates a chain of action-reaction process. The action is carried based on an interpretation and the effect of the action is reinterpreted to determine the actions in the next phases. This process of action-reflection makes, on the one hand, cultural particularity, and on the other hand, cultural dynamics possible to exist. The crucial point here is that democratization may only occur and only if we put it into a particular context and make contextual reflection on the existence of this idea of democracy on the particular context discussed. Moreover, the tendency to adopt democracy through

a normative perspective and framework leads us into the trap of inconsistency or hypocrisy. We claim ourselves to be democratic; cognitively, even democratic in a certain standard or pattern, but in reality our behavior may totally defer it. Such a naive perspective, that assumes that we adopt democracy consciously and deliberately, has not been effective so far.



The need for culture-specific model of democracy requires the Indonesians to go on with the quest for its own model of democracy. In this quest, the values of democracy carried by other nations or adopted in the past are treated as lesson or inspiration, while the actual experience of the Indonesians people will serve as the main base. Therefore, it is necessary to have a political movement based on a pro-democracy epistemic community that also understands the culturally specific daily practices.

As a *long-duree* process of social change, democratization should be understood as a process of continuous action-reflection. So far, it is difficult to carry a reflection to design a new action, since democracy is adopted to respond sudden and drastic change. Due to this lack of deliberate reflection, we slip into hegemonic discourses. As Indonesia has been adopting democracy for quite some time, it is necessary to consider getting back to a simple procedure: continuous action-reflection. Thus, we may amend mistakes we made in the past, and obtain inspirations for future actions. There is nothing wrong with

adopting brilliant ideas from other nations, as long as their actualizations are relevant to the Indonesian context.

The cycle of action-reflection, is basically, a process that connects the essential ideas of democracy to a particular context. Therefore, methodological competence is highly required in order to carry deliberate and comprehensive reflection and invent innovative measure to put democracy into reality.

Third, in order to carry the action-reflection process, it is necessary to institutionalize a contextual way of thinking. Democratization is a process of interpreting and carrying particular ideas into a real context. A context-based way of thinking and framework offers feasibility in implementing ideas, while normative ways of thinking prefers viability. Both are conditions for successful realization of any ideas, and failure to meet any of those conditions will obstruct the sustainability of carrying democracy.

For example, we may look back to the Sukarno's effort to bring democratization through his idea of Guided Democracy. This idea departed from critical reflection on what should be done if we want to realize the idea of democracy in this country. To some extent we may find truth in this idea as we recognize that the idea of democracy hides its own paradox. Soekarno's failure was his inability to make himself the leader of the democratization itself. Whatever model of democracy we choose, democratization needs guidance for a clear direction. To some extent, what Sukarno had done was taken over by Suharto. Suharto's offer to lead the transformation towards a clear direction of economic development was also troublesome. Why was so? Suharto was not sensitive enough to manage the paradox. For an example, the New Order regime was unable to

draw lessons or inspirations from critique. On the contrary, this regime, systematically, eradicated the public capacity to criticize the government.

We need to make a reflection on the reality that the effort to realize democracy, so far, has been going and rooted in developed industrial countries, based on the philosophy of liberalism. The main question here is not whether liberalism is good or bad, but the consistency of the Indonesian people when they want to bring democracy into reality with their undemocratic mind-set. When the adoption of the essential idea, in this case democracy, requires us to also adopt its form, liberalism, it will cause more obstruction to carry democratization. Unfortunately, even most of the educated segment of the Indonesian people have failed and been reckless to distinguish the essential idea of democracy and its form of liberalism. It is not uncommon to see daily political practices considered to be expressions of the idea of democracy but is in fact, parts of liberalism. Further, many of Indonesian political scholars give their agreement on the formula that there will be no democracy without having prior liberalism.

The difficulty to entangle democracy from liberalism has its root in the fact that liberal democracy has been a dominant discourse in Indonesia. The dichotomy of liberal vs non-liberal is blurred when its discursive process overlaps with other discursive processes involving debate on universality and particularity of democracy. According to the Universalists, the very idea of democracy and its actual manifestation should be the same across time and space. This view is rejected by the contextualists pole who argue that if the desired values are universal, their actualization should be compatible with the specific cultures of a given location. The actualization of

democracy is necessarily cultural-specific. Since one country is different to the others, so is the actualization of democracy.

The PWD-UGM team has no intention to obstruct the possibility to adopt a particular idea of democracy, but it believes that more proper consideration on the contextual aspect is just as crucial as the values of democracy themselves, no matter how we define them. Democratization is basically a cultural transformation process from a less democratic culture towards a more democratic one as defined by the public.

The management of the paradox of democracy must be done through dialectics between the discourse of becoming Indonesian in terms of culture and the values of democracy, in which its actualization also changes from time to time. The sustainability of this management process of these two seemingly contradictory things requires critical reflection and dialectic processes.

Fourth, behind this seemingly self-conscious and deliberate process of self transformation, we have actually involved ourselves subconsciously into a process of consciousness transformation. Such a process may take place through a long series of discursive and strenuous battle, although without bloodshed. People who will be involved may not even notice it because the contested prize of this battle is the interpretation of reality. Behind any discourse there must be a claim over truth, and a series of claim over truth widely accepted through intensive discursive process may set aside the previous claim and build a new one.

To make this clear, we may take a closer look on the debate between two pro-democracy groups. On the one hand we have a group who holds that democracy is a universal ideology. This group also believes that one of the main pillars

of democracy is recognition and guarantee of human rights. The idea of human rights applies universally, thus Indonesia's commitment toward democracy must be expressed by sanctioning various norms and standards of human rights as sanctioned by other countries. On the other hand we have a group with contrary claim. Democracy, whatever they define it, must manifest in everyday practices. Democracy must be an inseparable part of the society's culture. The downstream of this controversy or battle for claim over truth is the emergence of polarization of ideas. We have Universalists on one extreme and Particularists on the opposite one.

The process of mass communication in this era of globalization has facilitated the reproduction of the Universalist idea. The idea of democracy universality is spreading in the public arena through the reproduction of judgement. It is interesting that this judgement is made without a court. Through continuing discursive process, some ideas are hardened and become ideology, and widely accepted ideology serve as a base to make judgements. This process is known as the discursive engagement.¹⁶ The process to confirm *judgement* is carried through a process known with various terms. The spread of various narrations behind discussions, speeches, even papers has been arranged to confirm the dominant discourse.

The ability of the global regime to dictate its judgement on what is democratic and what is not is conditioned by the soft power of the super power countries. In this context, we may see democratization in every corner of this country as an effort of politico-economic global landscape arrangement for it to be compatible with the global regime's wishes. Thus, globalization comes with a message demanding some sort of

¹⁶ John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World*, Polity Press, 2006.

assurance that the existing form of democracy is compatible with the highly liberalized global political economy.¹⁷ The fragile soft power in countries which has just started its democratization process makes the democratization in those countries merely a process of expansion of developed countries, so they will meet less obstructions to further their own interests.

To put it clear, the contextual perspective has been easily defeated by the normative one, supported by the hegemonic discourse. In the grip of this hegemonic discourse, the desire to actualize democracy through different ways and manners or with particular attributes,¹⁸ will be easily accused as a tricky play of pseudo-democracy, regardless of the fact that Sukarno's will to develop Guided Democracy and Suharto's to develop the *Demokrasi Pancasila* were motivated by their reluctance toward democracy. If one wants to give priority to economic development, the key jargon of the New Order regime, in the public agenda, this person would be very likely to be accused as Suharto's agent. There is no intention to present neither Sukarno nor Suharto as true democrats here, but through the point above we just wanted to mention the importance of a contextual way of thinking and framework to put an imported idea such as democracy contextually compatible with Indonesian realm.

Fifth, facilitated by the hegemonic discourse, the form of democracy developed in Indonesia is the Universalist democracy. Once more, the main question here is not whether the Universalist claim is true or false, but its consequences. The reproduction process of the hegemonic discourse has smoothly

¹⁷Sylvia Chan, *Liberalism, Democracy and Development*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

¹⁸David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy 'With Adjectives': Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research", *Working Paper #230* - August 1996.

persuaded Indonesia to adopt particular models previously adopted by other countries. But this process still leaves particular mind-sets, reminiscence of the past era, which may not be compatible with the newly adopted model of democracy. This makes Indonesia, in a state of psychological analogy, like a person with split personality. Even worse, the adoption of the discourse of democracy universalism in Indonesia makes almost no room left to define or further Indonesia's interests. Day after day, Indonesia is faced with more prescription which gets increasingly fundamental and it has to obey in order to maintain its consistency in realizing democracy, of which its standards are set by other countries. As the confusion in distinguishing democracy and liberalism decreases when Indonesia gets more and more liberalized, there emerges a question, "Is this the only route we may take towards democracy?"

Sixth, a perspective of political ecology is appropriate to operate in Indonesia. It is particularly so in understanding various processes and forms of Power, Welfare and Democracy in relation to the high diversity of geographic conditions, types of resources, and the fact that the lives of the majority of the country still depends on the primary sectors, like agriculture, forestry, horticulture, animal husbandry and mining. In correlation with that, the results of preliminary study in Ecological Anthropology, Indonesia provides a reference to review the dynamics of PWD, regarding ecological changes that have occurred lately. There have been a considerable number of studies undertaken to examine the ecological changes and their impact to socio-economic structure of society, but these studies have not yet revealed the relationship between ecological dynamics with political issues and democracy.

Discursive Engagement

Considering the aforementioned point, soft power mobilization in countries with ongoing democratization process is crucial, so is discursive capacity to design democracy, of which its institutionalization is compatible to the Indonesian context. Democracy institutionalization is a process of cementing consensus produced through discursive engagement.¹⁹ The universal ideas of democracy will manifest in everyday life and, in turn, become inseparable through these continuous processes of problematization and critical reflection.

First, we should enhance soft power in the frame of political movement. This movement, however, must be based on the epistemic community so it may have a strategic contribution. This movement does not necessarily accomplish the ongoing democratization process, since it is only one among many pro-democracy elements. The urgency for the formation of this epistemic community is obvious since this is the weakest point of Indonesian pro-democracy movement. There is a tendency for this movement to lurk behind the idea of democracy universalism and requires Indonesia to craft its culture anew just in order to be part of a universal ideology. This lack of soft power contributes to the cornered situation Indonesia now faces.

Second, there are two crucial points to develop in order to enhance the soft power: (1) building the consensus on the direction of Indonesian democracy, (2) developing the required instrument to facilitate the functioning of epistemic community based democracy movement.

¹⁹ Jhon Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, Oxford Political Theory Series, Oxford University Press, 2000. John S. Dryzek, *op. cit.*

(a). *Assuming the Quest for a Model for Indonesian Democracy*

Democracy is only one of Indonesia's public agendas that demands immediate and deliberate solution. If we consider it constitutionally, the bond that keeps Indonesia as a nation is the existence of a form of public interest management in order to attain collective will referred to as "creating wealthy and just society." As pattern of public interest management, we need to design a model of democracy that manages and leads toward welfare the same time. The ongoing hot debate must go on so we may get closer to consensus on the daily operation of these two concepts of justice and welfare in everyday practices.

In the currently dominant idea of liberal democracy, the idea of justice tends to be defined as procedural justice. The government is considered just when it procedurally gives equal opportunity for every citizen to vote and be voted for public offices. Consequently, who will hold the public offices is not a big issue, regardless of their sex and gender, age, ethnicity etc. In short, this idea of procedural justice deals only with procedures in managing public interest, not its result.

If this is the case, how should we manage the efforts to enhance welfare? As we follow the procedural justice further, the welfare management is more and more handed to market mechanism. It is this market mechanism that determines the processes of welfare distribution, accumulation, and redistribution. The state as an agency no longer holds the central roles as it previously did. The next question would be, "Is this still within the scope of our discussion on democracy?" The answer is: "Yes." Apart from the Universalists obsession, democracy is essentially about public interest management. Discursive engagement is required to produce collective understanding on such matters.

The urgency to develop democracy in Indonesia comes from the demands to institutionalize public interest management in Indonesia. Thus, if public interest management can be started through recognition and insurance of political right, it should be followed by the development of instruments to make sure that the assurance of this political right will not endanger the public interest itself.

The aspiration to actualize the idea of democracy was not actually absolutely absent in Indonesia under the authoritarian rule of New Order regime. The demands for democratic development process were incessantly voiced throughout that era. However, The Indonesian political form in that era, had been institutionalized in such a way so it might serve as a reliable base and instrument for economic development. In order to confirm the effectiveness of disaster-control as formulated by the technocrats, the Indonesian government machinery was designed to operate from the centre and was very confident with its agendas.

Such mode of governing is known as the developmental state. Its tendency to respond to public demands in an authoritarian manner has drawn this model to transform into an authoritarian-developmental state. This authoritarianism may serve as a strategic scenario by letting various procedural rules to be violated. There are, however, some appreciable points in referring to non-procedural ideas. To be simple, in the framework of substantive democracy, the main concern is to make sure there is a congruency between the public's will and the government's as a public agent. If this will demands welfare-not assurance of individual political rights – optimization of welfare management becomes the democracy itself. In short, Indonesia demands democracy that directly leads to welfare.

Indonesia's performance in working for its public welfare during the New Order era was obvious. It is undeniable that to some extent some of its achievements were proven ephemeral as the economic growth was achieved at the expense of negligence of the principal of sustainable development. Thus, we have to pay the skyrocketing economic growth achieved in that era with current huge cost of disaster mitigation. It just got worse when we recall that Indonesia's public welfare, built upon technocratic-minded supported by centralistic mode of government, was devastated by the crisis.

(b). Instrument Development: Discourse Politics

Democracy is a matter of how the public – however we define it –works to deal with their-own well-being. The definition of the public may depart from the individual or the collectivity.²⁰ Thus, we must realize that the idea of democracy necessarily manifest in the performance of the public machinery, in public policy process,²¹ and in the power relationship embedded in that particular public interest management. Moreover, the democratization inevitably touches this power relationship. The democracy stagnation, in this context, could be understood as caused by the stagnation of transformation due to the strong resistance of the existing power structure.

²⁰These two perspectives have been battling for claim over truth. The idea of public based on individuality is obvious in liberalism, while the collectivist deeply characterize the socialism. For the discursive engagement in Indonesia, it is necessary to examine them both, though; the domination in the discourse realm has shifted toward the liberal perspective.

²¹ The difference in the meaning of public implies to difference on how the public policy works. The primacy of individuality is in congruency with the market mechanism. It is based on this premise that the state has to relinquish its central roles in public affairs and gives way for the market mechanism as the main pillar that supports the public interest.

Democratization is not only inseparable from the political performance of the involved parties, but also from the political phenomenon itself. If we take a close look from the perspective of political science, democracy is a matter of power relationship.²² This means that democracy is a struggle for power and, simultaneously, to institutionalize the power relationship.

Since Indonesia's faith is determined by its discursive capacity, the main question is, "Can the discursive process generate power transformation process?" This study is carried with a belief in mind that democracy demands rearrangement of the existing and structured relations. Moreover, structural transformation is possible as long as there is adequate discursive capacity. As aforementioned, discursive process has the capacity to condition the structural transformation. A successful discursive process is one which succeeds to mobilize counter-discourse and, in the end, to win the support for the transformation from the transformed party. Only with such a capacity Indonesia will be able to examine the situation and condition, and take opportunities in the global arena since it knows its own potential and situation. Indonesia is more than merely a laboratory to test unilaterally dictated alien ideas.

One among many possible things to do is carrying democracy assessment,²³ or democracy audit.²⁴ This assessment

²²Fredrik Engelstad, Þyvind Þsterud (eds.), *Power and Democracy: Critical Interventions*, Ashgate Publishing, Hant, 2004.

²³Todd Landman (ed.), *Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008.

²⁴Olof Petersson, *The Democratic Audit of Sweden*, SNS: The Center for Business and Policy Studies, Stockholm, Sweden. Lihat juga, Canadian Study of Parliament Group; *Canada: A Democratic Audit*, Friday, Ottawa, Ontario, March 11, 2005. Juga, Miguel Gutiérrez Saxe, *Citizen Audit of the Quality of Democracy in Costa Rica State of the Nation*

is carried merely to make a measurement, such as composing democracy index. When we decide to do this, the discursive process is very unlikely to develop further. Such assessment produces only numbers, and they are accessible and interpretable only to a small numbers of scholars. This number will also contribute insubstantially toward action-reflection process. The alternative is to carry this assessment to identify strategic issues through deep and comprehensive study to formulate transformation measures.²⁵

In order to accomplish the democratization agenda, the development of instrument for public interest management, including for carrying various assessments, is crucial. But before we go further, it is better to make sure that the discursive activity on the intended model of democracy is in line with what we have been demanding since many years ago: carrying development democratically.

It is noteworthy that for any particular country, assessment on the process and achievement of democracy has two edges. In the strong grip of universalism democracy, the criteria used for the assessment are derived from the universalistic claim of democracy and this assessment is carried in order to uniform the standards and expressions of democracy. In the *discursive engagement* mentioned above, the formation of public consciousness is necessary. This consciousness must be built upon the reality the public face, no matter how eager they are for democracy. The assessment should serve as leverage for collective self-reflection.

Project. See also, Democratic Audit Ireland, *Overview of the Democratic Audit Ireland*. Also on, Mellefolkkeligt Samvirke [MS Danish Association for International Co-operation], *The state of Democracy: Empower the Poor!*, Report # 1 2006.

²⁵ Maswadi Rauf, Saiful Mujani, Syarif Hidayat, Abdul Malik Gismar, *Laporan Akhir. Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia*, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional dan United Nations Development Programme, Desember, 2008.

Reckless self-reflection on the ongoing democratization process in Indonesia may lead to collective narrow-sightedness or irrational despair, which will eventually make us lose our way in the future quest. Therefore, it is necessary to have a reliable instrument for assessment of the democratization process in this country. In doing so, we emphasize the need, not only for information and collective consciousness on the achievement in democratization process, but also the ability to mobilize counter discourse for the dominant idea that captures the mind of the Indonesians.

A series of researches to facilitate the necessary process for democratization are required. Thus, the capacity of the pro-democracy epistemic community to provoke the collective consciousness on democracy is very crucial. Considering the strong conceptual grip of the hegemonic discourse, we need to design accountable alternative frameworks. Thus, the findings of those researches must be derived into contextual ideas to incite new consciousness.

As mentioned above, the scientific content of the democracy assessment report may deceive the public since the criteria used in the assessment are derived from the hegemonic concept of democracy. The criteria are formulated based on uncriticism sanctioned by the universality of democracy. Thus, such assessment serves only to re-affirm the hegemony of that particular concept and, thus, the simplification of democracy.

In short, if democracy assessment is developed in Indonesia as an instrument to facilitate the democratization process, we do so with the intention to aim at the heart of the problem in mind, that is the pattern of power relations. Thus, the democracy assessment project in Sweden, carried out by Fredrik Engelstad and Oyvind Osterud, is also known as power assessment or power study.

So far, there has not been a thorough and comprehensive assessment to facilitate reflection on the democratization in Indonesia. In fact, the National Body for Development Planning - Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has formulated Indonesian Democracy Index-Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI).²⁶ This assessment, of which its conclusion was presented in index, is clearly quantitative in its methodology and no matter how accurate this index is, it is clearly insufficient to facilitate the critical reflection process. Moreover, the criteria used in the IDI was derived from the idea of democracy universalism, characterized by the centrality of the idea of political right assurance while, at the same time, disregards the economic, social, and cultural ones. Undoubtedly, we need a particular kind of alternative assessment to facilitate the re-orientation of democratization in this country, so it may evade irrelevant prescriptions. This particular kind of assessment must depart from the linkage between democracy and public welfare. How does this particular assessment model look like?

To prevent us from the trap of universalistic democratization, it will be better if we make a review on the currently existing democracy assessment models. This review starts by delineating the dominant assessment patterns, which may indicate its hegemonic character. Then, we will continue with available alternative models and explore for new possibilities.

²⁶ Maswadi Rauf, Saiful Mujani, Syarif Hidayat, Abdul Malik Gismar, *op. cit.*

Freedom House Assessment

Freedom House is a notable independent institution based in Washington and annually evaluates what is called “World’s Freedom.” The map of this “World’s Freedom” or map of free world – the annual report is updated annually – specifically highlight the two categories of freedom as its main parameter: first, political rights; and second, civil liberty. With these two criteria, they have been conducting survey annually since 1972 to evaluate the situation of freedom in every country in the world. Most of their standards are based on the norms stated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. They believe that these standards are applicable for and in every single country, regardless of its geographical location, ethnic and religion composition, and level of economic development.

Since these two parameters also serve as the main elements of the democratic political system, they claim that they must be used as parameter for evaluation on the situation of democracy. The Freedom House sees that political right consists of a series of rights which is necessary for the democratic political system to work. This includes the right to join political parties and organizations, to compete for public offices, and to vote freely in election for accountable and effective representatives. Meanwhile, the Freedom House sees civil liberty to include freedom of expression and faith, right to form union, rule of law, and personal autonomy, including economic freedom without state interference.

It is noteworthy that the Freedom House sees freedom is vulnerable to the power of government and non-government parties, including armed rebel groups, organized crime syndicates, and also influential business powers. Thus, the Freedom House assesses the expression of those rights at the

individual level instead of the government's performance. Further, considering the great number of repressive governments which enact various laws to protect the political right and civil liberty of its citizens but fail to implement them effectively, the Freedom House emphasizes the actual practices of the expression of political right and civil liberty instead of their normative expression in the regulation papers.

In their last annual report of 2009, Freedom House assessed Indonesia as one among 192 countries in all over the world. The measurement was based on the answers given to 25 questions, 10 on political rights and 15 on civil liberty. The questions' themes were around the issues of media independency, freedom of faith, corruption, the rights of the political parties to perform their functions, the independency of the judicial system, and women's rights.

The result, though Indonesia was convincingly ranked as a free country, its rank related to the performance of political rights was 2nd, while for civil liberty Indonesia was ranked 3rd.²⁷ The ranking scale was 1 to 7, with the higher number representing higher performance.

In the Freedom House's category, a country ranked 2nd for political rights performance has weaker political rights performance than one ranked 1st due to factors like political corruption, the limited function and performance of political parties and opposition groups, besides the strong influence of foreign or military power in the domestic politics.

Countries ranked of 3rd, 4th or 5th for civil liberty are those which provide substantial protection for almost every

²⁷ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7626>.

kind of civil liberty. Countries at these ranks provide very strong assurance on some kinds of liberties but less on some others.

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Assessment

EIU is a research group, part of a notable and influential economic magazine, *The Economist* that annually produces reports on the Democracy Index all over the world. This index assesses the situation of democracy in 167 countries and emphasizes on evaluation and assessment of performance on five general categories: election process and pluralism, civil liberty, government performance, political participation, and political culture.

Methodologically, the Democracy Index is based on analysis on a series of survey data generated from various questions on the performance of democracy in each country. The given answers are mostly experts' assessment on democracy situation in each of those countries. EIU also utilize surveys carried out by other institutions, including Freedom House. Finally, based on the assessments *cum* survey the Democracy Index classifies each of those countries into four category of political regime's typology: (1) full democracy, with a score 8-10; (2) flawed democracy with a score 7-7.9; (3) hybrid regime with a score 4-5.9; and (4) authoritarian regime, with a score below 4.

In its report on the 2008 situation, EIU released Democracy Index that placed Indonesia – along with other 49 countries – as flawed democracy with a score of 6.34, right below Malaysia that reached 6.46. In general, the 2008 Democracy Index placed Sweden with the highest score of 9.88, next in line was Norway with 9.68, Iceland with 9.65, Holland

with 9.53, and Denmark with 9.52. Those five countries, along with other 25, were ranked as full democracy countries. In the group of hybrid regime countries, there were 36 countries included Albania (5,91), Singapore (5,89), dan Hongkong (5,85), Bosnia (5,70), Turkey (5,69); and the authoritarian regime category listed 51 countries included Laos (2,10), Libya (2,00), Saudi Arabia (1,90), Myanmar (1,77), Uzbekistan (1,74), South Korea (0,86).

Using a similar approach the Freedom House uses or The Economist with its democracy index, the *World Democracy League* (WDL) also made its own evaluation on what they labelled as “World Democracy.” This also used four parameters of human rights, political rights, freedom of speech, and the absence of corruption.

In particular, WDL used clean and transparent election as the main criterion of evaluation for the democracy performance in 150 countries. Through this viewpoint they found the world divided into four groups. The first and the second groups consisted of countries considered as having mature democracy, characterized by a guarantee of political rights and civil liberty; those that run the democratic cycle of power through regular election-though difference in degree due to the corruption factor. Twenty four countries in Western and Northern Europe and New Zealand were included in the group of countries with tradition of democratic election and governments free of corruption practices. Thirteen countries in Eastern and Southern Europe and United States of America are put into the second groups, since though they regularly hold election but there are flaws in its implementation and their governments also still showed indication of corruption practice.

The third group was represented by 77 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These countries were described as having a half-mature democracy, since not only assurance of political rights and civil liberty were absent, but their election were also considered as merely lip service which do not provide strong enough assurance for democratic circulation of power in the society's political dynamics. The other 36 countries were considered to be undemocratic since they do not regularly hold elections.

These are three specimens of democracy assessment models which represent the mainstream assessments with their tendency to quantify democracy achievements in every country through scoring and, even, rank them. The general characteristic of this mainstream model is obvious in their emphasis to evaluate democracy based on favorite criteria of political right and civil liberty. All three; the Freedom House, the Democracy Index, and the WDI, emphasize on these aspects, though each has its additional aspects and focuses. By simple form checklist consisting of simple and limited parameters to be applied to any countries, these assessment frameworks are off course, unable to grasp the uniqueness and complexity of democracy problems in each country.

Because there are deficiencies in the three models mentioned above, more perfected assessment models were developed in order to further examine the complex process of democratization through other parameters. The model below is one significant model among other new models.

International IDEA: Democracy Audit for Popular Control Based Representative

The Democracy Audit Approach developed by the IDEA (*Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*) is by far more comprehensive than merely checklist parameters. They realize that the assessment process must consider unique cultural, political, economic, and also historical aspects in each evaluated country in order to provide rational and reasonable context to understand the particular character of condition of democracy.²⁸ In contrast to other quantitative approaches, the International Idea is more interested to make its assessment more qualitative. So it is the quality of the democracy that is examined.

It argues that almost every survey in democracy state that more than 60% countries all over the world have adopted the minimum form of democratic government, especially in their institutions and procedures. Democracy has become the ends as well the means of the formation of modern countries, like economic development, poverty eradication, and guarantee of human rights. Thus, it is more crucial to promote the enhancement of the quality of democracy through the assessment on it. The assessment must lead to acts of reform. Those two efforts are considered as inseparable unity in influencing the democratization process.

The IDEA also introduces new approach by involving the citizens of the evaluated country to make their assessment. This is not only particularly useful to help build their understanding on the history and the culture of their countries' development toward the principles of democracy. IDEA argues that such knowledge and understanding are very useful to identify priorities

²⁸ International IDEA, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide* (Stockholm, Sweden), 2008, hlm. 30.

for democratic reforms and to monitor their progress and development.²⁹

The framework of the IDEA's democracy assessment is based on two focuses and four aspects. The first focus highlights how the popular control works on public decision making processes and the decision makers. The second focus highlights the condition of equality among the citizens to perform that control. Meanwhile the four aspects include: (1) guarantee of human rights for every single individual citizen and non-citizen; (2) the existence of public representatives body and accountable government; (3) the functioning elements of civil society; and (4) proper attention toward the international dimension of democracy, inter-states dependency, and global cooperation for democracy development.

Larry Diamond : *Measuring the Consolidation of Democracy*

Another alternative approach was developed by a group of scholars from the Transition School. Their main focus is on the post-2008 global situation, which according to Larry Diamond is a democratic recession, especially in new democratic-countries. This democratic recession is due to the occurrence of democracy stagnation – caused by what is known as deficit of democracy – in those countries which obstruct the intended democracy consolidation. Without the consolidation, democracy will always be instable and insecure. The main concern of this approach is how to generate a secure situation for democracy.

Departing from such concern, they developed approach to measure the condition of the consolidated democracy. They used three main approaches, first, examining the environment

²⁹ Ibid, hlm. 19

and structural foundation of democracy; second, behavioral evidences which support democracy; and, third, attitudinal examinations on specific situations of democracy. They combine five theoretical perspectives on democracy consolidation on which they move on to formulate indicators for more comprehensive measurement.

Tatu Vanhanen: Democratization as Resources Distribution

For Tatu Vanhanen, carrying democracy assessment is more than merely to see wherever the norms and institutions of democracy are stable as carried out by the Transition approach. From a different perspective, Vanhanen sees that the democracy assessment may function as an instrument for resources distribution including both political and economic resources.

The Vanhanen study started from the question, “Why do certain countries succeed with democratization while some others do not? Why do certain models of democracy experience further development while some others do not, and even degenerate? What is the cause of this development or degeneration? What is the available opportunity for the countries to maintain democracy and strengthen its basic institutions? What are the social, economic, and cultural barriers faced by countries which face problem or even grim prospect to have successful democratization?”

Having developed a study based on research on development of various form of democratic political system as long as one and a half century (1850-1990s), Vanhanen developed an alternative theoretical interpretation of democracy as a process where power resources are distributed widely so there will be no single group left to hold the power hegemonically. The hypothesis Vanhanen developed is that the

success of democracy and democratization is highly determinant on the degree of power resources distribution. The higher the degree of power resources distribution in a particular country, the higher the possibility of democracy and democratization to succeed in that country. Through correlation and regression analysis on the data of the development of democracy in 172 countries, finally, Vanhanen arrived at his conclusion that democracy will only develop and succeed in countries which succeed in carrying out the distribution of political and economic resources equally. Based on positive correlation of those two variables, he developed a predictive measurement framework on the prospect of democracy in every country. In general, Vanhanen relies on the perspective that previously developed by Lipset (1959, 1983, dan 1994), about the existence of high correlation between level of economic development and democratization. The difference between the two scholars was that Vanhanen's elaboration was more empiric on how economic development with certain levels of equal distribution will guarantee a healthy development of democracy and, in turn, makes democracy as a power circulation mechanism.

Hee Yeon Cho & Lawrence Surendra: Democratization as Demonopolization

Another alternative approach was developed by a group of Asian scholars based in the Sungkonghue University, Seoul, South Korea. Their approach has its roots on their concern on the fact that democratization process in almost all of Asian countries, especially post-dictatorial or post-authoritarian ones, show strong tendency to turn into oligarchy. This is due to the monopolistic structure in the state and political domains have not radically changed. They refer to another fact that the Asian elites actually never give their support for democratization which threatens to change the existing power relations, especially when

these elite realize that they are dependent on the power of global capital and finance that never take sides with progressive powers.

This perspective obviously offers a new genre of study to examine Asian democracy from Asian perspectives in the context when regional democratization is facing global political crisis.

Refusing the Transition and Consolidation approaches, Hee Yeon Cho & Lawrence Surendra argue that though there has been relatively high degrees of democracy consolidation in particular area in Asia, like Indonesia, Philippine, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea, the democracy consolidation process, however, still has unfinished task to eradicate the systemic dictatorship in the social, political, and economic domains. For them, dictatorship is equal to a monopoly complex. In the economic domain, this complex is marked by a “condition where particular enterprises perfectly dominate the market and industry and bar the entrance of new competitors.” Social monopoly is a situation where particular individual or group control the social resources and bar other competitors to have access to them. While political monopoly occurs when particular individual or group control the political resources – especially the state, bureaucracy, and other political authorities and powers and bar new competitors to enter the political arena.

In short, the Asian democracy has its own crisis since it tends to produce oligarchic democracy or democratic oligarchy with similar pattern in Thailand, Korea, Philippine, and Indonesia. Based on such insight, there emerges new assessment framework to deal with democratization project as demonopolization project. The democracy performance must be measured by its ability to carry demonopolization of the monopolistic and oligarchic powers.

Øyvind Østerud: Democracy and Power

Totally different to the assessment models previously examined, the study of a group of Norwegian scholars, headed by Øyvind Østerud, has produced a par-excellence study on the relations between democracy and power in Norwegian context. This is an assessment model specifically made for a particular country, with a broad focus – not only in its themes but also on the length of the term of its prediction.

This was a mandatory study from the Norwegian parliament as their collective reflection on Norway's journey as a welfare state since 1814. This study took five years (1997-2002) to completion. Its presented findings and conclusions incite discussions and debates on fundamental matters in Norway's political system and its contemporary trends in facing the future of global millennia. Some of the findings obviously reflect the quality and the depth of this study on strategic themes which apply not only for Norwegian, Scandinavian, and European context but also in general. They also reflect the symptoms at global level.

As a reflective study, the thematic findings of their study highlight new issues and symptoms in the relationship between democracy and power: for example, the crisis of nation-states, decreasing political participation, state capitalism without guiding strategy, weakening transparency, the under pressure welfare system, the phenomenon of judicialization of politics, the formation of ethnic based new social class, media edited public space, weakening social movement, and other contemporary issues.

By highlighting those issues, Østerud and friends actually emphasized a recommendation for the necessity of political transformation in Norway. This transformation has been getting

more urgent since there were more worry-some findings in Norwegian political system: (1) the weakening of parliamentary chain of government, (2) the withering of mobilization capacity among the political parties and election, and (3) the faulty connection between election results and policy formation.

Øyvind Østerud's study in Norway shows a new trend in global assessment model at general and situational levels to assessment model at national and specific and longitudinal level, especially for the sake of strategic reform and transformation on the relationship between democracy and power.

(c) Toward Contextual Approach for Democracy Re-evaluation & Democratization in Indonesia

After we examined various democracy assessment models, both the mainstream and the alternative ones, we are able to draw the contribution of each model to design a specific democracy assessment model compatible to the Indonesian specific context and problems. It does not mean that the contributions are combined arbitrarily and eclectically.

First, we must examine the strengths and weaknesses of each model, either through methodological or ideological critical examination. This first step requires adequate understanding on the paradigmatic foundation of various theories of democracy and democratization used in each assessment model. Second, our own choice of theoretical foundation and democratization framework must be put forward as discursive guidance in designing more relevant assessment model. Third, we have to map out the problems of democracy and democratization in Indonesia as clear as possible, its historical and structural barriers, the most urgent fundamental problems. The third step, in particular, is required to formulate the agenda for the huge

project of redefining, reform, and revitalize democracy and democratization in Indonesia.

It is also important to note that the study on Power, Welfare and Democracy needs to be developed within the framework of political ecology studies regarding the significance of ecosystem as an important element in human life. Furthermore physical conditions, patterns of adaptation, social organization and systems of human ideology have proven to be a dynamic object of the play of power. By using a political ecology perspective, we will be able to understand the processes in the development of power and how it works in environmental management, public interests and power relations toward the realization of welfare as well as democracy in society.

This whole process eventually requires long discussions. As an introduction to this laborious effort this chapter ends here.

Chapter II



Power, Wealth and Democracy: Reconstructing Welfare-Based Power Relations

Based on the critical reflection in the previous chapter, we have noticed that Indonesia is eagerly expecting the welfare-based democracy, which is built on the prerequisite to reconstruct power relations embedded in the daily life. We have to consider here that the ideal model of such relations has not been found, but the efforts to search for it must be persistently advanced. Not only its directions, but also the manners to achieve long term agenda, which is then widely known as democratization. This chapter seeks to provide some initial paths in searching the more appropriate and contextual model of power relations.

Power, Wealth and Democracy: An Ignored Relation

We argue that the essence of democracy is originally rooted in the power relations, which commonly takes place in the daily life. Nevertheless, the conceptualizations of democracy

in political science did not highly consider the democracy itself.¹ In consequence, to identify the mode of power relations in the daily life politics is not only a new necessity, but is also an alternative way for breaking through the varied *cul-de-sacs* in Indonesian politics. Democracy, by whatever it is subsequently defined, is ultimately the matter of people affairs and, therefore, becomes the necessity when it only corresponds to the people's daily life.² It is only through that approach can democracy be able to be carried out to the people and to be finally implemented by the will of those people.³ Democracy is almost impossible to be started from the outside since it will lose its meanings for the people.⁴ Once we conceptualize democracy in the contextual manners, the first point of democratization is then power order within the people's daily life.

The absence of power relations in the major theory of democracy is followed by any complex consequences. Democracy theories, particularly those influenced by the liberal thoughts, did not completely link the control of welfare and democracy. Jan W. van Deth, however, interestingly warn that "one does not have to be a Marxist to accept the notion that economic development shapes our world and determines the

¹ Ian Shapiro, "Power and Democracy" on Engelstad, Fredrik, Jyvind Jøsterud (eds.), *Power and Democracy: Critical Interventions*, Ashgate Publishing, 2004.


² Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds.), *Designing Deliberative Democracy The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

³ James D. Fearon, "Self-Enforcing Democracy," Department of Political Science, Stanford University, August 24, 2006.

⁴ John Campbell-Nelson, "Demokrasi Gadungan dan Demokrasi yang Sejati: Neraca Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Sebuah Refleksi Bagi Academia NTT," Kertas Kerja # 13, Institute of Indonesia Tenggara Timur Studies, March 2009.

prospects for democratic government.”⁵ As a result, the efforts to search for the welfare-based democracy shall be inevitably undertaken by analysing the power relations in development, particularly in the aspect of supply, accumulation, distribution, as well as redistribution of welfare. Within these power relations, we are able to assume the democratization which occurred in itself as a mechanism for achieving welfare. At this point, the practice of power, welfare, and democracy takes place in the particular social reality.

Models of Public Goods Management



Since the relations of democracy and welfare apparently manifest in the relations or interactions, the most appropriate approach must be based on inter-actors relations. Democracy, therefore, is not entirely comprehended in the terms of involved actors, but its mode of interaction. In the literatures of public goods management, there are at least three models of interaction in achieving welfare.

⁵ Jan W. van Deth, “Series editor’s preface” on Ole Elgström and Goran Hyden (eds.), *Development and Democracy: What have we learned and how?*, Routledge, 2002, pp. xv.

The political economy literature has analytically provided three kinds of framework. First, the **statism model** which is widely exercised by the states to overcome diverse public problems. We do not call it here as a **state model** in order to prevent the ambiguity of the state as an organization. This model is mainly based on the obedience on the multiple and hierarchical authority. Second, the **voluntary exchange model** which assumes the management of public goods as a matter of transactions. The public problems, according to this model, could be overcome only by the mechanism of voluntary exchange among equal actors with different interests. Third, the **intimacy model**, which highly regards solidarity as a basis for resolving collective problems in the society. The intimacy model involving any kinds of power relations resulted from ethnicity, religion, alumnae association, and so forth. In the daily life there are so many collective practices based on this model.

Regarding the three models of power relations, the assessment of democracy can begin by mapping out its existence and mechanism in managing public goods. We can conduct such assessment from that model, either simultaneously or one-by-one. There are four possible relations from those models that can be drawn here. The first possibility is that each model occurs independently without any connections. Secondly, each model is complementary for, or compensates the weaknesses of, the others. The other possibility is that those models may run contradictory and the last possibility is the combination among three previous ones.

We are able to tentatively suppose that the difficulties faced by Indonesia in managing public goods originated from its inability to make the three models of power relations synergic. It is true that individuals belong to more than one status. On

one occasion, someone is treated as a citizen who interacts with the state, but on the other, he or she is able to place themselves as a customer. In another he or she holds the role, for instance, as an *ummat* (member of religious communities). The management of public goods might be confused by this unstable status, particularly when they act to maximize benefit from certain status. To mention one case, such a condition is obviously manifested in the corruption. When one is accused of corruption for having misused bureaucratic procedures, he could defend as a member of a marginalised *adat*. Whilst candidates of local or national leaders are required to perform their competencies as a decision maker in public policies, they will mobilize sentiments of popular religion or ethnicity in certain areas.

No	Modes of Power Operation	Subject
1	The obedient relations onto the hierarchical authority of the state.	Citizen, people
2	The voluntary exchange relations.	Customer
3	The affection-based intimacy relations.	<i>Ummat</i> , etc.

The assumption laid on that hypothesis has apparently demonstrated that the problem of democratization in Indonesia is mainly on the extinction of the sense of publicness. What is normatively considered as a corruption could be reversely defended as an effort to overcome existing gaps resulted from one of the power relation models' failures.

From political ecology perspective, for instance, studies on Power, Welfare and Democracy may also be directed to two major themes. The first theme is about the relationship between management of society's adaptation to its environment and its

effect on the patterns of power distribution, how management of public interests and democracy is arranged. This theme will illustrate to what extent the patterns of adaptation generates the patterns of even distribution of power and enhance the strength and role of the state, social organizations, and market, in its function to manage public interests and to establish democratic characters.

This theme will, for example, question to what extent the community of fishermen for instance, can live in egalitarianism as a result of ecological adaptation, that rely on common property and without the facilities and massive state control. Does this egalitarianism affect the existence of the state, social organization and market in performing their roles of managing general welfare, and to what extent does this egalitarianism also affect the character and performance of democracy in fishing communities?

The second theme is environmental change in relation to the dynamics of the Power, Welfare and Democracy. This theme is highly relevant to consider in the study due to the phenomenon of ongoing environmental changes in society. Now one of the issues rises in Power, Welfare and Democracy and its relation to environment is the emergence of symptoms of climate change (CC) and the initiative of various stakeholders to develop a Green Forestry (GF). This theme assumes that environmental changes will have an impact on techno-environmental change, which in turn will affect the change in the management of public interest, accomplishment and character of democracy in society. Ellen (2002:223) reinforces this thesis by showing that changes in local plant species to new ones does not only suggest genetic changes that affect the

natural ecosystem, but is also related to the change in control over natural resources and bases of power and inequality are often led to the distribution of power in society.

The discussions on the relation of democracy and welfare are never accomplished because of, to mention one reason, the unbridging ideological dichotomies in search of a democracy or development model. Nevertheless, throughout the history, both ideas could be designed as a mutual reinforcement by advancing the sophisticated instruments to implement the democracy and development missions. These initial paths need to be strengthened as a basis both for reflections and to determine the following strategy to accomplish welfare-based democracy.

Unravelling Democracy: The Power Relations in Daily Life Practices

Similar to breathing which can only be examined through its phenomenon, power relations can also be imagined as the breathing of the body of democracy. Power relations are therefore an invisible matter, even unrecognized by the actors involved. Just like breathing, we do not consider that the process repeatedly takes place. When such a process is terminated for a long time, of course, the body will die. Democracy shall certainly be unnecessary if the power relations, by any means, are also terminated.

This thesis should be proposed here to indicate that we have ignored the complexity of democracy in building theory. Of course, there are various degrees of ignorance. For instance, the different judgements on the degree of democracy in

Indonesia is highly influenced by the certain theoretical viewpoints. It is important, however, to highlight that the current assessment of democracy does not closely correspond to the people's daily life.

Some analysts, who adopted the procedural standards of democracy, namely on free election, freedom of the press, and so forth, tend to demonstrate any successful-soundly achievements.⁶ The claims that Indonesia has attained somehow degrees of democracy are widely advocated by those, mostly liberal tradition, who are exclusively aware of the individual level or actor-based considerations, but neglect the structural constrains of democratization. Since the procedural democracy is a kind of democracy using minimal standards, the free election that has taken place in Indonesia since 1999 was then considered as a tremendous achievement. Such standards are also applied to assess the local elections, freedom of the press, and so on. This approach has clearly failed to consider that democracy is ultimately a matter of social and power relations.

The others, mainly from the structuralist tradition, are sceptical in arguing Indonesian democracy. Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz in the seminal work *Reorganising Power in Indonesia* apparently demonstrated the oligarchic powers which "hijack" the democratization processes in the post-Suharto Indonesia.⁷ Such sceptical position also presented in the research conducted by the *Demos* which methaphorically assumed

⁶ H Ross McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (Eds.), *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*, ISEAS, 2007.

⁷ Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*, Routledge/City University of Hong Kong Southeast Asia Series, 2004.

that building democracy is like “to build a home on the sand.”⁸

In sum, when it is argued that the democracy in Indonesia is getting better it is merely on its surfaces. The more successful aspects assessed, the easier to design the aspects, that are the institutionalization of procedures. We, of course, do not intend to naively neglect the current achievements, but it is fair enough to argue that Indonesian achievements are still on the level of *shallow democracy*. As a consequence, we need to develop an assessment model which enables to appropriately measure the structural constrains. In so doing, the process of *deepening democracy* is possibly brought about.

To sustain the *deepening democracy*, it is necessary to set up an assessment model that does not only declare “the degree of democracy” from various analysts or institutions, but also mapping out the problems or challenges of democratization itself. Proceduralists tend to be simplistic since they assume that the democratization can happen when the main actors control the government machine either through replacement, displacement, or transplacement.⁹ The coming of a main actor in the government system is supposed to be an all-in-one solution for the future of democratization. Such an assumption then falls apart when these actors who lead the democratic transition unable to cope with money politics and other bad practices.

⁸Willy Purna Samadhi & Nicolaas Warouw (eds.), *Building Democracy On The Sand: Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia*, DEMOS (Lembaga Kajian Demokrasi dan Hak Asasi), 2009.

⁹Huntington, *op. cit.*

Democratization theories will inevitably face enormous difficulties, particularly in the structural level which is deeply rooted in the course of history. The lack of apparent concepts and records on democracy in Indonesia imply to the unclear agenda for democratization. Such confusion was also acknowledged by Olle Tornquist in the International Seminar in University of Oslo on January 2010.¹⁰ He, therefore, suggested deconstructing the basis of power or power relations among involved actors in democratization. His ideas were in line with another Skandinavian political scientist, Fredrik Engelstad and Þvind Þsterud, who argued that the aspects shall be assessed in democracy, is not only on the basis of individual satisfaction but also on any forms of power relations.¹¹

The democratization agenda is highly determined by the obvious power relations embedded in daily life, whether we realize it or not, that structure the mode of accumulation and distribution of welfare. Action-reflection processes resulted intendedly from the power relations in the accumulation and distribution of such welfare should be treated as a basis for a new kind of democratization. To conclude, democracy audit and democratization agenda must persistently start with assessing power relations.

Neglected Dimension: Structural Relations

From the previous literature review, it is apparent that the problems in bringing about the idea of democracy mainly

¹⁰ Olle Tornquist; “Analysing the State of Democracy and the Dynamics of Democratization, Lessons from the National Bottom-up Surveys in Indonesia,” Presentation to Panel 7 ‘Assessing Rooted Powers and Shallow Democracy – Lessons and Ways Ahead’ Presented at the Conference on ‘Democracy as Idea and Practice’, 14-15 January 2010, University of Oslo.

¹¹ Fredrik Engelstad, Þvind Þsterud, *op. cit.*

originated from structural constraints. The assessment model popularly adopted in many countries essentially neglected this dimension. Moreover, such assessments also did not highlight the importance to link the democracy and welfare. It is highly important to recognize that the welfare is also a crucial aspiration impossibly compensated by the protection of civil and political rights. In result, to design an assessment model which and also be aware of the effort in welfare-making is highly essential. Those arguments might also to be comprehended reversely. The efforts in welfare-making carry certain power relations. The changes in power relations are needed to support the democratization agenda.

Various studies explored mode of relations between democracy and welfare,¹² have been conducted. There are three types of studies, precisely three approaches, to measure the relationship of both democracy and welfare. They are presented briefly in the following paragraph.

First, they put the one as a condition for another. Through finding out the causality relations, the studies mostly placed the economic basis as a precondition for the stable democracy or, conversely, presumed democracy as a political basis for social welfare. The analysis subsequently rests on the inter-actor interactions. *Second*, they observed that the welfare development is a result of structural factors. This approach looks at the more complex dimensions among inter-actor relations. However, when they make an effort to public welfare, they are

¹² The term of “welfare” is never homogenously defined in the political sciences and political economy. It is related to the the improvement of quality of well-being and it also refers to the institutions of “welfare states” which promote welfare issues for individuals or communities. This term also somehow used in the discourse on social welfare to understand the world. Garry Taylor, *Ideology & Welfare*, Palgrave MacMillian, 2007.

still trapped in the institutionalized social norms, any kinds of and quality of certain political infrastructures. *Third*, they attempted to look at democracy and welfare as a notion which is essentially in presence and is derived from the structure-agency logics. This approach tends to perceive both concepts as a formative relation— that is as a nodal point of various articulations of interest.

The modernization proponents were widely recognized as a group highly concerned on economic determinism. The institutionalization of democracy in particular political system, was then, determined mainly by the economic development. Seymour Martin Lipset, in the late 1950s, proposed a hypothesis on the importance of economic growth as a one of the basic requirements for the stable democracy. In the classical essay entitled “*Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*,” Lipset argued that the degree of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education have correlatively determined the quality of democracy.¹³

Interestingly, in the following debates, Samuel Huntington problematized the Lipset’s arguments and subsequently demonstrated that the economic growth did not always determine the democracy development. Huntington, conversely, examined the contribution of economic growth in decaying politics— that was in the situations when the massive articulations of interest of the middle classes and certain social groups was not accompanied by the proper capacity of political institutions to respond them. These theses led to be main

¹³ Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1, (Mar., 1959), 1959, pp. 75-77.

justification for the advent of military regimes in developing countries in order to control political stabilities and to institutionalize democracy at home. Such institutionalization, as Huntington proposed, shall produce a democratic political system in the end.¹⁴

Having witnessed the experience of the newly industrializing countries in East and Southeast Asia, the arguments of that “economic development” as prerequisite for stable democracy have again poorly failed. In these regions, most of the countries were successful in maintaining economic growth but it was not the case in establishing a democratic political system. These regimes were able to adapt the articulations of interest of certain social groups within the format of state-corporate institutions. The middle classes resulting from the economic boom were also unable to create political oppositions and to promote democracy.¹⁵ From those evidences, however, it is highly important to notice that although the economic growth insufficiently provides the opportunities for political changes towards democracy, it is still recognized that this variable can contribute to the more stable democracy.¹⁶

The studies of Adam Przeworski has interestingly provided analytical basis for certain epistemic communities in advocating democracy. In the surface, his analysis seemingly did not deal with any causal relations between economic development and democracy. Democracy, he proposed, will be

¹⁴See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, 1968.

¹⁵Yumei Zang, *Pacific Asia: the Politics of Development*, Routledge, 2003.

¹⁶B.C Smith, *Understanding Third Worlds Politics: Theories of Political Changes and Development*, Palgrave MacMillian, 2003, pp.261.

steadily installed not only in the societies with a stable economic growth but also in those who are capable to redistribute it.¹⁷ Democracy in any cases tends to be more stable in the egalitarian society instead.¹⁸ What do we learn from Przeworski's study is that democracy is a matter of power structure operations. The only power structures which are capable to institutionalize the accumulation and distribution of welfare that can be a proper basis for stable democracy.

In respond to this argument, Tutu Vanhanen has also comprehensively pointed out that democratization could only undertake within the conditions of which the power resources have been widely distributed. Vanhanen, through empirical studies on 172 countries, has apparently demonstrated the combination of the degree of democracy and resource distribution. The degrees of democracy was measured by these indicators: the level of competency and the scope of participation. Meanwhile resource and power distribution were assessed by these following indicators: (1) percentage of urban population, (2) non-agriculture-based population, (3) the number of students in higher education per 100.000 population, (4) the degree of literacy of adult population, (5) farming areas managed by the family, and (6) the degree of decentralization of non-agriculture economic resource.¹⁹

The arguments of the importance of a structural dimension are highly relevant when the studies on democracy

¹⁷ Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.120.

¹⁸ Bandingkan Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*, John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

¹⁹ Tatu Vanhanen, *Prospect of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries*, Routledge, 1997, pp.31-42.

approached the roles of actors particularly the bourgeoisie and middle classes as an element of democratization.²⁰ Barrington Moore, by looking at the dynamic relations of feudal classes, peasant, and city-based bourgeoisie, convinced that democratization can easily be conducted when the city-based bourgeoisie build a solid alliance to enforce the policies to manage the relations between feudal classes and peasant groups in balance positions.²¹

The efforts to observe the structural dimension do not necessarily correspond to the ethical dimension. Amarty Sen, with a different point of view, convinced that freedom, acknowledged as one of the pillars of democracy, possibly becomes a principal mean to achieve welfare or any common interests. The freedom does not only enable to consolidate a collective action but also prevents market distortion affected by any kinds of discrimination, manipulations of public information, and so forth. The potential of freedom also becomes an essential variable to promote the redistribution of welfare and social equality.²²

In order to set up a welfare design, freedom has a double role as constitutive and instrumental. On the one hand, freedom takes a constitutive role to produce a substantive freedom, which is highly significant to advance welfare. Substantive freedom is the basic capability to prevent any forms of social deprivation, such as endemy, hunger, and so on; and it

²⁰See Richard Tanter & Kenneth Young, *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia*, LP3ES, 1996.

²¹Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Beacon press, 1966.

²²Amartya Sen & Jean Dreze, *Hunger and Public Action*, Clarendon Press, 1989.

also refers to the capacity to measure the participation of society, the freedom of speech and so forth.²³ In other words, the overall activities in attaining welfare as common goods must be deeply understood as a process to expand the freedom as the ultimate outcome.

On the other hand, freedom has an instrumentative role which effectively support both economic and social realm. There are at least, according to Sen, five forms of instrumentative freedom that are: (1) political freedom, (2) economic facilities availability, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency assurance, (5) protective and social security. Moreover, when we discuss the roles of freedom instrumentatively it is going to deal with a number of rights, opportunities, and varied entitlements which applied to attain a substantive freedom and its progress.²⁴

Erik Oddavar Eriksen and Jorn Loftager asserted that welfare can only be established on the grounds of social and political equality principles. The most essential principle is the right to have freedom. Since it is the main condition for public autonomy of the citizen, this principle is then regarded as a constitutive force of democracy. Once the citizens have their freedom, they will subsequently achieve another kind of equality concerning economic and social dimension. By so doing, society will consider the importance of democracy as a crucial issue.²⁵

²³ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

²⁴ Ibid. pp.10, 36-37.

²⁵ Erik Oddvar Eriksen & Jorn Loftager, "Challenging the Normative Foundation of the Welfare State" in Erik Oddvar Eriksen & Jorn Loftager (eds.), *the Rationality of the Welfare State*, Scandinavian University Press, 1996, pp.5-6.

The aforementioned studies, which situate democracy as an important variable for welfare creation, also attempted to deeply explore the ideas of citizenship, which is acknowledged as a political “infrastructure” for the democratic welfare. T.H Marshall’s research on citizenship has sought to examine the formal democracy frameworks and social consequences of capitalism as an economic system.²⁶ He subsequently explored the historical processes in which the three dimensions (civil, political and social as well) of citizenship developed.²⁷ To date back, the advent of civil rights was related to the respond toward the absolute and institutionalized power since the seventeenth century. And the political rights came about at a time when representative democracy was introduced in the modern parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Furthermore, since the effect of massive industrialization on social life was highly significant, it adopted the concept of social rights, and was subsequently institutionalized in the mid twentieth century.

In other words, the welfare system is a performing when the political responds of the various social forces to the destructive effects of market which has continuously produced any social risks. The ability of those social forces to consolidate and to build a good bargaining position is an inseparable effort

²⁶T.H Marshall, , *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, 1950.

²⁷Citizenship is a concept which assumes that every subject do not only related to population of certain areas but also a political subject that entail varied attribute of rights. See Engin F. Isin & Bryan Turner (eds.), *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, Sage Publication, 2002. Once people acknowledge politically as a citizen, those subjects has transformed themselves from *ethos* to *demos*. See Claus Offe, “the Democratic Welfare State in an Integrating Eroupe” dalam Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Democracy beyond the State ?: the Eroupean Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

of the establishment of a democratic political system, which subsequently provide opportunities for articulating the interests of the citizen.²⁸

In addition, those social forces are able to support the welfare scheme through these ways: de-commodification and stratification system. The welfare system tends to problematize the dominant assumption that the people's survival depends highly on the ability to "sell" their ability for working. In the welfare system basic services are, therefore, understood as a matter of "rights" and people still survive without any dependence on market mechanism. By creating a stratification system, we mean that the welfare system attempts to re-structure the classes and social orders to be more egalitarian.²⁹

The institutionalization of welfare systems, therefore, calls for the existence of a social basis upon which the social obedience onto that basic scheme of welfare system can persistently be sustained. There are two social bases, which may enforce the politics of redistribution, which should be conducted voluntarily. *First*, mutual trust, that is the system that ensures another citizen to do similar obligations as we are. *Second*, solidarity, which enables people to reduce the use of their own things and to accept the social redistribution through social policies of the state. The welfare system cannot be optimally sustained when they face what is so-called "social traps," that is the condition in where individuals, groups, and organization do not succeed in making cooperations implied by the lack of

²⁸See Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets: the Social Democratic Road to Power*, Princeton University Press, 1985.

²⁹Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Polity Press, 1990.

mutual trust and the absence of social capital.³⁰

Making Synergy Three Models of Power Relation Mechanism and Its Co-existence

We do not intend to exaggerate the role of a particular power relation. Each of it has their own requisities in order to be optimally functioned and, of course, it has its limit. The statism model can operate well when institutions have not suffered from legitimacy deficit, and these institutions can control themselves for not being highly dominant. We can expect the voluntary exchange model to work, however, when the actors involved acquire the perfect information. The distortions of information imply on the actors inability to accurately choose their needs. Meanwhile, the intimacy model supposed that the actor interactions do not contradict with other models.

It is important to notice that these three models can be applied by the state, corporations, and communities alike. Government, as an organization of state affairs, can employ the market mechanisms for delivering public goods. However, government also in any conditions mobilizes the sentiments of society to approach the public problems.

³⁰ See Claus Offe, “the Democratic Welfare State in an Integrating Eroupe” on Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Democracy Beyond the State?: the Eroupean Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. See also Bo Rothstein, *Just Institutions Matter: the Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State*, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Bo Rothstein, *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

	Obedience onto authority	Intimacy and Loyalty	Voluntary Exchange
States	The common manners of the state	To overcoming creative public problems	
“community-based organizations”	To overcome Creative public problems	The common manners of the communities	
Corporations			The common manners of the corporations

In daily life, these three models can simultaneously be applied. Recently, the scholars have distinguished the actors involved in public management into three categories: (1) the state, (2) community-based organizations, (3) corporations. Each category may adopt a combination of the three models of public goods management, thus we can subsequently identify nine possibilities of power relation models. Commonly each entity uses the proper power relations, that are the state is preferring to apply the statism model and community-based organizations are using intimacy and so forth, but it does not prevent them to creatively exercise other manners.

However, it can be problematic when these creative manners are directed to optimize individuals or groups to gain or transfer the risks of individuals to the public. For instance, the government sets up regulations for the Permission Buildings (IMB). The vision of this regulation is apparently to maintain public space, but in practice it is frequently contradictory; some people get the permission to build department stores, and so forth by risking the major public interests. Another case is the relocations of people implicated by the establishment of certain

buildings. The people who have the resources will exercise by any means, to gain such a permission, particularly by adopting an intimate or sentiment mobilization approach.

We may add any similar cases on public goods management in the daily life. The point is that the government cannot be completely blamed for having ignored the public interests. The government has frequently exercised the combined manners in doing their tasks. When they need to socialize regulations, which will of course be financed by the state budget, they prefer to apply a model of intimacy by creating patron-client schemes.

These cases can possibly take place because, as we will argue, there are no obvious distinctions between private and public in Indonesia. As there are no distinctions, of course, the efforts to prevent the bad practices among entities are impossibly achieved. In such conditions, there are several topics to examine. *First*, democracy shall be approached as a disciplinary mechanism for public goods management. When we are expecting the obedient relations, the statism model shall be applied. We, of course, do not intend to exclusively advocate a particular model of interaction, but their clarity and consistency shall persistently be promoted. *Second*, it is necessary to clearly identify in what public issues do those models are properly selected. *Third*, the government reforms inspired by the experience network-based governance are somewhat problematic, whether these networks are a kind of solutions or it is only a part of the public problems.

The portraits of Indonesian democracy needs to be contextually framed into three categories. *First*, democratization undertook with a principle of the obedient to authority, either within or outside the government. *Second*, democratization

conducted by models of intimacy and solidarity, which was both less and well structured. For instance, *Nabdlatul Ulama* organizes their communities in a *jamiyyah* (organization) model, but in practice they mobilize intimacy and loyalty either in the government or corporations. *Third*, democratization operated with the corporations' market mechanisms in collaboration with either the government or society.

The issues of how to measure the degree of democracy within the three models and its mechanisms cannot be immediately answered. It does not mean, however, that it is impossible to cautiously approach it. We propose some initial directions to approach this issue. *First*, the obedient onto authority, mobilization of intimacy and solidarity, and the operation of market mechanism are merely instruments to manage public goods. At this level, we shall identify the actualization of democratic values implicitly embedded in their respective mechanism. *Second*, democracy should be substantively defined as negotiation between the government's decision and the aspiration of people. The degree of democracy, therefore, can be measured by minimalizing those gaps. *Third*, in order to obtain the more accurate phenomenon, should inevitably direct our analysis to the local levels. Since Indonesia has different situations in the local level, the composition of the power relations model must be dissimilar for each area. *The last*, an assessment of democratization must be conducted periodically so that the progress— and its challenges— can be immediately observed.

Democracy Assessment: Instruments of the Power Relations Transformation

In order to provide critical reflections, we need to develop an assessment of a democracy model that simultaneously enables us to measure the efforts in establishing welfare. We, therefore, should explore the varied studies on these related topics.

The studies in the **discourse analysis** traditions have attempted to focus mainly in problematizing the formation of democratic welfare system.³¹ Jacob Torfing, in analyzing the formation of democratic welfare state, has cautiously traced from some important dimensions such as ideology formation in civil society, identity construction from inter-subjective politics or the effects of the social dislocations.

Torfing described that the formation of welfare states in Europe was pre-dated from the Great Depression of 1932 which successfully brought about a newly discourse dislocations on managed capitalism. Within the condition of structural dislocation, the roles of states in economic activities were increased and simultaneously the notions of welfare states had been widely considered as an inseparable part of nation-building. The modern welfare states have effectively become a “space of representation” of social and economic demands as something else which owns its legitimacy and is capable of erasing social antagonisms into its “constitutive outside.”³²

³¹ See Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek*, Basil Blackwell, 1999. Veronique Mottier, “From Welfare to Social Exclusion: Eugenic Social Policies and the Swiss National Order” on David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds.), *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

³² Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek*, Basil Blackwell, 1999, pp. 130-131, 225-241.

In regards to these studies, we are able to provide a critical learning in order to develop an assessment of democracy, which is also adequate to measure the varied aspect of welfare. *First*, the expected assessment model should be directed to link democracy and welfare on the basis of daily life. Democracy, or at least the seeds of democracy, must be discovered in the rooted daily life politics. By so doing, we are cautiously able to observe the mechanism of public goods management within the society. Democracy is after all a matter of governing the public so the assessment model must be a part of the political crafting.

Second, the expected assessment model should consist of both comprehensive and practical indicators. The comprehensive dimension should be approached by exploring ideas and values operated within society, while the practical one should be designed statistically. *Third*, if the expected assessment searches for accuracy of details, it has to be designed in its proper scheme.

It has been frequently argued here that the power relations are deeply embedded in the daily life of society and the types of power relation will determine the forms of public management models. The most strategic aspect to design in the assessment model is the types of public management models or its modes of governance:

- How do individuals apply the market mechanism to overcome their problems?
- How do hierarchy of local authorities in certain areas adequate for conducting their roles in managing public?
- How important do the intimacy could be the basis for public management?

The last, it is important to measure the development of democracy specifically through identifying power relations, to be able to formulate the assessment model of democracy and welfare.

Chapter III



Action - Reflection

There are various aspects to formulate and agree to, to implement the extensive ideas presented in the previous chapters. The following is an initial matrix which attempts to map out the necessities and implications for accomplishing the agenda of democratization.

No	Necessity	Activities
1.	The networks of activists with academic competencies to do research and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To identify and map out the pro-democracy activist <p>Networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To set up a series of meetings for sharing forum on progress and models of democracy in Indonesia. ● To build a collective commitment to design short, middle, or even longer term. ● To create and develop instruments for networks management. ● To design the rights and obligations, reward-punishment scheme in managing overall activities.
2.	To be involved in setting up the counter-discourse activities against proceduralistic models of democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Networks produce a series of high-profile reports on the progress and direction of democratization in Indonesia. ● To set up a stable framework, including: (1) its viability and (2) feasibility to implement.

No	Necessity	Activities
3.	Ensuring the continuity of action-reflections processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The resulted reports are appropriate to enforce public debates to disseminate a newly awareness. There are quantitative components which adequately used to measure the progress of democratization; and a qualitative components based on the empirical cases in the daily life politics. ● There are clear action guidences for the activists.
4.	Obtaining accesses to the strategic actors in democratization	<p>Creating activities in order to develop a structured network, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>policy-makers</i> ○ mass media ○ research institutions ○ activist-based networks.
5.	Establishing an appropriate activist-based network to implement and advocate the agenda of democratization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Providing human resources for democracy movements. ● Developing these communities through networking. ● Linking academic and practical activities. ● Linking the research and advocacy activities in collective learning or curriculum.
6.	Providing a proper financial resource to support activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Fundraising.</i> ● Developing a resource sharing scheme. ● Mapping out the necessities and its operation plans. ● Developing operation plans.



Chapter IV

Conclusion

Disorientations on democratization possibly derived from the absence of efforts to conceptualize and practice the notions of democracy itself. We have a number of potential components to design and support democratization. Through the international learning, we recognize that it is insufficient to blame the global system wholly, but we have to respond to it creatively.

The activist-based networks which have academic competencies should be advanced to establish a counter-discourse against the hegemonic ones. Such counter-discourse proposed here is to link the concept and the practice of democracy and welfare, through reconstructing power relations.

In so doing, we shall strategically develop a democracy assessment model which does not only deal with the scoring mechanism of democracy, but also finding its difficulties. This democracy assessment model is inevitably an instrument to mobilize the public consciousness through public debates.

In regards to the complex agenda of democratization, it is highly important to enforce any kinds of permanent or temporary collaboration. We should bear in mind that there is no absolute guarantee that the involvement of these academic activism.



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